laitimes

After the party class, I increased the throttle and rushed to the high-end meeting place... In recent years, ICBC has two corruption cases involving the largest amount of money to find two "two-faced people"

author:Shangguan News
After the party class, I increased the throttle and rushed to the high-end meeting place... In recent years, ICBC has two corruption cases involving the largest amount of money to find two "two-faced people"

In view of the insufficient restraint on the power of the "number one" exposed by the Gu Guoming and Xie Ming cases, the discipline inspection and supervision group of the State Supervision Commission of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission stationed at the ICBC formulated and issued a disciplinary inspection proposal to the ICBC party committee, urging the improvement and improvement of the mechanism for restricting the decentralization of credit and power, and strengthening the supervision and management of the presidents of the branches. The picture shows that recently, the discipline inspection and supervision team stationed at ICBC held a symposium to study and deploy specific measures to strengthen the supervision of the "number one" of the domestic integrated subsidiary. (Courtesy of the Discipline Inspection and Supervision Group of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission and the State Supervision Commission stationed at ICBC)

Recently, the Henan Branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the ICBC Wealth Management Company undertook a special task from the ICBC Party Committee - piloting the newly formulated "Measures for Recording the Illegal Intervention of Managers in Major Matters" to accumulate experience for the comprehensive implementation of the future. The Measures focus on 11 major matters such as credit approval, selection and employment of personnel, etc., clarify the scope of application, reporting requirements, disposal processes, etc., and further standardize the use of power by managers.

This is a measure taken by ICBC to promote reform and treatment by case. Shortly after its establishment in January 2019, the Discipline Inspection and Supervision Group of the State Supervision Commission of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the State Supervision Commission in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China joined hands with the Local Discipline Inspection Commission to seriously investigate and punish Gu Guoming, former party secretary and president of ICBC Shanghai Branch, and Xie Ming, former party committee member and vice president of Chongqing Branch, for serious violations of discipline and law. The circular said that Xie Ming was "economically greedy, colluded with illegal private entrepreneurs, was willing to be 'hunted', directly intervened in and interfered in the examination and approval of credit projects, and engaged in power and money transactions." The first-instance judgment against Gu Guoming shows that he took advantage of his positions in charge of the credit approval department, credit management department, and presiding over the work of the whole bank to provide assistance to relevant units and individuals in handling financing loans, project allocation, contracting projects and other matters, and seek benefits, and accepted bribes equivalent to more than 136 million yuan.

The gu guoming and Xie Ming cases are the two most typical corruption cases that ICBC has investigated and handled in recent years. The case exposed prominent problems such as the use of loans by the senior management of the branch where the case occurred for personal gain, and the failure of the credit risk prevention system and mechanism. Why is corruption in the credit chain so high and frequent? What institutional and regulatory loopholes have been exposed? How to use cases to promote reform and cases to promote treatment? The reporter conducted an interview and reported.

After the party lesson, the driver was asked to increase the throttle to rush to the high-end meeting place; while turning in himself and arranging for others to return the gift money on his behalf, the more he came, the more the merrier

"It completely subverted our previous impression." "How did such a person who seems to be rigorous and more demanding of himself get to this point?" Talking about Gu Guoming's fall, the staff of ICBC Shanghai Branch described it as "unexpected" and "shocked".

He started his career in 1989 and has been promoted all the way for more than 30 years. But from the first bribe he accepted in 2008, his life trajectory hit an inflection point. The 17 years of taking up the leadership position of the branch are also the 17 years that Gu Guoming has been defeated and lost under the test of temptation.

"The first point of time is after he is in charge of credit, and the second point of time is after he is promoted to president." The relevant responsible person of the discipline inspection and supervision group stationed at the ICBC pointed out that the change in power, environment, and mentality is an important inflection point for Gu Guoming from refusing to accept gifts to corruption and degeneration.

Gu Guoming is good at being a "two-faced person", and he is quietly greedy through option corruption and proxy holding; in order to cover up corrupt behavior, he also deliberately makes a superficial article through various big things and small things.

Many people were deeply impressed by the party lessons taught by Gu Guoming, and he often took out the manuscript and quoted the scriptures. Less well known is that after an impassioned party lesson, the teacups in the conference room are still warm, and he has asked drivers to increase the throttle and rush to various high-end meeting places.

"In the exchange with private entrepreneurs, how to grasp yourself is an important issue." Gu Guoming once summoned the presidents of 31 branches of the Shanghai branch to sign a letter of responsibility, one of the important contents of which was that "dealing with private enterprises must ensure integrity." During the talks on honest government, Gu Guoming asked cadres not only to refuse gifts and gifts, but also to handle well the relationship with business development, and talked about their experience in skillfully refusing gifts. He cut hair, washed, and sent off old comrades in the unit out of his own pocket, and the party fee paid took the initiative to increase the calculation standard.

However, behind the big talk of rejecting the gift money, the more the merrier. The love of Peking Opera, the fascination with the military, the love of geopolitics, and the seemingly good preferences have attracted the "hunters" to elaborately set up a situation. Gu Guoming's dating does not set a threshold or a bottom line, but is relieved to have "found a confidant and a fellow traveler". The "sugar-coated cannonballs" and spiritual bribes, like boiled frogs in warm water, made Gu Guoming unconsciously become the "prey" of some merchants and brokers.

During the period of retention, Gu Guoming finally recognized himself: "I am not only greedy for money, but greedy for everything." They want to get rich, but they are not willing to give up the power in their hands and the social status they have achieved, and they want to use their power to make greater wealth, and then seek greater power to serve their own private interests. ”

Xie Ming, who fell two months before Gu Guoming, is also a "two-faced person" with different words and deeds.

Attending the democratic life meeting, he often said that he should be innocent, sober,and honest as an official; he still did not restrain himself until after retirement; he often said that he wanted to comprehensively investigate the hedonism and extravagance, but he accepted the luxurious banquet organized by the business owner in the internal restaurant; he often said that he should take the initiative to control substantive risks, but when he encountered enterprises related to interests, he opened the door to convenience; he handed in gifts and gifts from time to time, and also deliberately arranged for others to do it on behalf of others to enhance the effect of word of mouth. ...

From Gu Guoming to Xie Ming, these corrupt elements know what kind of fate they will face if their bad deeds are revealed. Fear and anxiety in their hearts force them to deliberately create a positive image. However, what ultimately awaits them is the severe punishment of party discipline and state law.

Business experts have become corrupt elements, the form of profit transmission is hidden, and "their own people" are installed to carry out gang crimes

The credit approval process has always been the hardest hit area of financial corruption.

According to the analysis and summary of the relevant responsible persons of the discipline inspection and supervision group stationed at the ICBC, the gu guoming and Xie Ming cases have the following common characteristics: First, they have become corrupt elements from experts who are proficient in business; second, the forms of interest transmission are hidden and difficult to detect; third, they have cultivated and installed "their own people" in key posts to facilitate gang crimes; and fourth, the consequences are serious, which has seriously affected the operation and development of the case issuance.

Gu Guoming has been in charge of both the credit front desk and the credit middle office in the Shanghai branch, and is familiar with various business lines and professional positions. Xie Ming, a credit major, was also in charge of credit for a long time after serving as vice president of the Chongqing branch. They are familiar with the bank's credit products, policies, systems and processes, and have a great say in the bank's credit business.

In addition to the right to speak, the "advantage" that loan companies value most is that they can professionally package loan information, cover up the essence of relaxing the risk control scale under the cloak of formal compliance, and facilitate them to obtain huge loans.

"What business can be done, according to which rules and regulations can be done, which can not be done, where is the bottom line, Xie Ming has studied these policies very thoroughly." According to the relevant person in charge of the financial business department of ICBC Chongqing Branch, Xie Ming has directly intervened in and interfered in the approval of credit projects many times, and carefully designed "private customization" rules for relevant enterprises under the banner of "innovation" for high-quality customer service. When others want to apply the rules to really good customers, there is "no way" in Xie Ming.

Behind the special convenience is a great reward. In October 2017, the person in charge of a private enterprise agreed to give Xie Ming 10 million yuan in the name of hiring a "consultant" after the expiration of the three-year ban period for Xie Ming's retirement, and pay it in 10 years.

The problem of corruption in the credit sector is often professional, technical and hidden, and it is generally difficult to detect. According to the case-handling personnel, Gu Guoming, Xie Ming, and others either optionized corruption and used their current powers to "lock in" long-term interests; or used product innovation and service innovation to circumvent institutional constraints and engage in profit transmission; or arranged for relatives to participate in relevant economic activities to seek illegal benefits.

Lending for personal gain often requires collusion between the top and the bottom, collusion between the left and the right, and multi-link cooperation. Gu Guoming and Xie Ming cultivated and installed "their own people" in key positions in the front, middle and back office departments of the credit business, forming a "one-stop" corruption. Under the intervention of Gu Guoming, the Shanghai branch appointed Shao Mou, general manager of the credit management department, as the general manager of the credit granting business department, and Shao mou, according to Gu Guoming's instructions, advised illegal enterprises to obtain loans and circumvent bank policy restrictions. Xie Ming formed a gang centered on it, with Yang Biao, former general manager of the credit approval department of the Chongqing branch, And Zhang Mengxu, former general manager of the investment banking department, as the main members, covering the former middle office, committing crimes collectively, and weakening the bank's risk control barrier and checks and balances mechanism.

Serious violations of discipline and law, such as the transmission of benefits and the exchange of benefits in the Gu Guoming and Xie Ming cases, were all at the expense of the safety of financial assets. For example, Gu Guoming received a benefit fee of 5.86 million yuan from an unscrupulous business owner, and the huge loan of the enterprise eventually formed a risk, and the business development of the case was significantly adversely affected. In 2019, the operating performance and business development evaluation rankings of Shanghai and Chongqing branches have declined sharply and fluctuated. By controlling the credit department to easily bypass the regulations within the bank and use loans for personal gain, these violations of discipline and law have also seriously damaged the political ecology of the branch where the crime occurred.

The system design in the credit field of some institutions is flawed, the system overlap and the provision gap exist at the same time, and the implementation of the system is not in place

Some bank executives have serious corruption problems, not only personal subjective factors, but also the main responsibility, supervision responsibility has not been effectively implemented, as well as the system, environment and other objective factors.

At present, China's financing structure is mainly indirect financing, and most of the enterprise funds come from bank loans. As the main channel for providing funds, bank credit is a typical area of resource enrichment and power concentration, and cadres are vulnerable to "hunting".

The system design in the credit field of some institutions is flawed, the system overlap and the provision gap exist at the same time, and the implementation of the system is not in place. There are many internal rules and regulations of ICBC, especially in the field of credit and operation, but the system design is still flawed, and the phenomenon of replacing the implementation of the system with the will of the governor occurs from time to time. For example, Gu Guoming designed and arranged through the credit department for the enterprise belonging to the same actual controller to establish a credit relationship in two branches, which easily bypassed the regulations in the bank. In order to help a boss involved in the case, Xie Ming adopted methods such as fragmentation, spin-off business, and ultra vires approval, under the pretext of "financial innovation", to break through or bypass many of these systems and processes, excluding those who held objections at the loan review meeting, and finally successfully handled financing.

The relevant responsible person of the discipline inspection and supervision group stationed at the ICBC told this reporter that from the perspective of system design, ICBC has a "three lines of defense" in the front, middle, and back office in credit management, but judging from the investigation and handling of cases, due to the interference of leading cadres and the collusion of crimes, the role of the "three lines of defense" has not been brought into place enough. For example, Xie Ming and others formed a community of interests with some members of the loan review committee, and vigorously engaged in gangs and gangs, weakening the risk control barrier and checks and balances mechanism. Some supervision and management are only formalities, failing to deeply discover and reveal problems, and the effectiveness of supervision needs to be improved.

The power of the "number one" is insufficiently restrained, and the supervision of the "key minority" is not strong and effective enough. At present, from the perspective of the authorization arrangement of the various business lines and management matters of commercial banks, the "number one" of the branch is the ultimate responsible person for human rights, power and financial rights, although there is a collective deliberation mechanism within, but in the case of the "number one" can directly determine or affect the position, salary, position, etc. of the employees, the collective decision-making mechanism of some party committee groups is in the form of a formality, and individuals or a small number of people decide on the "triple major" matters, forming a "hall of words". Gu Guoming used the power and influence in his hands to arbitrarily intervene in and interfere with the management of cadres, appoint nepotism and proximity, and arrange "tailor-made" post standards for specific targets to specific posts. The regulatory authorities are mainly responsible for the examination and approval of the qualifications of senior executives, and the supervision of these "key minorities" after formally performing their duties is not strong and effective. Gu Guoming and Xie Ming and others have been working in a local branch since they joined the work, and have inextricable ties with local enterprises, but the organization has not been aware of their "two-faced" behavior in time.

The main responsibility is not true, and the supervision responsibility is weakened. The occurrence of the Gu Guoming and Xie Ming cases has exposed that there is still a gap between some party organizations and discipline inspection organs of ICBC and the requirements of the party Central Committee in implementing the main responsibility and supervision responsibility of comprehensively and strictly administering the party, and the daily education supervision of the "key minority" is insufficient. The case also reflects the fact that some leading cadres have gone through the formalities in the "three meetings and one lesson." Gu Guoming confessed during his stay in custody: "Since joining the party in 1993, I have not seriously participated in organizational life for many years. How ironic it is to revisit the oath of joining the party in the liuzhi room today! ”

Promote the improvement of the credit approval mechanism of "grading, decentralization, avoidance, and checks and balances", and form effective checks and balances on the performance of duties and use of power in key positions

In view of the failure of the credit risk prevention system and mechanism exposed by the Gu Guoming and Xie Ming cases, the discipline inspection and supervision team stationed at ICBC issued a disciplinary inspection proposal to the ICBC Party Committee, requiring the improvement of the credit decentralization and restriction mechanism, and strengthening the supervision and management of high-risk positions such as branch presidents, risk directors, and heads of credit line departments.

Focusing on Gu Guoming's illegal interference in credit delivery, the responsibility was investigated, and the former vice president in charge of the credit line of the Shanghai branch who did not resist, report, and passively cope with the case was given the punishment of revoking his party post, and giving the relevant branch "number one" and the branch Puhui and the main responsible person of the investment banking department the punishment of revoking the party post.

In June 2020, ICBC issued the Opinions on Strengthening the Management of the Credit Granting Approval Process to promote the improvement of the credit approval mechanism of "grading, decentralization, circumvention and checks and balances", which has been fully implemented in domestic branches. The core content of the new regulations is to consolidate the responsibilities of the whole process by optimizing the front, middle and back office links, and establishing and improving the power balance and supervision mechanism. For example, establish a system of the main responsible person for the front desk operation and the main responsible person for the middle office review, consolidate the investigation and review duties; establish and improve the recusal checks and balances mechanism, strengthen the independence of collective deliberation, expand the team of full-time members, avoid the fixation of the participating members, clarify the system of the last speaker of the meeting, and strictly prohibit setting the tone in advance; establish a hierarchical management system for approvers, with no less than 2 approvers at the same level, and decentralize the right to approve; establish a trial and closing mechanism, and after the approver completes the examination, it is necessary to submit it to the president or his authorized person to perform the trial and closing procedure. The person who completes the review may veto or strictly adjust the approval plan, strengthen the supervision of examination and approval of the performance of duties, improve the recusal requirements, and make it clear that the line leader shall not approve the debt business directly submitted by the marketing department in charge or directly operated by the operating institution.

The ICBC Party Committee also dispatched 10 credit risk officers to domestic branches that focused on asset quality supervision and support, domestic branches (institutions) and integrated subsidiaries with weak investment and financing management foundations and severe compliance case prevention situations. The credit risk officer is responsible for the comprehensive risk management of the dispatched institutions, implementing the "double-line reporting" system, and promptly reporting to the head office and the party committee of the dispatched institutions when risk events and compliance case prevention problems are discovered, and assisting the discipline inspection and supervision departments in carrying out investigation and disposal work.

In view of the weak links exposed by the case in managing the party and governing the party, the "two responsibilities" are further consolidated. After the Gu Guoming and Xie Ming cases occurred, the ICBC party committee and the discipline inspection and supervision group stationed at ICBC held special meetings to analyze the root causes of the problems and study and deploy rectification and reform measures; carry out special warning education; party organizations at all levels conducted self-examinations in five aspects, such as the implementation of democratic centralism, credit, risk control, system building, selection and employment, and supervision and management; and individual leading cadres also carried out self-examination around five relationships, including the "relationship between superior and subordinate levels" and "the relationship between banks and enterprises."

In view of the problems exposed by the case, such as the lax implementation of the key post exchange and rotation system, the discipline inspection and supervision team stationed at ICBC urged the ICBC Party Committee to revise the "Regulations on the Term of Office of Managers", further clarifying the term of office, the maximum term of office and the rotation exchange requirements of the management "number one" and deputy cadres of the party committee of the head office; and promoting the strict implementation of the key post rotation system by the ICBC Party Committee, and the current proportion of exchange cadres in the first-level (directly subordinate) branch team accounts for more than 50%. At the same time, the provisions on the term of office of executive management personnel will be regarded as the key content of the special inspection of the selection and employment of personnel in the inspection and inspection.

Column Editor-in-Chief: Zhang Wu Text Editor: Fang Ying Title Image Source: Figure Worm Image Editor: Xu Jiamin

Source: Author: China Discipline Inspection and Supervision Daily Han Yadong Guan Xiaopu

Read on