At about 11:00 a.m. on August 28, 1945, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Wang Ruofei, and other Communist Party leaders, accompanied by U.S. Ambassador to China Hurley and Chiang Kai-shek's special envoy Zhang Zhizhong, boarded a special plane from Yan'an to Chongqing.
On the plane, Hu Qiaomu, the secretary of the CPC Central Committee and a so-called "pen within the party," asked Mao Zedong: "Can we come back?" Mao Zedong replied with 12 words after a little thought: "Regardless of it, it is likely to be an insoluble situation." ”
The simple words "no situation" show that Mao Zedong was prepared from the very beginning not to talk closely, so since the talks could not be discussed, why did he go to Chongqing at the risk of being assassinated by Kuomintang agents under the favorable situation of having already sat on more than 1 million troops and more than 2 million militiamen? The reason can be inferred from his conversation with Zhang Lan three days later.
▲ On August 28, 1945, Zhang Lan (first from left), chairman of the China Democratic League, personally went to Chongqing Airport to greet Mao Zedong's arrival. The two shook hands cordially.
On the third day of arriving in Chongqing, Mao Zedong took the initiative to visit Mr. Zhang Lanlao, the chairman of the Democratic League, whom he respected very much, on August 30, and during the banquet, Zhang Lan was very worried about Mao Zedong's personal safety, saying that he did not believe that Chiang Kai-shek had the sincerity of peace and democracy, and even bluntly said that Chiang Kai-shek was making a fake play.
For Zhang Lan's heartfelt words, Mao Zedong was very touched and attached great importance to it, and he immediately said his true thoughts in his heart: Even if it is a fake play, we must also fake the play and really do it, so that the people of the whole country can be the audience, see the true and false, and distinguish between right and wrong.
In fact, mao zedong said bluntly in his public speech as early as early August: "According to Chiang Kai-shek's policy, it is necessary to fight a civil war", and at that time he also gave a response strategy: "Tit-for-tat confrontation, every inch of land must be fought", "Chiang Kai-shek is against me, and Chiang Kai-shek stops me."
The so-called "fake drama is really done" is actually to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek in interpreting the drama of the Chongqing negotiations, and then in this process, we will fight a good public opinion war and a political war, so that the people of the whole country can clearly see who wants civil war and who wants peace.
It can even be said that as long as after this negotiation, Chiang Kai-shek accepts the idea of peaceful nation-building, then Mao Zedong will not be afraid, because as long as Chiang Kai-shek dares to launch a civil war, then he will act unjustly, that is, deliberately destroy peace, then Mao Zedong and the Communists will have a legitimate reason to defend themselves and counterattack, then the People's Liberation Army will be the only righteous teacher.
Do not underestimate this, justice is crucial to winning the war.
It turned out that Mao Zedong won, and the development of the whole "story" behind it was almost exactly what he had envisioned.
The following is to recreate the thrilling war of words and words in that year by reconstructing the 14 meetings between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing.
After arriving in Chongqing, Mao Zedong was warmly welcomed.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="22" > the first and second meetings: the guest is as stable as Taishan</h1>
At three o'clock in the afternoon of August 28, the plane landed smoothly at the Chongqing airport, and Mao Zedong was widely welcomed by the crowd after walking out of the hatch; at 8:30 p.m. that night, Mao Zedong was invited to attend the welcome banquet specially held by Chiang Kai-shek in his home, which was his second face-to-face conversation with Chiang Kai-shek after about 20 years.
20 years ago, they both served in the Kuomintang, and Mao Zedong's official position was even higher than chiang kai-shek's; in 20 years, although they had never met, they were very familiar with each other, Chiang Kai-shek regarded Mao Zedong as a thorn in the flesh of his eye, called him a "red bandit", and even repeatedly explicitly asked for his head, but dramatically, 20 years later, Mao Zedong not only did not disappear, but became more and more courageous, and when he sat in front of Chiang Kai-shek again, he had become the supreme leader of the Liberated Areas with a population of 125 million.
Therefore, when negotiations began under such circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek was anxious, mao zedong was in no hurry, and the strategy he always believed in was "mourning the soldiers must win."Therefore, after arriving at Chiang Kai-shek's mansion on the same day, his posture was very low, and he took the initiative to raise a glass many times to wish "Chairman Chiang Kai-shek" good health, did not talk about any political topics, treated Chiang Kai-shek as an old friend, and completely respected Chiang Kai-shek's "master" posture.
Not only that, on the night after the banquet, Mao Zedong did not return to Guiyuan, Zhang Zhizhong's prearranged residence, but instead followed the host and gladly invited him to stay in Chiang Kai-shek's mansion Forest Garden, the whole process was not arrogant and impatient, as steady as Mount Tai, creating a very harmonious atmosphere for their first meeting.
▲ The second building of the forest garden, also known as the "Meiling Building", was repeatedly stayed here by Mao Zedong during the Chongqing negotiations.
The next morning, perhaps not adapted to Chongqing's "stove" climate, perhaps not accustomed to the high bed soft pillows here, or perhaps the need to "reverse the jet lag" (before he was used to resting during the day and working at night), Mao Zedong got up early, completed the washing in three or two clicks, and then went to the forest outside the house alone for a walk, the early morning forest garden air is fresh, cool breeze, very comfortable.
Just as the so-called narrow road was narrow, walking along, he met his old rival Chiang Kai-shek, who had also gotten up early (Chiang Kai-shek had the habit of getting up early) and also walked in the garden.
As the saying goes, "the mountain rain is about to come and the wind fills the building", which is the last tranquility before the storm.
▲ In the early morning of August 29, 1945, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek had a brief exchange here.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="35" > third and fourth meetings: the beginning of confrontation, the beginning of the conflict</h1>
On the morning of August 29, the two parties began a formal meeting at the Marshall Mansion, the third building of the Forest Garden: in the morning it was a general conversation between Zhou Enlai and Zhang Zhizhong, and in the afternoon it was a summit meeting between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek.
At that time, Chiang Kai-shek righteously and sternly stated that there was no civil war in China, and Mao Zedong was very unhappy about this statement; he did not choose to acquiesce, but listed on the spot the fact that the Kuomintang troops had repeatedly "encircled and suppressed" the Communist forces in the past ten years or so.
This was the third meeting between the two, and the first formal meeting between the two on the table, although there was no victory or defeat, but the flames had begun to ignite.
▲ Linyuan Building No. 3, also known as "Marshall Mansion", is mainly used for meetings
That evening, Mao Zedong was invited to stay in The Second Building of the Forest Garden.
According to the "Long Story of President Chiang Kai-shek", that night, when Mao Zedong was resting in the house, Chiang Kai-shek, surrounded by Zhang Zhizhong and Shao Lizi, took the initiative to come to the Lotus House, the second building where Mao Zedong was staying, in order to fulfill the friendship of the landlord.
In the process, everyone, including the guards on both sides, obediently stood outside the door, and only Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek were in the house, who talked secretly for about half an hour, and the content was not known to the outside world.
Chiang Kai-shek once called it "ordinary socializing" in his diary that day, but Mao Zedong did not talk about it openly, and it can be speculated that it should be a general conversation.
▲ During the Chongqing negotiations, Mao Zedong stayed in the "Meiling Building" many times
So far, Mao Zedong had already met Chiang Kai-shek four times in just one and a half days and a half after arriving in Chongqing, during which Chiang Kai-shek seemed to be courteous and thoughtful, but in fact he had already made other plans behind his back.
On August 29, the same day of their talks, Chiang Kai-shek secretly ordered He Yingqin to issue the "Handbook for Suppressing Bandits" to various theaters, which was a lesson plan for "suppressing" the Red Army that he personally wrote in June 1933.
After these four ceremonial meetings, Mao Zedong officially began a fierce battle of wits and courage with Chiang Kai-shek.
▲ During the Chongqing negotiations, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="45" > Fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth meetings: fierce confrontation, retreat to advance</h1>
After returning to Guiyuan on August 30, Mao Zedong was busy for several consecutive days, first taking the initiative to visit Many democratic authorities such as Song Qingling and Zhang Lan, and then receiving visits from literary and art circles including Liu Yazi, Shen Junru, Huang Yanpei, Wang Kunlun, And Zhang Bojun.
During this period, almost everyone who met mao zedong directly or indirectly advised Mao Zedong to leave as soon as possible, "Chongqing's climate is not good, and the mountain city cannot stay for a long time. In his view, since people have come, they must carry out a struggle, find the weakness of the other side in the struggle, and force the opponent to make moves, so that they can see the tricks and give full play to the advantages of the back hand.
Therefore, on August 30, Mao Zedong initially proposed a negotiated plan for retaining 48 integrated divisions in a telegram to the Central Committee of Yan'an.
Three days later (September 2), he met with Chiang Kai-shek for the fifth time in the forest garden, during which Chiang Kai-shek also showed the price tag, saying that the maximum number of integrated divisions of the CCP was 12, which was far from the 48 mentioned by Mao Zedong on August 30. Mao Zedong chose to retreat into advance.
▲ Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek during the negotiations in Chongqing
On September 3, when Zhou Enlai and Zhang Zhizhong were negotiating, Mao Zedong had already reduced the number of integrated divisions from 48 to 28 on the initiative, taking the lead in making huge concessions on this crucial military number, the purpose of which was actually very simple, to fully demonstrate the sincerity of our negotiations, and then to see how the opponent behaved.
On the same day, Mao Zedong also took the initiative to visit a group of well-known "anti-communist" people, such as Dai Jitao, Wu Zhihui, and others, and when he visited Dai Jitao, he unexpectedly met Chiang Kai-shek, which was their 6th meeting, when Chiang Asked Mao Zedong where to go, Mao Zedong said that he had gone to see Dai Jitao, and Chiang Kai-shek was first frightened, and then he smiled and said: "Good, good to see, good to see." In fact, all the "anti-communist" celebrities at that time, including Dai Jitao, did not expect Mao Zedong to take the initiative to visit, and behaved quite crampedly, while Mao Zedong was calm.
At that time, Mao Zedong wanted to convey our desire for peace to the outside world, which seemed to be an initiative to show weakness, but in fact it was retreating into progress.
▲ Mao Zedong during negotiations in Chongqing
On the evening of September 3, Chiang Kai-shek heard from his subordinate Zhang Qun that we had proposed a plan for 28 reorganized divisions, and he felt "deeply stimulated by his brain", because the number he wanted was 12, and judging from the diary of those days, he was very dissatisfied with the results of the negotiations between Zhang Zhi and others.
About a week later, Chiang Kai-shek finally ordered Yan Xishan's troops to invade the Shangdang Liberated Areas and take the lead in tearing off the false mask of the peace talks, one set after another, which aroused the strong dissatisfaction of many patriots in Chongqing.
It was in this sudden situation that Mao Zedong also tacitly interrupted the summit talks, and only held three ceremonial meetings (the 7th, 8th, and 9th) on September 4, 5, and 12, and the struggle between the two sides suddenly shifted from the stage to the stage, for which Mao Zedong was prepared.
From the Battle of Shangdang to September 12, the Jin-Hebei Luyu Liberated Area annihilated the 30,000 troops invaded by Yan Xishan's army in one fell swoop, and the huge military victory gave Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others great bargaining chips, but at the same time it also stimulated Chiang Kai-shek's self-esteem and desire to win and lose.
▲Shangdang campaign information photo
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" Data-track="71" > Tenth meeting: frequent accidents and life-threatening</h1>
On September 17, Mao Zedong was invited to meet with Chiang Kai-shek for the 10th time, but the result was predictable, it was still fruitless, and the negotiations between the two sides were almost deadlocked.
On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek personally wrote a letter to Yan Xishan to exchange military battle plans, and at the same time attached two copies of the "Handbook for Suppressing Bandits" that he had written, as if he had abandoned the so-called negotiations.
Mao Zedong was certainly well aware of this, and for the next 21 days, he and Chiang Kai-shek never saw each other again, and the negotiations were completely interrupted, and even on the verge of rupture.
At the same time, there were some unexpected events in these 21 days, which not only brought the Chongqing negotiations closer to breaking down, but also put Mao Zedong in great personal danger.
On September 22, Hurley, as the mediator of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, suddenly returned to the United States to report for duty, and he had personally promised to guarantee Mao Zedong's safety, and now his sudden departure made Zhou Enlai begin to worry about Mao Zedong's safety; on September 27, the "master" Chiang Kai-shek also suddenly left Chongqing and went to Xichang to recuperate, and after staying for several days, his departure directly caused Mao Zedong to lose his corresponding negotiating opponent, which made the already cold negotiations even more deadlocked, in this case, Mao Zedong also had the idea of leaving Chongqing.
On October 5, in order to ensure the personal safety of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai took the initiative to visit the Soviet ambassador to China, hoping that the other party would use a third party as a guarantee, but the other party refused, this vague statement made Zhou Enlai more worried, he ran in many ways, and finally only Zhang Zhizhong made a clear statement, "I welcome Mr. Mao to come, of course, I am responsible for sending him back", which is to make Zhou Enlai's hanging heart have a little comfort.
Judging from the current situation of struggle, the negotiations could not be concluded in a short period of time, and Mao Zedong could no longer stay in Chongqing, so in order to let Mao Zedong return to Yan'an as soon as possible, Zhou Enlai submitted his own draft "Minutes of the Meeting" on October 5 in order to speed up the negotiations and give Mao Zedong a suitable reason to leave as soon as possible.
At that time, Mao Zedong himself also decided to leave, because he had a premonition that there would be no breakthrough in the talks, so when Zhou Enlai submitted the minutes of the meeting, he originally decided to leave on the 9th, but he did not expect that Chiang Kai-shek forcefully retained him to stay for the Double Tenth Festival, Zhang Zhizhong also expressed his hope that Mr. Mao would stay to attend the signing ceremony of the "Minutes of the Meeting", and said that he was such a big person who came, he always had to make something, and finally Mao Zedong had to postpone it until the 11th.
However, just as they were nervously preparing to sign the agreement, a wave of unevenness arose again, and on October 8, a shooting incident broke out on the streets of Chongqing, and Li Shaoshi, the former director of the Eighth Route Army's office in Chongqing, was assassinated by secret agents, which completely aroused the highest vigilance of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and Mao Zedong's return was already on the string.
On October 11, 1945, Mao Zedong left Chongqing
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="82" > The eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth meetings: sign the agreement quickly and leave Chongqing immediately</h1>
On October 9, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek met for the 11th time in the forest garden, the main trip was to bid farewell to Chiang Kai-shek, the parting was imminent, the conversation between the two was still scorching, Chiang Kai-shek still proposed that the Chinese Communists abandon the army and the liberated areas, Mao Zedong resolutely disagreed, "the people's armed forces, a gun, a bullet, must be preserved, can not be handed over", for Chiang Kai-shek's toughness, Mao Zedong did not make concessions.
On October 10, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek met twice, one was the signing of the Double Tenth Agreement during the day (the two sides agreed to build a peaceful and democratic country, but there was no agreement on the number of liberated areas and integrated divisions, and other issues were recorded according to their respective formulations), and the other was mao Zedong's overnight stay in the forest garden at night, but still fruitless.
▲Double Ten Agreement
On the morning of October 11, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek had breakfast together, which was their last meeting during the Chongqing negotiations, and the last time they had met in their lives, and after that, until the death of both sides, they did not see each other again, and the two had a brief exchange on the issue of the Liberated Areas again, but Mao Zedong still did not budge, and the two hurriedly ended the 43-day negotiations.
At about 9:30 after breakfast, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai left the forest garden together, and before leaving, he also shook hands with the Kuomintang gendarmes who also served in the forest garden and said: You have worked hard, thank you, and then boarded the plane at 9:45, and the Chongqing negotiations came to a temporary end.
Looking at this negotiation, it seems that there are some "tigers and tails", at the beginning Mao Zedong showed a low profile, halfway with Chiang Kai-shek to fight wits and courage, the negotiation table can not be close, then give a strong military blow, originally achieved a favorable situation, but did not expect that in the later period but accidents frequently, in order to preserve the existing results and ensure that no personal accidents occur, Mao Zedong quickly left Chongqing, the end was very fast.
When he left, the result of the negotiations was actually similar to what he predicted on the plane 43 days ago, it was a "no-win situation", although he left, but the negotiations were not completely over, and then Zhou Enlai would continue the negotiations.
But even so, the content of this "no-win situation" is almost enough, and Chiang Kai-shek has accepted the principle of peaceful and democratic nation-building, which is known to the whole world, as long as there is this, he will not be afraid to fight in the future.
▲ On June 26, 1946, The Kuomintang troops besieged the Liberated Area of the Central Plains centered on Xuanhuadian in Eyu-Anhui, and a full-scale civil war broke out.
Only eight months after the Chongqing negotiations, the Kuomintang troops took the lead in invading the Liberated Areas of the Central Plains, the People's Liberation Army responded, the national civil war officially broke out, and two years later, the People's Liberation Army turned into a strategic counteroffensive, until 1949, when the victory was basically determined.
In fact, in hindsight, mao zedong originally rushed to Chongqing to go to this "Hongmen banquet", as if it was a chess piece that had been set long ago, although it was somewhat dangerous, but the significance was significant enough, for this dangerous move, Mao Zedong had to play, and he also had to play accurately and fiercely.
As long as the Chongqing negotiations are played well, the situation behind will be like a domino, as long as one card is pushed down, the rest is a victory like destroying the decay.
The great historical significance of the Chongqing negotiations is far higher than you think.