Manstein's memoirs show that he probably came up with the idea of fighting back. It is worth noting that Manstein's Vennitsa command (south of Zhytomyr), also not far from the war zone, was conducive to his command of the counterattack. The final plan was that the Germans would first launch a main offensive from the southwest of Fastorf to Brusilov, crushing the Soviet forces that were advancing from Kiev to the southwest. Then turn west to crush the Soviet forces in the Zhytomyr region and rescue the trapped German 13th Army.
Why did Merentin lie? In fact, he has always presented himself as a loyal subordinate and staunch supporter of Manstein. Perhaps reluctant to criticize Manstein's plans, he preferred to vent his grievances on the less connected Austrian Rouse.
As for who is more correct about his and Manstein's plan, the author's assessment is: After all, Manstein is much older than Merentin, and he knows that the strength of the Soviet army cannot be underestimated now, preferring to choose a steady approach.
He also had tactical considerations: through the previous counter-offensive of the 25th Panzer Division against Fastov, Manstein found that a strong Red Army tank unit (the 3rd Guards Tank Army) had been assembled there. In order to avoid this Soviet army, it was necessary to shift the main direction of attack to the west. In this way, the main opponent of the 48th Panzer Army became the more easy to deal with the Soviet 38th Army. In addition, Manstein was particularly sensitive to the threat from the northern flank of the Red Army's 60th Army.