06.
The departure of the Ambassador of Germany and the return of the Ambassador of Austria eight days later were destined to be arranged by me. So on the morning of August 5 I sent my naval secretary, Admiral Hood, to the German Embassy in uniform, hoping to know in what way we could satisfy and facilitate Prince Lisinovsky. Despite being insulted and even attacked by the German mob as the French and British ambassadors left Berlin, we proceeded with meticulous caution, ensuring decent courtesy to those for whom we were responsible. Prince Lishinovsky recorded the courtesy he received, and our actions seemed to leave a deep impression on his heart.
To the Austrian Ambassador, Count Mensdorf, I wrote the following notice:
August 13, 1914
"Here comes the Secretary of the Navy, Hood, who has been instructed to help you on your sea journey in comfort and convenience. If you need any help at this point, I hope you will notify me.
While terrible developments have set aside the ancient friendship between our two countries, the respect and care that has arisen from years of personal interaction will not pass away from the hearts of your British friends. ”
The Austrian ambassador asked whether a ship could be sent to send him directly to Trieste [Note: Trieste, now part of Italy. ] and demanded that this care be given to some Austrian civilians living in London who now had to leave the country. I then arranged for as many as 200 people to board the Ambassador's ship. I am sure that I am taking these measures in accordance with the rules required by British dignity.
07.
In accordance with the King's Charter establishing the Admiralty and the orders of parliament, the Minister of the Navy is responsible to the King and Parliament for all the affairs of the Admiralty. For this reason, the Secretary of the Navy himself delegated responsibility for technical and professional management to outstanding sailors. But he cannot thus relieve himself of his theoretical or practical responsibility; he is responsible for everything that happens; he is to blame for every disaster. The glory of victory is due to the commander who achieved it; the responsibility for defeat or mishandling must rest with the Admiralty, and the condemnation of the people falls primarily on the Minister of the Navy.
How, then, does the appointment of a minister of civil service without authoritative expertise for political or parliamentary reasons perform his duties? It is clear that this depends on the personality, temperament and ability of the Secretary of the Navy and the First Admiral. The two of them must work together to face rapid, continuous, complex major issues, and if they cannot achieve wholehearted agreement, then the king must choose the other two at the suggestion of the Prime Minister. I understand my responsibilities this way: I take full responsibility for the success of all my work. In this spirit, I exercise close and comprehensive supervision over every piece of work that has been undertaken or proposed. In addition, I demand unlimited power of advice and initiative for the entire naval sphere, and all orders are given with the consent of the First Admiral. Whatever I do, right or wrong, I want people to judge my merits on that basis. In fact, it is less difficult than imagined. Indeed, after a long period of endless crisis and tension, the machine ran smoothly.
Tirpitz
At the beginning of the war, the German Admiral von Tirpitz found himself completely cut off from the fleet strategically and quasi-tactically, so much so that he declared that "he did not understand the naval battle plan." "He was limited to doing purely administrative work. Because he was in charge of administrative work, he lost the position of the emperor's entourage in the base camp. The Naval Staff, originally led by von Bohr, had eyeliner at the emperor's side and could receive hints from the highest levels in line with the emperor's wishes. The situation of Admiral von Tirpitz was therefore extremely unpleasant. The Naval Staff did everything possible not to bring him close to the Emperor, persuading him to reject his efforts to break into the highest circle. The Emperor, who was under the weight of the entire state, gave instructions to the General Staff at any time, dictate words that had not been carefully considered, which would later be carried out as irresistible authority. Admiral von Tirpitz attributed the paralysis of the German fleet in the first months of the naval battle to these events. According to him, this situation deprived Germany of the opportunity to fight the most important battle under the most favorable conditions, and in fact the sea supremacy fell into the hands of the British without a war, so that British troops were continuously transported to the European continent. If our solution to the conundrum of naval warfare is incomplete, so is our enemy.
08
The naval superiority gap we know of in domestic waters is smaller at this time than at any time in the war. The main fleet concentrated in the Northern Theater on August 1, 1914 consisted of 24 ships belonging to the Dreadnought class or stronger. In addition, the battlecruiser Invincible is moored in Queenstown and guards the Atlantic coast, with 2 Lord Nelson class cruisers with the Straits Fleet and 3 other battlecruisers in the Mediterranean. The Germans actually mobilized 16 warships of the same class. [Original note: Writings of German Admiral Scheer, p. 13.] We can't be absolutely sure, although we think they also have 2 or even 3 other warships, which is actually unlikely, these are their maximum strength. Fortunately, each British warship was fully prepared and in perfect condition. None of them were being repaired. The current combatable forces are 16 of our 24 against the enemy and 19 of the possible. But these figures were not the entire material strength of the British fleet as a whole, let alone the firepower of British warships. In addition to the Dreadnought class warships, the British fleet also had 8 King Edward class warships, which were obviously superior to the remaining 8 German warships. Even without mentioning the advantages in this regard and the resulting confidence of the people, the fact is certain that we have a clear numerical advantage in terms of our 5 to 8 more Dreadnought-class battleships alone. In terms of the percentage of accidents and mechanical failures that the huge fleet must expect, we are not very far from the enemy. It is impossible for us to suffer a catastrophe caused by a surprise attack because we are unprepared. For the observer, who looked only at the superficial phenomena, he looked down from the cliffs of Dover or Portland a squadron of six or seven warships, lying far below like tiny models, and it was obvious that he would be troubled by the foundations of the British world on which they depended. If the wisdom and courage of the British officers and men at sea are not what we believe; if the craftsmanship of these huge warships is not sufficiently reliable and exquisite; if the navigation skills and artillery skills of our sailors on the water are inferior; if something terrible or wrong happens by accident, then the fighting forces of the two sides may be equal.
British fleet
It is easy to understand how high expectations were expected of the British Navy. If the German Navy were to fight a major battle, now was the best chance to start the war. Of course, the German Admiralty knows what warships we can use and we have mobilized, concentrated, and cruised our fleets at sea. Even if they had taken the unusual fact that each of our Intrepid class battleships was fully prepared, none of them had gone wrong, and in the eyes of the Germans they had endured a battle against the German fleet by a maximum of 27 to 16 – a huge gap, in their opinion. The gap is even greater when the observation extends to the entire fleet, but it is still small compared to the gap they will face in 6 months, 12 months or later. For a look at the reinforcements that these two opposing fleets are about to receive show that, in addition to completing our own ships, we can requisition battleships built for foreign countries in our docks. So we have 7 big battleships in 3 months, and 12 big battleships in 6 months will definitely be able to join our main fleet. In contrast, the other side can count on only 3 in 3 months and only 5 in 6 months, so that the balance sheet after 3 months is 34 to 19, and 6 months later it is 39 to 21; this does not count the 3 battlecruisers in the Mediterranean and the 3 battlecruisers in the Pacific, the Australia. If this warship is needed, we can obviously transfer it back to Britain.
This is the most favorable moment for Germany; it is the best opportunity they can find. Isn't that a strategic moment? Didn't the Germans think that transporting the British Army to France was the most serious thing for the Admiralty? Isn't it clear that a victory at this critical juncture, even a partial victory, will be more productive than a victory at any other time? The 42 German commercial cruisers could attack on the sea in just a few moments, and we would need to sink them one by one later. Of particular importance is the real effect of interfering with and delaying britain's transport of troops to greatly increase their forces on land? The German General Staff believed in short-term warfare, and they bet everything on the best effort to increase their power on land. Why didn't the German fleet go to war, why didn't it play a role in something valuable at the most critical moment? What other uses can it be put for?
So we look for warplanes on the ocean. We expect to fight, we pursue war. The news that the navies of the two countries are approaching each other and preparing for a decisive battle at sea will be welcomed with genuine satisfaction by our fleet and by the Admiralty with composure. We cannot send our main fleet to an area of the Helgoland Gulf where mines and submarines congregate. But if the enemy provides fighters under any conditions, and this condition does not put us at a serious disadvantage, it will also be accepted by us immediately.
In fact, the sober confidence of the Admiralty was based on the calculation of relative forces, the reliability of which could not be doubted by the German General Staff. Even von Tirpitz, the advocate of the operations, wrote in the book (p. 356): "The reason for the opposition to immediate combat is that when war broke out the entire British fleet was ready for war thanks to experimental mobilization, yet we had only a few squadrons in active service ready," said the official German naval history. As a result of the experimental mobilization and the subsequent measures to obtain a wide range of military superiority, although the British were bound to cause disturbances and uneasiness as a result ... But this advantage cannot be offset or caught up by Germany. "The German General Staff considered it not worth a try, even though it was the best opportunity to test its strength, but it was still extremely dangerous or even without any prospect of success; and so their fleet remained hidden in the harbor for a disgraceful life; and this undoubtedly led to the continued and massive consumption of resources by England for maritime missions, and germany to obtain indirect tangible benefits, but not to exert decisive influence on the whole course of the war.
So we waited, but nothing happened. Nothing big happened right away. There was no big fight. The Main British fleet remained at sea, and the German fleet did not leave the harbor where it was hiding. The cruisers were also inactive. A German minelayer mined off the coast of Harwich was chased and sunk by a small fleet of destroyers led by the Amphelion, who was hit and exploded as she passed through the German minefield on its way home. In addition the cannons that lingered on the vast and narrow seas did not break the silence. But in this period of silence, from the very beginning the British Navy ruled the entire world unchallenged. All German cruisers in foreign waters had disappeared into the vast sea; all German merchant ships had fled to neutral ports from the earliest moment when Britain was clearly about to enter the war. Seven of the 8 potential destroyers targeting merchant ships even hid without firing a single shot. German maritime trade outside the Baltic Sea ceased to exist from the evening of August 4. On the other hand, after a few days of hesitation, a large number of British merchant ships began to sail to sea with government guarantees of no more than 6% insurance rate, and even before the main armies of the two sides of the european continent came into contact, the entire oceanic communication of the British Empire continued on a largest scale. By the end of August, the insurance rate had dropped to 6 percent, and by this time the Admiralty was able to announce that 11 of the 42 German liners deemed a threat to maritime trade had been disarmed and detained in American seaports under surveillance by British cruisers; 6 had taken refuge in other neutral seaports, where they were either dismantled or monitored; 14 were in German ports, tightly enclosed by a cordon and 6 were left as spoils of war; and only 5 were unaccounted for, the fate of which would be described later.
There were some pessimistic prophecies at the time, and these prophecies were the subject of much controversy and article. For example, our merchant ships would be attacked by German attackers in the major oceans; dozens of British cruisers would need to be added to protect commerce; and British merchant ships would not want to venture out to sea once they were in safe ports. None of this has really been achieved. This situation can be interpreted as having been dismissed. In the years before the war, the three major dangers of the Navy that mainly occupied our minds —first, the danger of a surprise attack on the fleet; second, the danger of mines; and third, the paralysis of maritime trade—were like the great waves that rolled away from us after the ship's speed.
More than 100 years have passed since the last time the British Navy was tasked with the biggest urgent challenge. If, 100 years from now, the same circumstances are encountered, and the Navy can show the same degree of preparedness, we have no reason to blame our next generation, just as they have no reason to blame us. (To be continued)