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In 1949, Premier Zhou invited Zhang Zhizhong to a banquet and took the opportunity to disclose Xiong Xianghui's identity, which was later found to be very clever

author:Ding girl talks about history

At 12:30 p.m. on November 6, 1949, Premier Zhou hosted a special banquet at the Zhongnanhai Qinzheng Hall in Beijing. Invited to the banquet were Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi, Liu Fei, and others, who had previously been representatives sent by the Kuomintang to Beiping to participate in the peace talks.

In 1949, Premier Zhou invited Zhang Zhizhong to a banquet and took the opportunity to disclose Xiong Xianghui's identity, which was later found to be very clever

At the banquet, in addition to Premier Zhou and Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi, Liu Fei and others, there was another person who accompanied Premier Zhou. This person's name was Xiong Xianghui, he was a native of laizhou, Shandong, born in 1919. Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi, Liu Fei and others had known Xiong Xianghui before, Hu Zongnan's aide-de-camp and confidential secretary, when Zhang Zhizhong was surprised and said to Xiong Xianghui: "Isn't this Old Brother Xiong?" You also revolted? ”

The reason why Zhang Zhizhong asked this question was because "Old Brother Xiong" was previously Hu Zongnan's aide-de-camp and confidential secretary, and he had a very close relationship with Hu Zongnan. Seeing "Old Brother Xiong" at this special banquet, Zhang Zhizhong's first reaction was naturally to be surprised and think that "Old Brother Xiong" had also revolted. Otherwise, how could "Old Brother Xiong" accompany Premier Zhou to the banquet?

In fact, Zhang Zhizhong at this time did not know that Xiong Xianghui was ostensibly Hu Zongnan's aide-de-camp and confidential secretary, but in fact his real identity was an underground worker of our party. As early as during his studies at Tsinghua University, Xiong Xianghui secretly joined the party organization and became an underground worker. In December 1937, during the all-out War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Xiong Xianghui came to Hu Zongnan's troops to "serve" as a senior student of Tsinghua, according to the instructions of Premier Zhou.

Since then, Xiong Xianghui, who has "performed well", has gradually gained hu Zongnan's weight and appreciation. Soon, Xiong Xianghui became Hu Zongnan's aide-de-camp and confidential secretary, and he was not only responsible for handling confidential documents and daily affairs, but also drafting speeches for Hu Zongnan. As soon as he came and went, Xiong Xianghui became Hu Zongnan's most powerful confidant. For this, Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi, Liu Fei and others have known it for a long time.

In 1949, Premier Zhou invited Zhang Zhizhong to a banquet and took the opportunity to disclose Xiong Xianghui's identity, which was later found to be very clever

Whether during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression or during the Liberation War, Xiong Xianghui made great contributions on the hidden front. For example, Xiong Xianghui cleverly sent out many important pieces of information such as the Kuomintang army's want to "blitz Yan'an" and the confidential content of the Xi'an Military Conference, and made many achievements in foiling the despicable conspiracy of the Kuomintang side, consolidating the anti-Japanese national united front, and safeguarding the security of the central authorities. The great man once praised Xiong Xianghui, saying that he alone could top several divisions.

Around July 1947, Xiong Xianghui was sent by Hu Zongnan to study in the United States, and thus ended his lurking career. Later, Hu Zongnan learned xiong Xianghui's true identity from the intelligence department, although he was furious, but Hu Zongnan considered his career, so he took the method of concealing his own fate, did not hold Xiong Xianghui responsible, and only stopped paying Xiong Xianghui's public study abroad fees.

At the beginning of 1949, Xiong Xianghui returned to China after completing his studies in the United States and began to contribute to the diplomatic cause of New China. At that time, Xiong Xianghui's identity was not made public until this special banquet on November 6, 1949. When Zhang Zhizhong said, "Isn't this Brother Xiong?" After the sentence that you also revolted, Premier Zhou smiled and said: "He (Xiong Xianghui) is not an uprising, he is a return team." Then, Premier Zhou gave Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi, Liu Fei and others a detailed account of Xiong Xianghui's lurking experience.

At this time, Zhang Zhizhong suddenly realized, and ate this banquet with Shao Lizi, Liu Fei and others in mixed feelings. Then, why did Premier Zhou choose to disclose Xiong Xianghui's identity at a special banquet during this time period, in front of Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi, Liu Fei, and other former KUOMINTang dignitaries? What is premier Zhou's intention in revealing the identity of red agent Xiong Xianghui at the banquet? It can be said that it was found very clever after the fact.

In 1949, Premier Zhou invited Zhang Zhizhong to a banquet and took the opportunity to disclose Xiong Xianghui's identity, which was later found to be very clever

Let us start from May 1949, after the victory in the Battle of the Crossing River, our army made arrangements for the direction of the advance of the various field armies in light of the actual conditions on the battlefield. In the course of the deployment, the central authorities clearly stated that "the Erye (Second Field Army) should also be prepared to march west with the main force or with the whole army in two months, operating Sichuan (Sichuan), Qian (Guizhou), Kang (Xikang), and Dian (Yunnan)".

In order to completely annihilate the main force of the Kuomintang army in the southwest region and prevent it from fleeing to the border of Yunnan and Burma or burma, the central authorities also formulated the strategic principle of "great detour and great encirclement" with great foresight. Under the circumstances at that time, this strategic principle had the superiority of "cultivating the path and secretly crossing the Chen Cang", which could not only confuse and contain the enemy, but also catch the enemy by surprise and occupy the complete strategic initiative.

The Ming Xiu Trail, that is, the 18th Corps of the First Field Army (commanded by Zhou Shidi) held Hu Zongnan's troops on the qinling front, giving the enemy the illusion that our army was about to enter Sichuan from Shaanxi; secretly crossing Chen Cang, that is, using the main force of the Second Field Army to unexpectedly insert directly from the Xiangqian border into the southeastern sichuan region, thus cutting off the enemy's passage to escape from Yunnan and Burma in the west, and then catching turtles in an urn and annihilating the enemy in Sichuan.

Whether or not our army can successfully implement the strategic principle of "great detour and great encirclement" has a very crucial precondition, that is, before that, the enemy must remain in Sichuan's territory and must not flee from Sichuan territory to Yunnan and Burma in advance. Graphically speaking, the turtle is caught in the urn, the turtle runs first, and the urn has no effect. So, can the enemy obediently stay in Sichuan and wait for our army to encircle it?

In 1949, Premier Zhou invited Zhang Zhizhong to a banquet and took the opportunity to disclose Xiong Xianghui's identity, which was later found to be very clever

At that time, the Kuomintang army was retreating on various battlefields one after another, and it had completely become a bird of fright, and it was impossible to live in fear. In the southwest region, in addition to the troops controlled by local forces, the enemy's main force consisted mainly of two parts: first, the troops of the former Xi'an Appeasement Office led by Hu Zongnan, with 4 corps and 13 corps totaling more than 400,000 people, stationed in the northern Sichuan region; second, the troops of the Xiang'e Border Region Appeasement Office led by Song Xilian, with a total of 2 corps and 8 corps of about 140,000 people, stationed in the eastern Sichuan region.

That is to say, the military deployment of the Kuomintang army in Sichuan was that Hu Zongnan led more than 400,000 troops to defend northern Sichuan, and Song Xilian commanded about 140,000 people to defend eastern Sichuan. Judging from this military deployment, the enemy is ready to hold Sichuan and even the entire southwest region. However, although the enemy's military deployment has put up a posture of sticking to it, Hu Zongnan and Song Xilian, who were frightened by our army, do not intend to hold on to it, and the two of them plan in unison to "abandon Sichuan and even the southwest and retreat to the defense of Yunnan and Burma."

In August 1949, Hu Zongnan and Song Xilian went to Chongqing together to meet Old Chiang Kai-shek, who had come to inspect the defense of Sichuan. At that time, Hu Zongnan immediately suggested to Old Chiang that he abandon the southwest and move into Burma. However, the old Jiang, who had always been self-conscious, did not heed Hu Zongnan's advice, and even reprimanded Hu Zongnan. Because, in the view of old Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang army still has a fighting force in the southwest region, and it is inevitable that retreating without a fight will be a little self-contemptuous and a little unwilling.

In any case, before our army implemented the strategic principle of "great detour and great encirclement," Hu Zongnan and Song Xilian had already planned to flee. Although the old Chiang at that time did not agree to Hu Zongnan's plan, the old Chiang Kai-shek would be "capricious and change from day to night" and finally agreed to Hu Zongnan's plan. If the turtle in the urn is allowed to run away, then our army's strategic policy of "great detour and great encirclement" will be useless.

In 1949, Premier Zhou invited Zhang Zhizhong to a banquet and took the opportunity to disclose Xiong Xianghui's identity, which was later found to be very clever

In the face of such a situation, how can we let the enemy stay in Sichuan and not let him flee to Burma? The most important thing is to make lao Jiang firmly adhere to his idea of "sticking to Sichuan". On November 1, 1949, the Second Field Army officially opened the curtain on the enlargement of the southwest. Five days later, on November 6, 1949, as we said at the beginning of the article, Premier Zhou hosted a special banquet at the Zhongnanhai Qinzheng Hall in Beijing, where he revealed the identity of the red agent Xiong Xianghui in front of Zhang Zhizhong. What happens next?

That night, Zhang Zhizhong wrote a long letter to old Jiang. In this long letter, Zhang Zhizhong mainly recounted Xiong Xianghui's underground work experience and various relations with Hu Zongnan, and finally came to the conclusion that the Kuomintang was not only not an opponent of our party militarily and politically, but also far from being an opponent in intelligence.

Just imagine, when Old Jiang received This long letter from Zhang Zhizhong, what expression would he have? In fact, as Premier Zhou had expected, Zhang Zhizhong's long letter quickly passed into the hands of Lao Jiang, who spoke swear words in his hometown dialect and developed resentment towards Hu Zongnan, a general of the concubines. Speaking of this, perhaps some readers have understood that this long letter is a divisive plan for old Jiang to lose trust in Hu Zongnan.

It was precisely because he had lost trust in Hu Zongnan that old Jiang also began to scoff at Hu Zongnan's suggestion of "abandoning Sichuan and even the southwest and retreating to Yunnan and Burma on all fronts." Later, Hu Zongnan and Song Xilian repeatedly suggested to Lao Jiang that the main force should be withdrawn from Sichuan as soon as possible to avoid the total annihilation of the army. However, Old Jiang completely ignored it, and even intensified his efforts to dispatch troops everywhere, vowing to defend Sichuan to the death.

From December 4 to December 16, 1949, Lao Jiang refused Hu Zongnan and Song Xilian's request to "abandon Sichuan and retreat to Burma" four times in a row. Some people have analyzed that in the situation at that time, only from a military point of view, Hu Zongnan and Song Xilian's proposal was undoubtedly correct. The plan of retreating to the defense of Yunnan burma was the only plan that the Kuomintang army at that time could survive, and this plan was much more "clever" than the empty slogan of "defending the great southwest" advocated by chiang kai-shek.

However, it was precisely because of Zhang Zhizhong's statement in the long letter about Xiong Xianghui that Lao Jiang began to distrust Hu Zongnan; it was precisely because of his distrust of Hu Zongnan that Lao Jiang finally rejected the "reasonable" suggestions of Hu Zongnan and Song Xilian. In this way, the two large armies of Hu Zongnan and Song Xilian were firmly tied to sichuan. That is, the turtle did not run away, the urn had formed.

In 1949, Premier Zhou invited Zhang Zhizhong to a banquet and took the opportunity to disclose Xiong Xianghui's identity, which was later found to be very clever

Later, in the face of the powerful offensive of the Second Field Army, Song Xilian's troops were the first to be destroyed, and Song Xilian was captured on the battlefield. On December 9, 1949, the Kuomintang troops in Yunnan and Xikang declared uprisings one after another, and the two provinces were peacefully liberated. It was not until this day that old Jiang suddenly realized that he had made a serious strategic mistake, and he immediately approved Hu Zongnan's request to "abandon Sichuan and retreat to Yunnan and Burma" and ordered Hu Zongnan to lead his troops to break through in the direction of Xichang.

However, at this time, Hu Zongnan had no fighting spirit at all, and his 4 corps successively declared an uprising or chose to surrender. In just a few days, Hu Zongnan's troops collapsed, and Hu Zongnan could only abandon his troops and flee to Taiwan by plane. In this way, under the strategic blow of our army's "great detour and great encirclement," the main force of the Kuomintang army in the southwest region was completely destroyed, and the historical process of our army's liberation of the great southwest was greatly accelerated.

Let us turn around and say that when Hu Zongnan intended to abandon Sichuan and flee to Burma, in order to firmly tie him to Sichuan, so that our army could carry out a "great detour and great encirclement" and annihilate him completely. Premier Zhou came forward to set up a banquet to entertain Zhang Zhizhong and others, and let Xiong Xianghui, an underground worker of our party, accompany him, the purpose of which was to make Xiong Xianghui's identity public and inform Lao Jiang of this matter with the help of Zhang Zhizhong's hand, thus causing contradictions between Lao Jiang and Hu Zongnan.

Once this was calculated, the old Chiang Kai-shek did not agree with Hu Zongnan's reasoning of "abandoning Sichuan and retreating to Yunnan and Burma." The later facts were also just as Premier Zhou had expected, and although Hu Zongnan repeatedly requested to abandon Sichuan and flee to Yunnan and Burma, the old Chiang Kai-shek remained unmoved. It wasn't until the victory and defeat had been divided and the ending had been decided that Old Jiang reacted to it, but unfortunately it was too late.

In 1949, Premier Zhou invited Zhang Zhizhong to a banquet and took the opportunity to disclose Xiong Xianghui's identity, which was later found to be very clever

It can be seen that Premier Zhou specially set up a banquet to entertain Zhang Zhizhong and others, and made public the true identity of the red agent Xiong Xianghui; after that, with the help of Zhang Zhizhong's hand, he told lao Jiang about this matter, thus dividing the relationship between lao Jiang and Hu Zongnan; and then using lao Jiang to firmly tie Hu Zongnan and Song Xilian to death in Sichuan territory, helping our army to achieve a major victory in the process of liberating the great southwest, which is very clever!

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