Welcome to Shiyuan History Column No. 2642. During the Liberation War, the most important "red agent" of our army was Guo Rugui, who served as chief of staff of the Kuomintang Xuzhou Army General Headquarters, director of the Department of Operations of the Ministry of National Defense, and commander of the Twenty-second Corps in a secret capacity. In particular, during his tenure in the Ministry of National Defense, he participated in the formulation of strategies and tactics for many major battles and sent out key information in a timely manner. If we talk about contribution, there was no agent at that time who could compare with him.
Since he once held a high position in the enemy camp, he naturally came into contact with a large number of Kuomintang military and political leaders. When Guo Rugui wrote his memoirs in the 1980s, he focused on several high-ranking figures in the Nationalist army who had observed and contacted during his lurking career. Among them, there were two people who made him feel more admired, and for the really powerful old Jiang and Chen Cheng, he sneered, why?
Guo Rugui's views on these important members of the national army are much more accurate than those of ordinary people in our army and history enthusiasts of future generations. The first thing he admired was General Zhang Zhizhong, who, although he was named a second-class general in the Kuomintang Army and had once won the trust of chiang kai-shek, had never commanded a single battle in the Liberation War, because he was the staunchest anti-war fighter in the Nationalist camp. According to Guo Rugui's recollection, during the negotiations in Chongqing, the only upper echelons of the Nationalist army who truly supported peace and resolutely hoped to avoid civil war and had worked hard for it were Zhang Zhizhong. It is also based on this that Guo Rugui greatly lamented the heavy character of General Zhang. After the founding of New China, Zhang Zhizhong became vice chairman of the National People's Congress, and outside of work, he was also a good friend with the chairman, the premier, Peng Zong, and others.
Another big man of the Nationalist army who made him feel admired was General Fu Zuoyi, the former commander-in-chief of the North China Suppression Campaign. Guo Rugui admired Fu Zuoyi in two main ways. One is from a military point of view, Fu Zuoyi's deployment and command of the Battles of Datong and Jining, and the Battle of Zhangjiakou in 1946 can be said to be a classic example of winning more with less, which is a very rare style of play and achievement in the nationalist army, and only a command genius like Fu Zuoyi can do it. Guo Rugui once commanded front-line troops during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and his own military theory was very prominent, so he could become the director of the Operations Department of the Ministry of National Defense of the Nationalist Army, and he was very proficient in the military, so talents like Fu Zuoyi, Guo Rugui naturally saw it very thoroughly. It is a pity that Fu Zuoyi was not used by our side in the early days, and if he had revolted early, his contribution would have been even greater.
Fu Zuoyi also has a little strength that Guo Rujie admires: that is, he can bend and stretch, see the situation clearly, and hold heavy power in his hands but can afford to put it down. Fu Zuoyi saved the ancient capital of Beiping and millions of people in early 49, which Guo Rugui greatly appreciated, believing that this was not something that ordinary high-ranking generals could do. It should be said that Guo Rugui's comments on Zhang Zhizhong and Fu Zuoyi are very pertinent.
But for Old Jiang and Chen Cheng, Guo Rugui was not so polite. In his memoirs, he once recorded that in his early years, he heard about the achievements of the old Chiang Kai-shek's Eastern Expedition and the Northern Expedition, and believed that this person must have a very high strategic and tactical level. But after years of actual contact, it was found that it was not. Old Chiang only knew some basic tactics, and he regarded himself as a military scientist and principal, and he liked to intervene in and command the front line, which affected many battles that should have been fought. At the strategic level, the old Chiang Kai-shek is even more of a mess, and our leaders are not on the same level. Guo Ruzhen was surprised and puzzled at first, and then he became accustomed to it.
Although Chen Cheng has promoted Guo Rugui many times, because Guo is essentially an underground party member of our side, this is not a favor, and he has a more objective and rational evaluation of Chen Cheng. One of the things that impressed me the most was Chen Cheng's tough attitude during the Chongqing negotiations, and he tried his best to obstruct the peace talks, which made Guo Rugui very disgusted in his heart. In terms of specific military level, Chen Cheng is not prominent, he is more adept at playing with power than a pure soldier. Guo Rugui did not have a high evaluation of Chen Cheng, the "old chief" during the incubation period.
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