He recalls his father, Hong Xuezhi, who pioneered modern logistics work during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea

-- A special plan to commemorate the 71st anniversary of the Chinese Volunteer Army's war to resist US aggression and aid Korea

Fight in support, support in battle

Recalling his father Hong Xuezhi's pioneering modern logistics work in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea

My father, Hong Xuezhi, was ordered to the Korean front in October 1950 as deputy commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army, in charge of the headquarters, special forces, and logistics. In the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the vast number of logistics officers and men fought while providing support, made great sacrifices, fulfilled the arduous logistical support tasks, effectively guaranteed the final victory of the war, and wrote their loyalty to the motherland with their lives and blood.

It is good at adapting to changes in the situation and tasks, focusing on new operational styles, exploring the establishment of a centralized and unified logistics command system, and forming a composite army logistics organizational structure. Compared with domestic operations, the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was far from the rear, and the supply method was developed from scattered local financing and nearby support to relying on the state and unified supply. Faced with an unfamiliar battlefield, an unfamiliar enemy, and an unfamiliar style of operation, my father thoroughly analyzed the war situation and promptly proposed to Commander Peng Dehuai and the Central Military Commission that logistics should strengthen organizational leadership and implement centralized and unified command. The Central Military Commission approved and decided to establish the Rear Service Command of the Volunteer Army (hereinafter referred to as Zhihou), appoint my father as the commander, and at the same time deploy various arms to coordinate logistics operations. In addition to being responsible for the unified management of all logistics organizations and facilities of our army in korea, Zhihou also unified command of all units attached to the logistics system. In accordance with the needs of operational logistics support, we have enriched and perfected military stations, sub-departments, finance, military quartermasters, guards, ordnance, and other specialties, formulated work mechanisms and standards, and formed an all-round support system that is able to fight, defend, transport, and supply, realizing the transformation from single-branch logistics to integrated logistics of various arms, and improving the logistics support capability of the volunteer army.

In view of the passive situation of logistical support in the early stage of the war, he proposed to combine the supply of demarcation with the supply of the establishment system, and closely integrated the stability of the rear of the campaign with the mobility of the tactical rear. In the early stage of the war, the logistics branch of the Volunteer Army deployed the troops in accordance with the operational direction to carry out follow-up support for the troops, and the lack of a clear division of labor between the logistics department and the corps caused the passive support work to a certain extent. Through investigation and study and exploration in actual combat, Zhihou promptly made adjustments to the logistics supply support system, divided the ports of the motherland from the ports of the motherland to the front-line armies as the rear of the campaign, divided a number of supply areas, abolished the logistics of the corps, and set up branches to directly supply the various armies; and then divided the army logistics to the forward positions into tactical rear areas, and the units below the army level were supplied according to the establishment system. This system conforms to the principle of consistency with the operational command system, straightens out the supply relationship, and improves the efficiency of support. At the same time, according to the needs of the battlefield, the combatification of logistical support was carried out, the dual functions of "commanding battles and organizing supplies" were performed, and the logistics of the volunteer army was ensured to "fight in support and implement support in combat", thus reversing the unfavorable situation. Compared with the early stage of the war, the vehicle loss rate decreased from 42.8% to 1.8%, the material loss rate decreased from 13.4% to 10.8%, and the transportation efficiency increased by 76%.

Good at grasping the main contradictions, insisting that "thousands of transports are the first", and miraculously establishing "steel transport lines that cannot be broken, constantly exploded, and cannot be broken". The logistical support difficulties and challenges of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea are beyond imagination, and there are many difficulties in overcoming such difficulties as the supply of food supplies, the replenishment of ammunition and weapons, and the rescue and treatment of the wounded and sick. In the case of thousands of enemy planes bombing indiscriminately every day, even if the rear materials are sufficient, it is useless to transport them, the wounded and sick cannot be transported down in time, many soldiers will lose their precious lives, and transportation will become the main contradiction. Grasping the key to transportation, Zhihou adopted targeted measures such as building a transportation network, organizing relay transportation, carrying out air-to-air operations, and repairing and passing with the blow-up, and smashed the enemy's "stranglehold war" and "suffocating war" without air supremacy, and achieved the greatest guarantee results. In the more than one year from January 1951 to February 1952, the amount of enemy aircraft bombing increased by 7 times, and the amount of material transportation of our army not only did not decrease, but more than tripled.

We should be good at following the mass line, drawing on the wisdom of the masses, gathering the strength of the masses, and creatively solving difficult problems in logistics work. Zhihou often held "Zhuge Liang meetings" to ask questions of officers and men, sum up and popularize the effective experiences and practices of the troops, especially the grass-roots frontline, and overcome many difficulties. For example, in the early days of the war, the volunteer army could not eat vegetables for a long time, coupled with the fact that it was basically lying out at night and rarely seeing sunlight, which led to some officers and men lacking vitamins and suffering from night blindness. Some officers and soldiers got the local method of treating night blindness from ordinary Koreans: one was to cook masson pine needle soup to drink, and the other was to eat small toad bones (tadpoles), which my father immediately promoted after finding it effective, and the food supplied was constantly enriched, which quickly eliminated the night blindness of the troops. For another example, in train transportation, the method of "crossing the river with cattle" is adopted in the form of "guerrilla stations" and "sheep-pulling style loading and unloading" outside the station; for railway bridges that cannot withstand the heavy pressure of the locomotive head due to emergency repairs, the method of "crossing the river with cattle" is adopted, and when the train crosses the river, the locomotive is adjusted to the rear of the train, and the lighter carriage on the head of the car is used to cross the bridge, and another locomotive is used on the opposite side of the bridge. For another example, in road transport, the transport of successive rows will be changed to the transportation of sports bicycles in scattered rows, and the system of segmented charter transportation will be implemented, and hidden bunkers will be excavated along the line to reduce the loss of personnel and vehicles and improve the efficiency of transportation.

Through the practice of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the CPC Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Mao have gained a completely new understanding of logistics modernization. Many senior cadres have also profoundly realized that in modern warfare, logistical support occupies an extremely important strategic position, and the amount and timeliness of material supply directly affects or even determines the scale and duration of the campaign, and has become one of the main bases for commanders to make up their minds and carry out deployments. The practice and experience of logistical work in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea fully explain:

Logistics itself is an important component part of combat effectiveness, not a guarantee factor other than combat effectiveness. The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was fought abroad and far away from the rear, and the main method with which our army was familiar with in the past was "other confessions" has been replaced by "self-confession." In front-line combat operations, logistics has become an important component part of combat effectiveness, and it is not at all a guarantee factor other than the optional and negligible combat effectiveness.

Logistics is the guarantee of the continuous generation of combat power. The combat effectiveness of front-line troops is dynamic, not fixed, and has a continuous generation process. If logistical support is not timely, combat effectiveness will naturally decline. At this time, logistical support is particularly important, and logistics such as the mobile advance of the troops, the supply of grain and ammunition materials, and the transfer and treatment of the wounded and sick are important supports for the continuous generation of the combat effectiveness of the troops.

The logistics transport line is the "lifeline" of combat effectiveness. The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was fought in the middle and late stages, and in a certain sense it was a fight for logistics. Due to the backward logistics supply method of our army, coupled with the strong air blockade of the US army, the communication line is blocked, resulting in combat materials mainly carried by soldiers, often only able to support a week of combat operations. The facts of blood have proved that no matter how many materials there are, they cannot be transported to the front line and to the hands of front-line officers and men, which is useless. In war, the logistics transport line is the real "lifeline", "victory line" and "lifeline".

Logistics work must also require the coordinated operations of various services and arms in order to achieve combat-oriented support. Support in battle and fighting in support is a true portrayal of the logistical support of the Volunteer Army. It is precisely because the logistics units of the volunteer army have their own strong combat and protection capabilities that they can break through the layers of blockade of the US army and continuously send ammunition and materials to the front line, thus ensuring the final victory of the war. The above valuable experiences exchanged for life and blood are extremely precious and play a pioneering and foundational role in accelerating the modernization of our army's logistics.

(Author: Hong Hu, former governor of Jilin Province, son of Hong Xuezhi, deputy commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army and commander of the Rear Service Command)

Source: People's Liberation Army Daily