Author: Liddell Hart Translation: Little Xiaoice Man
After the fall of Poland, six months of false calm followed, but a sudden thunderclap ended the period. This sunny thunderbolt came not from the center of the storm clouds, but from the edge of Scandinavia. A bolt of lightning from Hitler's regime struck the peaceful states of Norway and Denmark.
Newspapers of 9 April 1940 reported that the British and French navies had sailed into Norwegian waters yesterday, where they had laid minefields to prevent ships trading with Germany from entering. Comments in the newspaper praised the aggressive actions of the Anglo-French Navy and justified the undermining of Norway's neutrality. But the morning's broadcast made the news in the newspaper obsolete, because it reported even more shocking news: German troops were landing at a series of locations along the Norwegian coast, and they had entered Denmark.
The Germans acted recklessly, completely ignoring the superiority of British maritime power, and the Leaders of the Allied Powers were stunned. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain said in a statement in the House of Commons that afternoon that German troops had landed on the west coast of Norway in Bergen, Trondheim, and the southern coast, adding: "There are reports that they have also landed in Narvik, but I suspect that this information is inaccurate." To the British authorities, it seemed incredulous that Hitler would venture so far north, and even more inconceivable was that they knew that their powerful naval forces were right near the site of the incident, covering operations and other predetermined measures. They believe that Narvik must have been a clerical error of Larvik, located on the southern coast of Norway.
But by the end of the day, it was clear that the Germans had captured Oslo, the capital of Norway, and all the major ports, including Narvik. Every simultaneous German raid was successful.
The British government was so dismayed by this German victory that new illusions arose. Mr. Churchill, then Minister of the Navy, said in the House of Commons two days later: "In my opinion, Mr. Hitler made a serious strategic mistake, and my experienced advisers felt the same way... We've learned a lot from these things that happened in Scandinavia... He made a series of landings off the coast of Norway, which forced him to engage in combat throughout the summer, and the allies he was fighting against not only had absolute superiority in naval power, but it was easier to project combat power into the battlefield than he did. I don't see what advantage he has... I think our sworn enemy made a strategic mistake after being provoked... This gives us a big advantage. ”
The ensuing practical actions are not worthy of such rhetoric. The British counterattack was slow, hesitant, and clumsy. The British Admiralty was dismissive of air power before the war, but when it was their turn to act, they became extremely cautious and did not dare to risk sending warships to waters where intervention could be decisive. The ground forces were even worse off. Although the British landed at several locations to drive out the German invaders, they re-boarded and evacuated after only two weeks, leaving only a foothold in Narvik. A month later, with the Germans launching their main offensive on the Western Front, narvik's stronghold was abandoned.
The castle in the air built by Churchill collapsed. These fantasies are based on fundamental misunderstandings about the situation, about the changes in modern warfare, and in particular the impact of air power on sea power.
Churchill described Norway as Hitler's trap and spoke of the German invasion as a measure taken "after Hitler was provoked," which made his closing remarks more relevant and important. After the war, documents about the battle were discovered, and the most striking fact is that, despite Hitler's recklessness, he preferred to keep Norway neutral and initially did not intend to invade the country, until he was provoked by the obvious signs of hostilities by the Allies in the region that he blatantly invaded Norway.
It is fascinating to explore the events behind the scenes of both sides, and while tragic and terrifying, it is easy to see how these politicians with a strong offensive mindset can easily influence each other and cause destructive forces to explode. The first explicit measure appeared on September 19, 1939, when, according to Churchill's memoirs, he proposed to the Cabinet a plan to lay minefields in Norwegian territorial waters as a way to "prevent the Norwegians from transporting Swedish iron ore from Narvik to Germany." He argued that the measure was "extremely important for weakening the enemy's war industry." Churchill later informed first sea secretary: "The Cabinet, including the Foreign Secretary (Lord Halifax), seems to strongly support this action. ”
This is surprising because it shows that the Cabinet is inclined to support the objectives without carefully considering the means or the possible consequences of such a move. When war broke out in 1939, the British government's ideas were more reckless than at the end of the First World War. However, the British Foreign Office exerted a restrained influence that heard the cabinet against the violation of Norway's neutrality. Churchill wrote in frustration: "The reasons for the neutrality [of Respect for Norway] by the Foreign Office carry a very weighty argument, and my opinion has not been adopted." I use various methods to stand up for my views on various occasions..." More and more people are discussing this issue, and even newspapers have published articles in support of this view. This caused anxiety among the Germans, who began to take countermeasures.
From the archives captured after the war, the first important event on the German side occurred in early October, when the German naval commander-in-chief Raeder was deeply concerned about the possibility of opening ports to Britain by the Norwegians, and he reported to Hitler the possible strategic disadvantages caused by the British occupation (Norwegian ports). Raeder also noted that "with the help of pressure exerted by the Soviet Union, control of several bases off the Coast of Norway, such as Trondheim," would have benefited Germany in conducting submarine warfare.
But Hitler shelved the proposal. At this point he was preoccupied with the Western Offensive, intending to force the French to make peace, and therefore did not want to be involved in any insignificant combat operations or to disperse resources.
The Soviet invasion of Finland at the end of November brought a new and more intense stimulus to Britain and Germany. Churchill was aware of a new possibility of attacking the German flank under the guise of aiding Finland: "I welcome this new and favourable atmosphere, because in this way it is possible to cut off the supply of iron ore, which is vital to Germany, and to achieve our main strategic advantage." ”
A December 16 churchill report listed all the reasons he had recommended the measure, calling it "a major offensive operation." He acknowledged that the move could lead to a German invasion of Scandinavia because, as he put it: "If you open fire on the enemy, then he will certainly return fire." But he went on to assert: "If Germany were to invade Norway and Sweden, for us it would gain more than we would lose." He had no idea what the People of Scandinavia would suffer if those countries became battlefields.
Most cabinet members remain wary of violating Norway's neutrality. Despite Churchill's strong pleas, they did not approve the immediate implementation of his plan. However, they authorized the chiefs of staff of the three services to "draw up a plan for the landing of an army in Narvik", which was a railway terminal to the Yeliwal iron ore mine area in Sweden, which also connected to Finland. The ostensible purpose of such an expedition was to support Finland, but the real main intention was to control the iron ore mines in Sweden.
That month, an important visitor arrived in Berlin from Norway. He was former Norwegian Minister of Defence, Vidcon Gieslin, who is now the leader of a small Norwegian Nazi party that strongly supported Germany. As soon as he arrived in Berlin, he visited Admiral Raeder and told Raeder that the British would soon occupy Norway. Planning a coup d'état to overthrow the current Norwegian government, Keisling asked Germany for funding and covert help. He said a group of important Norwegian officers were ready to support his coup, including Colonel Sandlow, commander of the Narvik garrison. When he came to power, he invited German troops to enter Norway to provide protection and prevent the British from entering Norway.
Raeder persuaded Hitler to personally receive Giesling, and they met twice on December 16 and 18. The minutes of the talks show that Hitler said he "wanted Norway and the rest of Scandinavia to remain completely neutral" because he did not want to "expand the battlefield", but "if the enemy attempts to expand the war, he will also take measures to avoid being threatened". At the same time, Hitler promised to fund Gisling and promised that he would study the issue of military support for Gisling.
Nevertheless, the war log of the German Naval Command of 13 November shows that after a month, although they were anxious about "Britain's attempt to occupy Norway with the acquiescence of the Norwegian government", they believed that "the most advantageous solution was to maintain Norway's neutrality".
So, what happened on that side of the mountain? On 15 January, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gammerin, sent a letter to Prime Minister Daladi about the importance of opening a new theater of operations in Scandinavia. He also drew up a plan to send a coalition force to land in Pesamo in northern Finland, while taking precautions to "seize ports and airports on the west coast of Norway." The programme further envisages the possibility of "extending the operation to Sweden to occupy the Jellívare iron ore area".
Churchill's radio speech, claiming that neutral nations had an obligation to join the struggle against Hitler, certainly caused anxiety among the Germans. 4 In short, too many public hints suggest that the allies will soon act.
On 27 January, Hitler gave his military advisers a clear order to draw up a detailed plan for their invasion of Norway if necessary. The special units formed for this purpose met for the first time on 5 February.
On the same day, the Supreme Military Conference of the Allies was held in Paris, and Chamberlain and Churchill attended together. The meeting approved a plan to form a coalition of two British divisions and a smaller French division to "rush to Finland", and to reduce the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, the soldiers "disguised as volunteers". But the meeting disputed the dispatch route of this army. The British Prime Minister highlighted the difficulties of landing in Pesamo, as well as the advantages of landing in Narvik, in particular "being able to control the iron ore area of Yelivare". That is the main objective, and only some forces will continue to move forward to provide assistance to Finland. The British view prevailed, and it was decided that the army would set sail in early March.
A major incident occurred on 16 February. The German transport ship Altermark transported British prisoners of war back from the South Atlantic, was chased by British destroyers and hid in a norwegian fjord. Churchill gave direct orders to the captain of the destroyer Cossack, Vian, to enter Norwegian waters and board the Artemack to free British prisoners of war. Two Norwegian gunboats were present but did not dare to intervene, and the Norwegian government subsequently protested against british violations of its waters, which the British refuted.
Hitler saw this protest as nothing more than a gesture to fool him, convinced that the Norwegian government was an accomplice of britain. The inaction of the two Norwegian gunboats and the fact that Gislin reported that the Cossack's operation was a "pre-arranged" event reinforced Hitler's convictions. According to german admirals, the Events at The Artmark played a decisive role in the wavering determination of Hitler to invade Norway. In this way, a spark ignited the fuse of gunpowder.
This article is excerpted from the "Two World War History Set (World War I History + World War II History)"