#著名世界战争史分析#
In 1929~1933, the world economic crisis hit the British economy. From mid-1932, the British economy began to slowly recover.
In the 2030s, Britain's economic power lagged behind that of the United States and Germany. This greatly influenced Britain's political, foreign and military policy throughout the 30s, shackling its armament development. Britain practiced appeasement diplomacy in the 30s.
Pacifism is a bourgeois liberal political trend. The pacifist movement in Britain arose from the First World War. The unprecedented devastation of World War I and the economic recession after the war led to the further development of the pacifist movement in the 2020s and culminated in the 30s. This situation greatly increased the fear of war among the British public and contributed to the upsurge of the pacifist movement.
In March 1935, Nazi Germany issued a declaration on rearmament and openly embarked on the road of arms expansion and war. But in Britain, pacifists held a peaceful referendum. The largest pacifist movement in British history was initiated by pacifist groups such as the League of Nations and the New Federal Press, and supported by pacifist MPs from the Labour and Liberal parties. A total of 11.5 million people across the country participated in the peaceful ballot with the assistance of 500,000 volunteers. They advocated the complete disarmament and abolition of aviation forces, and also called for non-military economic sanctions to prevent the outbreak of war. With this as a sign, the pacifist movement in Britain reached its climax.
In the mid-30s of the 20th century, the scale of the British pacifist movement, the number of participants and the wide influence were unprecedented, which effectively restricted the actions of the British government and influential politicians, became a force that cannot be underestimated in British political life, and had a major impact on Britain's domestic and foreign affairs. "Even political activists like Churchill and Lloyd George took into account the sentiments of the masses and appropriately revised their course of action."
In 1935, the British military proposed a limited rearmament program in response to the deteriorating international situation. Baldwin, the leader of the Conservative Party, who was now prime minister of the National Cabinet, still told British voters: "I assure you that there will be no large-scale armaments. "Avoiding war and seeking peace became the rule of conduct of the whole British nation for a while. It can be said that the pacifist movement is a hotbed of British appeasement and has played an important role in the formation and development of Britain's appeasement policy.
After World War I, Britain moved away from a policy of military involvement to a traditional European balance-of-power policy, working to establish a stable security situation based on mutual trust and cooperation between Britain, France and Germany. In the twenties, France united with Eastern European countries to suppress Germany, contradicting the traditional British policy of balance of power. As a result, Britain pursued a policy of supporting Germany and suppressing France, in an attempt to weaken the position of France and its allies in order to ensure its status as an arbiter on the European continent.
In March 1933, Britain threw out the "MacDonald Plan" at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the purpose of which was to appease Hitler, who was clamoring for "equality in armaments" by reducing the French Army. After Germany's withdrawal from the Conference on Disarmament and the League of Nations, Britain continued to press France to make concessions in order to return Germany to the Conference on Disarmament and the League of Nations, that is, to allow Germany to expand its forces within British control. Thus, Britain embarked on the path of appeasing Germany.
The First World War caused great psychological trauma to the British people, and the pacifist trend prevailing in Britain provided the British ruling class with an excuse to implement a policy of appeasement. In November 1936, Baldwin admitted "surprisingly frankly" that the only factor preventing the implementation of a massive rearmament program in 1934 and 1935 was public opinion. In April 1938, in a speech to voters, Chamberlain said: "The wealth accumulated by the people of the mainland through hard work should be used to alleviate the suffering of the people... The thought that this wealth should be spent on building weapons of war strikes me as disgusting and damned. ”
In the 30s, when the situation in Europe and the world was deteriorating, although the British ruling clique gradually realized the threat of fascist countries, its foreign policy did not implement a comprehensive adjustment, until the outbreak of war in the West, there was no effective response to the threat of war of fascist countries. In March 1935, Britain publicly announced the rearmament of Germany, but instead of taking any protests, it signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement with Germany in June 1935. The main point of the agreement was a fixed ratio of 35:100 for the strength of the German navy to the total naval strength of the Commonwealth member states. However, another agreement provided that German submarines could account for 45% of all submarines in the UK, and in critical cases this limit could be raised to 100%. As a result, Hitler broke the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles and began to expand his arms and war. This was an important step on Britain's path to appeasing Germany. In December of the same year, Italy invaded Abyssinia, and Britain, fearing the loss of Italy as an ally, did not dare to impose strong sanctions against it. With the continuous expansion of fascist countries, Britain's policy of maintaining the "balance of power" on the continent lost its practical basis, and appeasement gradually became the main content of British diplomacy.
In May 1937, after Chamberlain became British Prime Minister, he declared to Parliament that the policy of this government was "appeasement of the whole world." As a seasoned politician, Chamberlain was aware of Nazi Germany's lack of faith and its ambitions for world domination. In a letter to Morgenthau of the United States Treasury shortly before becoming Prime Minister in March 1937, Chamberlain stated that Germany was determined to make itself so strong that no one dared to resist its territorial claims, whether against Europe or the colonies, and that since it so intentional, "it is unlikely that it will agree to any disarmament program that would undermine its stated objectives." Only when Germany believed that its efforts would be resisted by superior forces.
Nevertheless, Chamberlain's government remained convinced that it was in Britain's best interest to settle disputes peacefully than to resort to war when national interests were not jeopardized. In order to avoid war, the Chamberlain government believed that it was necessary to comprehensively solve the European problem through peaceful negotiations. This became the core of the foreign policy of the Chamberlain government, the main contents of which included: recognizing the irrationality of the European borders drawn after the First World War, satisfying Hitler's demand for a "unified German nation" in order to find a solution to the political problems of Europe; "Economic assistance to Germany" in the context of an agreement on a "political settlement" in Europe, allowing Germany to develop its export potential, thereby economically removing the justification for German expansion abroad; Return Tanganyika (a German colony in Africa before World War I) to Germany in order to find a solution to the colonial problem.
Based on the above ideas, after Chamberlain came to power, he carried out a series of related appeasement diplomatic activities. First, to strengthen diplomatic ties with Germany. As soon as he came to power, Chamberlain went all out to promote appeasement diplomacy with Germany, invited German Foreign Minister Wright to visit Britain, and sent Halifax to Germany in November 1937 with the aim of "finding a solution to [our differences]" and achieving "a general solution in which legitimate grievances may be eliminated, suspicions may be shelved, and trust may be restored." After the visit, Chamberlain said that the talks were full of mutual trust and further strengthened the desire for mutual understanding.
Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler also required appeasement of Italy in order to achieve the goal of appeasement of Germany. In July 1937, in a personal letter to Mussolini, Chamberlain further confirmed the principles of the Anglo-Italian Mediterranean Agreement reached in January. At the beginning of 1938, he proposed talks with Italy to resolve all disputes between the two countries, and despite the objections of Foreign Secretary Eden, concluded the Anglo-Italian Agreement on April 16, confirming and delimiting the rights and interests of the two countries throughout the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and recognizing the Italian occupation of Abyssinia in exchange for Mussolini's tacit agreement and reward in the "General Settlement".
According to Chamberlain's vision of a comprehensive settlement of the European question, the question of the Far East was secondary to Europe. In 1937, after Japan launched a full-scale war of aggression against China in the Eastern Theater, Chamberlain wrote in his diary: "In the current situation of two hot-tempered dictators in Europe, we can hardly afford to quarrel with Japan anymore." Thus, as Japan expanded its aggression, the appeasement of British Far East policy was stronger than ever.
Chamberlain felt deeply that Britain alone could not achieve a comprehensive solution to the European problem. In view of France's importance in the European landscape, Chamberlain visited France in November 1937 and exerted diplomatic pressure on France to coordinate its actions with it. This played a great role in France, which at this time had taken alignment with Britain as the base point of diplomacy, sliding farther and farther on the road of appeasement.
In order to reach a comprehensive solution to the European problem with Hitler, Chamberlain did not hesitate to meet his demands for aggression and expansion at the expense of small and medium-sized countries, as long as Hitler agreed to "achieve change in a peaceful evolutionary way." It was under the guidance of this ideology that Chamberlain went further and further on the road of appeasement. After Germany annexed Austria in March 1938, Chamberlain considered it "impossible to avoid." Hitler then pointed his aggression at the Czech Soudet. Chamberlain saw this as a possible entry point to a general solution to the European problem. When the Czech crisis intensified, Chamberlain flew three times to Germany to negotiate with Hitler, and repeatedly made concessions, and finally staged the Munich scandal, which pushed British appeasement to the top.
Other British diplomatic activities in the 30s of the 20th century:
On August 26, 1936, Britain signed a 20-year treaty with the Egyptian government in order to maintain its colonial rule. The Ethiopian crisis of November 1935 threatened Britain's position in Egypt, the Red Sea, and East Africa. The British authorities immediately began to strengthen Egypt's borders, with a steady flow of British troops, weapons and ammunition to Egypt, and construction of airfields, ammunition depots, strategic roads, and communication routes. These preparedness measures have caused concern among the Egyptian people, who do not want to suffer the catastrophe of Italian occupation of neighboring Libya. Egyptian nationalist forces therefore sought to exploit British diplomatic difficulties to extract concessions from the British, which reinstated Egypt's 1923 constitution in December 1935. At the end of 1935, five political parties representing the Egyptian National Movement submitted a memorandum to British High Commissioner to Egypt Lampson, proposing the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty "on the basis of respect for Egyptian interests." On 31 December, London gave an official response, arguing that negotiations on a treaty were not appropriate. This attitude aroused great anger among the Egyptian people, and under the pressure of the new demonstration movement, the British government made certain concessions. On January 20, 1936, the British High Commissioner in Cairo told the Egyptian government and the leader of the Waffle Party, Nahas, that he was willing to discuss the Anglo-Egyptian agreement. On February 13, the King of Egypt issued an edict in Cairo, ordering Najas to lead a delegation to negotiate with the British government, but negotiations were intermittent. Egypt's parliamentary elections in May resulted in a resounding victory for the Waffle Party, and the new cabinet made concessions to compromise with the British, leading to the signing of the Treaty of Alliance on August 26. The treaty provided for an "alliance" between Britain and Egypt for a period of 20 years, and Britain was responsible for protecting Egypt from foreign aggression, and Egypt was placed under British administration in wartime; Britain ended its military occupation in Egypt and withdrew its troops, but had the right to garrison 10,000 troops and 400 pilots in the Suez Canal; The British Air Force has the right to fly in Egyptian airspace and use Egyptian airfields; Britain retained the naval base in Alexandria for 8 years; Egypt can build an army, but it needs to buy British weapons and receive training from a British military delegation; abolish extraterritoriality in Egypt; Egypt joins the League of Nations; British High Commissioner changed to Ambassador; the restoration of the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement on Sudan, which allowed Egyptians to emigrate to Sudan; Egypt may not conclude political alliances with other States that contradict this treaty, etc. This unequal treaty, ratified by the Egyptian parliament, was opposed by the Egyptian people. In October 1951, Egypt denounced the Treaty.
The Spanish Civil War broke out, and the British and French governments pursued a policy of non-intervention. The German and Italian fascists, on the other hand, openly intervened in the Spanish Republic, not only sending large amounts of money, weapons and ammunition to the Spanish rebels, sending warships to blockade the Spanish coast, but also sending hundreds of thousands of regular troops to directly invade Spain, which suddenly tensed the situation in the Mediterranean. Under these circumstances, and in order to put an end to the dangerous hostilities in the Mediterranean, the Governments of Great Britain and Italy signed the Mediterranean Agreement in January 1937. The parties to the agreement undertook to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean, to respect each other's interests and rights in the Mediterranean, and to jointly preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Spain. However, the conclusion of this agreement had little concrete impact on the situation in the Mediterranean, nor did it have any limiting effect on Italy's aggressive expansion and armed intervention in Spain.
Amid cries of "treason" and "shame" in the British House of Commons, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain announced on February 27, 1939 that he recognized the Franco regime in Spain. French President Le Brun took similar steps, but he received unanimous support from members of his cabinet. President Azania, the crumbling government of the Spanish Republic, has not participated in political activities during his time in Paris. At this time, he left the Spanish embassy in France, but he refused to resign. Recognition was considered inevitable, but many, especially the free-spoken opposition in Britain, were distrustful of Franco's vague assurances of "a free Spain" and expressed concern about the German and Italian troops remaining in Spain.
On April 1, 1939, Prime Minister Chamberlain had pledged military support for Poland in order to prevent threats to its territorial integrity. An official statement issued by London declared: "If the Polish government feels that its independence is threatened and must resist by force, then Britain and France will stand with Poland." When Hitler realized that Britain's statement was in response to the German invasion, he seduced Britain into taking the bait, challenging it, or picking it to interfere with Germany's political ambitions. At the launch of the battleship "General Tirpitz" in Wilhelmshaven, northern Germany, Hitler delivered an indignant speech to a crowd of 100,000. He warned that Germany would not allow Britain to embark on the "evil plan" to encircle Germany that had been used before the Great War. He declared to the people: "Whoever is ready to fight in the fire between the great powers will eventually play with fire and set himself on fire." French observers described the speech as "bland and confused."