Liu Jinglu
The legislation of nature for man was a substantive element of Heidegger's later thought. Man legislating nature is a fundamental spirit of Kant's philosophy. Heidegger and Kant, one is a modern great thinker, the other is a modern great philosopher, the two people are more than a century and a half apart in time, but the ideas of the two people have formed a sharp contrast in the process of historical development: in terms of views on science, Kant tried to argue that the universal necessity of science lies in the innate form of knowledge, proposing that man legislates for nature in cognition, and Heidegger aims to illustrate the one-sidedness of science's object thinking about nature, criticizing the extreme expansion of subjectivity in scientific activities. In terms of the view of practice, Kant proposed in the analysis of practical reason that man should act in accordance with the moral laws promulgated by reason, transcending man's own nature and external nature, which is man's own legislation, and in essence, this is man's own legislation for nature, and in essence, this is proposed that man legislate for nature in practice, and Heidegger proposed in the analysis of human technological practice that man and nature are the integral beings, and nature is the foundation of man's survival. Man must obtain his own measure of existence from between heaven and earth, so in the final analysis it is nature that legislates for man. This article will make a comparative discussion of these two ideas, which are in essence and complete opposites, and make a preliminary examination of the relationship between man and nature.
I. Science and Nature: Exalt the subjectivity of science to nature and criticize the subjectivity of science to nature
Science is one of the basic activities of modern human beings, but there have always been various and even completely different views on the nature of science and the role of science in human progress. Kant and Heidegger's views on this problem are two completely opposite poles.
Let's start with Kant. It is well known that Kant first explained how science is possible in order to argue how metaphysics is possible, that is, how scientific knowledge has a universal necessity. Kant believed that pure mathematics, pure natural science, is possible, and the reason why they have universal necessity is that the subject has an innate form of knowledge. When the object stimulates the human senses, the human perceptual intuitive ability begins to move, forming the appearance of external objects, and sorting out these appearances in the form of innate pure intuition, that is, space and time, to form a perceptual experience. Then, intellectual ability further synthesizes and unifies perceptual experience, combines its innate categories with perceptual experience, and forms scientific knowledge. Since these innate forms of human knowledge are universally inevitable, this ensures the universal necessity of scientific knowledge and makes scientific knowledge possible. According to Kant, this is the epistemic legislation of nature: "Reason holds principles in one hand (according to which they appear in unison can be considered equivalent to laws), and in the other hand holds experiments on which it designs these principles, and it must approach nature in order to consult nature." In doing so, however, reason does not listen only to what the teacher wishes to say as a student, but as an appointed judge, compels the witness to answer the questions he himself poses. ”〔1〕
Kant pointed out that the nature referred to in his "man-made legislation of nature" refers to the sum of phenomena, that is, the sum of appearances in our minds, not to the ontological things themselves, and that the law in his "man-made legislation of nature" refers to the law of the connection of phenomena or appearances, that is, the law of the possibility of experience in general, that is, the universal law of nature, not to the principle of experience or the natural law of experience. 〔2〕
It is in this sense that Kant makes it clear: "We must distinguish the laws of nature of experience from the laws of nature, pure or universal." The former is always premised on individual perception, while the latter is not based on individual perception, they contain only the necessary conditions for the necessary union of individual perception in an experience. As far as the latter is concerned, nature and possible experience are exactly the same thing; and since legality here is based here on this inevitable connection of phenomena in an experience (without which we can never know any object of the perceptual world), and thus on the primitive laws of reason, it would seem strange to say that the (innate) laws of reason are not derived from nature, but prescribed by reason to nature, but it would certainly seem strange, but yet it is absolutely true. ”〔3〕
Obviously, although Kant defined nature and law in "man-made legislation of nature" in this way, so that "man-made natural legislation" refers only to natural legislation in the sense of man-made phenomena and not to the legislation of man-made things themselves, although Kant argues how science can or can have universal necessity, perhaps for the purpose of drawing the boundaries of science and determining the territory of morality, for the purpose of drawing the boundaries of knowledge and establishing the territory of faith, for the purpose of drawing the inevitable limits of theoretical reason and establishing the territory of freedom to practice reason, But Kant's argument actually exalts man's subjectivity of nature in the field of cognitive activity. First of all, Kant attributed the possible conditions of experience, that is, the universal laws of nature in the sense of the sum of phenomena, to the innate form of knowledge of the subject, and believed that the intellectual property dynamically used these forms of knowledge to organize the perceptual empirical material to form scientific knowledge, and without the form and agency of innate knowledge, it was impossible to form knowledge with universal necessity, which highlighted the subjectivity of man's knowledge of nature in the form of a priori. Second, Kant viewed the relationship between scientific experiments and nature from the perspective of man-made legislation on nature. He believed that man must conduct scientific research according to the rational plan, design experiments according to the principles of reason itself, and must not let nature lead it, otherwise he will not be able to discover any law of necessity. Reason has its insight only in what is produced according to its own plan, and must not allow itself to let nature lead it along, but must guide the way forward according to the principle of judgment formed by fixed laws, forcing nature to answer the questions which reason itself decides. Any accidental observation that is not made according to a predetermined plan can never produce any law of necessity. ”〔4〕
Kant clearly shows here that man's scientific experimental design from his own rationality is the fundamental premise for exploring nature and the decisive condition for discovering the laws of nature, which highlights the subjectivity of man's understanding of nature from the perspective of scientific experiments. In short, in the relationship between science and nature, what Kant argues exalts is the dynamic performance of human scientific activities on the subject of nature, and his way of thinking belongs to the mode of thought of subject-object opposition in modern times, an object-oriented way of thinking in which man is an active subject and nature is a passive object, and the essence of this way of thinking is to make the object naturally subordinate to the subject.
In contrast to Kant, Heidegger was critical of the objective way of thinking of science and the development of modern subjectivity represented in this way. He believes that the direct cause of the indiscriminate plundering and destruction of nature by modern human beings lies in this object-oriented way of thinking of science and the expansion of human subjectivity.
Heidegger believes that modern science has two outstanding features. One is that it looks at, plans, and calculates nature only as an object object, and it only looks at nature based on how effectively the subject understands nature's use of nature, and does not look at nature from the perspective of nature itself or nature as a non-object. That is to say, modern science, as a research activity, is an object thinking that adheres to the dichotomy of subject and object. "Science, as theory, has fixed itself within the realm defined by objectivity",[5] "Any emerging phenomenon is processed until it is incorporated into the relation of the decisive object of the theory." [6] Heidegger argues that this involves the one-sidedness of science, because the appearance of science, the object-oriented thinking, must not encompass the rich essence of nature, and "the objectivity of nature is only a way by which nature appears." 〔7〕
Another outstanding feature of modern science is its enterprise production (Betrieb) characteristic.
Although scientific research itself is not directly enterprise production, because it is carried out in research institutions, the process and direction of scientific research are more and more oriented to adjusting itself only by how many material products it can eventually bring, and more and more towards the calculation of how much commodity value nature can bring, so scientific research has more and more characteristics of enterprise production. In the context of this increasingly prominent feature, the true truth-seeking scholars disappeared, and the researchers essentially embarked on the path of "technologists".
Heidegger believes that this object-oriented thinking of modern science, which understands nature only as an object, is the same process as human beings becoming subjects in modern times. Since modern times, human beings have gradually become the masters of all other beings, the subjects as opposed to other beings, and the other beings have become objects dominated by the appearance of human beings. This is manifested in the relationship between human beings' understanding of nature, that is, human beings only regard nature as an object of their own to see, think, and calculate. Therefore, the object thinking of scientific research is, in the final analysis, the expression of human beings exalting their own subjectivity to nature.
Therefore, in the analysis of science and the relationship between nature, Heidegger clearly put forward the decisiveness of nature to science: nature is by no means just the object of science, the object of thinking, but fundamentally the independent force that emerges and exists in itself, it has its own scale of operation, it must not be a transfer of science's attitude toward it, on the contrary, science can only achieve its own real development only by listening to the voice of nature and understanding nature according to its nature.
In sum, Heidegger's analysis of science is in essence the exact opposite of Kant's ideas about how science is possible. Heidegger's aim is not to affirm the universal necessity of science vis-à-vis nature, but to point out the subordinate attribute of science to nature; not to illustrate the rationality of the way of thinking in which science thinks about nature, but to illustrate the urgency of this way of thinking which must be changed; not to exalt the subjectivity of man in scientific activity, but to break the infinite expansion of this subjectivity. In a word, in Heidegger's view, it is not scientific understanding that legislates for nature, but nature that legislates for scientific understanding.
From the perspective of the development process of Western philosophy, Heidegger's idea of natural scientific legislation is a historical reversal of the metaphysics of subjectivity in the modern West. Just as the development of rationalism to the extreme inevitably produces irrationalism, the development of the philosophy of subjectivity to the extreme inevitably produces the philosophy of non-subjectivity. Of course, the dominant spirit of the entire modern Western humanism is to highlight subjectivity rather than anti-subjectivity or non-subjectivity, and what it highlights is the emotions, experiences, instincts, wills of individual survival and the subjectivity of individual survival self-selection, free decision, and uniqueness. Heidegger's later ideas, on the other hand, were the opposite of this dominant spirit. His analysis of the limitations of the era of modern subjective philosophy and the revelation of the one-sided subjectivity of the objective way of thinking of modern science to nature are not only a historical reversal of modern Kant and even the entire modern Western philosophy of subjectivity, but also have a unique significance in modern Western humanism.
Second, practice and nature: transcending nature and conforming to nature
Heidegger and Kant are completely opposite not only in their views of the relationship between science and nature, but also in their views of the relationship between practice and nature. Kant advocated that man transcend the nature of phenomena in practice to reach the essence of things, that is, the thing itself, while Heidegger advocated that man conform to nature in practice and dance in harmony with nature.
Kant analyzed the moral practice of human beings. He believes that science can only be limited to the phenomenal field of things, and cannot reach the ontological field of things; it can only be limited to the field of necessity of perceptual nature, and cannot reach the free field of supersensory nature. The true moral practice of man is different, which is based on the rational scale of man. Kant believed that man was a dual being, who had both a perceptual existence and a rational existence. Man's perceptual existence is the natural existence of man's phenomena, and man in this respect belongs to the entire phenomenon of nature, and is governed by the natural law of cause and effect, but man's rational existence means that man's action can get rid of the perceptual nature domination of man and external objects, only accept the domination of sexual will, act only according to moral laws, so as to transcend the phenomenon of things, reach the essence of things, transcend the necessity of perceptual nature, and achieve the freedom of reason itself. This is also the legislature of man (reason) for himself: "The third practical principle of the will, which is the highest condition for the harmony of reason in universal practice, is that the will of every rational being is regarded as the will of universal legislation." [8] In Kant's view, only the rational existence of man is the true existence of man.
Only when it has eternal meaning, man's perceptual existence is changeable and fleeting, and should be subordinated to man's rational and free existence. "Man, as far as he belongs to the world of sensibility, is a being of need, and within this context his reason always has an unshirkable mission for sensibility, that is, to apprehend the interests of sensibility and to establish for himself some criterion of practice for the happiness of this life and the happiness of the next life, if possible. But humans are not yet an animal through and through,...... The reason which he possesses also has a higher use, that is, it must also take into account what is good or evil in itself (this level can only be judged by pure reason, which is not affected by any perceptual interest), and it must also completely separate this evaluation of good and evil from the consideration of good and bad, thus making the former the highest condition of the latter." 〔9〕
Obviously, Kant's man's self-legislation means that man transcends perceptual nature and moves toward the rational self, beyond the necessity of phenomenal nature and towards the freedom of the ontological self, in short, man legislating himself means that man transcends nature in practice according to the requirements of reason. On the face of it, Kant's man-made legislation for himself seems to be completely different from his man-made legislation for nature, as if man-made legislation for himself is only in relation to the relation of man's reason to man's action, and man-made legislation for nature is only in terms of man's rational (intellectual) relation to external nature, but in fact it is not. I think that the two are identical in essence: both are man transcending the particularity of perceptual nature with his own rational universality, and transcending the natural necessity of phenomena with the freedom of ontological reason. The difference between the two is only that the former is that man, in the form of cognition, makes phenomena, including man and external things, naturally subordinate to the universality of reason, and the latter is that man makes phenomena, including man and external things, naturally subordinate to the universality of reason in the form of practice. As Kant himself said, pure reason (i.e., theoretical reason) and practical reason are the same reason, except that pure reason explains reason from the perspective of cognition, and practical reason explains reason from the point of view of action. Therefore, I believe that man-made legislation for oneself and man-made legislation for nature are by no means separated from each other, let alone contradictory, but on the contrary, man-made legislation for oneself is precisely an inevitable extension of man-made natural legislation in the essence of thought and an inevitable continuation of ideological logic.
Unlike Kant, Heidegger did not analyze the moral practice of man, but he did analyze another kind of human practice, modern technological activity. Although the field of practical activity analyzed by Heidegger is different from the field of practical activity analyzed by Kant, its substantive spirit is also completely opposite to Kant's thought.
First of all, Heidegger believes that modern technology is not only a means for human beings to realize themselves, but also a way of imposing on nature, and its essence is the framework of nature, and the direct cause of this framework conquest of nature is indeed the extreme expansion of human subjectivity. "The manifestation of dominance in modern technology is a kind of compulsion (dasHerausfordern).
This imposition places an unwarranted demand on nature to exploit and store its energy. [10] Modern technology has imposed nature on a merely human-for-use mode of representation, disposing of it as something which is subordinate only to man. For example, the Rhine River is limited to being a provider of water pressure, the Earth is limited to being a provider of energy, and various natural things are limited to being disposed of as raw materials for technological production. This is in effect the definition of nature as a best-of-breeding reserve at any time for human service. Heidegger pointed out,
In the case of this one-sided framework of technology, nature has lost even its status as an object being of human beings. "Anything that exists in the form of a backup no longer exists as an object of ours." [11] This restrictive treatment of nature by modern technology is a one-sided way for human beings to deal with their relationship with nature, that is, to make nature merely subordinate to man. This is the essence of modern technology - the framework (Gestell).
The occurrence of this framework nature of modern technology is indeed the result of the expansion of human subjectivity on a direct level. "The subject is 'subject' because the provisions for the being and the person himself are no longer restricted, and in any respect they are freed from restrictions. ...... Man uses the measure against the being, because he proceeds from himself and prescribes what can be regarded as existence according to himself. The scale of use is the monopoly scale through which man as the subject is established as the center of all beings. ”〔12〕
Second, Heidegger saw nature as the foundation of human existence, the home in which human beings inhabited. He pointed out that the foundation of man is not only in the same way as the foundation of animals, but the foundation of the two is the same thing, that is, nature as "complete nature". Nature is the rise and fall of the sun, the rise and fall of the moon, the flash of the stars, the movement of the four seasons of spring, summer, autumn and winter, that is, the existence of the entire universe. "Nature means the existence of the being. Existence persists as primordial vitality. It is the power to bring all things together in themselves while making all things what they are. [13] Nature serves as the foundation of human existence, that is, the home of mankind. It is of extreme importance to the survival of humanity. If humanity does not fully realize this and simply plunders it and destroys it, its own existence will fall into a rootless state. Heidegger pointed out that modern technology has seriously damaged the natural foundation of human existence, uprooted human beings from the earth, and left human beings in a state of homelessness. Therefore, human beings must stop the destruction of nature by technology in modern times, protect the foundation of their own survival, and return to the natural home. Only in this way can human beings hear the voice of nature and not be punished by nature. "The natural things of nature entrust and speak to people when they inhabit." 〔14〕
Finally, Heidegger proposed that the scale of human existence lies in the "between heaven and earth", in the harmonious dance with the gods of heaven and earth that constitute the nature of the entire universe, and this can only be achieved by overcoming the indiscriminate plundering and conquest of nature by modern technology. Heidegger believed that the whole world was composed of a unity of mutual reflection and mutual subordination composed of heaven and earth, man and god, and the four were interrelated and inseparable. Each of the Fours reflects in its own way the presence of the other three, and at the same time reflects itself in its own way, thus returning to itself in the pure oneness of the four. This reflection is not a portrait depiction, but illuminates the four and transfers their own presence into a unity of mutual subordination. [15] Precisely because man and the gods of heaven and earth are purely one, the measure of man's existence does not come only from man himself, but from man's position in this whole. That is to say, man's survival is not self-sufficient survival, but survival under the sky, on the earth, before the gods, is a kind of dwelling, therefore, the scale of human survival (class) is that it must achieve its own survival under the condition that the gods of heaven and earth are what it is, he must accept the sky, save the earth, wait for the gods, not reject the sky, destroy the earth, disobey the gods, in a word, man must coexist with all things, dance in harmony with the gods of heaven and earth. Heidegger pointed out that in order for man to live poetically with nature, he must first be freed from the framing conquest of nature by modern technology, and not continue to be in the madness of modern technology: the so-called salvation of the earth is to let the earth exist freely in its essence, not to exploit it, to exhaust it, to control it, to conquer it. 〔16〕
In short, Heidegger's thought is very different from Kant's in terms of his view of the relationship between human practice and nature. Heidegger's thought does not advocate the indiscriminate conquest of nature by man, but advocates opening up nature according to the scale of nature, not advocating the extreme exertion of subjectivity to transcend nature, but advocating non-subject-object conformity to nature, in a word, not advocating man-made legislation of nature, as Kant did.
Third, two-way legislation between man and nature
Heidegger's legislation of nature for man and Kant's legislation on man-made nature do have a fundamental spiritual difference. From Kant's man-made legislation to Heidegger's natural-man legislation, it has the historical inevitability of social and philosophical development, and is the philosophical manifestation of the profound changes that have taken place in the process of human historical development. It is not intended here to illustrate the inevitability of the historical development of society and philosophy, but only to give a preliminary view of the question expressed by the two different ideas of Heidegger and Kant, what is the relationship between man and nature.
First, it is true that man and nature are essentially both different and antagonistic, as well as identical and unified. On the one hand, nature exists in the form of unconscious and aimless immobility practice, and man exists in a conscious and purposeful way that can be consciously practiced, and man can know and act according to his own scale; at the same time, many things in nature cannot directly meet man's needs, and many phenomena and processes in nature are harmful to man, and in turn, many of man's activities will consciously or unconsciously violate the scale of natural existence and destroy the harmony of nature. This is the difference and opposition between man and nature. But on the other hand, man is the product of the development of nature to a certain stage, is a part of nature, and man himself belongs to the whole nature, so man must have natural needs, and these natural needs can only be realized directly or indirectly from the whole nature, including man, and since nature has produced man, then it must have a basis for realizing man's natural needs in a certain space-time process, so man and nature are unified.
Second, it is precisely the antagonistic and unified relationship between man and nature that determines that the legislative relationship between man and nature is by no means a one-way legislative relationship, but a two-way mutual legislative relationship. On the one hand, the difference between man and nature not only determines that man must actively understand and transform nature from his own needs, so that nature becomes the presence of human purposes in a certain scope, degree, and way, but also determines that the law of nature itself is the yardstick that man must abide by to understand and transform nature, and if he violates it, he will be punished by nature. The former is man-made legislation for nature, and the latter is natural legislation for man. On the other hand, the unity between man and nature not only determines that man can understand nature, can transform nature, and can realize the conversion of material energy between man and nature, but also determines the law of man and nature as a whole and its overall unified operation, which cannot be violated by man. The former is man-made legislation for nature, and the latter is natural legislation for man. Therefore, the two-way movement process between man and nature is the antithetical unity of man-made legislation by nature and legislation by nature for man. This is made clearer from the specific process.
From the perspective of man-made nature legislation, man-made nature legislation is manifested in the selection of natural objects in people's cognition and practical activities, the dynamic understanding and transformation of natural objects, and the use of the results of activities. First of all, the understanding and practical activities of people at a certain stage do not point to all natural objects, but to a part of natural objects, and the selection of this part of natural objects is based on the needs, purposes, interests and other factors of people at this historical stage, which is the starting point of man's legislation on nature. Secondly, in the process of understanding and practical activities, man-made nature legislation is manifested in the fact that man has great initiative or subjectivity towards nature. This is manifested not only in the fact that man can dynamically rise from the understanding of natural phenomena to the understanding of the nature of nature, in the fact that man takes the initiative to transform nature from his own ends, and in the way in which man understands and transforms nature. For example, in terms of cognition, modern physics recognizes the properties of particles by hitting them at ultra-high speeds and causing them to change, which shows the specific way in which man legislates for nature in the process of cognition, and shows that man must know the power and will of natural particles. For example, in practice, modern biological genetic engineering changes the way biological genes are combined, so that the hereditary characteristics of organisms change and breed more excellent biological varieties, which prominently shows the way people legislate for nature in the process of practice. Thirdly, in the use of the results of knowledge and the results of practice, since these results are already the purpose of man's activity, man is able to use them to achieve his own needs, and the use of these results and how to use them also shows the nature and manner of man-made natural legislation, and this is the end of a specific process of man-made natural legislation.
Conversely, from the perspective of the legislation of nature for man, nature stipulates the scope and degree of selection of the object of human knowledge and the object of practice, the object scale followed by the process of cognition and practice, and the limit of the results achievable by transforming the energy of nature. First, the total amount of natural objects is established, and exists in a certain structure, mode, and state, which determines that people's understanding and practical choices of natural objects under certain historical conditions are limited in scope and degree. For example, the biological resources of nature are limited and exist in one way or another, which determines both the limits of man's knowledge of the total quantity of natural life and the fact that man can only know and use certain creatures or specific aspects of certain creatures at a certain stage. Second, the object nature and the non-object nature associated with it in the process of cognition and practice also have their own nature, characteristics, and laws, which determine that man can only know and master them and use them according to their nature, otherwise man will be defeated or the natural basis for his own survival will be destroyed. Third, the results that man can achieve by understanding and transforming nature are ultimately determined by nature. Man can combine different things of nature to form new things that are different from the original things, but this must be based on the original natural things, and the combination or change of these natural things by man is not arbitrary, but must be premised on the internal connection between different natural things. Man cannot create something that is absolutely unnatural, it is impossible to create something that is completely detached from nature, just as man cannot create a perpetual motion machine.
From the perspective of the antithesis and unity movement of man-made natural legislation and natural man-made legislation, the interaction and interconnection between the two is the mutual generation process of the two, and man's natural object selection, the process of cognition and practice, the use of the results of cognition and practice, etc. for natural legislation and nature's legislation on man in these aspects, only in the best state of opposing unified movement will there be harmonious coexistence between man and nature. Man-made natural legislation means that nature generates from man, that is, what is natural becomes something that belongs to man, that is, what Marx called the humanization of nature. In turn, nature legislates for man, that is, man generates from nature, that is, what man becomes natural, that is, marx calls the naturalization of man. The best mutual generation of man and nature is the unity of nature's conformity with human nature and man's conformity with nature, and the unity of nature's purposefulness with man's regularity with man's conformity.
In short, the relationship between man and nature is not as simple as generally thought, but much more complex and rich. The legislation of man-made nature and the legislation of nature for man involve all aspects of the existence and unity of man and nature, and are a process of repeated contradictory movements. Kant and Heidegger emphasized the opposite side of the problem because of the requirements of their respective epochs, and thus both had both the rationality of the epochs and theories and the limitations of the epochs and theories. The significance of their ideological opposition is to promote our more comprehensive and deep understanding of our relationship with nature, so that human beings can enter the process of optimal interaction with nature. On the one hand, in connection with the crisis of the natural basis caused by the plundering and conquest of nature by modern mankind, and on the other hand, in connection with the fact that a considerable part of the peoples of mankind (such as Africa) are still powerless against the ravages of nature, it is time neither one-sided nor one-sided emphasis on man-made legislation by nature, but rather on the harmonious unity of man-made legislation and natural legislation for man. Undoubtedly, only this emphasis on the unity of the two is more in line with the reality of human existence today, and therefore the most realistic significance for the survival of mankind today. ＊
exegesis:
[1] [4] Kant: A Critique of Pure Reason, Central China Normal University Press, 1991, pp. 15, pp. 62-63.
[2] [3] Kant: Introduction to Metaphysics, The Commercial Press, 1982, pp. 92-93, pp. 93-94.
〔5〕〔6〕〔15〕〔16〕Heidegger:《Lectures and
Aufsatze" Pfullingen, 1959, pp. 63, 57, 178, 150.
[8] Kant, A Survey of moral metaphysics, The Commercial Press, 1959, p. 45.
[9] Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, The Commercial Press, 1960, pp. 62-63.
[7] [13] Heidegger, Holzwege, Frankfurt, 1980, pp. 88, p. 274.
〔10〕〔11〕Heidegger:《The Technique and the Sweep
Pfullingen, 1988, p. 14, p. 16.
〔12〕Heidegger:《Nietzsche》,Volume 2,Pfullingen,1961,第171页。
〔14〕Heidegger:《Hebel-der Haus Freund》,Pfullingen ,1958,第28页。
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