After Massoud Chapter 3: From Mourning Leaders to Utopias of Power I

After Massoud Chapter 3: From Mourning Leader to Power Utopia I (By Amrulla Saleh)

Disclaimer: This translation is for informational purposes only and I do not assume any responsibility for translation errors, factual errors and positions and opinions that appear therein.

Chapter 2: The unarmed army, because it contains content that is not suitable for publication, unfortunately can not meet, and friends who feel that they are not addicted can send private messages.

At that time, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (Note 1), wrote his most sincere eulogy, calling Massoud a "tired and bleeding martyr" who was willing to join him in order to make his sacrifice immortal.

The first days after Massoud's death were accompanied by grief, revenge, and excitement—grief at the loss of a leader and excitement about approaching a power utopia. For the simple villagers who prayed with Masood for Allah, the grief has been continuing, but for some middle-level leaders, the excitement about approaching power is beginning to be greater than the grief for Masood.

Few talk about the relationship between Ahmed Shah Masood and Rabbani during the jihad and the relationship between the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Resistance Front. Ahmed Shah Masood respects and obeys Rabbani as the leader of islamic jihad in Afghanistan and the head of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. But this relationship exists in a delicate layer of the two people's unique personal tastes and opinions. When Rabbani agreed to remove Ahmed Shah Masood from the Ministry of Defence as a precondition for a ceasefire under the 1993 Jalalabad Treaty, Masood immediately respected Rabbani's decision and never entered the Ministry of Defence again. But since the main force defending Kabul is affiliated with the Islamic Council for the Advancement of Islam, Ahmed Shah Al-Masood continues to play a key role as a military figure and deputy prime minister. It was not until 1996, as a result of an agreement with PAS (Note 2), that Wahidulla Sabavin was formally appointed Minister of Defence.

As a symbol of prudence and patience, two thoughtful, courageous leaders, Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, are at the heart of the campaign, which has surprised Pakistan and its Arab and American supporters by pouring money into ISLAM and other extremists to seize the power vacuum that followed the collapse of Dr. Najibura's government in 1992. In his book War in Afghanistan, U.S. Ambassador to the Jihadist Organization Peter Thomson details Pakistan's efforts to marginalize Afghan nationalists, particularly against Ahmed Shah Masood. But after Massoud's death, the group collapsed. From 2001 to late 2009, a group of Ahmed Shah Al-Masood supporters chanted the slogans of the younger generation of Islamic Jihad, successfully marginalizing Rabbani. The Americans also exploited the ambitions of these figures.

The first CIA delegation, led by Gary Sharon, arrived in Panjshir, where they bought a helicopter in Russia a year ago to travel to Afghanistan. The helicopter pilot, Sabour, was chosen from among the generals of the Resistance Front. When the Taliban's initial offensive did not work, the U.S. delegation flew to Panjahir. There was a stalemate on the battlefield, only this time the hope of victory was on the side of the Resistance Front, while the Taliban were in disarray.

Gary Sharon wrote a book called First Entry. The book has been translated into Persian. In that book, Gary Sharon outlines the content of the negotiations from an American perspective. The resistance front's resolve consists of three elements: grief, revenge and power. Perhaps Americans' resolve is also based on these three elements — grief over the loss of thousands of civilian lives, retaliation against al-Qaida and the Taliban, and the consolidation of American power in the region and the world. Grief is common to both sides, and vengeful anger is common, but the two sides are vastly different in vision and strength. In large seminars, the Americans don't need to be transparent with us, they don't share any information about talks with the Pakistanis, they don't talk much about Afghanistan's future power structure, and their themes are very targeted.

Americans have taken great advantage of our poverty. Our situation is dire and critical in every way, and we are experiencing serious economic difficulties. Afghanistan as a whole is an isolated country, and the areas occupied by the Resistance Front, besieged by harsh natural conditions and the Taliban, are poorer than in other areas. Prior to my invasion of Kabul, I participated in most of the meetings and discussions on the military situation, the daily and strategic exchange of information. But the meeting of General Tommy Franks, commander of the U.S. Central Command, in Dushanbe was the most valuable, and I was unable to attend due to bad weather. In his book American Soldier, General Franks described the meeting in a very ugly way.

In each negotiation, the Americans have referred to the Taliban and al-Qaida as enemies. However, there are considerable differences between the two sides on Pakistan. They see Pakistan as a key ally in the region, and based on the credible evidence we have, we see Pakistan at the center of the problem, but providing that evidence will never change U.S. policy toward Pakistan. This problem still exists today. Although Osama bin Laden was located and hunted near the most important Kakar military academy in abbotabad town, Pakistan is still seen by the United States as a "lied friend" rather than a "hostile state."

We have consistently insisted that the Americans respect the unified leadership of the Resistance Front and not deal directly with local commanders in the Northeast and on the Resistance Islands. We believe that retaining the organization inherited from Massoud would be effective in countering the Taliban and preventing further political instability. Instead of complying with this, many Americans paid and provided assistance directly to the Resistance Islands, deviating from our commitments. Although they had provided the most aid to the center of the Resistance Front at Panjhir, they had soon had General Ata Mohamed Noor, General Abdul Rashed Dostum and Karim Khalili equally equipped. The British were the only countries to recognize that Rabbani's centrality should be highlighted, and they sent a small British intelligence team to Faizabad and from there into Panjahir. Whether the British approach was well-intentioned or not, as an old colonial empire of the past, they knew how to act cautiously and make fewer mistakes.

In The American Soldier, General Tommy Franks recalls in a very unusual way his meeting with Fahim Khan at Dushanbe Airport in October 2001. The translator of the meeting was Iranian-American, and perhaps unfamiliar with some common terms in the Afghan situation, he might not be able to explain Fahim Khan's reasons for asking americans for money. In any case, General Franks' deepest memory at this meeting was Fahim Khan's insistence on cash donations. In the negotiations, in addition to providing weapons assistance and direct military pressure to the Taliban, the Americans provided $7 million a month to the Resistance Front, particularly Fahim Khan. Although the agreement was made by the commander of U.S. Central Command, it was not offered by representatives of the CIA until June 2002.

By Afghan standards, General Tommy Franks was a tall man, probably more than two meters tall. He is the only senior U.S. official who does not respect the indigenous Afghan culture and does not care about the risks that come with it. In those days, al-Qaida had just battered America's national dignity. For Americans, the world is flat. Political and military leaders of various countries accommodated the United States out of sympathy, and this alliance had nothing to do with General Franks' diplomatic skills. As commander-in-chief of the so-called Central Command of the U.S. military, he met with all the military and political leaders of the countries in the region, and the understanding they expressed added to his hegemony.

However, the U.S. military, the world's largest military power, was willing to develop a military plan against the Taliban at the behest of the Resistance Front. But because of Massoud's absence and the emergence of internal conflict, the Resistance Front was unable to build a stable and inclusive Afghanistan in this plan. Tactically, the Americans had no better option. Only we had access to the area. The Americans did not have the human resources to gather intelligence and needed Afghans to manage military victories politically. The only force that has this legitimacy and ability is the Resistance Front.

Information about the state of war regularly came from the islands of the Resistance. The Americans established a base called Kanabad in southern Uzbekistan to operate in an emergency. The Ukrainian government may have received some concessions from the Americans in this regard, one of which was that the special forces of the US military should be integrated with General Dostum. According to President Musharraf, Pakistan has handed over all its air bases to the United States, but the base in Balochistan is the main location for operations in the south. Due to the scorching situation in northern Afghanistan, the Kanabad base in southern Uzbekistan is the second most important location for U.S. Air Force forces. The fighter jet flew from the indian ocean island of Diego Garcia. Some strategic bombers also flew from the United States with fuel and flew back to the United States after the mission.

October and November 2001 were the worst months for the Taliban and Al Qaeda, who had lost faith in their organization and leadership and were struggling with some sort of desperate struggle. Their northern and southern fronts were originally linked, but after a multi-hundred volunteer army consisting mainly of Pakistani extremists such as the Ulima Society reached Balkh province with difficulty, the supply line through Badegis and Bamiyan was cut off. In mid-October 2001, some 3,000 troops were bombed near Mamer, most of them annihilated.

Although the forces of the Shiite parties, especially those under the command of Mr. Muhaq, played a very effective role on the Northern Front, Atta Mohammed Noor and Abdul Rashed Dostum cast a shadow over the battlefields in the North. I will not delve into the events that took place at Qala-i-Jangi Castle here (Note 3), which americans have described in great detail in several papers and books. But I would like to briefly mention the reasons for the surrender of the defeated Taliban in Kunduz to the forces of General Abdel Rashed Dustum.

As far as we know, Pakistanis, especially General Musharraf, are particularly concerned about the Tajik faction of the Resistance Front. That is why he called General Dostum twice before the fall of Kabul and assured him that Pakistan had made mistakes in the past and that it was time to make amends to the people of northern Afghanistan. Pakistanis and the Taliban believe that the killing of Ahmed Shah Al-Masoud has angered the Tajiks in the Resistance Front, who are more resilient. For this reason, the defeated Taliban were instructed to surrender to General Abdul Rashed Dostum during the retreat, not to General Daoud or General Ata Mohammed Noor. (Note 4)

As a result, thousands of Taliban elements surrendered west of Kunduz to the army of General Abdel Rashed Dustum. General Daoud commanded his troops to occupy the area east of Kunduz. These Taliban prisoners later revolted in Qala-i-Jangi and suffered numerous lives in battles with General Dostum's army and several U.S. troops. There are also allegations that the treatment of Taliban prisoners has changed since then.

To be continued

Note 1: It has nothing to do with the current so-called ISIS, which refers to the regime established by guerrillas in 1992 after the fall of the Najibura regime in Afghanistan, headed by President Burhanudin Rabbani, whose capital Kabul was captured by the Taliban after 1996, and Rabbani was exiled, but is still recognized by the United Nations and internationally recognized.

Note 2 to entry refers to an organization founded by the infamous Qulbuddin Shikmatiyar.

Note 3: Qala-i-Jangi is the site of a castle left over from the time of the Afghan Kingdom, and after Receiving the surrender of a large number of Taliban, Dostum imprisoned them in this medieval castle because they had no experience and conditions to guard prisoners, and due to insufficient guards, Dostum's prison guards were unable to search the prisoners, resulting in the Taliban prisoners taking advantage of the lax garrison to launch an armed rebellion, which was mentioned earlier in the "Art of Intelligence" (Chinese imported edition of the book title "The Threat of the State" ) is described in great detail.

Note 4 to entry: Dostam is a Uzbek, while both Daoud and Nur are Tajiks along with Massoud.