About a decade ago, online texts emerged. Many people have taken the favor of the public and started a wave of belittling Zhuge Liang. The original intention was actually good at the beginning, because people had long been misled by the Romance of the Three Kingdoms. The Romance of the Three Kingdoms over-mythologizes Zhuge Liang and becomes an extreme. Therefore, Mr. Lu Xun commented on the "Romance of the Three Kingdoms" and said: "Zhuge Liang is wise and close to a demon. ”
But then he went to the other extreme, that is, to say that Zhuge Liang would not fight at all. The discipline of history pays attention to evidence, but there has always been a drawback, the so-called evidence has become a simple find, as long as the ancients said, it has become the truth. Therefore, Chen Shou, the author of the "Romance of the Three Kingdoms", commented on Zhuge Liang: "Gai strain will be omitted, not his strength." "Enshrined as a guideline.
This is a rather funny thing, Chen Shou himself does not understand the military at all, what can he evaluate on the question of whether Zhuge Liang will fight a war? It is ridiculous to enshrine the words of a man who does not understand military affairs as truth. Historians who write history books, where can their level be compared with the heroes they write. This is the difference between heaven and earth. The most taboo thing for people who read books is to believe what they see, and the most important thing is to have the ability to distinguish.
In order to belittle Zhuge Liang's military talents, these people usually focus on the words said by Sima Yi and Zhuge Liang in the battle of Wuzhangyuan before 1787, that is, in 234 AD: "If you are brave, when you go east by the mountain, if you go west to Wuzhangyuan, the armies will be fine." In this way, he proved Sima Yi's divine ingenuity and clever calculations, and thus proved that Zhuge Liang's military level was not enough.
But what is very interesting is that the more Sima Yi's words are taken out to say things, the more it shows that this author is a military white and does not know anything.
Although these so-called writers interpret Sima Yi's words as the most typical nonsense. But Sima Yi's words are very interesting, it can be used as a standard, a test of whether military science is introductory.
Let me talk about the Battle of Gojohara.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="8" >. Wei's operational guidance for Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition</h1>
Shu Han was a small country with only tens of thousands of mobile combat troops, and compared with the powerful State of Wei, it was not a small size at all. However, in the face of Zhuge Liang's Fifth Northern Expedition, the Wei state adopted a defensive approach. This was the lesson learned by The Wei Ming Emperor Cao Rui from summing up his previous combat experience, and thus formed the operational guidance. Improper things (before Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition), extreme shock (First Northern Expedition), field victory (before the Fifth Northern Expedition), and holding on to the enemy (Fifth Northern Expedition). This was the process of the formation of Cao Wei's guiding ideology for Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition. Sticking to the enemy, it looks quite good, in fact, it is dead guard, the tiger does not go out of the hole, shrinks its head as a turtle, and kills me and does not go out to fight with Zhuge Liang.
At that time, Cao Cao often played the trick of defensive counterattack, but Cao Cao was a strategic defense, and tactically it was an opportunity-seeking decisive battle. However, Cao Rui faced Zhuge Liang strategically and tactically and completely adopted pure defense. This is a strategic and tactical move to face an opponent that you are sure not to be able to beat.
His strength was far stronger than Zhuge Liang's, but he didn't even have the courage to fight. It could force the powerful Cao Wei to this extent, and it could force Sima Yi, the top general of the Three Kingdoms, to this extent. Those who say that Zhuge Liang's military skills are not good, do they really have long brains?
After Zhuge Liang's Fourth Northern Expedition, Sima Yi was defeated at Halo City and Zhang Guo was shot at Mumendao, Wei's courtiers put forward their views on the situation of the next war. Qunchen believed that Zhuge Liang would once again send troops to Longyou after the wheat was ripe in the following year. Sima Yi, however, tried his best to dispel the public opinion, believing that Zhuge Liang's re-dispatch of troops would not be in Longyou, but in Longdong, and would not attack the city, and would definitely seek field battles. Moreover, in order to solve the problem of military food, Zhuge Liang must have sent troops only after completing sufficient preparations for logistical support, and it is expected that after the wheat valley is three times ripe.
Sima Yi is ranked high in the list of famous generals in Chinese history, and his judgment is much more accurate than that of those courtiers. Why was Sima Yi able to make this judgment? It comes from the accurate study of Zhuge Liang's strategic intentions, and is also a profound achievement in the military theory of the battle to seize space and the battle to destroy the enemy army.
However, the scheming Sima Yi miscalculated, he saw most of it, but he did not see the last step.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="69" > Second, Zhuge Liang used a strategic attempt to cover up the campaign attempt</h1>
This brings us to zhuge liang's strategy and campaign intentions?
After fighting for so many years, Zhuge Liang's strategic intentions were no secret to the State of Wei. Zhuge Liang's mind was to break the dragon. With the strength of the Shu state, he wanted to eat the Guanzhong region of the Wei state in one bite, but he did not have this ability and could only gradually encroach on it. First Long Right and then Guanzhong, naturally the meaning of the question. Sima Yi's son Sima Zhao often said later that Zhuge Liang had the ambition of "concurrently appointing the four counties of Minyi, according to the dangers of Guan and Long".
To occupy the Long Right of the State of Wei was tactically a battle to seize space. I have told you before that Liu Bei's conquest of Hanzhong was a decisive battle, because all the life and death honors and humiliations are here! , is a classic example of a space capture battle. Liu Bei squeezed the space by seizing the main points, forcing Cao Cao to withdraw from Hanzhong.
For Zhuge Liang, Liu Bei's method could not be used. He was a visitor from afar, and even if he could capture some points in a battle, it would be difficult to hold on. This was because Zhuge Liang's rear base was far away in Hanzhong, and the main points captured by the front line had to rely on the long and steep Qinling Ancient Road to maintain contact. This kind of logistics line is doomed to capture even if a few lone points are captured, and once the main army retreats, it will certainly not be able to hold; and the main army of Shu Han cannot hold here for a long time. This is in stark contrast to the most classic battle in Liu Bei's life, the Battle of Hanzhong. Zhuge Liang in the Northern Expedition was the same Cao Cao who came from afar in the Battle of Hanzhong.
However, Zhuge Liang had another way, cutting off Guanzhong's rescue to Long Right and directly taking Long Right. This was actually Cao Cao's method, and Cao Cao chose Yangping Pass to force Liu Bei to withdraw from Hanzhong after capturing Yangping Pass.
In the first Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang adopted this method, sending Ma Mo to intercept wei reinforcements at the Longshan Pass, and as a result, Ma Mo's marching speed was slower than Zhang Guo's, and Zhang Hao preemptively entered the Longshan Pass.
During the Second Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang chose to attack Chen Cang, but was prejudged by Cao Zhen that Zhuge Liang failed to capture Chen Cang. Why can Cao Really predict it? Because Zhuge Liang's strategic attempt to break Long had been exposed during the last Northern Expedition, if he wanted to break Long, he either took the Qishan Road and blocked the Longshan Pass after attacking Longyou, or directly cut off the road from Guanzhong to Longshan. Zhuge Liang suffered a loss in Longyou last time, and the possibility of taking the Qishan Road again is very low, and taking Chen Cangdao to take Chen Cang as a forward base is even higher from this crossing the road of Longyou and Guanzhong. Therefore, Cao Zhen was able to predict that this was based on the fact that Zhuge Liang's strategic intentions were no longer secret.
In the third Northern Expedition, the target was Wudu and Yinping Counties, which was to seize the forward base, not to mention.
During the Fourth Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang realized that the State of Wei had gained insight into its strategic intentions, that he no longer had the suddenness of war, and that there was no other way but to crush the main army of the State of Wei. Therefore, Zhuge Liang decided to correct the previous tactics of seizing the control space of the main points, and used the main decisive battle to defeat the Wei army to forcefully seize the Long Right. Since the strategic attempt is no secret, it is impossible to think of a surprise victory over the suddenness of the attack. Therefore, Zhuge Liang was determined to annihilate the main force of the Wei army Guanzhong Regiment. As a result, Sima Yi was unable to hold out after Shangyi was defeated by Zhuge Liang, preferring the Shu army to flaunt its might in the State of Wei, preferring to lose resources and population rather than fight again. Just as Li Yan had a moth on his side, Zhuge Liang had to retreat.
After his long-term training, the combat effectiveness of the Shu army has surpassed that of the Wei army and has the ability to win in the field. In this way, Zhuge Liang is different from Guan Yu in the Battle of Xiangfan, Guan Yu will not have the ability to annihilate the enemy, forcibly send troops, doomed to the inevitable failure of Guan Yu's defeat, it is completely Zhuge Liang's fault, only Chairman Mao hit the nail on the head and pointed to the point.
In the previous article, I recommended two sets of books and a famous book, full of mistakes, but if you understand it, you will understand why the Kuomintang army always loses, "Chinese Military History" and "General History of Chinese Military", Ancient Chinese Military, it is enough to read these two books. The second volume of the "Chinese Military History", "Military Strategy of Chinese Dynasties", lists Zhuge Liang's lack of grain as an important reason when analyzing the reasons for the failure of Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition.
This is a wrong view, Zhuge Liang is not short of food, but soldiers. The loss of Jingzhou is not only the territory, but more importantly, a large number of population resources. This made Zhuge Liang lack the ability to divide his troops and mobilize the Wei army.
Moreover, because the Shu army was too far away and the infantry mobility was not as good as the Wei army, it was not difficult to defeat the Wei army in the field, but as long as the Wei army after the defeat held a solid camp, it was still difficult to annihilate the enemy on a large scale. Zhuge Liang must find a way to solve this problem.
So, did Zhuge Liang find a way? Found out, the method is in the "Sun Tzu Art of War", attacking the enemy will be saved.
In the Fifth Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang chose to go out of the Chu Chuan Road, and the northern end of the Chu Chu Road exited the Diagonal Valley in Guanzhong, which was exactly what Sima Yi calculated, and Zhuge Liang's further troops must be Longdong.
The problem that Zhuge Liang wanted to solve with this dispatch was to crush the Guanzhong Corps of the State of Wei and seize space by eliminating the main force of the Wei army.
Then Zhuge Liang had two choices, one was to threaten Chang'an to force the Wei army to fight a decisive battle; the other was to send troops to Guanzhong as a disguise, in fact, just like the time when Chen Cang sent troops, cut off the guanlong ancient road and prevent Wei reinforcements from capturing longyou. The first choice is actually a dead end, the last time Sima Yi fought a big defeat, this time he will not fight zhuge Liang again, with a strong camp blocking Zhuge Liang's way to Chang'an, Zhuge Liang will not be able to do anything. Under the technical conditions of ancient times, the strong attack on the fortress had to pay a great price. The tens of thousands of people under Zhuge Liang's command were elite divisions that had been selected by thousands of people and built with the strength of the whole country, and with the population base and national strength of the Shu state, this kind of loss was unbearable. The second choice is that the problem is that there are not enough troops, even if the Guanlong Ancient Road is successfully cut off, the main force will turn to attack Longyou, and it is inevitable that the troops will be left to block the Wei army, and there will be fewer troops left, and they will not be able to stop it, and there will be more troops left, and the troops to attack Longyou will be insufficient. The Shu army must concentrate on fighting.
However, the way of the art of war is virtual and real, in fact, Zhuge Liang has a third choice. That is, to cut off the Guanlong Ancient Road, pretend to attack Longyou, and force Sima Yi to leave the camp to attack the blocking troops, while Zhuge Liang took the opportunity to fight with Sima Yi. This is what Sun Tzu said: "Although the enemy is high and deep, he who has to fight with us will be saved if he attacks him." ”
Therefore, Zhuge Liang chose to go out of the Chu Chu Dao, because the Chu Chu Dao entered Guanzhong and went directly north, which was the bee waist of the Guanzhong Plain, and the narrowest section was only 40 kilometers wide. The Guanlong Ancient Road is passing through it.
In fact, this is to use his own long-exposed strategic attempt to seize the Long Right to cover up Zhuge Liang's campaign attempt and fight a decisive battle with the Wei army.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="70" > Third, Sima Yi's judgment was wrong</h1>
At this time, it is time to talk about the beginning of this article, Sima Yi said to the generals: "If you are bright and brave, when you go east according to the mountain, if you go west to Wuzhangyuan, then the armies will have nothing to do." What exactly this sentence means, combined with the context, you can understand it at a glance.
Three years earlier, Sima Yi had determined that Zhuge Liang wanted to seize space by means of field victory. In Sima Yi's view, the most important support point in Guanzhong was naturally Chang'an.
Therefore, at the beginning: "In the second year, Liang led more than 100,000 people out of the slanting valley and built a base in the southern plains of Weishui in The City of Guo." The Son of Heaven was worried, and sent Qin Lang, the protector of Shu, to ride 20,000 horses and was subject to the emperor's festival. The generals wanted to live in Weibei to wait for it, and the emperor said: "The people are gathered in Weinan, and this must be the land of contention." So he drew the army to the aid of the army, and took the water as a barrier. ”
The Wei generals all believed that they should seize positions on the north bank of weishui in case Zhuge Liang crossed the weishui. But Sima Yi cherished the lives and property of the masses of the people and must occupy a position on the south bank of the Weishui River. The so-called occupation of the position on the south bank of the Weishui River is the only way for Zhuge Liang to march towards Wugong after leaving the Xie Valley. This hand was to prevent Zhuge Liang from attacking Chang'an. Sima Yi was still prepared to follow Cao Rui's will and use the method of sticking to Zhuge Liang to drag out time until Zhuge Liang ran out of grain and retreated.
Then it happened: "If you are brave, when you go east by the mountain, if you go west to the five zhangyuan, then the armies will have nothing to do." "
This was Sima Yi telling the generals that if Zhuge Liang advanced with a martial arts attack on the east side of qinling, it would be terrible, because it would threaten Chang'an; if Zhuge Liang advanced to the northwest of Wuzhangyuan, it would be fine.
However, Guo Huai later pointed out: "In the second year of the Qinglong, Zhuge Liang came out of the Xie Valley and landed in Lankeng. It was Sima Xuanwang Tun Weinan; Huai Ce Liang would fight for the Northern Plains, and it was advisable to base it on it first, but most of the deliberators said otherwise. Huai Yue: "If Liang crosses the Wei Dengyuan, even the soldiers on the North Mountain, isolates the Long Dao, and shakes the people and yi, this is not the benefit of the country." ’”
After Guo Huai made a suggestion, Sima Yifang woke up like a dream: "Xuanwang Shanzhi, Huai Sui Tun Beiyuan." The fortress was not completed, the Shu soldiers were so large that Huai counterattacked. Sima Yi listened to Guo Huai's words and realized that he had made a big mistake, and once Zhuge Liang occupied the Northern Plains, he would be in a dilemma, and in the end he would attack and defend. If you attack, you will fall into Zhuge Liang's trap; continue to defend, in case Zhuge Liang really attacks Long Right, he will be defeated as well.
Combined with the context, this is the original face of the matter, and after restoring the original face, we can find that Sima Yi's judgment at the beginning was wrong.
Although Sima Yi judged more than half accurately, his eyes only saw Chang'an when he was carrying out the campaign. In order to prevent Zhuge Liang from attacking Chang'an, Sima Yi refused to occupy the position on the north bank of Weishui and had to go to the south bank of Weishui to prevent Zhuge Liang from advancing east.
In fact, all the generals of the Wei army believed that Zhuge Liang would not attack Chang'an, and their minds were still broken. However, Sima Yi was stubborn, and his error in judgment was influenced by the defeat at the Battle of Shangyi and the operational guiding ideology formulated by Cao Rui. In the last Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang had already shown that he wanted to fight Cao Wei to win. The State of Wei had the advantages of troop strength, arms, and home combat, and if it could be fought, there was no reason not to fight, but Sima Yi could not fight. Under these circumstances, Sima Yi was very worried that after he moved his troops to the north bank of Weishui and gave way to Chang'an, Zhuge Liang would mobilize himself to force himself to fight a decisive battle by attacking Chang'an. Therefore, he resolutely set up a position on the south bank of the Weishui River and east of the Wugong River, and zhenzhen had a word to teach the generals.
Guo Huai was a man who was very good at the battle, and I said at the Battle of Hanzhong that after Xiahou Yuan was killed, all the generals of the Cao Army believed that the army should be placed in front of the Han River. Only Guo Huai clearly saw Liu Bei's intentions and incisively pointed out: This kind of move that seems to strengthen guard is actually a weak move in Liu Bei's eyes, which is a show of strength and weakness. Liu Bei did not want to cross the Han River at all, so we should also learn from Liu Bei, give up the beachhead position, and lure Liu Bei to cross the river. In fact, what Guo Huai said at that time meant that Liu Bei was luring us to cross the river, and we did the same, so that everyone would not cross the river. This vision is very unique. Unfortunately, the frontal command is its weakness, this person is very suitable for being the chief of staff, and it is not satisfactory to be alone.
Because of Guo Huai's correct advice, the Wei army was one step faster than the Shu army, "the barrier was not completed, and the Shu army was great." Zhuge Liang still suffered the loss of driving too far into the road and lacking maneuverability. Guo Huai's suggestion actually showed that there was no need to fear Shu like a tiger, and that even if the powerful Wei army was divided, it would also be able to defend.
The generals of the Wei army may not have seen through Zhuge Liang's desire to lure the Wei army into a decisive battle, but they had already formed the mindset that Zhuge Liang must break the long, and when they saw Zhuge Liang send troops, the first reaction was to block Zhuge Liang's broken long, which did not mean that the Wei generals were smarter than Sima Yi, and the wei army moved to the northern plains, and there were loopholes for Zhuge Liang to take advantage of. Zhuge Liang could in turn cut off the Wei army's rear road and pretend to attack Chang'an to lure the Wei army into a decisive battle. Zhuge Liang's plan can be changed.
However, Zhuge Liang still could not perfectly solve the problem of too far a road to advance and insufficient troops, which could not be solved by manpower.
From Hanzhong to Guanzhong, any road is too long, and after the vanguard troops leave the valley, they must wait for the follow-up troops to arrive. Therefore, Zhuge Liang could only "go out of the valley and join the field in Lankeng" at the beginning, just to wait for the follow-up troops. The Shu army was almost all infantry, and if Zhuge Liang had a strong cavalry unit, it could be compared with the Speed of Maneuvering with the Wei Army, but Zhuge Liang did not. He wrote in the "Table of Later Masters": "From the subjects to Hanzhong, in the middle period of the year, Zhao Yun, Yang Qun, Ma Yu, Yan Zhi, Ding Li, Bai Shou, Liu Guo, Deng Tong, and others, as well as more than seventy generals of Qu Chang and Tun, and more than a thousand people of Tu General, Wu Qian, Wu Shu, Qing Qiang, Scattered Horse, and Wu Horse. These are the elites of the four parties that have been entangled in decades, not the ownership of a state; if they are pluralized, they will lose two-thirds of the time, so why should they seek the enemy? ”
At that time, Ma Chao brought over the little cavalry, and basically died.
The infantry forcibly marched one step slower than the Wei cavalry.
Why did Sima Yi's performance fall short? It's because of fear and lack of confidence. This was a manifestation of being beaten and feared by Zhuge Liang, who did not dare to divide the troops and supported the heavy troops to protect themselves. This was also the reason for Hong Chengzu's later defeat to Emperor Taiji, Who did not have the self-confidence he had when he faced Li Zicheng, and more than 100,000 troops surrounded him like hedgehogs, not daring to divide his troops to preempt the point. The more afraid, the more they can't fight, psychologically they have already lost, where there is still the courage to fight. In this case, Sima Yi could not grasp Zhuge Liang's psychological activities, Zhuge Liang was absolutely reluctant to let his army attack, and the Wei army could completely divide the troops boldly, without fear of breaking through each one.
The battle for the Northern Plains failed, and for Zhuge Liang, the fifth battle had already failed. The story behind is very familiar to everyone, and this time, the generals will laugh at Sima Yi again for "fearing Shu like a tiger", and Sima Yi will resolutely stop fighting. Even if Zhuge Liang forced Sima Yi to come out to fight a decisive battle, he sent women's clothes. In the face of great shame and humiliation, the generals were in an uproar, but Sima Yi continued to endure.
At this time, in fact, Sima Yi's situation was also quite pitiful, such a powerful army did not dare to fight zhuge Liang, the generals under him were disobedient, their prestige was damaged, and the military's heart was turbulent; but when he went out to fight, it was really impossible to fight. In order to calm the hearts of the army, Sima Yi played the trick of asking for battle on the table of a thousand miles, and fooled the generals into going through the approval of the Wei Ming Emperor Cao Rui.
If he could not hold out, it was the combat guidance set by Cao Rui, and Sima Yi did this to ask the emperor for help. Cao Rui naturally understood the spirit and pretended to send Xin Bi to the army to strictly order that he was not allowed to fight. Even Jiang Wei did not understand this, and told Zhuge Liang: Sima Yi will not go to war when Xin Bi comes. Zhuge Liang was amused by Jiang Wei: "He had no war feelings, so he insisted on inviting the warriors to show his martial prowess." Generals in the army, the king's orders are not subject, and he can control me, and he will fight evil for thousands of miles! ”
Sima Yi, who had the superiority in troops, could not hold out, and Zhuge Liang had no way, because his innate conditions were insufficient. Without sufficient objective conditions, there is naturally no ability to create a fighter. His only chance was to wait for Wei Jun to make his own mistakes in the stalemate. However, under the circumstance that Cao Rui had already set the operational guidance of sticking to the battlefield and Sima Yi resolutely implemented it, it was impossible to wait for the Wei army to make a mistake.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="71" >4</h1>
It is extremely ridiculous for those writers who belittled Zhuge Liang to present what Sima Yi said when he made a mistake in judging the war situation as evidence that Zhuge Liang could not fight.
Let's get back to the title of this article. Li Shimin spoke highly of Sima Yi's military level: "The hero is decisive within, the hero is decisive, the army is like a god, and there is no further plan." "Sima Yi's fighting style was originally known for his fierceness and boldness.
However, Li Shimin's evaluation of the Battle of Wuzhangyuan was: "Even if he embraces the masses and moves westward, he holds up with Zhuge Zhuge and holds on to him." Or his armored soldiers, who have no fighting spirit, leave their scarves behind, and fang is angry. The cane festival is the door, the xiongtu dun bends, please fight for thousands of miles, and the deceitful demonstration. And the people of Qin Shu are brave and cowardly, brave and cowardly, take dangerous roads, and work and escape differently, so as to compete for merit, and their benefits can be seen. And the return to the closed army to consolidate the stronghold, do not dare to fight, timid and real and not forward, dead doubts and still, the way of good generals, lost in Sihu! ”
Translated into the vernacular, one sentence is enough: "It's too much, your face has been lost by sima yi." ”
This passage is an evaluation of Sima Yi, but why is my title an evaluation of Zhuge Liang? Isn't this very simple, Li Shimin criticized Sima Yi for not being able to do it, isn't he praising Zhuge Liang for his cleverness?
Only those who dare to fight can fight, they are afraid first, and their strength is completely unable to exert themselves. When Ma Mo lost to Zhang Gao, he lost here.
Sima Yi, who was so highly appraised by Li Shimin, was afraid that Zhuge Liang was afraid to such an extent that it would not be a joke that zhuge Liang could not fight.
About the author: Wang Zhengxing, a special military observer of the Xinhua News Agency Lookout Think Tank, and a former officer of a field unit of the People's Liberation Army, has served in infantry detachments, headquarters, logistics departments and other units, devoted himself to the study of war history and tactics, and has a unique understanding of military tactics and non-war operations. His book "This is War" was recommended in two issues in May and June 2014 by Phoenix TV's "Eight Minutes of Open Volume" column. His public account name is also "This is war", welcome to pay attention