In 1206 AD, with the emergence of the Mongols, the nomadic regime in the north of the continent, an unprecedented war of conquest swept across Eurasia like a hurricane.
At the same time, the Mongol army also created a logistical miracle: such a long-term, long-distance, non-dependent conquest without relying on local supplies never experienced serious logistical difficulties.
The Mongols were originally a branch of the Donghu ethnic group in northern China during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, and later developed and grew on the Mongolian Plateau. The success of the Mongol army was largely due to its unique military system and logistics.
At the beginning of the founding of the country, Genghis Khan implemented the system of integrating military and pastoral affairs and military and government according to the characteristics of the life and actions of the nomadic people in the steppe.
At the heart of this system was that the soldiers were engaged in animal husbandry in peacetime and galloped across the field in wartime, and the generals of the army were also local administrators. With regard to the establishment of the armed forces, we should adhere to the principle that it is conducive to wartime mobility and flexibility, and at the same time convenient for centralized and unified guidance.
In terms of the national logistics system, Genghis Khan carried out territorial rewards on the basis of the thousand-household system. All the chiefs of the thousand households were appointed by the Great Khan, and their hereditary lineage was first recognized by the Great Khan, who was actually in charge of the logistics of all the thousand households.
In terms of the army's logistical system, Genghis Khan set up officials at all levels of the army who were responsible for grazing horses, sheep, and camels, and in charge of baggage. At the same time, it was stipulated that each rider must carry several horses in addition to his own riding in wartime, so that he could rotate his ride.
The soldier's armament is based on the principle of light and offensive power, and the materials that each soldier should bring with him when he goes out on the battle. It not only ensures that you can travel lightly, but also meet the minimum level of living needs.
It also stipulates that all the weapons and equipment and major logistical materials needed by the soldiers of the army in combat shall be provided by themselves, and the state shall not be responsible.
In order to ensure that the army fights, the Mongolian army has established the "Oulu" system, in which the children of the families of the soldiers are responsible for the logistics supply. During the battle, the sergeants went to the front line to fight, and the family members and baggage of the soldiers remained in the rear of the war zone.
Oulu, which accompanied the army, was the supply of food, weapons, horses and soldiers for the fighting troops, both women and children. "The women were in charge of the felt tents, and the horses and baggage, and the wagons were collected," while the children were used as reserve soldiers. When marching, "the cart carries heavy loads and old and young animals to the end of the room".
In order to strengthen the management of Oulu, the Mongol army later established Oulu officers, who were responsible for requisitioning grain and grass and transporting soldiers, and in fact became the rear guard of the armies on the edge of the town.
In terms of logistical construction, the Mongolian army emphasized the unity of life and war, that is, the living conditions were the same as the fighting conditions. The main approach was to deliberately create an environment of daily life that was similar to the wartime environment, in order to train the soldiers to adapt to the hardships of life.
Because the Mongol way of life is to live in pursuit of water and grass, and constantly move throughout the year, they have formed a daily life environment that is very similar to the war environment, and laid the foundation for long-distance mobile warfare.
The Mongols live simply. In order to adapt to the needs of constant migration, they did not have much for pleasure except for the necessary daily necessities, and most of their diet and clothing came from horses, cows, sheep and hunted animals.
The way to eat it is simple, just roast it over the fire. This way of life reduces the logistical burden and is more conducive to local delivery.
In addition to the naturally formed quality advantage, the Mongols also intended to train their own army, and Genghis Khan proposed: "When the Mongols do not fight with people, they should fight with animals." ”
Warfare with animals, refers to hunting, which is actually a combat exercise with animals as the object. In this way, the living conditions of the Mongol army were more consistent with the fighting conditions.
The support method of "making up for the enemy" is also an important factor in ensuring that the Mongol army is invincible and rarely encounters logistical difficulties.
"Supplementing the enemy because of the cause" refers to using the method of plundering from the conquered areas to ensure long-term operational needs, and it is a kind of predatory logistics. Relying on this kind of logistics, they did not need to carry a large amount of grain and materials, nor did they need a huge convoy of baggage to accompany them, nor did they have to keep a rear supply base.
Thus, the troops did not have a logistical "tail" and acted quickly. In addition to plundering and extorting tribute to ensure the supply of materials for the army and amass wealth and livestock, the Mongol army also made extensive use of the manpower of the conquered territories as a supplement to the army's strength.
When attacking the city, they used captured prisoners and forcibly recruited local residents to build fortifications, fill ditches, and transport stones, acting as the vanguard of the siege. At the same time, they were also asked to do all kinds of chores as a way to preserve the strength of the Mongol army.
In short, in the 13th century, the Mongol army formed a special logistics suitable for its large-scale mobile operations, relying on this logistics, the Mongol army fought in the south and the north, and was invincible.
This kind of logistics is vividly called "immediate logistics" by later generations.
In this regard, the Encyclopedia Britannica makes a vivid statement: the logistics system of the Mongol cavalry army in the 13th century is one of the most effective logistics systems in history. It is based on self-sufficiency and local provisioning, supplemented by base supply.
The Mongol army was divided into several legions, accompanied by baggage wagons, carrying livestock and herds. When entering the enemy's country, the army abandoned its baggage and herds, divided into a number of independent columns with large intervals, and charged at the unsuspecting enemy in many directions and at high speeds.
In one such engagement, a Mongol army traveled 180 miles in three days. Supplies, military horses, transportation and other services were properly organized.
The hard-working and well-trained Mongol warrior was able to live almost indefinitely on dried meat and cheese, occasionally supplemented by prey, and as a last resort, he could suck a little blood from the veins of his mount's neck.
Mongolian ponies bred in the arid steppes generally have endurance. Each of them had several horses, and the luggage was reduced to a minimum. The equipment is lightweight and standardized.
Relying on this "immediate logistics", Genghis Khan was invincible.
From 1204 to 1209, he attacked the Western Xia three times and forced his Natu to submit, from 1211 to 1215, he attacked the Jin State three times and occupied all the territory north of the Yellow River, and in 1218, after destroying the Western Liao Kingdom in a whirlwind, he led his troops to the west, opening the prelude to the conquest of the world.
In the autumn of 1219, the Mongol army turned to the kingdom of Khorizm in Central Asia. The country is several times larger than Mongolia in terms of manpower and economic strength. The army of 400,000 was twice the size of the Mongol army, but it was defeated by the Mongol cavalry, and by 1222, the 400,000 army of Khwarazm was completely annihilated.
Subsequently, the Mongol army crossed the Caucasus Mountains into the Don steppe region of Europe, and then ended its westward expedition and led the army back. In the spring of 1226, the Mongols marched south to defeat the 89-year-old Tangut Dynasty. In this year, Genghis Khan died of illness at the age of 66.