By 25 April, 10 days had passed since the internal conflict in the Sudan. Under the mediation of the United States and Saudi Arabia, the parties to the conflict in Sudan agreed to a ceasefire for 72 hours from the early morning of the 25th. Previously, the two sides agreed to a 24-hour ceasefire on the 18th, but the fighting did not completely stop during the ceasefire, and the situation was further deteriorating. According to Sudan's Ministry of Health, the clashes have killed 420 people and injured about 4,000. At the same time, tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced by the fighting. At present, Chad and Egypt have closed their borders with Sudan, indicating that some countries in the region believe that the conflict may expand further.
A view of the city in Khartoum, Sudan, 72 hours after the ceasefire between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudanese Paramilitary Rapid Support Force (RSF), April 25, 2023, local time. Visual China map
Will Sudan fall into a protracted civil war?
Many observers see Sudan as sliding into a spiral of protracted civil war, and a quick military victory between the two sides seems unlikely anytime soon. Alex DeWaal, an expert in Sudan studies at Tufts University, believes that the ongoing conflict may be a prelude to civil war. The two sides of the conflict, the Sudanese Rapid Support Force (RSF) and the Sudanese army, have gone from allies to enemies during a three-year transition period, and peace is almost impossible, and winning by force, or winning more bargaining chips by force, is more in line with the current mentality of the warring parties.
One of the most important reasons for the possible long-term confrontation is that the difference in strength between the Sudanese army led by Burkhan and the RSF led by Khmeti is not very large, and the two sides have their own strengths in territorial occupation, resource possession, combat capabilities and methods, and have the ability to form a long-term confrontation. The RSF has impressive military and economic strength, absorbing a large number of retired officers, establishing multiple commands in the capital, Khartoum, and having administrative structures and military bases in most of Sudan's provinces. It also has a large trade and financial network, engaged in various economic and trade activities such as banking, agricultural projects and gold mining, which provides continuous financial support to the RSF.
On April 24, 2023, local time, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, evacuees arrived at the King Faisal Naval Base after a rescue operation in Sudan. Visual China map
Moreover, conflicts are almost impossible to mediate at an early stage. The expectation of the warring parties during this period was often that the final benefits of the war would cover the costs of the war, and the benefits of the war would certainly outweigh the benefits of compromise. The winner will be able to continue to rule Sudan, and the loser will likely have no place in Sudan. Therefore, the early stages of conflict are also the most difficult to mediate. There is no single force in the Sudan that can act as a trusted mediator for both sides. Externally, despite mediation by the United Nations, IGAD, the African Union, the Arab League and many other international organizations and many countries in the past ten days, the results have not been significant. Alex de Waal believes that disorderly bullish mediation may be more complicated and difficult to work than the war itself.
When the forces of the two sides of the conflict are roughly balanced, another important factor affecting the development of the conflict in the Sudan is the manner and extent of intervention by external forces. When civil wars break out in countries in the Middle East, external forces often become an important factor affecting the development of the situation. As the wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya have shown, civil wars in the Middle East can easily turn into proxy wars by outside powers.
The involvement of external forces will further enhance the combat capability of the two parties to the conflict, change the existing balance of power and expectations of the outcome of the war, and then affect the course of the war. If external forces favor and support one side, and strike at the other side instead of mediating, Sudan is likely to fall into a protracted civil war. Both sides have their own regional and international allies, and indeed they are trying to get weapons and reinforcements from outside. The day after the clashes, there were signs of direct involvement by external forces, with Hemmeti claiming on 17 April that the RSF base in Port Sudan had been attacked by foreign aircraft.
If the conflict in Sudan is not resolved quickly, it is likely to turn into a multi-layered game in which regional and international actors will influence the situation in Sudan through financial support, arms supplies, and even direct troops. The International Crisis Group reports that the longer the fighting drags on in Sudan, the greater the likelihood of external intervention. Among the external forces, Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are more closely linked with Sudan.
The concerns of Egypt, the northern neighbour, in the Sudan
Egypt and Sudan are extremely closely linked in terms of history, culture and trade. After then-Sudanese President Bashir al-Bashir stepped down in 2019, Egypt feared that political turmoil in Sudan would spill over into the country. Sudanese are the largest group of foreign migrants in Egypt, with about 4 million people in Ethiopia, including about 60,000 refugees and asylum seekers.
On April 21, 2023, local time, Khartoum, Sudan, a hospital was filled with smoke. Visual China map
In the Sudanese political process after the overthrow of al-Bashir, Egypt was widely regarded as a supporter of Burkhan and the Sudanese military. There is a lot of military cooperation between the two sides. One of the triggers for the conflict was the RSF's deployment of troops to Meroe, a strategic military location in northern Sudan, prompting a backlash from the military. The Sudanese military works closely with Egypt here, and in March 2021, Sudanese and Egyptian forces conducted an air combat military exercise in Melovai. Over the past two years, the Melovi military base has hosted joint Nile Guardian military exercises involving all services of the two countries.
Egypt's main concern in the Sudan is to ensure that the Sudan is on Egypt's side in the dispute with Ethiopia over the rehabilitation dam. According to the Wall Street Journal, Egypt was behind the October 2021 coup against Hamdok's government, which favored Ethiopia and was intolerable by the Egyptian government. Egypt sees Sudan as a key ally against Ethiopia, and is unlikely to stand idly by if the military is at a disadvantage. Correspondingly, relations between Egypt and the RSF were tense. During the battle at Melovy, the RSF captured an Egyptian military camp stationed there.
In addition, Sudan's other neighbors, Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, South Sudan and Ethiopia, are among the countries most affected by the Sudanese conflict, along with Egypt, and are likely to play some political and even military role in the conflict. These countries are the only way for the Sudanese army and the RSF to obtain external supplies, and as the war progresses, they are likely to choose to support one or the other, increasing the uncertainty of the war.
The Gulf Arab States are closely linked to the RSF
In recent years, Gulf Arab states have paid more and more attention to the Horn of Africa, including Sudan, and regard the Horn of Africa and the entire African continent as an important investment destination and trade object. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are members of the Quadripartite Mechanism for Mediating the Political Process in the Sudan (the other two being the United States and the United Kingdom).
Thanks to Saudi Arabia's "golden dollar diplomacy" in Sudan, Saudi Arabia has important influence over Sudan. After al-Bashir was overthrown, Saudi Arabia provided in-kind assistance to the Sudanese government to revive the economy and repeatedly provided food and sanitation assistance to Khartoum during major disasters and floods. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have strong ties with RSF and Khmeti. In 2015, the RSF sent 15,000 troops to participate in a Saudi-led multinational coalition military operation against the Houthi armed forces in Yemen, becoming the largest contingent in the Sudanese army. Khmeti not only received a lot of financial support from the two countries, but also established good personal relations with the two countries. In addition, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have extensive economic and financial ties with RSF.
Cooperation between the Wagner Group and RSF
Russia, especially the Russian mercenary group Wagner, has close ties with the RSF. A report in The Hill reported that the Wagner Group has been providing advanced training to RSF since 2017 to exchange intelligence with it. In return, Wagner gained control of several gold mines in Darfur, the Blue Nile and other parts of Sudan through RSF. Although Wagner denied any activity in Sudan, Western reports generally saw a major cooperative interest in gold mining in Sudan, with Khmeti providing protection for Wagner's mining company, Meroe Gold.
Another important area of cooperation between Russia and the RSF is the Port Sudan military base. RSF facilitated the construction of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan. At the beginning of 2022, the day before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Khmeti led a public visit to Russia, opening a new stage in the relationship between RSF and the Wagner Group. After the visit, Khmeti said that anyone could establish a military base in Sudan as long as it was in the interests of the Sudanese. Since then, the two countries have made rapid progress on the construction of military bases, with Sudanese authorities stating in February 2023 that they had completed a review of the December 2020 agreement with Russia on the establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea, which is expected to be signed at the Russia-Africa summit in July.
The United States lacks the will to intervene
The United States is a member of the Quartet that promotes dialogue in the Sudan. But U.S. willingness to intervene in the conflict in Sudan remains to be seen, and the U.S. evacuated diplomats and family members in Sudan on April 23. Alex de Waal believes that Sudan has never been a priority for the Biden administration. The United States removed Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism after Sudan's transitional government agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020, but billions of dollars in loans and aid promised by the United States were also put on hold after the 2021 military coup. It is likely that the United States, as it did in Libya after 2012, will not be substantially involved in Sudan's internal conflict. This also coincides with the broader context of its strategic contraction in the Middle East.
Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may not be completely sideways, and Russia, despite its close ties with Khmeti, also needs to take care of its relations with Egypt, which has always been an important target for Russia in regional and international affairs. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are more in the interest of maintaining stability in Sudan, and the continuation of the war will inevitably destroy their investment and trade environment in Africa, and the refugees generated by the war will also spread to the Gulf Arab states.
Therefore, the direction of the conflict in Sudan does not depend entirely on whether the two parties to the conflict choose cooperation or conflict, and regional and international powers always regard the chaos in Sudan as their opportunities. Whether neighbors, regional countries or major powers, they should learn the lessons of Libya and Yemen, and should not pursue their own interests by supporting one party to the conflict, but should mediate and promote cooperation at the right time. A stable Sudan is in the interest of all.
(Xiaodong Ma, PhD candidate, School of International Studies, Peking University)