Author: Mast
The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was a battle of national prestige for New China, which washed away the shame of a hundred years and created a lasting peaceful environment for New China. It should be said that the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea reshaped the self-confidence of the Chinese nation and was the most angry foreign war of the Chinese people in modern times. It is precisely because of this that some foreign and flattering forces have always used various ways to smear this war. Among them, the more typical and exaggerated are all kinds of lies against the battle in Pingpingli. This battle was commanded by Xu Guofu, commander of the 119th Division of the 40th Army of the Volunteer Army. Today we will take a look at some of the realities of this battle.
First, the "casualty figures" of the volunteer army as described by the smearers are 15 times more exaggerated than That of Li Qiwei
Some smear articles say that the battle of Pingli was "the 5 main divisions of the Volunteer Army (more than 50,000 people) launched an attack on the encircled US 23rd Infantry Regiment (more than 4,000 people), attacked for two consecutive nights, and finally killed more than 30,000 people, left more than 10,000 corpses, and helplessly withdrew from the battlefield." He also said conclusively that "this historical truth was concealed for nearly 40 years, until after the 90s, it gradually surfaced." The casualty figure mentioned here is 10 times more exaggerated than the number bragged by the US military that year.
Let's look at the numbers for the U.S. army: Ridgway wrote in his memoirs of the Korean War, "The 38th Parallel," "The 23rd Regiment has been fighting in the Tsumping-ri area, about 20 miles northwest of Wonju. Five divisions of the Chinese army surrounded the 23rd Regiment, taking turns to attack, trying to break through its defenses and eliminate this force. The 23rd Regiment crushed all of the enemy's attack, inflicting extremely heavy losses on the enemy. As many as 2,000 enemy bodies were reported in front of the 23 regimental positions. ”
That is to say, those smear articles are 15 times more exaggerated than the numbers bragged by the US military. In fact, the data of the US military cannot withstand scrutiny, so Ridgway used "reported", and according to whose report did not make it clear.
Second, Deng Hua said to Xu Guofu: Although the enemies are American soldiers and French soldiers, the problem is not big
On January 8, 1951, the third battle of the Volunteer Army ended, and the whole line was transferred to the battlefield for recuperation. On the 25th, Ridgway commanded 16 divisions and 3 brigades and 1 airborne regiment of the US coalition army, a total of more than 230,000 people, taking the opportunity of the volunteer army to rest and launch a large-scale attack on all fronts, which was the fourth campaign. The strategy adopted by the volunteer army was to defend the west and attack the east, with Han Xianchu, deputy commander of the volunteer army, commanding the 38th and 50th armies to defend the western front, and Deng Hua, deputy commander of the volunteer army, commanding the 39th, 40th, 42nd, and 66th armies in the Hengcheng area to seek opportunities to counterattack. This is the battlefield situation of the fourth campaign.
On February 6, the Eastern Bloc began the Hengcheng Counterattack. By the 12th of the battle, the objectives of the counterattack operation were basically achieved, and the enemy army was left with only a lone point in the area north of Hengcheng.
Towards the end of the Yokoseong counterattack, the Headquarters of the Eastern Group was preparing to concentrate 8 regiments to attack Pingli. On February 12, Deng Hua convened a combat conference. At the beginning of the meeting, Deng Hua first reported the news from the 42nd Army, saying that the enemy in Pingli had signs of fleeing south, and that the strength of the troops was only 1 or 2 battalions, and they were ready to launch an attack that night. In fact, this message is inaccurate.
This incident was relatively sudden, there was no time to prepare, and some troops were afraid of difficulties. So Deng Hua said to Xu Guofu: "If you don't act immediately, the enemy is likely to run away." With 2 regiments of your 119th Division (the other 1 regiment with the 118th Division as the main attack), and then assigning you to the 359th Regiment of the 120th Division, the 375th Regiment of the 125th Division and the 42nd Regiment of Artillery, with 5 regiments to fight 1 or 2 battalions, although the troops are now greatly reduced, although the enemy is American soldiers and French soldiers, but the problem is not big. He also said, "How about you, Xu Guofu, under the unified command?" ”
Xu Guofu first took a stand and resolutely carried out the order. However, having always been steady, he raised three questions: First, although there were 5 regiments (4 infantry regiments and 1 artillery regiment) in total strength, which came from 3 divisions and military units respectively, neither assembled nor was it difficult to communicate smoothly, so I am afraid that unified command would be inconvenient; second, he himself and the leaders of various regiments had not seen the terrain of Tongpingli; third, whether the strength of the enemy defending Pingli was accurate and it was necessary to conduct reconnaissance.
U.S. ring positions in Pingli
Third, the situation was unclear and the preparation was insufficient, xu Guofu issued an order with a hard scalp
Deng Hua was obviously a little unhappy about Xu Guofu's above-mentioned questions, saying: "Commander Xu, what you said is all reasonable, but we have the information that the enemy in Pingli is ready to flee. If we move slowly and let the enemy run away, can you Xu Guofu bear this responsibility? Since Deng Hua said so, Xu Guofu had no choice but to carry out the order.
Xu Guofu immediately summoned the cadres of the regiments participating in the battle to a combat meeting. At the meeting, Li Wenqing, deputy commander of the 375th Regiment, said that he had just come from the front line of Pingli, and the enemy was not 1 or 2 battalions, but the 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division and 1 French battalion, and was building fortifications, and there was no sign of escape.
In this regard, Xu Guofu reported this latest situation to Deng Zhi while deploying the battle, asking all departments to step up preparations and start the attack at 4:30 p.m. the next day (13th). However, before the attack was launched, there were two accidents: one was that the 42nd Regiment of Artillery was attacked by enemy aircraft, and the losses were heavy and could not be put into battle; the other was that the 375th Regiment of the 125th Division was suddenly unable to contact. In this way, only the 356th and 357th regiments of the 119th Division and the 359th Regiment of the 120th Division were able to enter the battle, a total of 3 infantry regiments, and there was no artillery cover.
It should be said that fighting a battle in which this situation is unclear and underprepared does not conform to Xu Guofu's consistent and steady combat style, and he gave orders with a hard scalp.
At 4:30 p.m. on the 13th, more than 2,300 people from three regiments launched a peripheral battle at the same time. The volunteers carried forward the advantages of night battles, and at first it was relatively smooth, but the follow-up attack became more and more difficult. In the course of the battle, the reports of the regiments basically confirmed what Deputy Regiment Commander Li Wenqing had said. However, after this situation was reported to Deng Zhi, there has been no response. During the battle, Xu Guofu asked the regimental chief of staff, Shack, to continue to contact Deng Zhi, but he was unable to connect. During the battle, due to the lack of artillery cover, the participating troops were gradually increased in casualties under the powerful artillery fire of the enemy.
After more than 30 hours of fierce fighting and repeated battles, the volunteers took control of the main outer highlands and confronted the enemy. Xu Guofu once observed the high ground and saw that the enemy army was compressed in an area of less than 2 square kilometers, all shrunk into a fortification surrounded by tanks and artillery. At this time, the attack on the enemy's core positions had not yet been launched.
What is the real casualty figure? Deng Hua said: The responsibility is mine
In the early morning of the 15th, Xu Guofu suddenly received an order from Deng Zhi to "withdraw from the battle". For this order, from the 119th Division to the commanders of the regiments participating in the battle, they did not quite understand it, nor were they willing to withdraw, demanding that they bite their teeth and fight it. But Xu Guofu obeyed the order and withdrew from the battle. This is the basic process of the battle in Pingli.
There were three reasons why Deng Zhi ordered the withdrawal from the battle: First, the enemy's reinforcements were close to Pingli, and one of the tank detachments had already entered Pingli; second, it was clear that the enemy in Pingli was not one or two battalions, but 1 regiment of the US army plus 1 battalion of the French army (the specific number was more than 4,000, more than 6,000, etc.), which was not easy to destroy in a short period of time; third, the coalition army had established a defensive line southeast of Tongpingli, and even if it was captured, it would be difficult to defend.
Judged by whether the objectives of the battle were met, the battle was undoubtedly a defeat, and the casualties were large, and nothing was gained. After the war, Deng Hua called Xu Guofu and took the initiative to take responsibility for the defeat in the battle, saying: Because of the mistakes in the enemy's situation, there were mistakes in judgment and determination, "This responsibility is mine, in my command, and I will bear the responsibility." He also fully affirmed Xu Guofu's command and the fighting spirit of the 3 regiments participating in the battle. Deng Hua also said to Xu Guofu: "Although we have misjudged, you have played very well. You can adjust the deployment in time, random attack, worthy of the old war! ”
General Deng Hua
I have to say that this reflects the demeanor of General Deng Hua and does not push the problem down.
After the war, Xu Guofu asked the Operations Section to count the situation, and the casualties reported by the 3 regiments participating in the battle were more than 900 people, and the casualty rate was as high as 40%, which was indeed very heavy. In another article, I will explain this number in detail.
[Welcome readers and friends to click "Help" below to add a handful of oil for our participation in the headline vitality conference! Thank you very much for your affirmation and love for us! 】