Author: Mast
After the Huxi Sutuo Incident, Liang Xingchu led the 4th Brigade to leave Huxi and enter Lunan, and since then it has been separated from the structure of the Suluyu detachment and placed under the direct command of the 115th Division. After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, Liang Xingchu led the Shandong 1st Division into the northeast and reached the Jinxi area in mid-November 1945. At that time, Lin Biao had just arrived in the northeast and was appointed commander-in-chief of the Northeast People's Autonomous Army, and at this time he was arranging a "big battle" in Jinxi according to the requirements of Yan'an. After the meeting, Lin Biao immediately grabbed Liang Xingchu in his hand. This article talks about Lin Biao's use of Liang Xingchu as a love general during his time in the northeast.
Liang Xingchu
(1) In the early days of the march into the northeast, Lin Biao directly commanded two troops
Since the troops marching into the northeast came from different base areas and arrived one after another, the formation was chaotic, and without a codebook, all the troops could not communicate smoothly. During this period, Lin Biao was actually a light rod commander. After more than 7 years, when Lin Biao saw these old subordinates again, he must have been very happy in his heart, because he finally had a unit that could command the war.
At the beginning, there were two units that Lin Biao had seized: the First was the Shandong 1st Division, where Liang Xing was the first division commander, and the other was the 7th Brigade of the 3rd Division of the New Fourth Army, of which Peng Mingzhi was the brigade commander. From the number of these 2 units alone, we can see how chaotic the troops marching into the northeast at that time were: some troops of similar size were called divisions, some were called brigades, some were called detachments, some were called columns, and so on. Take the 7th Brigade of the 1st and 3rd Divisions of Shandong as an example: when marching into the northeast, the 1st Shandong Division had about 7,500 men, while the 7th Brigade had about 9,000 men.
These two units were developed from the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division: the predecessor of the 7th Brigade of the 3rd Division was the 685th Regiment; while the 1st Shandong Division was developed on the basis of the new 2nd Battalion of the 685th Regiment and later merged into the 686th Regiment. That is to say, the main force of the 343rd Brigade, which was reorganized from the Red 1Staffe Army, was in these two units. Among them, Peng Mingji, the commander of the 7th Brigade, was the chief of staff of the 685th Regiment that year, while Liang Xingchu was the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 685th Regiment. At that time, Generals such as Peng Mingzhi and Liang Xing were also very happy to see Master Lin.
In the early days of his march into the northeast, Lin Biao mainly relied on these two troops. At this time, Lin Biao, who had left the front line for more than 7 years after being injured, neither knew himself nor knew the other, and he could not fight at all. So he kept leading the 1st Division and the 7th Brigade against the enemy. Since the beginning of December, he commanded the 1st Division and the 7th Brigade to fight several small battles in Qitai, Kaiyuan and other places, observing the tactics, firepower, morale, etc. of the enemy and our army at close range, and observing and summing up the first two tactical principles in view of the situation that the formation of our army was too dense and the enemy's firepower was strong when attacking: one point, two sides and three three systems.
On February 13, Lin Biao commanded the 1st Division and the 7th Brigade to fight the first major victory and annihilation battle after marching into the northeast at XiushuiHezi. Until the first reorganization of the Democratic Coalition Army in August-October 1946, the troops directly commanded by Dong Zong were these two units, which showed how much Lin Biao relied on Liang Xingchu and others.
(2) The newly established 10 columns need to be "struck with iron"
On August 3, 1946, the Democratic Coalition Army reorganized the Shandong 1st Division, the 2nd Division, and the 7th Column (Wan Yi Column) into the 1st Column, with Liang Xingchu as deputy commander and commander of the 1st Division. Under the command of Liang Xingchu, the 1st Division fought many big and hard battles, and its battle achievements were also very prominent, comparable to the 2nd Column and 5th Division.
On August 20, 1947, the Eastern General Order was organized into the 10th Column with the Independent 1st Division, the 2nd Division, and the East Manchuria Independent Division, with Liang Xingchu as commander and Zhou Chiping as the political commissar. Regarding Liang Xingchu's promotion to the position of commander of the 10th Column, there is a story to the effect that Lin Biao talked to Liang Xingchu and wanted to transfer him to the newly established 10th Column as the first deputy commander, but Liang Xingchu was not satisfied with this arrangement, saying that "it is better to be a chicken head than a phoenix tail." Later, after consulting with Luo Ronghuan, Lin Biao appointed him as commander. The author has looked up a lot of information and thinks that this is probably just a story, not a fact. Why?
Judging from some reminiscence articles and materials, this is not in line with Liang Xingchu's personality. First of all, he was a general who fought all the way from soldiers, only knew how to fight, and never considered the level of his position. When he was the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 685th Regiment, it was still the political commissar Wu Wenyu (Faxian) who recommended him to the division headquarters to become the deputy regimental commander. Second, the general's fighting style is hard and has a tiger spirit, but he is very modest and low-key, has no arrogance, cannot see domineering, and does not have the "second pole spirit." Third, he is very principled, obeys orders and listens to commands, and it is unlikely that he will be able to call a "chicken head and a phoenix tail" with his superiors. When Huxi was revolted, Wang Fengming said that it was an "organizational decision", and as the chief officer of the army, he did not resist when he was arrested, and he did not hear any complaints afterwards. This high degree of organizational discipline is a conspicuous feature of the generals of the people's army.
Liang Xingchu (center) returned to the battlefield of the Black Mountain Blockade Battle
There is a circumstantial evidence: as the saying goes, "a text is like a person". The Battle of Montenegro was a famous battle in Liang Xingchu's military career. On "Red Flag Fluttering", there is an article written by Liang Xingchu in 1959, "Remembering the Black Mountain Blockade Battle". Looking at the whole text, we are talking about the correct instructions of our superiors, the effective command of commanders at all levels, and the bloody struggle of officers and men in the frontline, and we rarely talk about ourselves. On the third day of the battle (25th), the 101 heights, the most critical defense line, were lost at 4 p.m. He Qingji of the 28th Division took into account the casualties and asked for instructions to counterattack again in the evening. At that time, the situation was extremely critical, and if the 101 heights could not be retaken immediately, the enemy was very likely to use the day to take advantage of the situation to break through the defensive line. Therefore, Liang Xingchu ordered that "we must fight back before dusk" and analyzed the pros and cons, and although the determination was unshakable, it used a "consultative" tone.
Liang Xingchu (left), Jiang Yonghui (center), and Liu Xiyuan of the 38th Army
Why did you transfer Liang Xing to be the commander of the 10th Column? Let's first look at the history of the 28th Division, the main force of the 10th Column.
The 28th Division, adapted from the independent 1st Division, has a very long history and was formerly part of the 359th Brigade. In June 1945, the second detachment of the 359th Brigade set out from Yan'an to open up a new area in the Yangtze River Basin. When he reached the territory of Xin'an, Henan, he was ordered to transfer to the northeast. This unit was developed on the basis of the 717th Regiment of the 359th Brigade, and was the old foundation of the Red 6th Army. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the troops were transferred back to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region in 1939 to garrison, and at the end of 1940 they went to Nanniwan to clear the land, staying away from the front line for a long time, engaging in production and business, and weakening their ability to fight wars.
The "Military Materials of the Three-Year Liberation War in Northeast China" says: "This division is one of the units with the oldest historical foundation among the units in the northeast, many of which are the backbone elements of the agrarian revolution and the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the vast majority of cadres at or above the company level are veteran cadres who joined the army in Guannei, but the style of the troops is very tired, lack vitality, are conservative, make slow progress, have a passive fighting style, and have not been able to give full play to their combat effectiveness; their unit history should be included in the main divisions of the northeast units, but their combat effectiveness is not as good as that of the ordinary old units and the new units that cannot catch up with the rapid progress."
(3) Heroic troops that are "fiercely" out
Most of the old troops who marched into the northeast from Kannai were the main objects of dongzong's dependence. However, the 359th Brigade did not fight any good battles in the northeast, could not attack and could not hold, and was criticized by the Eastern General For many times. Many of the units established during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression had long since entered the ranks of the main force, while the 359th Brigade of the Red 6th Army was demoted to an independent division. The root cause is that "the style is very tired".
The author has said many times in previous articles that there are three elements of combat effectiveness in a unit: style, tactics and command. Where style is the foundation. Without a good style, nothing else is left to talk about. The same is true in peacetime, just look at Chinese football.
Therefore, in order to change the 359 Brigade and enhance its combat effectiveness, the first thing that needs to be solved is the problem of work style. At this point, when Lin Biao selected the commander of the 10th Column, he must have first thought of this "iron striker". This is also in line with Lin Biao's consistent style of employing people, that is, selecting people according to the characteristics of the troops: using fierce generals whose style is not good, using capable generals whose tactics are not good, and using wise generals whose command is not good. The columns and divisions of the four fields adjusted to the military commanders and basically followed this line of thinking.
Objectively speaking, Liang Xingchu, who was born in iron, was a tiger general and a fierce general, but in the four fields where the battle generals were like clouds, he could not be said to be a wise general. He is characterized by a hard style, fierceness, and the courage to fight desperate battles. Most of the battles he commanded were such hard and desperate battles, such as the Black Mountain Blockade Battle, the Sansoli-Longyuanli Battle during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and the Blockade Battle on the South Bank of the Han River. For the troops whose "work style is very tired," they need this kind of fierce force, and they need this kind of "fierce people" to deal with it. This was the reason why Lin Biao arranged for Liang Xingchu to be the commander of the 10th Column, and Liang Xingchu was the deputy commander of the 1st Column at that time, which was more appropriate.
As for Liang Xingchu's qualifications being inferior to that of the commander of the 28th Division, political commissar, etc., this has never been a problem in Dongye. Compared with several other field armies, the commander of the Dongye column was the most frequently adjusted, except for Liu Zhen, the commander of the 2nd column, the other columns of the first batch of reorganizations all adjusted their commanders, and some columns even adjusted several times. Because in Higashino, there is such a mechanism: if you can't fight a war, you adjust, or go to the rear, or go to the localities, or even demote, etc., seniority has never been the main factor. It is precisely because of this mechanism that a large number of generals with low qualifications but outstanding personalities such as Liang Xingchu will stand out.
In the Battle of Montenegro, Liang Xingchu set up the column headquarters near the front, and at the most tense moment of the battle, he went to the command post of the 28th Division on the defensive front. When the fierceness came up, there was no need to say more, and the positions of commanders at all levels moved forward one after another. In this way, the 10th Column and 28th Divisions had such a "ruthless man" as Liang Xingchu, and their style of work immediately changed, and their names were corrected from then on. The 28th Division, which has always been "very tired in style", became a heroic unit in world war I.
【Deeply cultivate the history of war, carry forward positive energy, welcome to submit, private messages will be restored】