As is known to all, after the Zunyi Conference on the Road of the Long March of the Red Army determined Chairman Mao's leadership, it saved the Party, the Red Army and the Chinese revolution at an extremely critical juncture.
The former site of the Zunyi Conference
However, although the Zunyi Conference corrected the erroneous command of Bogu, Li De, and others, the situation faced by the Central Red Army after many bloody battles did not improve in the slightest.
At this time, the Central Red Army not only lost more than half of them after many fierce battles, but also, under the encirclement and blockade of hundreds of thousands of troops of various warlords and Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army, more than 30,000 Central Red Army was in danger of being surrounded and annihilated by the enemy at any time.
It was in this situation that Chairman Mao showed unparalleled military talent, he commanded the Central Red Army to cross the Chishui River in four directions, jumped out of the enemy's encirclement in one fell swoop, and entered Yunnan for the second time in April 1935.
Although the Central Red Army has shaken off the most dangerous situation, the warlord armies in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan are still blocked on the only road for the Red Army, and the Kuomintang Central Army led by Xue Yue is still like a dog skin plaster, always pursuing it.
The Long March of the Central Red Army
Therefore, after entering Yunnan, Chairman Mao commanded the Central Red Army to attack the east and the west, and let the Red Army pretend to attack Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, so that Wang Longyun of Yunnan was shocked several days and was forced to transfer the main force of the Dian Army used to encircle the Central Red Army back to Kunming, thus transferring the main force of the Kuomintang army stationed on the Jinsha River.
How did Chairman Mao command the Red Army to cross the Jinsha River?
On April 24, 1935, when Chairman Mao led the Central Red Army to enter Yunnan for the second time from Fuyuan County, Guizhou, the Red Army faced the greatest difficulty, that is, there was no clear enough and complete map.
The importance of maps for the combat march and combat of an army is self-evident, and without a map, it is especially difficult to march in the completely unfamiliar and mountainous Region of the Great Southwest.
Anyone who has been to the mountains knows that the peaks that rise everywhere can easily block the line of sight, making it difficult to discern the direction. Moreover, if there is no accurate road, it is even more inefficient to act in the mountains, and "looking at the mountains and running dead horses" is not only a proverb, but also the truest portrayal of the people in the mountains.
Yunnan Burma Highway in Yunnan during the Republic of China
To this end, after entering Yunnan, the Central Red Army, which had no map, had to find the local masses to understand the route, and then simply draw a road map according to the description of the masses. However, it is clear that such a map according to the dictation of the people is not only very one-sided, but also has huge errors in mileage, route marking, location and so on.
And such a situation is obviously very dangerous for the Central Red Army, which is being chased and intercepted by the Kuomintang, because once the precious time is delayed because of the wrong map, it is very likely that the encircling and suppressing Kuomintang troops will surround it, and the Central Red Army will face a huge threat.
Just as the Central Red Army was in trouble because it did not have an accurate map, on April 27, three days after entering Yunnan, the Red Army intercepted a car of the Dian Army in the village of Xishan in Qujing.
It was on top of this car that the Red Army not only captured a large amount of other food, but also had more than 1,000 packs of Yunnan Baiyao and 1/100,000 scale military maps that the Red Army most urgently needed.
The Long March of the Red Army
These military maps were not only accurately drawn and clearly patterned, but also had more than 20 copies, which solved the urgent needs of the Red Army. It was after the capture of these military maps that Chairman Mao and the Central Red Army had a clear idea of where they were and what was about to be planned.
Lu Liping, the founding major general and then a staff officer at the headquarters of the Red Army, recalled: "The determination to cross the river was dismounted on the night the map was captured, and the marching route and the location of the crossing were demarcated on the map that night."
Relying on these more than 20 maps, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission determined the marching route and the location of the crossing of the Jinsha River, and quickly issued the "Instructions on Our Army's Rapid Crossing of the Jinsha River to Establish a Soviet Zone in Western Sichuan."
Therefore, from the experience of the Central Red Army in Yunnan, it can be clearly seen that these military maps, which were captured in time like timely rain, played an extremely important role in the Red Army's escape from the enemy's encirclement and the crossing of the Jinsha River.
Cross the Jinsha River
It can be said that if it were not for the emergence of these military maps, the Central Red Army without military maps would probably not be able to accurately find its own location and the place of crossing the river, and it is likely to be in Yunnan for a longer period of time.
Once the Jinsha River could not be crossed in time, under the attack of hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops, the Central Red Army was likely to suffer greater losses in Yunnan. Therefore, the importance of this batch of maps cannot be overstated.
So, how did the Central Red Army intercept these military maps in time?
In April 1935, when the Long March of the Central Red Army arrived in Yunnan, the whole territory of Yunnan at this time was under the rule of the second Yunnan Wang Longyun.
However, at this time, although Long Yun said one thing and one thing in Yunnan, just like the Emperor of Tu, Long Yun was not without his own worries. At this time, the central Red Army entered Yunnan, posing a great threat to Long Yun's rule over Yunnan.
Yunnan Wang Longyun
On the one hand, once the Red Army with the support of the people stays in Yunnan and does not leave and establishes a base area, it is bound to pose a huge threat to Long Yun's rule, and with the strong combat effectiveness of the Red Army and the general support of the people, this threat is not only imminent, but also extremely terrifying.
Therefore, Long Yun was extremely vigilant about the Central Red Army entering Yunnan. This is also an important reason why after the Red Army's Long March into Yunnan, Long Yun was extremely nervous and did not hesitate to mobilize heavy troops to defend. Because the arrival of the Central Red Army did pose a huge threat to the throne of the King of Longyun and Yunnan.
But at the same time, Long Yun was wary of Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Army that had followed the Central Red Army, even above the Red Army.
Long Yun and Chiang Kai-shek both belonged to the Kuomintang, and they also sided with the encirclement and suppression of the Red Army, and Long Yun was nominally under Chiang Kai-shek's command, so why was Long Yun so wary of Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Army?
The reason could not be simpler, because Chiang Kai-shek, who is nominally the supreme leader of the Nationalist government, and warlords like Long Yun are naturally in a situation of opposition.
Chiang Kai-shek
Truly reunifying the whole country has always been Chiang Kai-shek's greatest dream, but Chiang Kai-shek, who himself started by warlords, has been co-opting his cronies, eliminating dissidents, and establishing his own central army, warlords throughout the country have also learned from each other and formed warlords of all sizes.
These warlords had different sizes of territory and different armies. However, they all have one common characteristic, that is, they rely on private armies, regard the territory they occupy as private property, and not only wantonly oppress the people, but also despise the central government headed by Chiang Kai-shek.
This naturally brought a huge threat to Chiang Kai-shek's rule, so after the Central Red Army embarked on the road of the Long March, while launching heavy troops to pursue and intercept the Red Army in the Long March, in fact, Chiang Kai-shek also had another wishful thinking, that is:
Taking advantage of the opportunity of the Central Red Army to enter the southwestern provinces, it sent troops into the southwest region in the name of encircling and suppressing the Red Army to strengthen the influence of the Central Army over the southwestern provinces; at the same time, it sat back and watched the warlords in the southwest and the Red Army fight to lose both, reap the benefits of the fishermen, and truly bring the southwestern provinces into their own scope of rule.
Xue Yue
It has to be said that Chiang Kai-shek's wishful thinking was indeed extremely exquisite and the harvest was extremely fruitful, and it was precisely by encircling and suppressing the Red Army in the Long March that Chiang Kai-shek's army and forces penetrated deep into the southwest region in one fell swoop.
The Central Army followed the Red Army into the southwest region, which was counted by Chiang Kai-shek in one fell swoop, but for local warlords such as Long Yun, it was tantamount to a thunderbolt on a sunny day.
Because once the Central Army, which was more numerous, more advanced in weaponry, and occupied Dayi, once entered its own territory, it was likely to become Liu Bei's borrowing of Jingzhou—whether it was borrowed or not, which would greatly threaten their position as emperor of the land.
And the facts also proved that Long Yun and others were worried. Just as the Central Red Army was leaving Guizhou and entering Yunnan, at a time when the "King of Guizhou" Wang Jialie led his army to suffer heavy losses in the battle against the Red Army, Chiang Kai-shek bribed many Qian warlords, forced Wang Jialie to resign from his posts as chairman of Guizhou Province, commander-in-chief of the Second Route Army, and commander of the Twenty-fifth Army, and ordered his close associate Wu Zhongxin to be the chairman of Guizhou Province, thus taking Guizhou under his command in one fell swoop.
Wang Jialie
After this, Guizhou ended the history of rule by Guizhou warlords. Wang Jialie's tragic encounter made Long Yuntu die and the fox sad, which made him extremely jealous of Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Army that followed the Central Red Army.
Therefore, on the one hand, Long Yun dispatched troops and generals to build fortifications throughout Yunnan, trying to hinder the Red Army's offensive with dense bunkers and fortifications. At that time, Long Yun's fortifications in various parts of Yunnan were spared no expense, and he successively built more than 4,000 bunkers in Yunnan Province.
At the same time, fearing that the Red Army would penetrate deep into Yunnan, strict orders were also issued to officers and officials who were ineffective in resisting the Red Army, and at that time, Long Yun even shot a county magistrate in Yunnan on the grounds that "pursuing and suppressing the Red Army was unfavorable." Moreover, in Places such as Hutou Mountain, the Dian Army under Long Yun's command did engage in a large-scale battle with the Central Red Army.
But at the same time, even though he was extremely jealous of the Central Red Army entering Yunnan, Long Yun was still reluctant to let the Central Army enter Yunnan. He had repeatedly tried to prevent the Central Army led by Xue Yue from entering Yunnan.
Dragon Cloud
According to Hu Yugao, a Kuomintang official who had served as a county magistrate in Guizhou and many other places, "Xue Yue led the army into Yunnan, and Long Yun first informed him that Xue Jun personally came to the province, and Yu Dang welcomed it, and if the unified army came with him, it would not be necessary."
However, Long Yun's wish was obviously impossible to achieve, and even though he repeatedly refused, Chiang Kai-shek, while appeasing, insisted that Xue Yue lead his troops into Yunnan. For a time, Long Yun faced the red army and the central army entering Yunnan at the same time, and became anxious.
There were wolves before and tigers after them, and they were not easy to mess with, how should Long Yun ensure his rule over Yunnan? Long Yun decided to adopt the policy of "letting go" for the Central Red Army.
Why "let it out" instead of eliminating it once and for all?
Although at this time, the Central Red Army only had more than 30,000 people, and it was always under the encirclement and interception of the Kuomintang, the combat effectiveness of the Central Red Army was beyond doubt, and even if it occupied absolute superiority, the defeats of the Kuomintang army again and again proved the powerful combat effectiveness of the Central Red Army.
The Central Red Army in the Long March
Therefore, according to Chiang Kai-shek's orders, fighting with the Central Red Army and losing both sides or even destroying the whole army was obviously not acceptable to Long Yun, but of course, he was also afraid that the Central Red Army would stay in Yunnan and not leave and occupy his old nest.
Therefore, expelling the Red Army from all of Yunnan became the best choice for Longyun. Therefore, in the face of the Central Red Army, Long Yun, on the one hand, asked Chiang Kai-shek to send air force assistance to closely grasp the movement of the Red Army in Yunnan.
On the one hand, the use of force force forced the Red Army to continue to march, cut off the Red Army's idea of staying in Yunnan, and once the Red Army showed signs of competing for territory, it ordered the Dian Army to resist desperately.
Chairman Mao and the Central Red Army naturally knew Xue Yue's ideas very well. After the Long March of the Red Army, Chen Gengya wrote to Long Yun in the name of the Yunnan Brigade Shanghai Hometown Association and the Alumni Association, saying: The Red Army's Long March passed through Yunnan, and I hope that you will preserve your strength and not be too embarrassed with the Red Army.
Road map of the Long March of the Central Red Army
Moreover, Luo Binghui, a senior general of the Red Army who was born in the Dian Army and was then the commander of the Red Ninth Army, also wrote a letter to Long Yun, expressing the meaning that the Red Army only transited through Yunnan and would not stay in Yunnan for a long time.
These active communications of the Red Army allowed Long Yun to put down some of his heart, but also further strengthened Long Yun's determination to "send" the Central Red Army out of Yunnan as soon as possible.
However, although Long Yun was already the king of Yunnan at this time, he must also take into account the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek, who occupied the great righteousness of the central government and was far stronger than him.
Therefore, how to send away the Red Army "sleeping next to the bed" without attracting Chiang Kai-shek's attention has become a difficult problem facing Long Yun.
In the end, Long Yun chose the most cost-effective and most useful way for the Red Army, that is, to present pictures. As mentioned earlier, maps are very important for an army, and only with a map can military commanders direct operations and plan marching routes.
Long Yun and Chiang Kai-shek
However, precisely because the influence of the Red Army in Yunnan was relatively weak and the time was too tight, the central Red Army did not have a suitable map after entering Yunnan, which naturally greatly aggravated the plight of the Red Army in yunnan.
Long Yun, who was born in the army and started by the army, naturally knew all this. Therefore, Long Yun cleverly used the method of sending cars to transport maps, Yunnan Baiyao and other materials, and sent this vehicle carrying a vital map to the Red Army.
For this point, after the founding of the Country, many people's memories also confirmed that the map was donated by Long Yun on his own initiative.
For example, in the early 1950s, the son of Zhang Chong, a famous general in the Yunnan Army, wu bone, personally overheard his father and Long Yun in a small talk, long Yun said to Zhang Chong: In 1935, the Red Army captured the map white medicine and other materials in Qujing, which he told the Red Army in advance through connections.
Zhang Chong
Zhao Rucheng, a soldier of the Dian Army who escorted the car to transport the map at that time, also recalled that when he was ordered to escort the car to transport the map, Yunnan Baiyao and other materials, there were many mysteries in itself.
For example, the vehicles escorting strategic materials such as maps this time are not only civilian vehicles, but also do not use more convenient methods such as aircraft, and there is no armed escort.
At the same time, the route of the car was almost to meet the Headquarters of the Red Army entering Yunnan from Guizhou, and the behavior of Deputy Li, who was also in charge of escorting him, was also very strange.
Moreover, Long Yun's behavior is also very strange in the memories of many people, for example, the reason why military supplies are transported by car instead of aircraft, long Yun gives the reason that the pilot suddenly fell ill.
However, it is clear that this reason is not valid, because as early as 1926, Long Yun strengthened the training of the Yunnan Aviation School and established the Air Force of the Yunnan Army.
Chiang Kai-shek and Long Yun
By the time the Red Army's Long March arrived in Yunnan in 1935, Long Yun had more than 50 pilots and more than one aircraft, so even if there were planes or pilots who could not fly for any reason, others were enough to replace them, so the reason for the sudden illness of the pilots was obviously unconvincing.
At the same time, sending a map to Xue Yue was sent along the direction of the Red Army's advance, knowing that military supplies were very important and the road was dangerous, but did not send an army escort, Long Yun's arrangements were not very reasonable, and further proved the purpose of Long Yun's transportation of maps.
The final result was obviously as Long Yun had hoped, and after the Central Red Army obtained long Yun's map in Yunnan, it quickly crossed the Jinsha River, not only escaping the encirclement and blockade of the Kuomintang army in one fell swoop, but also leaving Yunnan under Long Yun's rule.
At this point, Long Yun not only got rid of the threat of the Central Red Army to his old nest in one fell swoop, but also gave the Kuomintang Central Army that entered Yunnan no longer have a reason not to leave, which can be described as a perfect realization of the expected goal.
Dian Army
Moreover, after presenting the map, Long Yun had a deeper understanding of the Red Army and Chiang Kai-shek. He further experienced Chiang Kai-shek's psychology of excluding dissidents and killing people with a knife, and at the same time, he realized that the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, which were still highly morale and strong in combat effectiveness despite extreme difficulties.
In sharp contrast, Long Yun's thinking began to change, and during the War of Resistance, this change contributed to Long Yun's approval of the anti-Japanese national united front led by the Communist Party of China, and at the same time, it also made him more active in the War of Resistance. During the Liberation War, it also contributed to Long Yun's anti-Chiang kai-shek stance and the planning of the Yunnan Uprising.