"Zhu De's Military Anthology", The Experience and Lessons of the Great Victories in the Two Battles of Huangpi dongpi (1)

First, the course of the battle

The strategic plan of the enemy's "offensive and suppressing" army is as follows:

Chen Cheng (2) was the commander-in-chief of the Middle Road, with Fuzhou as the center, commanding three columns, a total of ten divisions, and encircling and intercepting Lichuan, Jianning, and Taining in the strategic principle of fighting on the outer front and attacking in separate attacks.

His strategy is implemented:

Zhao Guantao (3) was the commander of the third column, commanding four divisions of the 5th, 6th, 9th, and 79th Divisions, and attacked us from Jinxi out of Lichuan to the front, in order to resist our main red army in the Yujian and Li areas.

Wu Qiwei (4) was the commander of the second column, commanding three divisions of the 14th, 10th, and 90th divisions, from Nancheng and Nanfeng out of Kangdu to attack our Li, Jian, and Tai on the flank and intercept our way back.

Luo Zhuoying (5) was the commander of the first column, commanding three divisions of the Eleventh, Fifty-second, and Fifty-ninth Divisions, from Yihuang and Le'an out of Ningdu and Guangchang, blocking the way back of our main Red Army, and penetrating deep into the Soviet area to attack our rear.

This new strategic plan is the result of my victory in expanding the Lebanese, Jianjian, and Taixin Soviet districts. The enemy thinks that it is particularly beneficial to attack our new Soviet zone strategically.

After our main Red Army attacked Nanfeng from Lichuan, the enemy's strategy remained unchanged. After the siege of Nanfeng (6), our main force crossed the river from Xinfeng Street to Lichuan with the Red Eleventh Army, and the task was to clamp down on the enemy's third column and confuse its second column, still attracting the enemy in the direction of Kangdu, while our main force advanced westward toward Guangchang and Luokou, the enemy still did not know our actions, and its original strategy remained unchanged.

During this period, we marched west with the main force and quickly broke through the three divisions of the first column of the enemy's main force, which was the most dangerous column of our army, so we were determined to advance to Dongpi and Huangpi to encounter the enemy.

On February 27, our front attacked the fifty-second and fifty-ninth divisions at various points in Dengxian Bridge, Moluo ridge, Huoyuan, and Huangpi, and won an unprecedented great victory in eliminating the Fifty-second Division, eliminating four regiments of the Fifty-ninth Division, and capturing the commanders of the two enemy divisions (7).

This victory immediately changed the strategy of the enemy's middle-class route army; its second and third columns were changed into reinforcements of Yihuangzhi. When the enemy reached Yihuang, our front retreated victoriously, and the enemy redrew his offensive plan.

The new program is:

1. The three columns were reduced to two columns, and the strategy of dividing the attack and attacking together was changed to the strategy of overlapping the two columns as an intermediate breakthrough.

Luo Zhuoying was still the commander of the first column, commanding three divisions of the eleventh, fifth, and ninth divisions as the rear column.

Wu Qiwei was still the commander of the second column, commanding three divisions of the fourteenth, tenth, and ninetieth divisions as the front column.

The Seventy-ninth Division guarded Yihuang and the Sixth Division guarded Fuzhou. The implementation of the new plan is that Dongpi and Huangpi will take Guangchang directly through Xinfeng City and Ganzhu.

The two columns overlapped, marching at the depth of six divisions, and the long path was delivered to more than three days. The enemy did not take this into account at all, but only tried to break through the front of our Red Army in the middle, occupy Guangchang, seek political influence, and try to make the two armies of Guangdong and Fujian advance and reap the effect of encirclement. Our strategy is based on the principle of individual breakthroughs, with the Red Eleventh Army clamping down and attracting its vanguard column to the east, and after passing four divisions, that is, cutting off two divisions of the enemy's rear column (the eleventh and ninth divisions). On March 21, when the enemy's vanguard had reached Ganzhu and could not return to help at a distance of ninety miles, I wiped out most of the enemy's Eleventh Division in Dongpi, Caotaigang, Huangbaishan, perak Mountain, and other places, leaving only a regiment of people, wiping out a small part of the Ninth Division and the remnants of the Fifty-ninth Division. At night, the remnants of the enemy took advantage of the night to retreat to Huangpi, and the enemy's vanguard column also retreated to Nanfeng, and the two offensive plans were broken, thus winning a continued victory in the Battle of Dongpi.

Ii. The main principles of the tactics of the Red Army

The main principles of the Red Army's tactics were swift, secretive and resolute, and this time they were well implemented.

After the siege of Nanfeng, the Red Eleventh Army went east to confuse the enemy and reached it on schedule, and the enemy mistakenly believed that our main force moved east to Lichuan, while our main force actually moved south and turned west, and reached its destination very quickly. Operating in the border areas, the enemy never knew the location of our main force. The fact that tens of thousands of Red Army operations were able to attack the enemy unexpectedly with tens of thousands of Red Army operations is proof of secrecy and creates an example of a large-scale attack. The red soldiers' resoluteness was better than before, brave and resolute in contact with the enemy, repeatedly charging, fighting with white blades more than ten times, rushing to the highest peak, and in a very short period of time, very simply destroying the enemy, which can be the best example of the Red Army's tactics.

3. Cooperate in combat

Guerrillas, independent divisions, independent regiments and local work coordinated with the Red Army and achieved considerable results.

Our army has paid special attention to the development of guerrilla warfare and has scored great achievements. The Independent Fifth Division has a wider range of activities, and the Independent Fourth Division, as well as the independent regiments of Yihuang, Le'an, Yongfeng, and Nanguang, as well as various small guerrilla units, have all made considerable achievements in destroying enemy communications, bridges, and weights, confusing the enemy, intimidating the enemy, and so on. Since the Red Twenty-first Army moved north, guerrilla warfare has made considerable progress in coordination with the main Red Army.

Before and after the dongpi and huangpi operations, the guerrillas played a very good role; when the enemy's Fifty-second and Fifty-ninth Divisions advanced from Le'an, the front and rear flanks were surrounded by many small guerrilla units of ours, and when our main army attacked, the enemy still mistook it for a small guerrilla, thus causing the main Red Army to annihilate the enemy.

During the battle, our guerrillas and others took part in the battle behind the enemy's flank, and they were very happy to receive prisoners and guns, guns, bullets and automatic rifles; the enemy, on the contrary, was extremely panicked. After the battle, the enemy encountered the guerrillas and mistakenly believed that it was the main Red Army, and defended step by step, camped every day, occupied the position, and was tired. At this time, the guerrillas were more active.

Although the achievements in the redwashing work in military regions and localities are not very good, some have been done, and the masses are on our side. Dongpi and Huangpi were occupied by the Yihuang County Soviet and the Independent Regiment, and the news was blocked, and there were no reactionary forces in the decisive battle area to embarrass the Red Army, giving the Red Army these favorable conditions.

Fourth, the automaticity of machine arbitrariness is still lacking

At the Battle of Huangpi, we ordered and decided to use the main force to fight from left to right, quickly solve the enemy's Fifty-second Division and Fifty-ninth Division, and attack the troops aided by Yi Huang from left to right, that is, to continue to eliminate Xiao Qian's Eleventh Division. Our attempts had been instructed, but on the twenty-seventh day our main force made contact with the enemy, that is, to solve the first part of the Fifty-second Division, the commander of the division had been captured, and the battle was settled at nine o'clock in the morning of the twenty-eighth, and only one regiment of the Fifty-second Division retreated to Dahua Mountain, and was surrounded by our Twenty-first Army. During this period, it was very advantageous to quickly copy the right rear of the enemy on the right flank with a single main force, and it was most advantageous not only to solve the battle of the right wing in its entirety on the twenty-eighth day, that is, to attack the enemy's eleventh division on March 1. However, only a part of our main force was sent to reinforce the Twenty-first Army to solve one regiment of Dahua Mountain, and the rest were concentrated on standby. Although the other part of our main force has carried out the action of maneuvering arbitrarily, pursuing the enemy to the right wing front, and actually assisting the right wing army, it has not eliminated a regiment of the Fifty-ninth Division of the Western Source, the radio team, the quartermaster office, and other remnants of the enemy, that is, it has returned the unit to the formation, because it has traveled back and forth on the way, and has missed this good opportunity.

On March 1, our front had already dealt with two of the enemy's divisions, and the enemy's eleventh division rushed to the mouth of the river to reinforce Huo yuan, which was a good opportunity to destroy the enemy's eleventh division. However, our main military aircraft were not able to move their troops to the right flank in advance, and because the order of the eleventh division of the general offensive was not reached until late afternoon because the order of the eleventh division of the general attack was transmitted by radio, the time was missed, and the general attack was not carried out. Reinforcements from the enemy's second and third columns reached the mouth of the river on the second day, and I could no longer attack and had to withdraw from the battle.

The lesson of this campaign is that our resolute implementation of orders is a recent progress, but it is a defect for commanders at all levels to carry out their full tasks without the intention of their superiors and to carry out great maneuvering and arbitrariness.

Obedience to orders and arbitrariness are not in conflict. It is absolutely impossible to mislead the arbitrary act of the machine for disobeying the order, nor can it be mechanically carried out and the machine is abandoned. It has been repeatedly explained in the battle regulations and the field regulations: The Red Army must absolutely carry out orders, and at the same time cultivate the automaticity of organic and arbitrary action. We should learn from this lesson to win all victories.

The Battle of Dongpi also lacked the arbitrary disposition of the machine. After all of the enemy's Eleventh Division had collapsed and most of its weapons had been disarmed, one regiment of the remnants of the Fifty-ninth Division had also been broken up by the rout troops, one regiment had been disarmed, and one regiment reinforced by the enemy's Ninth Division had also been broken and disarmed by our army. But the commanders at the forefront cannot use the greatest opportunity to act arbitrarily, to pursue, to intercept, to threaten the other part of the retreating enemy. At night, when the enemy had retreated in the dark of the night and the movement on the way was very difficult, he did not use firepower to disturb and send troops to pursue, so that the enemy fell into a total collapse, so that we could destroy many with a small number of troops

It is a pity that the good opportunity of several enemies was completely missed, and that the remnants of the enemy's Ninth Division and Eleventh Division were able to retreat to Yihuang.

Fifth, the communication is not accurate

Liaison in mountain warfare is difficult, but our communication tools are not fully utilized to overcome this difficulty. For example, radio communications have made great efforts, but because of the large number of telegrams, the interference of natural electricity is so large that the emergency orders cannot arrive on time, the radio is far away from the command site, and sometimes it is in action, so that the order to attack the enemy's eleventh division at eleven o'clock on March day, many troops received it in the afternoon, so that the actions of the various units were not coordinated to eliminate the enemy's eleventh division. This situation is one of the reasons for the untimely communication of communications.

It is the most dangerous phenomenon that we have recently relied exclusively on radio communications as the most important tool and have relaxed the use of other means of communication. Radios are most prone to malfunctions and secrets.

Wired telephones are the most appropriate tools for command, but communications at all levels cannot be set up on time, resulting in the inability to command the dongpi and huangpi campaigns in a timely manner. The flag also has a considerable role in the mountains, but it is not fully trained in normal times, and these two battles are not used.

Reports, orders, and circulars transmitted by foot communication are delivered on time and in writing.

(6) Negligence in cleaning up the battlefield and handling post-war affairs

The comrades in charge of cleaning up the battlefield also have the habit of guerrillaism. Pick up what you need, leave the rest alone. Lift the light machine gun up, and the heavy machine gun is not needed. Some pick up the new and discard the old ones. Some collected parts of personal need, regardless of all machines, and were thus damaged so that each trophy seized was incomplete.

In the Battle of Huangpi, there were still some machine guns, mortars, and rifle cartridges on the right wing side that had not been collected, although there were enemy concerns, but if they could pay attention to it earlier, they would not give up temporarily.

In the Battle of Dongpi, on the second day after the war, the troops reported that the cleaning of the battlefield had been completed, but on the third day, when a large number of personnel were sent to clean the battlefield, the result was that they cleaned up for a week and collected more than a thousand quintals of booty, rifles, carbines, barge guns, machine guns, and mortars, and there were many bullets and countless bullet casings.

It follows from this that our ordinary comrades have not yet noticed that the spoils of war are the greatest supplement to the Red Army at present, namely, small pieces, i.e., bullet casings, which are also very much needed. Mishandling prisoners is also a guerrilla habit. The capture of a large number of prisoners was not easy to deal with for a while, but they were only sent out of the money as usual. The victory in the Battle of Huangpi was won with blood, more than 10,000 people were captured, and most of them were immediately released, leaving only more than 3,000 people. Many reactionary officers, including brigade commanders and regimental commanders, were mixed in and let go, and this was a major loss. We released the prisoners, and the enemy quickly organized them again, equipped them with guns, and two or three months later they went to work with the peasant masses. This approach really helps the enemy.

The Battle of Dongpi, having learned the lesson of the preceding paragraph, did not release a single captured officer or soldier, and wiped out the reactionary Eleventh Division completely, except for the dead and wounded, few escaped, so it would not be easy for it to restore its structure. By intensifying our political work, we can win over some prisoners to become Red Army, and the rest should be dispersed elsewhere, so that it will have a broader political significance and a more thorough destruction of the enemy's organization.

Notes

(1) From February to March 1933, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai commanded the Red Army, and in the Huangpi and Dongpi areas, adopted the policy of concentrating forces to annihilate the enemy in a mobile war, eliminating three enemy divisions, thus smashing the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression" of the central revolutionary base areas. In order to sum up the lessons learned from this anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, Zhu De wrote this article. There are eight verses in the whole text, and only six of them are included here.

(2) Chen Cheng, who was then the commander of the Eighteenth Army of the Kuomintang Army.

(3) Zhao Guantao, who was then the commander of the Eighth Army of the Kuomintang Army.

(4) Wu Qiwei, who was then the commander of the Fourth Army and the commander of the 90th Division of the Kuomintang Army.

(5) Luo Zhuoying, who was then the commander of the Fifth Army of the Kuomintang Army.

(6) On the eve of the Fourth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" campaign in the Central Revolutionary Base Areas in early 1933, the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Union repeatedly ordered Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and others to lead the Red Army to take the lead in attacking and capturing the heavy garrison cities of the Kuomintang army- Jiangxi Nancheng and Nanfeng. Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and others realized in practice that this order was wrong under the conditions at that time. They proposed to the Party Central Committee and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Union the policy of concentrating forces to annihilate the enemy individually in a mobile war. On February 4 of the same year, the new plan proposed by the Central Bureau of the Soviet Union still insisted that the Red Army attack Nanfeng. Under these circumstances, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and others made flexible arrangements that were contrary to the original purpose of the Central Bureau's order and reported to the Party Central Committee and the Central Bureau, on the one hand, preparing to attack Nanfeng by force, and on the other hand, preparing to fight the enemy's reinforcements when the strong attack failed. From February 9, the Red Army marched toward Nanfeng from Lichuan and the nearby assembly area. On the twelfth day, the Red Army surrounded Nanfeng, and after dusk launched a full-line attack on the defending enemy, and as a result of the fierce fighting all night, less than one battalion of the enemy was annihilated, but its own casualties exceeded three hundred. At this time, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and others resolutely changed the strong attack on Nanfeng to pretend to attack Nanfeng on the basis of the correct judgment of the defending enemy waiting for help and the three ways of aiding the enemy. On the night of the thirteenth day, the main force of the Red Army withdrew from Nanfeng and secretly moved to the area west of the first line of Nanfeng and Litawei, and deployed reinforcements to ambush the enemy. On the 22nd, it was transferred to the Dongshao and Luokou areas. This major decision led to the victory of ambushing and annihilating the enemy's 52nd and 59th divisions in the Battle of Huangpi at the end of February.

(7) Refers to Li Ming, commander of the 52nd Division of the Kuomintang Army, and Chen Shiji, commander of the 59th Division.