One of Manstein's views expressed after World War II was that his defensive counterattack tactics were better than sticking to the spot, so he opposed Hitler's order to stick to it. However, this is not how clever he is, but because he is narrow-minded and overconfident, and he is obsessed with Hitler's dismissal in the first half of 1944.
The defensive counterattack tactics he advocated were too expensive, too much influenced by the terrain, and reflected that the strategic vision was not high enough.
Manstein in the liberation
Manstein's defensive counterattack tactics, in simple terms, are to lure the enemy deeper, find the flaws of the Soviet offensive troops, and then attack with armored units from the flanks, and then divide and encircle them, and it can achieve brilliant results, but how many elite troops will be used in this tactic?
For example, the Second Battle of Kharkov in May 1942, which was a prelude to the Battle of Stalingrad. When the Soviets stormed the German Army Group South, Hitler ordered the German Army Group Center to lend a large number of troops to army group South to launch a counterattack, and the stronger German counterattack forces were the 6th, 11th, 17th Army, and the 1st Panzer Army. There are about 500 tanks (some say about 1,000) and about 600 aircraft. This made the counterattack successful and wiped out a large number of Soviet troops.
German Tiger tanks
The Third Battle of Kharkov in February 1943 was even more exaggerated, with the wehrmacht's elite Greater German Panzergrenadier Division and the SS 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Panzergrenadier Divisions all allocated to Manstein's command, and the latest Tiger was allocated a lot. In the end, the main attacking force of the Soviet "Star" operation was defeated.
Both battles were Manstein's proudest works. However, if the Germans fought back defensively on all fronts
How many other elite armored units are available for use on other fronts, and how many new weapons can be allocated to other generals?
Moreover, Manstein simply said that he won the battle, why didn't he say that he had lost the battle?
In late 1942, the Soviets launched Operation Uranus and counterattacked the German 6th Army in Stalingrad. Manstein complained bitterly that Hitler had ordered it to hold on, and Goering was blindly confident. However, the "winter storm" that countered the Soviets outside the city was under Manstein's command. Elites such as the German 6th Army dragged out the Soviet counter-offensive forces in front, and Manstein could fight back against the Soviets as much as he could, but was he successful? Instead, the few far-reaching and circuitous Soviet tank units surprised Manstein.
In the second half of 1943, after the Battle of Kursk, the Soviets launched a counterattack. Manstein repeatedly ordered the Germans to retreat, claiming to shrink their forces to fight back. However, he was shrinking his strength, and accordingly, the Soviet troops did not have much attrition and continued to attack. Manstein retreated all the way across the Dnieper, could the German armored forces re-cross the river to counterattack? This was probably the beginning of Hitler's great disappointment with Manstein.
Ferdinand/Elephant Tank Destroyer
In early 1944, when Cherkasser was encircled and the Germans were surrounded by Soviets, it was another great opportunity for Manstein to rescue them, but what? How many Soviet troops did he encircle through defensive counterattacks? The losses of the SS 1st and 5th Panzer Divisions were extremely severe. This was a battle in which Hitler was utterly disappointed in him.
If you look at the northern and central Soviet-German fronts, the terrain is more restrictive.
The famous Lezhev salient in the center, the transportation hub in the hands of the Germans, the German army for a long time held on to the millions of troops of the Soviet Western Front, which was seriously pinned down, and if they and Manstein had a defensive counterattack, it was difficult to imagine how the successful defense could not be achieved without so many elite German troops.
As for the northern front, Leningrad is flanked by Lake Ladoga on one side, and on three sides are large areas of woods, swamps, extremely low visibility, and long polar nights. Manstein and his 11th Army also fought briefly there. At that time, neither side even found the opposing attacking force, making the Battle of Signavino a two-sided attack, not to mention the difficulty of the tank troops detouring.
What is Manstein's good policy for such objective conditions?
German tank destroyer group
Finally, Manstein knew that Hitler was asking for more aircraft, artillery, and tanks, and that before the Battle of Kursk, the German High Command had almost all of the latest and best German weapons in his direction. But he wanted weapons, and did he know where they came from?
German military production required resources from the occupied territories and the support of vassal states. If Manstein blindly withdraws one after another, and may not be able to fight back successfully, how to maintain Germany's deterrence?
The biggest counterexample came from the Western Front, Marshal Albert Kesselring, commander-in-chief of the Southern Theater defending Italy, whose troops, relying on the mountainous Italian terrain, made the Allied offensive extremely slow, forcing the opponent to abandon the idea of counterattacking France from Italy and instead implement the Normandy landings. If Manstein was transferred to the Italian theater, I wonder how he would command? Will southern France be the first French territory the Allies to liberate?
Marshal Kesselring
After the war, the British and American sides attached great importance to Manstein, probably because Manstein had not fought with the Allies since the Battle of France in 1940, and sat on the cold bench in the last year of the war.
Moreover, many warlike German generals, such as Marshal Modell, Marshal Kruger, Marshal von Bock, etc., were either killed in battle or hanged in the post-war trial.
As a result, he was hired as an adviser to the West German army, and his memoirs, The Lost Victory, were greatly praised by the West, and were touted by highly ideological historians such as Albert Seton and Little Hart, claiming that Hitler could win World War II by listening to Manstein, and that Manstein could become commander-in-chief of the German army.
These exaggerated words of praise are both the needs of cold war anti-Soviet propaganda and the conclusions drawn from Manstein's one-sided words.
Marshal Kesselring, on the other hand, was listed as a war criminal after the war and almost executed, and I am afraid that it has a lot to do with the tactics of the Allies hating his stubbornness.
German prisoners
Therefore, Manstein put forward some war ideas that he thought were clever, but they were not. Over time. Manstein's memoir, Lost Victory, has been given an increasingly low rating. He has been nicknamed many nicknames, such as "The Art of Throwing the Pot", "Failure is Not Bad for Me", "They Dead People Can't Talk".
The chapters in it have also been nicknamed, such as:
Hitler was a big fool;
Paulus was a big fool;
The hairs are stupid, that is, there are many people;
The United States is also a fool, with the ability to single out;
All but me are idiots.
This so-called tactical theory, which feels good about oneself, has been refuted even by American historians who carefully compare historical materials, so it is only an outdated statement at the height of the Cold War due to opaque information and the war of public opinion between the United States and the Soviet Union.
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