The country is very independent, cooperating with the West in most areas, but is careful to avoid institutional hostility to Russia.
The open discussions about Ukraine are all about confrontation. But do we know where we're headed? In my lifetime, I have seen four wars, all of which began with great enthusiasm and public support. We don't know how to end all these wars, and we unilaterally withdrew three of them. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.
The Ukrainian question is often a showdown gesture: will Ukraine join the East or the West? But if Ukraine is to survive and prosper, it must not be an outpost of either side against the other – it should act as a bridge between them.
Russia must admit that trying to force Ukraine into satellite status and thus move its borders again would doom Moscow to repeat the mistakes of the past, entering a dead cycle of mutual pressure and self-actualization with Europe and the United States.
The West must understand that Ukraine can never be just a foreign country for Russia. Russian history began in a place known as Kievan Rus' and from where Russian religion spread. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before that. Beginning with the Battle of Poltava in 1709, some of Russia's most important battles for freedom were fought on Ukrainian territory.
The Black Sea Fleet – Russia's means of projecting power in the Mediterranean – was stationed in Sevastopol, Crimea, for a long time. Even prominent dissidents like Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insist that Ukraine is an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, part of Russia.
The EU must recognize that in
In the negotiations on Ukraine's relations with Europe, the EU bureaucracy was protracted and strategic factors were subordinated to domestic politics, which led to the negotiations turning into a crisis. Foreign policy is an art that emphasizes the distinction between priority and importance.
Ukrainians are the decisive factor. They live in a country with a complex history and multilingualism. In 1939, parts of Ukraine's western front were incorporated into the Soviet Union, becoming a spoils of war divided between Stalin and Hitler. 60 percent of Crimea's population is Russian, and it wasn't until 1954, when ukrainian-born Nikita Khrushchev celebrated the 300th anniversary of Russia's agreement with the Cossacks, that Crimea was included in Ukraine' territory. Most of the western part of Ukraine is Catholic, while most of the east is Russian Orthodox.
Ukrainians in Western Ukraine speak Ukrainian, while Eastern Ukrainians speak mainly Russian. Any attempt by either side in Ukraine to dominate the other – which has always been a common pattern – will eventually lead to civil war or division. Seeing Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would wipe out the prospects for Russia and the West – especially Russia and Europe – into a cooperative international system for decades.
Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years and has been under some sort of foreign domination since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders did not learn the art of compromise, let alone a historical perspective. Post-independence Ukrainian politics makes it clear that the root of the problem lies in the attempts of Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on the recalcitrant regions of the country, first one faction and then its opposite.
This is the essence of the conflict between Yanukovych and his main political rival, Tymoshenko. They represent two wings of Ukraine and are reluctant to share power. A sensible U.S. policy toward Ukraine is one that needs to seek a way for the two parts of Ukraine to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not one factional rule.
Russia and the West, especially all factions in Ukraine, have not acted in accordance with this principle. Each faction makes the situation worse. At a time when many of Russia's borders are already in jeopardy, Russia cannot impose a military solution without unifying itself. For the West, demonizing Putin is not a policy, but an excuse for its absence.
Putin should realize that whatever his grievances, military imposition will lead to another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating Russia as an anomalous country and patiently accept washington's code of conduct. Putin is a serious strategist – premised on Russian history. Understanding American values and psychology is not his forte. Understanding Russian history and psychology is also not a strength of U.S. policymakers.
Leaders on all sides should re-examine the results and not compete with each other in terms of posture. Here are my thoughts on outcomes that are in line with the values and security interests of all parties:
1) Ukraine shall have the right freely to choose its economic and political union, including its alliance with Europe.
2) Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I made seven years ago.
3) Ukraine shall be free to establish any Government that conforms to the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would choose a policy of reconciliation between different parts of their country. In fact, they should pursue a posture comparable to Finland.com. There is no doubt that the country is very independent, cooperating with the West in most areas, but carefully avoiding institutional hostility to Russia.
4) Russia's annexation of Crimea is not in line with the rules of the existing world order. But it should be possible to deal with Crimea's relations with Ukraine on a less worrisome basis. To this end, Russia will recognize Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea. In elections held in the presence of international observers, Ukraine should strengthen Crimea's autonomy. This process will include the elimination of any ambiguity regarding the status of the Sevastopol Black Sea Fleet.
These are just principles, not prescriptions. Those familiar with the region know that not all of these initiatives will satisfy all parties. The key is not absolute satisfaction of the parties, but the balance of the dissatisfied parties. If some solution based on these or similar conditions is not achieved, the situation in Ukraine will accelerate towards confrontation. And that moment will come soon.
Kissinger served as U.S. Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, published in the Washington Post on March 6, 2014