#以军称伊朗的袭击将 "Responded" #
On April 15, local time, the chief of the general staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Hezi Al-Halevi, said during an inspection of the Nevatim airbase that Iran's missile and drone attacks on Israel "will be responded." According to local Israeli media reports, on the same day, after several hours of discussion, Israel's wartime cabinet decided to counter the previous Iranian missile and drone attacks. According to the report, Israeli officials decided to continue meeting on the 16th to discuss counterattack actions.
For now, Israel's attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria from the outset has shown a strong urge to expand the conflict. And judging from the pre-action perceptions of some Israeli intelligence services, Israel still has a tendency to seriously underestimate its adversaries. As a result, Iran's retaliation is more intense than Israel expected. Of course, it remains to be seen whether this news is reliable.
Israel's motivation to expand the conflict is relatively sufficient. First, Netanyahu needs to meet the demands of his political allies at home, and Netanyahu needs to give his country an account on issues such as judicial reform. While Netanyahu has practical political considerations for doing so, especially as Israel's domestic structure is becoming increasingly unbalanced, it is clear that Netanyahu is not really going to break the game. It's just that for Neta to consolidate power, an insecure state is necessary.
Second, Israel also needs to create conflict to avoid a greater U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East. The United States has been advancing this strategy in order to concentrate strategic resources to compete and confront China. Israel will worry about the decline in strategic attention to Israel after the US withdrawal from the Middle East, which is similar to Hamas. After Hamas launched the "Al-Aqsa flood" operation, Israel also continued to escalate the conflict in order to keep the United States strategically invested in Israel.
The Israeli airstrike on the Iranian embassy in Syria is also a product of this logic. On the whole, Iran's counterattack was still very restrained, and even clearly informed the surrounding countries in advance. Therefore, the United States and Israel actually know the specific direction and can make full preparations.
So is that all Iran is capable of? Of course not. It is estimated that Iran has more than 30,000 surface-to-surface missiles of various types, and this time it has used more than 100 of them. There is also a significant number of Iranian drones, which can quickly deplete Israel's reserve of anti-aircraft firepower. It can be said that if Iran really wants to fight, whether it is the Houthis or the Lebanese Allah party, they will inevitably link. At that time, Israel will face defensive pressure in three directions, and there will be multiple waves of strikes. Iran can also use precise planning and dispatch to allow drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles to reach the target area in multiple directions at the same or similar time, so as to launch a saturation strike in a real sense. If this is to be done, Israel will not be able to prevent it.
Therefore, Israel's boastful interception of "99% of Iranian missiles" is only creating a perception of wartime security, and is far from the truth. If Iran uses all its strength, it will not be defeated immediately, but Israel will also suffer the same old sin.
Of course, Israel has the option of offensive operations, using the advantages of the F-35I to strike at important Iranian targets with high efficiency. However, Iran is much larger than Israel, and although Iran does not have reliable air defense against Israel, the same Iran has considerable means of retaliation. If Israel were to attack Iran on its size, it would never be something Israel could afford.
Israel's capacity is also weakening. After a massive strike on the Gaza Strip, Israel did not fully achieve its strategic objectives and fell into serious diplomatic isolation. Israel's economy contracted by 20.7% in the fourth quarter of 2023, worse than expected. Israel's internal pressures will also continue to rise, and these will ultimately manifest itself in Israel's strategic will and capabilities. Therefore, it is dangerous for Israel to choose the strategy of the brinkmanship of war, because Israel does not have enough capital and resources to deal with the situation after the bottom line is breached. Israel's most fundamental bet is on the United States.
For us, Israel's expansionist moves are seriously at odds with our interests. We need a prosperous and stable Middle East, and Israel must maintain chaos in the Middle East in order to maximize its own security. In addition, Israel's interests remain with the United States, which means that Israel will cooperate with the United States in many aspects, including putting pressure on China. Therefore, our relations with Israel are not expected to be very good, but they are far away and do not lead to direct conflict.
Judging from the performance of Israel and Iran this time, Israel is like an immature child who is pampered and proud by holding his thighs and controlling the field of public opinion, while Iran is like a steady and composed international political chess player. Israel's superiority is becoming more fragile over time and with its own internal political imbalances, and the future is very uncertain.