College of Military and Political Basic Education, National University of Defense Technology: Wu Shenye, Yang Zhengsheng, Liu Yiao
In order to revive the majesty of "the sun never sets", Britain's recent investment in the construction of the Royal Navy has become more and more eye-catching. When political and economic issues are superimposed on technical issues, where does the development of weapons and equipment go?
Babcock Shipbuilding Group
Last year, Britain announced that it would permanently deploy a Type 31 frigate (also known as the Arrow-140 frigate, Swiss Army Knife) in the "Indo-Pacific region", and launched a new Type 31 frigate to fill the gap in the frigate field, improve the combat effectiveness of the navy, and maintain national security. At the same time, the Royal Navy's Type 45 destroyer, known as the "first ship in Europe", is also undergoing a metamorphosis.
Type 31 frigate
However, opportunities and challenges coexist, and many problems have become apparent during the development of Type 31 frigates and Type 45 destroyers.
The first is the cost conundrum of planning. In 2019, the British Ministry of Defense announced that the Arrow-140 frigate scheme offered by Babcock International won the Type 31 frigate tender program and signed a contract with the company for the construction of five Type 31 frigates. In April 2023, Babcock International and the UK Ministry of Defence launched a DRP (Pre-Dispute Dispute Resolution Procedure) to secure an additional £100 million in funding. Although the UK Ministry of Defense has eliminated the requirement for more expensive equipment, the contract price is still as high as $336 million, and the actual price is likely to be higher, even exceeding the defence budget. Earlier, Babcock International proposed to replace the Sea Viper missile system with the American Mk-41 anti-aircraft missile system in order to increase the combat capabilities of the Type 31 frigate. However, the use of American-made missiles will not only significantly increase the cost of ships, but will also lead to the phasing out of European weapons systems. After providing Ukraine with high military spending, Britain's financial resources were greatly reduced, and only equipped the Type 31 frigate with one 57 mm naval gun and two 40 mm secondary guns, and installed two 8-pack vertical hair units, which made a ship with a displacement of nearly 6,000 tons equipped with weak firepower and low practicality.
Secondly, the delay in the plan can lead to a vacancy in the defense. After the two Type 23 frigates announced their early retirement, the number of frigates and destroyers available to the British Navy was further reduced, while the Type 45 destroyers frequently "lay down" and "dropped the chain", and the national defense and security problems became more and more serious. The British Ministry of Defense made a hasty decision accordingly: to compensate for the reduction in the total number of ships with cheaper frigates. But apparently, this is just a self-deceptive move, and political and economic issues are choking the development of weapons and equipment.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Australia. It is rumored that Australia ordered frigates of the "Hunter" type (a modification of the Type 26) not because it was the best or most suitable for its class, but because there was a behind-the-scenes deal between London and Canberra. Now, as the implementation of the "Hunter" frigate program has become more expensive and right-leaning, more doubts have gradually emerged.
"Hunter" class frigates
The first is the planned delay. Initially, the Australian side asked for the first Hunter frigate to be commissioned in 2027, but now it has postponed it until 2032. The main reason for this is that the Australian-designed Ceafar-2 modular active phased array radar system is significantly better than the original Artisan 26 radar of the British Royal Navy when it comes to improving the air defense capabilities of capital ships, but at the cost of increased weight, so the hull width will be increased by 0.6 meters compared to the Type 26 design. But even a slight change in the dimensions of the hull would mean a major recalculation of the original design, which would significantly delay the original plan. And if you switch to the American Aegis air defense system, then it is much easier and cheaper to equip 3-6 ships than before. Due to COVID-19 and other complex elements affecting the Marine Corps, including radar and combat systems, the parties agreed to postpone the steel cutting time for another 18 months in 2021. The postponement of the plan exacerbated the emptiness of Australia's defense, creating an atmosphere of crisis for the development of weapons and equipment.
The second is the issue of politics. Theoretically, the Spanish company Navantia's FREMM or F-100 would be more in line with the requirements of the Australian Navy, and in the fall of 2022, the company offered Canberra to buy more Hobart-class destroyers (the company delivered three such ships to the Australian Navy between 2017 and 2020). This would have solved Australia's needs, but political issues intervened: after the conclusion of the AUKUS treaty, the Australian Navy needed surface ships designed for missile attacks on sea and land targets, while anti-submarine and anti-ship missile capabilities were on the back burner and could only be used as a means of self-defense. So Australia, despite the domestic crisis, ordered frigates of the "Hunter" type. At the same time, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) appealed: "Reduce the order for the Hunter to 6 ships." Because the current plan will lead to an imbalance in the fleet, the focus should be on anti-submarine defense, and the rest of the ships should be replaced by multipurpose frigates or destroyers with stronger missile capabilities to meet the requirements of force projection strikes. ”
It can be seen that these military procurement and R&D decisions are often not only limited by the feasibility of technology and the bearing capacity of surface capital, but are also deeply influenced by political factors, which are deep capital. But when these so-called old capitalist countries lose control of capital, both deep and superficial, it remains to be seen what way to forge the blade of the state, military power.