On April 15, 2024, the U.S. Army Pacific issued a press release stating that as part of the "Salaknib 24" exercise, C-17A transport aircraft of the 62nd Airlift Wing of the U.S. Air Force transported the "Intermediate-Range Capability" missile weapon system from Company C of the 5th Battalion of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment of the 1st Multidomain Task Force of the U.S. Army from Joint Base Lewis-McCord, Washington, to the Philippines on April 7, during which a total of 15 hours of flight and a cumulative flight distance of more than 12,875 kilometers. Subsequently, on April 11, the system was successfully deployed in northern Luzon in the Philippines. It is reported that this is the first time that the US Army has deployed an "intermediate-range capability" missile weapon system outside its home base, and at the same time, it is also the first deployment of the system in the Asia-Pacific region.
Marcos Jr. admitted in a recent interview that the United States has added four new military bases in the Philippines "to target China."
This deployment is more of a test of the US military's mobile deployment capability. As far as the United States is concerned, the dilemma of insufficient strategic resources has already emerged in the western Pacific, so the concept of "distributed strike" put forward by the United States is more about relying on existing communications and networks to form a highly mobile strike network, and in this way consume the opponent's strategic resources and maintain its own strike capability.
In fact, the increase in deployment in the Philippines is not surprising, because the Philippines is a military alliance of the United States, although it does not carry much weight. The United States has a large chain of interests in the Philippines, which also gives the United States a very deep control over the Philippines. The increase in military deployment in the Philippines will help the United States provide fire support to the Bass Strait, the Balintang Strait, the northern part of the South China Sea, the southern part of Chinese mainland, and the island of Taiwan. So it's no surprise that the U.S. would naturally choose to increase its presence in the Philippines.
Of course, logically speaking, the US military is forced to engage in guerrilla warfare because it cannot concentrate all its military forces in the Asia-Pacific region against China, and it also lacks intermediate-range missile firepower (for the time being). The currently deployed Typhon system can launch Tomahawk Block IV/V cruise missiles, as well as Standard-6 anti-aircraft / anti-missile / anti-ship missiles. The deployment of this system is relatively mobile, and it is relatively difficult to capture and strike.
There are also many options that China can take. First of all, it is necessary to clearly revise the rules of engagement, which on the one hand will allow China to attack hostile targets in third countries, and on the other hand, it will also deter the political intentions of third countries to confront China. Saying it plainly is a credible deterrent.
Secondly, it is to paralyze and strike at important nodes of the entire network, which is the most effective strategy. Of course, this will not be an easy strategy to achieve, but it is what the PLA has been doing before. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has many long-range strike means, medium-range missiles generally have a flight time of less than 15 minutes after launch, and hypersonic weapons are even shorter, so it is feasible to strike these targets. In addition, there is also a lot of weapons and equipment that can be used to strike at large rear air targets such as US transport planes, and the key is to establish a larger-range battlefield perception capability and the shortest possible strike chain.
Third, the logic of the U.S. guerrilla warfare is to cover up the defects of its own insufficient strength through mobility, so as to achieve the intention of containing the opponent's huge forces with a small number of troops. If China can continue to increase its resources and further widen the resource gap between the two sides, this kind of high-tech guerrilla warfare will tend to be ineffective.
Some people say that this deployment amounts to the "Cuban Missile Crisis", but this is an exaggeration. There has always been U.S. military power around China, and to drive it away is the final step that involves changing the basic rules of the entire international system. The current deployment of the United States will frankly not have a substantial impact on the overall balance of power, and if the United States dares to deploy nuclear weapons in the Philippines, then China will never be polite. This deployment has not yet reached such a level of high-intensity confrontation, and it is not enough.
From a larger strategic point of view, China's ability to radiate to Southeast Asia is still very strong, and as long as Southeast Asia does not side with the United States, it can be in China's interests. If the Philippines wants to follow the United States, in the long run, it will lead to the marginalization of the Philippines in the development of Southeast Asia, and social pressure may bring about greater changes. We can even say that if China cooperates with a new political family, it is entirely possible that the political power in the Philippines will change. In the long run, to ensure China's domestic stability and development, the overall situation will always be in our hands.