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Battle of Kinmen: Why did the People's Liberation Army suffer a crushing defeat for the Nationalist army? The lessons are unforgettable: the military preparations of both sides are second, the early efforts to liberate Fujian are three, the reasons for the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen are fourth, and the impact of the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen

author:常棣tandy

I am Tang Di, a history buff. Welcome everyone [attention] I, let's talk about the past and the present, and discuss the general trend of the world. Gentleman I, just to learn and make friends!

<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="50" > military preparations of both sides</h1>

The liberation of Fuzhou and Xiamen by the Tenth Corps of Ye Fei of the Third Field Army was a battle in which the East China Liberation Army, with the cooperation of the Fujian underground party guerrillas of the CPC, chased and annihilated the generals who had slipped through the net on the Yangtze River front and successfully liberated the famous southeastern cities of Fuzhou and Xiamen, which Chiang Kai-shek's army was holding. At the same time, due to the PLA's light enemy and unfavorable weather, the attack on Kinmen Island was unsuccessful, and it was the first time since the establishment of the Third Field Army that it was defeated by Chiang Kai-shek's army. Since then, a situation has been formed in which Chiang Kai-shek and the remnants of the people's liberation army have been defending Taiwan, Penghu, Jin, Ma, and the Chinese people's liberation army have been facing each other across the sea for a long time.

Battle of Kinmen: Why did the People's Liberation Army suffer a crushing defeat for the Nationalist army? The lessons are unforgettable: the military preparations of both sides are second, the early efforts to liberate Fujian are three, the reasons for the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen are fourth, and the impact of the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen

In April and May 1949, the Second and Third Field Armies of the Chinese People's Liberation Army led by Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi, with a fearless spirit and heroic spirit, ruled out the armed intervention of British and American imperialism, broke through the Yangtze River graben, and annihilated more than 200,000 Chiang Kai-shek troops in famous cities such as Nanjing, Nanchang, Hangzhou, and Shanghai. The remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army, which had slipped through the Yangtze River defense line, fled to Fujian one after another in a vain attempt to rely on the steep mountains and rivers of Bamin, with their backs to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, to resist the People's Liberation Army, waiting for the outbreak of World War III and its comeback.

In order to preserve Fujian and the coastal islands in order to consolidate Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek, in addition to strictly ordering Zhu Shaoliang to build a semi-permanent fortification overseer, and in order to rectify the defeated generals of this remnant army, decided to set up a southeast regional inspection and reorganization committee above jiang Dingwen and Yu Feipeng as the main and vice chairmen, verify the personnel of each unit, and seriously estimate the combat strength. Then, according to the actual salaries of soldiers in each department, the regiment, division, and army establishment was determined, and the establishment of a large number of soldiers and officers was abolished, so as to enrich the shortage of soldiers in their subordinate units.

After the end of the Battle of Shanghai, Ye Fei's Tenth Corps gathered in the Suzhou area for reorganization and actively carried out various preparations for the liberation of Fujian. In accordance with the instructions of the East China Bureau of the CPC and the Sanye Front Committee, the significance of marching into Fujian to consolidate national defense was generally explained among the troops, the specific conditions of fujian in all aspects were introduced, and all officers and men were educated to understand the difficulties in the march. Research ways to overcome difficulties.

At the same time, the organization should be reorganized, the equipment should be reduced, and the training in mountain warfare should be carried out. And the advance team was formed by the corps and entered the northern Fujian region in advance. Contact was made with underground parties and guerrillas to learn more about the situation, to collect food and grass, and to repair roads in order to ensure the advance of the troops. In order to ensure a rapid march into Fujian, the former cadres of the Branch Committee of all walks of life in East China, who were originally assigned to the Tenth Corps, as well as some migrant workers and buckles, continued to enter Fujian. At the same time, in order to quickly open up local work in Fujian, the East China Bureau of the CPC dispatched more than 5,000 party and government local work cadres to form the Fujian Provincial CPC Committee and party and government organs at all levels, and went south with the army.

Battle of Kinmen: Why did the People's Liberation Army suffer a crushing defeat for the Nationalist army? The lessons are unforgettable: the military preparations of both sides are second, the early efforts to liberate Fujian are three, the reasons for the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen are fourth, and the impact of the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen

In early July 1949, the Tenth Corps was transported by Southern Jiangsu to Shangrao in northern Jiangxi and Jiangshan in western Zhejiang, and then on foot to the south. It was a hot summer, the roads were often washed away by torrential rains and flash floods, and the commanders and fighters carried dozens of kilograms of weapons, equipment, and grain, carried forward the style of arduous struggle, and with the enthusiastic support of the garrison of the Second Field Army and the local party, guerrillas, and the broad masses, in late July, they triumphantly went to the Jian'ou, Nanping, and Gutian areas in northern Fujian, and immediately launched specific preparations for the attack on the enemy.

In order to solve the problem of supply and transportation of the operational rear area in the new area, under the leadership of the Fujian Provincial CPC Committee and the Party Committee of the Tenth Corps, the cadres accompanying the army to the south assisted the local party and government organs to form the former headquarters of the Northern Fujian Branch, which was responsible for mobilizing the people's strength, collecting grain and grass, and ensuring the progress of the campaign.

At that time, Ye Fei and Wei Guoqing's Tenth Corps, in accordance with the instructions of the Field Army Front Committee and the enemy situation, terrain, transportation conditions, and the situation of their own troops in Fujian, decided to first encircle and annihilate the enemy in the Fuzhou area, control central Fujian, open up the situation, and then take advantage of the belly to go south and continue to annihilate the enemy in the Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, Xiamen, and Kinmen areas to liberate the whole province.

<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="65" > second, the early efforts to liberate Fujian</h1>

On August 17, the People's Liberation Army entered Fuzhou amid a welcome. In order not to give the enemy a breather' time, they immediately launched a pursuit and blockade, and after several days of pursuit and blockade, except for the enemy's one part that fled into Pingyuan Island and the Zhangzhou and Xiamen areas, most of them were pursued and annihilated on the banks of the Wulong River in the northwest of Fuqing. By the 23rd, the Battle of Fuzhou was victoriously over, annihilating nearly 40,000 Chiang Kai-shek's army.

The First Unit of the 21st Army of the Seventh Corps stationed in Fuqing first captured Sanduao, Luoyuan and other places, and played a powerful role in the Battle of Fuzhou. The Tenth Corps under the command of Ye Fei and Wei Guoqing, in order to completely annihilate the remnants of the enemy in the Guizhang, Xiamen, and Kinmen areas, except for one unit that served as a garrison in Fuzhou City, decided to use the main force to first eliminate the remnants of the enemy in the Zhangzhou area, liberate the Fujian mainland, and then eliminate the remnants of the enemy on the two islands of Xiamen and Kinmen.

The enemy in the Zhangzhou and Xiamen areas was the remnants of the 55th Army, the 68th Army, and the Independent 37th Division under the command of Liu Ruming's Eighth Corps, which fled from the Yangtze River Defense Line in May, and Li Liangrong's 5th and 25th Armies of the 22nd Corps and the remnants of the 96th Army, led by Fuzhou, with a total strength of about 60,000 troops.

In early September, Ye and Wei waved their armies south, and the 28th Army attacked Putian, Quanzhou, and other places along the coastal road, defending the enemy and fleeing south, and in the middle of the year, they crossed the sea to occupy Nanri Island, Pingtan Island, and their surrounding islands, annihilating more than 8,000 chiang kai-shek troops on the island.

Battle of Kinmen: Why did the People's Liberation Army suffer a crushing defeat for the Nationalist army? The lessons are unforgettable: the military preparations of both sides are second, the early efforts to liberate Fujian are three, the reasons for the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen are fourth, and the impact of the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen

In order to firmly defend the Zhang, Xiamen, and Jin regions and to shield Taiwan and Penghu, Chiang Kai-shek decided to gather the remnants to resist stubbornly, and adjusted the deployment as follows:

Tang Enbo, deputy chief of the Southeast Military and Political Chief's Office and director of the Xiamen Branch, led the Eighth Corps to defend Zhangzhou and Xiamen, and the Twenty-second Corps to defend the big and small Kinmen with all its strength. Xiamen and KinmenWangdao are important islands off the coast of Fujian, choking on maritime shipping. Xiamen is close to the mainland, and there are some permanent fortress fortifications; Kinmen is farther away from the mainland, and the original fortifications are not as strong as Xiamen, but the main forces of Li Liangrong's corps, the Fifth and Twenty-fifth Armies, are gathered here, and the strength of the troops is stronger than that of Xiamen.

On September 19, the People's Liberation Army occupied Zhangzhou, and on the 23rd, it occupied Jimei. As for how to solve the problem of the Kuomintang troops in Xiamen and Kinmen, the Corps put forward three plans: attacking Jinxia at the same time, first building and then Jinxia, and then Jinxia, and because it believed that the Kuomintang army was panicking and wavering, it initially decided to attack Jinxia with a single blow, but then, because there were not enough ships to transport troops, it decided to concentrate ships to carry troops and attack Xiamen first and then attack Kinmen.

Although Xiamen Island was held by more than 30,000 people from 2 armies and 5 divisions of the Kuomintang led by Tang Enbo, its nearest point was only about 1 nautical mile from the mainland, which was relatively easy to capture. On the night of October 15, the 10th Corps concentrated the troops of 6 divisions to cross the sea to attack Xiamen, successfully landed on the northern coast of Xiamen Island on the morning of the 16th, and then developed in depth, occupying the entire island of Xiamen on the 17th, Tang Enbo led 1 division to evacuate in a hurry, and yu was annihilated.

<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="67" > third, the reason for the fiasco at the Battle of Kinmen</h1>

After the 10th Corps captured Xiamen, it issued an order to attack Kinmen on the 18th according to the battle plan. Large and small Kinmen Island are located in the east of Xiamen, of which the area of Greater Kinmen Island is more than 120 square kilometers, the area of Little Kinmen Island is 15 square kilometers, and the nearest part of the mainland is about 10 kilometers.

The Kuomintang defended Dajinmen with 1 army and 1 division, 1 division defended Xiaojinmen, and before and during the war, two corps of the 12th Corps were transferred from the Chaoshan region of Guangdong, bringing the strength of the defending island to 40,000 people, but these movements did not attract enough attention from the 10th Corps of the Third Field Army. Attacking Kinmen was carried out by 6 regiments of the 28th and 29th Corps of the 10th Corps of the Third Field Army, but due to difficulties in collecting ships before the battle was launched, the attack was postponed from the 20th to the 23rd.

After the liberation of Xiamen, Ye Fei and Wei Guoqing immediately led the corps to enter the island to take over the city, and the task of liberating Kinmen was handed over to Zhu Shaoqing, commander of the Twenty-eighth Army, who commanded his Twenty-eighth Army and the First Division of the Twenty-ninth Army, and was responsible for capturing Kinmen. The terrain of Greater Kinmen Island is narrow at both ends, and the eastern half of the mountain is steep and not easy to climb; the western half of the terrain is relatively flat, and the north shore is a mud beach, which is conducive to landing, which is the focus of Chiang Kai-shek's garrison.

Battle of Kinmen: Why did the People's Liberation Army suffer a crushing defeat for the Nationalist army? The lessons are unforgettable: the military preparations of both sides are second, the early efforts to liberate Fujian are three, the reasons for the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen are fourth, and the impact of the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen

With the exception of a few fortifications on the island, Chiang Kai-shek's army built field fortifications and laid obstacles in areas where the PLA could land. In order to strengthen the island's defenses, Chen Cheng had already transported the well-equipped 11th Division of The 12th Corps of Hu Lian's 12th Corps, which was originally stationed in the Chao'an and Shantou areas of Guangdong Province, to increase its defenses. On the 20th, it was learned that another division of the corps had arrived in Kinmen Bay. On the 23rd, it was learned that the follow-up troops of the corps were on the way by sea, and asked Chiang Kai-shek for directions.

At that time, the leaders of Ye Fei and Wei Guoqing's Tenth Corps judged that Jiang Jun in the south might take over the defense of Kinmen or strengthen the defensive strength of Kinmen. In view of the fact that at this time the Twenty-eighth Army had recruited ships capable of carrying three regiments at a time, it was estimated that two crossings in one night and five main regiments would be enough to solve the enemy on the island. Therefore, it was decided to take advantage of the fact that the juju army had not yet arrived in full, and ordered the Twenty-eighth Army and other units to attack.

For various reasons, the landing echelons were not accompanied by commanders at or above the division level, and the various departments were not subordinate to each other, resulting in difficulties in unifying command and coordinated operations; insufficient exercises on landing operations were carried out, and factors affecting landing operations such as sea tide and climate were not fully considered; the Area around Xiamen is a newly liberated area, the mass base is relatively poor, and it is not easy to win the support of the masses.

The combination of these factors led to the defeat of the Golden Gate Campaign.

In order to defend their last position, Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago, Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng decided to transport their rebuilt elite Twelfth Corps from the Chaoshan region to Kinmen Island; Shaanxi Yuanxiao, the commander of the corps known for his good fighting, made Hu Lian, who was born in the fourth phase of Huangpu, the commander of the Defense of Jin and Ma commanders, commanded Li Liangrong's Twenty-second Corps, which had retreated to Kinmen, and the main force of the newly aided Twelfth Corps, to hold Kinmen and resist desperately in order to protect Taiwan, where Chiang and Chen were finally based.

On the night of October 24, Ye Fei and Wei Guoqing launched an attack on Kinmen, and two regiments of Zhu Shaoqing's 28th Army and one regiment of Hu Bingyun's 29th Army were set up from Lianhe, Dadao, Houcun and other places. Due to the influence of tidal weather, it was only at 24:00 that the fleet was in disarray, and on the way, it was bombarded by enemy artillery fire from the shore, and the troops suffered some casualties.

At about 2 o'clock on the 25th, the vanguard regiments of the two armies landed near Longkou and Guningtou. Under the tactical principle of "a few people fighting a battle with a few people, not waiting, not hesitating, and plunging inwards," the regiments attacked the enemy bravely and boldly interspersed. At this time, Jiang Junxiao's general Hu Lian had already led the main force of his Twelfth Corps to the island, and Hu immediately commanded the army to carry out continuous counterattacks against the three pioneer regiments of the People's Liberation Army that landed with the cooperation of tanks.

Battle of Kinmen: Why did the People's Liberation Army suffer a crushing defeat for the Nationalist army? The lessons are unforgettable: the military preparations of both sides are second, the early efforts to liberate Fujian are three, the reasons for the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen are fourth, and the impact of the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen

The three regiments that landed on the island were forced to retreat to the area of Gongningtou to fight bravely. Because it was already low tide time when the troops landed, and because there was no one to organize their return voyages, all of them ran aground and were damaged by Chiang Kai-shek's aircraft and artillery fire, so that the follow-up troops had no boats to cross. After the urgent mobilization of zhu and Hu commanders, only a few ships were found, and four companies were rushed to reinforcements on the night of the 25th. Helpless soldiers are weak and weak, and it is difficult to save the crisis.

The landing forces of the two armies totaled about 7,000 people, and fought hard for three days and nights with tens of thousands of elite troops of Chiang Kai-shek's army, and on the 26th, the Kuomintang army counterattacked with all its strength to Guningtou, and the landing troops persisted until the night of the breakthrough, and by the afternoon of the 28th, all more than 9,000 people were either killed or captured. The PLA fighters captured by Chiang Kai-shek's army were transported back to Taiwan by Chiang Kai-shek to stabilize the crumbling hearts of the people on the lonely island of Taiwan. Hu Lian, who guarded the Golden Gate, was touted by Jiang and Chen as an invincible hero. Later, he was sent to Vietnam by Chiang Kai-shek and Chen to serve as the head of the advisory group of Nguyen Gogh's Vietnamese puppet army, and under the command of us imperialists, he was an enemy of the Vietnamese and Chinese Liberation Army for a long time.

<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="68" > the impact of the fiasco at the Battle of Kinmen</h1>

At the Battle of Kinmen, the 10th Corps of the Third Field Army suffered heavy losses.

Commander Ye Fei summed up the reasons as follows:

"It is mainly due to our impatience, the loss of victory, blind optimism, and the lightness of the enemy. ...... The pursuit of a quick attack does not allow the enemy room for respite and reorganization, without giving much thought and consideration to difficulties, and underestimating the seriousness of the final struggle against the enemy... It fully demonstrates the impatience of the light enemy and the subjectivism of fighting the battle of uncertainty and risk. "

On October 29, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China sent a telegram to the troops:

"This loss is the largest since the Liberation War. The main reason for this is light hostility and impatience. At a time when the end of the entire War of Liberation is no longer far away, the mentality of light enemy and impatience are likely to occur among leading cadres at all levels, mainly among leading cadres at and above the military level, and the Kinmen Island incident must be taken as a deep warning. To educate the corps that are still in combat, it is imperative to guard against the impatience of the light enemy, to steadily and systematically annihilate the remnants of the enemy, and to liberate the whole country. "

On November 3, the 21st Army of the 7th Corps of the Third Field Army sent 6 battalions to cross the sea in two batches to attack Dengbu Island, the southeast gateway of the Zhoushan Islands in Zhejiang Province, resulting in a stalemate battle with the Nationalist army guarding the island, and because the follow-up troops could not follow up, they finally decided to retreat, causing more than 1400 casualties.

Battle of Kinmen: Why did the People's Liberation Army suffer a crushing defeat for the Nationalist army? The lessons are unforgettable: the military preparations of both sides are second, the early efforts to liberate Fujian are three, the reasons for the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen are fourth, and the impact of the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen

Facts have shown that the sea crossing and landing operation is a completely new form of operation, and in the absence of adequate sea and air and logistical support, the sea crossing and landing operation is quite difficult and cannot be acted hastily. Since then, the units of the Third Field Army and the Fourth Field Army, which are respectively responsible for the sea crossing and landing operations in Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong, have adopted a cautious and conscientiously prepared attitude toward crossing the sea to attack the coastal islands.

As the Third Field Army prepared to march into Fujian, Mao Zedong also called Su Yu and others on June 14:

"Please begin to pay attention to the study of the question of the seizure of Taiwan, whether it is possible to seize Taiwan in a relatively short period of time, by what methods to seize it, and by what means to divide the enemy forces in Taiwan and to win over a part of it to take our side and carry out internal and external cooperation. If we cannot resolve the Taiwan issue for a long time, Shanghai and the coastal ports will suffer great harm. ”

Taiwan is farther away from the mainland, and it is also the area that the Kuomintang is preparing to hold last after withdrawing from the mainland, with more troops deployed and more difficult to attack. The Third Field Army made full preparations and meticulous exercises for attacking Taiwan.

Battle of Kinmen: Why did the People's Liberation Army suffer a crushing defeat for the Nationalist army? The lessons are unforgettable: the military preparations of both sides are second, the early efforts to liberate Fujian are three, the reasons for the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen are fourth, and the impact of the fiasco in the Battle of Kinmen

In April 1950, the Fourth Field Army successfully crossed the sea to capture Hainan Island. On May 13, the Nationalist army withdrew from the Zhoushan Islands, the most important island group off the coast of Zhejiang, and on the 19th, the Third Field Army entered and occupied all of the Zhoushan Islands. However, due to changes in the situation at home and abroad after the outbreak of the Korean War in June, the plan to march into Taiwan was ultimately not implemented.

(End of text)

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