If the Norwegian campaign is mentioned, then it is a crushing victory between Britain and Germany on both sides of the war. In this battle, the Germans certainly appeared as invaders, while the British were called saviors. But if we look at history, we will find that Britain was not as just as he said, and Germany's troops had a preemptive flavor. So behind the history, what kind of game is there between Britain and Germany? Today we will reconstruct the Anglo-German game behind the Norwegian campaign through historical materials to see how the truth of history really is.
I. The Aftermath of the Polish Campaign
The polish campaign was followed by an eerie calm. France and Germany confronted each other on the border, and the two sides were like two beasts roaring in the air, but no fighting broke out. At first glance, it seems that war is not going to break out. However, smart people know that this peace is precarious, that war may eventually break out, and that everyone is waiting with trepidation.
Hitler in Germany was still terrified of Britain and France, hoping that the war could be avoided diplomatically, and made peace proposals to Britain and France, but Britain and France rejected Hitler's peace proposals on the 10th and 12th, respectively, and began to mobilize troops as much as possible in order to engage Germany – or to force Hitler to make concessions through a tough gesture.
This can be seen in the French Offensive of the Saar on 7 September 1939, because if the French really wanted to attack, the weak strength of the German army on the Siegfried Line obviously could not stop the French attack.
However, the 40 divisions used by the French army to attack quickly withdrew to their starting positions after "capturing" 20 German villages and reaching the Siegfried Line without any resistance.
It is conceivable that this offensive is only a politically tough gesture, but it has no substantive effect in essence, and is at best a provocative act. It also reflected the fear of war between France and Britain, and the residual effects of appeasement on Both Britain and France.
The refusal of Britain and France was already expected by Hitler, and he also issued the Führer's Special Directive No. 6 on October 9, 1939, which required the defeat of Western European countries before further expansion into Eastern Europe, especially Britain and France, which were unprecedentedly powerful.
But despite Hitler's emphasis on the need for a pre-emptive attack on France, defeating the French army and the British Expeditionary Force deployed in France, and ensuring that Germany would not fall into the crisis of two-front operations.
Hitler, however, misjudged the internal form of Germany, and although he thought that an attack could be launched in a few weeks, it would take at least three months for the German Army to repair the heavily worn tanks and vehicles, and the ammunition and other materials were scarce enough to support such a major war.
On the other hand, the Wehrmacht officer corps also generally wanted to avoid war with Britain and France, and Hitler also needed to do some struggle with the officer corps.
In response, the British planned to use their powerful navy to blockade Germany. In world war I, the British used this tactic to trap Germany. But at this time, the British were nervous, and the success of this tactic depended entirely on the small Nordic country , Norway, which could be said to determine the success or failure of the British naval blockade, but this was precisely the reason for the British nervousness.
Second, the British plan
As early as September 19, 1939, when the Polish Campaign was still in progress, the British Minister of the Navy Churchill had suggested to the British Cabinet to send the navy to mine mines in Norwegian waters, which he claimed would force Sweden to fail to transport iron ore and balls and bearings to Germany in the winter.
Churchill's remark was not unreasonable, because of the lack of concentrate ore in Germany, so it could only be imported from Sweden. But in winter, Germany can only transport from the ice-free port of Narvik in Norway. This move can be described as a kill, the real sense of the snake hit seven inches.
But there was only one problem with the plan, and that was that the Royal Navy had to enter Norwegian waters to mine mines, which was tantamount to undermining Norway's neutrality.
Of course, Churchill argued that such a step was of great importance in attacking German industry and reducing Germany's war potential.
He also told the Chief of the Naval Staff after September 19: "The Cabinet, including the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, seems to be strongly supportive of this operation." ”
Note that Churchill's remarks seem to imply that britain did not carefully consider the scheme's means, and then hastily agreed to the plan's purpose, without giving much thought to the possible consequences of the plan.
Of course, Churchill's proposal was ultimately blocked by the British Foreign Office, which reminded the British cabinet that it should pay attention to the chain reaction triggered by the breach of Norwegian neutrality.
Churchill recorded this in his memoirs: "The debate in the Foreign Office on the question of gravity is so weighty that I cannot carry out my ideas, but I continue to work on all occasions by all means." ”
It can be seen that Churchill's plan at that time was obstructed and constrained by the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and eventually it was not implemented.
Churchill himself, however, remained indignant about this and promoted his plans on various occasions, even if they undermined Norway's neutrality and sovereignty.
And when the Soviet-Finnish War broke out, Churchill got a second chance, he thought that under the guise of aiding Finland, he could get a chance to strike at the German flank .
On the way to Finland, he passed through Sweden and controlled the iron ore mines in Sweden, cutting off germany's iron ore access once and for all.
Churchill himself described it this way:
"As a means of cutting off the supply of Germany's main iron ore, I welcome this new and advantageous opportunity, which can give us great strategic significance."
Churchill's appetite was greater at this point, and as to whether the Germans would invade Norway and Sweden for this, he commented on it as: "
When you fire at your enemy, he will certainly fight back. But if the Germans attack Norway and Sweden, we gain more than we lose. ”
Third, Germany's response
In fact, when Churchill first proposed his plan, he turned it into a debate and eventually developed into a multifaceted discussion and public topic. As you can imagine, this is bound to attract the attention of the Germans, who only need to send the contents of the British newspaper back to Berlin, and Hitler can understand this.
Of course, this inevitably caused Hitler to worry and consider a countermeasure.
The German War Navy documents captured after the war also recorded that the commander-in-chief of the navy, Admiral Raeder, was worried at the time, and he reported to Hitler in early October that britain might occupy Norway and have a strategically adverse impact. It was recommended to use diplomatic means and military pressure to acquire a base in Norway, which he said would facilitate the German submarine force to carry out a break-up operation.
Although Riddle's proposal is very pragmatic and has a very good reason and basis. But Hitler still threw Reddell's suggestion aside, because he was focusing his attention on the Western Front and was unwilling to expand the battlefield.
In particular, pre-emptive action against Norway could further stimulate Britain and France, which was a more dangerous option at the time. The German war navy was far less powerful than Britain and France, and the invasion of Norway was a joint landing operation of the army, navy and air force, during which it was inevitable to engage the British Royal Navy.
If the weak German war navy were to engage the Royal Navy at sea, the outcome would be really to know with your toes.
In December of the same year, Gersling, the former Norwegian minister of defense and now the leader of the Norwegian Nazi Party, came to Berlin, where he hoped that Hitler would support his plan to seize power and that Germany should preemptively attack or Norway might be occupied by Britain and France.
But Hitler unexpectedly said: "He would rather Norway and the rest of Scandinavia remain completely neutral." Hitler explained this because he did not want to expand the battlefield, but if Britain and France were ready to expand the war, then he would also take measures to ensure that Germany was not threatened.
As evidence of Hitler's remarks, the German Naval General Staff recorded their views on this sentence in the war log of 13 January -
"The most favourable solution is to maintain Norway's neutrality"
。
This is a more striking fact in a way, that in the early days of the war, Hitler did not want to undermine Norway's neutrality.
Despite his greed and cunning, he adopted the principle of Norway's neutrality in the norwegian question and did not plan to invade Norway.
This may be due to his reluctance to expand the battlefield, so that he dispersed the precious German forces, after all, the German family is not rich, and it is necessary to use troops in a planned way. It may also be out of fear of a chain reaction, especially the anti-German wave in neutral countries, especially the United States, and considering that the United States helped Britain and France win victory in World War I, the Germans have a fear of the United States in their hearts.
Either way, Hitler never considered invading Norway early in the war.
But the situation changed too quickly, and as the French commander-in-chief Camerin suggested that the French government send troops to open a second front in Scandinavia, and Churchill openly called for neutral countries to support Britain and France against Germany, Hitler realized that he had to draw up a plan to invade Norway if necessary, lest Britain and France occupy Norway first.
On February 5, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain approved the dispatch of an expeditionary force into Sweden to control the Yelivare iron ore mine in the name of "aiding Finland", and the new French Prime Minister Daladiy proposed on February 21 that the British destroyer be used to break into Norwegian ports and board the German merchant ship Altmark as an excuse to invade Norway and capture all Norwegian ports.
In response, Daladi argued: "Since the world's memory of Norwegian complicity with the Germans in this incident is still very fresh, the faster we act, the more effective our propaganda will be, and we will appear to be justified in front of world public opinion." ”
This argument is in some ways more Nazi than Nazi, and the new French Prime Minister Renault, who succeeded Daladiy, also supported the invasion of Norway and wanted to start the invasion immediately – this was also something he and Churchill had discussed.
At this time, Germany had no choice, and the invasion of Norway became an inevitable move, because even if Germany did not go, Britain and France would invade first.
epilogue
In the end, Norway's fate was completely reduced to the victim of this great power game. Hitler finally made up his mind to invade Norway on April 1, 1940, and ordered an invasion of Norway at 5:15 a.m. on April 9.
It should be noted that at this time Britain, France and Germany invaded Norway almost simultaneously. If the term aggression had been applied to both sides, the British might have been 24 hours earlier.
Perhaps as the British military scientist Liddell Hart wrote in his History of the Second World War,
Germany won Norway by a narrow margin ahead of Britain and France, and the subsequent actions of Britain and France were only part of their expected aggression.
Poor Norway, on the other hand, had to endure a war that did not belong to them.
Reference: History of the Second World War
Memoirs of Churchill