【Editor's Note】This article is reproduced from the public account "Eurasian New Observation", written by Ivan Timofiev, an expert on Russian international issues and a project director of the Committee on International Affairs.
Russia's military operations in Ukraine raise a range of short- and long-term consequences for the Russian government that need to be addressed. These issues can be discussed in several dimensions: the future of the European order, the balance of power in Europe, the future of Ukraine, and the economic and domestic political costs of war for Russia.
The war in Ukraine should be analyzed in the context of Moscow's attempt to re-examine the post-Cold War European security order. Since the mid-1990s, the transformation of the European security order has raised growing concerns in Russia. The key issue is NATO's eastward expansion. If Moscow reluctantly acknowledged the membership of former Warsaw Pact members and Baltic states to NATO because of its poor economic and military situation, Russia now sees Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries joining NATO as a red line.
Moscow believes that the United States and the West have to some extent instigated "color revolutions", and this series of "color revolutions" is adding fuel to the fire. The "color revolution" is considered a scam trick to put the "Free Choice Alliance" on track. Domestic political events in Ukraine in 2014 led moscow to take its first hard-line action – annexing Crimea and subsequently supporting Donbass separatists. At the same time, Russia is not unfounded in its call for attention to NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia, the recognition of Kosovo's independence, and other contentious events in post-polar Europe. The inevitable reaction to the events of 2014 has accelerated Kiev's shift to the West, forming a new, relatively stable framework of relations. If the West imposes sanctions, Russia can afford it. Ukraine signed the Minsk Agreement, but secretly resisted and refused to implement it with the acquiescence of Washington and Brussels.
Obviously, at some point Moscow thought that this architecture was seriously flawed. Over time, the outcome of this architecture, if not ignoring Ukraine's membership in NATO, is at least the modernization of Ukraine's armed forces and the gradual strengthening of its national status. This view itself is not without controversy. Strictly speaking, Russia has enough means to contain NATO, and even Ukraine. However, the Kremlin has clearly decided to take the lead.
A diplomatic marathon related to Russia's European security requirements was held before the situation deteriorated. Its main content can be understood as Moscow's demand for legal guarantees for NATO's non-eastward expansion. Meanwhile, Moscow has assembled a large number of military swarms on the border with Ukraine. The United States and NATO took Russia's demands seriously, responding that they were ready to engage in dialogue on some issues, but rejected several principled demands from Moscow. The heads of state of major European countries, such as Britain, France and Germany, made a series of visits to Russia without any results. Attempts to restart the "Normandy model" negotiations failed. Kiev's actions show that no progress will be made in implementing the Minsk agreements. Even after Moscow officially recognized the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk republics, many remained skeptical of the reality of a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. All suspicions vanished on Thursday, February 24.
Suppose that one of the goals of the military operation is to force the West to engage in further dialogue and make concessions to Russia's demands. However, there is no indication that the West will engage in dialogue, let alone make concessions. Instead, the U.S. and NATO positions have hardened. The European order will be established through concrete actions, not agreements. On the Russian side, it may be a complete "format" of the Ukrainian state, and in the West, it is the maximum blockade and containment of Russia. Based on the uncompromising military-political confrontation between Russia and NATO, Europe is forming an asymmetrical polarity.
From the perspective of balance of power, the asymmetrical poles manifest themselves as a clear inequality in the potential of the opponent. In the context of the confrontation with Moscow, the defense spending of NATO countries will increase significantly. The war in Ukraine will reinvigorate the old concept of increasing defence expenditures, which are mainly about increasing spending on the modernization of weapons and equipment and the procurement of weapons and equipment, as well as on defence as a whole. The gap between Russia and NATO on this indicator has reached hundreds of percentage points, and the gap will be even greater in the future. Imbalances will also depend on the growing disparity in economic potential.
There is no doubt that the West will impose severe sanctions on Russia (the first step was already taken on February 24). The first is to freeze the assets of large banks, and then gradually squeeze Russia out of the European and global oil, gas, coal, metals and other raw materials markets. Every market has its peculiarities. Sanctions for each industry need to be calibrated to avoid local shocks in the market. There is no doubt that the West will, as always, seek other sources of raw materials at all costs, and rebuild its economy from new sources regardless of economic losses. It is foreseeable that the supply of industrial and technological products will be quite limited. Given that Russia remains heavily dependent on imports, sanctions will dampen growth and further widen economic imbalances. There is no doubt that the Russian economy will gradually adapt, striving to find new sales markets and suppliers, first of all in China. But in any case, for the Russian economy, the losses will be long-term and significant.
In the long run, economic dysfunction could lead to the technological backwardness of the Russian armed forces. However, in the coming years and even decades, Russia's potential will be sufficient to prevent direct military intervention by NATO. In the event of a conflict, Russia will inflict unbearable losses on NATO, even if it does not use strategic nuclear forces, but only conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. However, this does not mean that there will be no war between Russia and NATO. Accidents, a series of miscalculations or contingencies can lead to war. In any case, NATO will expand its power in Eastern Europe, first of all, to reach the Russian border.
As for the future of Ukraine, it is clear that Russia is planning to change its political system by force. It is unclear where the borders of the new State are and whether they are sovereign in principle. It is to be expected that a Ukrainian government-in-exile will emerge. Territory controlled by Moscow would be subject to trade and economic blockades from the West, similar to those of Crimea, Luhansk and the Donetsk Republic. It is unclear how long Ukraine's resistance to Russian troops will last. It may soon destroy the resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces, but underground activities and guerrilla warfare will be long-lasting. The duration of the military operation has little impact on the severity of sanctions against Russia. No matter how long the military operation lasts, the sanctions will be enormous. Under the premise of the trade blockade, Moscow had to rebuild the Ukrainian economy and put it on a new track. This will require significant investments, which will be greatly diminished to some extent by the impact of local corruption.
The medium- and long-term impact of this war on the Russian economy will be enormous. The ruble exchange rate crash, inflation, rising import prices and higher prices due to tighter export controls are all expected. Once the policy of "squeezing Russia out of the raw material commodity market" is successful, it will inevitably affect Russia's budget revenues. The experience of imposing sanctions on Iran shows that the United States can not only co-opt allies who plan to impose sanctions on Russia, but also force countries that maintain a neutral stance against Russia to impose sanctions on Russia. While the supply of resources is shrinking, an accelerated arms race with the West will lead to an increase in defense spending, and it will also face the provision of resources to Ukraine. A range of economic factors will affect the quality of life and income of Russian citizens.
Theoretically, a decline in the well-being of Russian citizens would exacerbate domestic political problems. Indeed, given the huge reserves and the delaying effects of sanctions, events are unlikely to move in this direction in the short term. However, in the medium term, the possibility of accumulation of protests and spontaneous release under the influence of one trigger or another is not ruled out. The dependence of domestic political stability on resources will be non-linear and difficult to predict. Domestic protests will be an important variable in the West's strategic assessment.
Military action against Ukraine is turning a new page in the history of international relations, while at the same time taking shape different everyday realities. For some people, this moment is changing, and for others, these changes do not occur until they are older than the years. But these changes will affect the lives of people inside and outside Russia.