"It is not that the troops are not good, it is not that the divisions, brigades, and regiments are not good, and it is not that the field army staff office is not good, but mainly that I, the commander-in-chief, have made two mistakes. In the past, comrades in the Party had a public opinion that I, the person, was the best at losing battles, and this was very correct. I would like to move from disadvantage to advantage this time and reaffirm this assessment. ”
On October 4, 1946, Marshal Chen Yi wrote such a passage in a letter to the main force of the Shandong Field Army, the Eighth Division. Among them, the five words of "good at losing battles" mean a lot, and it seems to say that Chen Yi will not win the battle, and it also seems to say that Chen Yi is good at planning in a losing situation and finally winning by surprise. What should be explained specifically, I am afraid that only the old marshal himself can say clearly.
Behind six battles and one victory
In 1945, the arduous War of Resistance Against Japan came to an end. Chairman Mao understood that whether it was entering the parliament of the National Government or opening up the world, it would not be a peaceful process. In particular, the Shandong and Suwan areas are the bridgehead for the national victory. At the beginning, many generals of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army operated here, and established a base area of considerable scale. However, in order to cope with the next battle, this kind of scattered armed force is obviously not enough, and it is necessary to unite all the forces that can be united, and one person will rule the overall situation and lead the battle.
After study, the central authorities made a decision: led by Chen Yi, the Shandong Field Army was established; su Yu was the leader to establish the Central China Field Army. The two armies are advancing hand in hand, and they must fight a piece of the world in central and eastern China.
This arrangement, in fact, was not his first choice as Far as Marshal Chen Yi was concerned, and his original plan was to go to the northeast. After the defeat of the Japanese army, the northeast was controlled by the Soviet Red Army for a long time and belonged to a vacuum zone. Rao Shushi, a leader in central China, as well as senior leaders such as Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, and Zeng Shan, all had unpleasant experiences with Chen Yi.
Therefore, when Chairman Mao arranged for Chen Yi to go to Shandong, his attitude was not positive. Before leaving, he also said a sentence helplessly: "I am afraid that I will have nothing to do when I go back to China, and it will not work!" Obviously, he was afraid that he would be lifted up and unable to control the local troops. However, the chairman's attitude was very firm, and he replied: "Play Go if you have nothing to do." As long as you sit there it works! ”。 Hearing the chairman's answer, Chen Yi could only harden his scalp.
After coming to Shandong, Marshal Chen Yi found that the actual situation was even more serious than he thought. In order to attack the liberated areas in Shandong, the Chiang Kai-shek clique mobilized a large number of elite and heavy army groups, and even the well-known reorganized 74th Division was sent into battle, and the quantity and quality of the army were far stronger than those of the Platon Army. The pressure on the People's Liberation Army is unprecedentedly heavy.
On the other hand, there are also problems within the army. Some generals who had been in Shandong for a long time were not very happy to obey Chen Yi's orders. Only the column led by Ye Fei was still under the command because it was an old squad of the New Fourth Army. However, Yizhong was also isolated by other troops and did not receive fair treatment in the distribution of soldiers and materials. This situation has led to the inability of the army to unite and unite, which has greatly weakened the combat effectiveness of the troops.
Under the internal and external troubles, Chen Yi was also anxious to succeed, and hastily launched the Battle of Sixian County, which was defeated by the Gui army; the enemy attacked the Huaiyin and Huai'an regions, and he was unable to hold on. For a time, the situation in the Shandong region continued to be sluggish, and a negative mood permeated the entire army of the Shandong Field Army. According to Chen Liao, a researcher at the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences, Chen Yi was at this time "entering the six battles in Lu, and only Tai'an won one victory." ”
The "no war" crisis of trust
And Chen Yi himself has also fallen into an unprecedented crisis of trust. In 1946, the Central China Sub-Bureau held a combat meeting, at which the leaders of the military region openly criticized Chen Yi by name for "not fighting!" Even Chen Yi himself was discouraged and lazy, saying many times: "I am a person who will not fight, and I will still engage in my cultural work in the future." ”
In sharp contrast to the shandong war situation was the Soviet Central Theater. The leadership collective composed of Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin was super strong in combat effectiveness, and in the northern Jiangsu region came a "seven battles and seven victories", achieving fruitful results and boosting morale. Therefore, some generals of the Shandong Field Army proposed to the central authorities that Su Yu should unify the command of the two field armies in central China and Shandong.
In fact, people who know Chen Yi know that it is biased to say that he will not fight. At the beginning of the Central Red Army's Long March, Chen Yi led the Red Army to remain in The Guerrilla Attack on Gannan and persisted for a full 3 years. If he really couldn't fight, I'm afraid he would have failed long ago. Now his dilemma in Shandong is mainly because of the unity of the generals. Still according to Chen Liao, the Shandong generals at this time "did not obey Chen Yi's command and did not buy it." Chen Yi's command did not move, and he could not concentrate his forces. Chen Yi himself knew this very well. However, he still made a profound review in the telegram to the Party Central Committee, saying that he had made two mistakes: first, he hastily attacked Sixian County when the time was not ripe; second, the command was not resolute enough to defend Huaiyin.
Soon, the party Central Committee's reply came. There is no critical remark about Chen Yi above, but there is another sentence: "Comrade Xu Xiangqian is planned to be sent to Lu and bear the responsibility of commanding the Lunan front!" ”
The meaning of this sentence is very clear: change the generals in the front, and replace Chen Yi with Xu Xiangqian to command the Shandong Field Army! This kind of denial is difficult for anyone to accept. Chen Yi held the telegram and was in a very depressed mood. He found Wang De, the chief of staff, and said the helpless words: "I will still do my cultural work in the future." But out of consideration for the overall situation, he still called the central government and welcomed Xu Xiangqian to Lu.
No one could have imagined that Chen Yi's situation, even the entire war situation in central and eastern China, had begun a subtle change from this moment.
Support from the Chair
We drew our eyes back to Yan'an. At this time, although Chairman Mao did not openly oppose the change of Shandong's main generals, he still had many concerns in his heart. After Xu Shuai's sudden onset of pleuritis in July 1944, his health has been bad. Although there is a slight improvement today, it is still unknown whether it can bear the heavy military work. When Chen Yi was first sent to Shandong, he had already considered the complicated situation, but he did not expect the situation to be so serious. Will the real removal of Chen Yi now make the situation more complicated?
The People's Liberation Army was reorganized from the original Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and local armed forces, and guerrilla warfare was once their magic weapon. However, with the change of the form of war, guerrilla warfare is no longer suitable for the needs of the battlefield, and large corps operations have become more and more the norm. Not only Chen Yi, but also the whole army, there are only a few people who can adapt to changes in this situation. At this time, it was a little impersonal to ask Chen Yi harshly.
In fact, the situation that Chen Yi is facing now, no matter who goes to Shandong, actually has to face it. The great war has just begun, and there is a lack of running-in between the various units and a sense of unified cooperation. Can this situation really be improved in the future by changing horses? Even if Xu Xiangqian is really put in charge, in case several battles are not fought well, will there be the same dilemma as Chen Yi? Will there be a change of coach at that time? Can anyone else change it?
In fact, Chen Yi is a handsome not a general, and his body has two advantages needed to sit on the side:
The first point is that Chen Yi has a broad mind and a good view of the overall situation. When he first entered Shandong, the old troops were squeezed out, and Chen Yi, as the commander-in-chief, tried his best to exercise restraint and coordination, ensuring unity among the various commanders. Moreover, for the criticism of others, Chen Yi did not use the power of the pressure, but low-key reflection, from his own body to find the reason. Even if it is the fault of anyone, he takes the initiative to bear it. Although this seems to be detrimental to their own prestige, people's hearts are all flesh, and the commanders and fighters in Shandong cannot be untouched in their hearts. If Chen Yi can really subdue people with virtue, the situation in Shandong will be greatly improved.
The second point is that Chen Yi is determined and has no doubts about the use of people. In the Battle of Huangqiao in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Su Yu could only face Han Deloitte's army and take a risky approach. Once there is a mistake, the consequences are unimaginable. Chen Yi firmly chose to stand with Su Yu and never used his rights to interfere with the command of his generals. Since then, Su Yu has repeatedly had new ideas in strategy, but due to the problem of seniority, he always dares not speak. Whenever this happened, Chen Yi would always support Su Yu, which was undoubtedly an incomparable trust in him. In the battlefield where the situation is changing rapidly, the most feared thing is that the generals will be suspicious of each other and miss the opportunity. On the border between central China and east China, the enemy and us are intertwined with canine teeth, and sometimes the fighters are fleeting, and only by fully delegating power can we quickly seize the opportunity. If you change a big marshal like Lin Biao who has to manage everything, it may be a mistake.
At the beginning, it can be said that it was precisely because he saw these two advantages in Chen Yi that Chairman Mao insisted on letting him go to the battlefield in Shandong. Nowadays, if you encounter setbacks and change your original intentions, is it not halfway through?
So, how to solve the problem? Chairman Mao, after constant reflection, found his own answer.
Therefore, after waiting for more than twenty days, Chen Yi did not wait for Xu Xiangqian, but received a telegram: go to Lianshui County, Jiangxi Province, and meet Su Yu! From now on, the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army will fight one family! On the same day, after Su Yu saw Chen Yi, who was full of energy and tigers, he strode forward, saluted a standard military salute, and said modestly: "Commander, I am late. ”
This was the chairman's solution: the two major field armies would be brought together, Chen Yi would be in charge of the overall coordination work, and all military problems would be entrusted to Su Yu to solve. In this way, it can not only solve the problem of Chen Yi's lack of experience in commanding a large corps, but also allow Su Yu, who is still young, to have a solid backing, which can be said to complement each other.
After joining the army, Chen Yi was in a good mood and immediately wrote a poem:
Luring the enemy to let the two Huai, Jiang Jun came here to bury it.
The canal is not a chasm, and the tide will come to the ground.
After that, Su Yu, with the support of Chen Yi, sent a telegram to the Party Central Committee, hoping to merge the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army into a unified combat unit, which would be more convenient for command. On October 15, the Central Military Commission replied to the telegram, agreeing to Su Yu's proposal to merge the two major field armies into the East China Field Army, and suggested that Chen Yi be the commander and political commissar, Su Yu the deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin the deputy political commissar.
Soon, the combined troops ushered in their own challenges: in mid-December 1946, Chen Yi and Su Yu launched the Subei Campaign, annihilating the elite of the Kuomintang army, the reorganized 69th Division, and its division commander Dai Zhiqi committed suicide! This was the biggest victory won by the People's Liberation Army in central and eastern China at that time, which not only improved morale and captured materials, but also accumulated experience in coordinated operations of large corps.
The Battle of Subei was also Chen Yi's "battle to turn around". After the war, his poetic temperament exploded again, and he wrote another poem:
The enemy to the canal song, the gathering of fighters he doubt;
Try to see the peak under the mountain, buried Dai Zhiqi!
Since then, Chen Yi's prestige has become higher and higher, and the commanders and fighters in Shandong have become more and more admired him. And his support for Su Yu is also the same as always. The two marched hand in hand, turning the East China Field Army into one of the most effective units in the Platon Army.