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Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

author:Military History Lookout

Author: Shi Qian

Lenin, the teacher of the proletarian revolution, had a very highly appreciative remark about the Prussian bourgeois military writer Clausewitz, saying that he was "a very famous writer of the philosophy of war and the history of war." ”

Clausewitz pointed out in his famous "Theory of War" that the war situation is like a balance, and the weights at both ends of the scale are like the crystallization of the wisdom of the supreme commanders of the two armies, and the wisdom of one side exceeds the other, and the weight of the balance is tilted to the side that exceeds.

At that time, Chiang Kai-shek had an army of 4.3 million people, a considerable number of combat aircraft, ships, heavy artillery and tanks, a population of 339 million, more than 7.3 million square kilometers of land, and controlled almost all large and medium-sized cities, transportation lifelines, mineral deposits, and almost all modern industry and military industry; while the Communist-led People's Liberation Army had only 1.27 million people of "millet plus rifles" and only 136 million people and 2.3 million square kilometers of barren and backward areas.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

The overwhelmed Chiang Kai-shek could not help but show off: "In terms of comparing the strength of the enemy and ourselves, we have absolute superiority in any aspect." He was confident in victory, believing that in just three to six months he could defeat the People's Liberation Army and put the Communist Party to death.

Chiang Kai-shek's arrogance was not only because he had a huge army, aircraft, artillery, tanks and warships, but also the support of "exceptionally powerful", "invincible" American imperialism with atomic bombs in its hands.

According to the "History of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" published by the Academy of Military Sciences, the highest scientific research institution of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, at the beginning of China's civil war, the assistance provided by the United States to Chiang Kai-shek, including weapons, materials and loans, reached 4 billion US dollars. This figure exceeds the total amount of postwar U.S. borrowing from Britain and the total amount of relief supplies that UN Relief Agency has provided to the world in a year. Chiang Kai-shek fought the civil war and received a large amount of "generous" assistance from US imperialism, and financial and military aid rolled in like flowing water.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

June 1946 was the craziest day before Chiang Kai-shek's military career reached the end of his career. Taking the large-scale attack on the Liberated Areas of the Central Plains as a starting point, he brazenly launched an all-out attack on the military and people in the Liberated Areas. From July to September, the Kuomintang troops successively launched a large-scale attack on the liberated areas of Suwan, Shandong, Jinji- Luyu, Jin-Cha-Ji, and Jin-Sui. In October, another large-scale offensive was launched against the Liberated Areas of Northeast China. At the same time, it continued to encircle the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region with large armies.

Black clouds overwhelmed the city, and the military situation was critical. In response to the beastly attack of Chiang Kai-shek's army, the Communist Party of China held high the banner of the People's Liberation War without hesitation.

Chiang Kai-shek adopted the principle of strategic offensive and quick battle and quick decision, first occupying the strongholds, mastering transportation, controlling the line with points, controlling the surface with lines, and advancing step by step in an attempt to force the People's Liberation Army into a decisive battle. The Communist Party of China, on the other hand, adopted the strategic principle of active defense mainly by annihilating the effective forces of the Kuomintang army rather than by guarding the localities. The People's Liberation Army heroically resisted the rampant attack of Chiang Kai-shek's army in six large combat areas.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

On February 1, 1947, Chairman Mao presided over a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee. This was the Communist Party's last Politburo meeting in Yan'an. Chairman Mao pointed out: "The current situation in all aspects shows that the current situation in China is about to develop to a new stage. This new stage is the stage in which the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle on a national scale develops into a new people's revolution. It's the eve of it. The task of our Party is to struggle for the arrival of this climax and its victory. ”

At this time, in the face of the frenzied and indomitable fierce attack of the enemy who was still very powerful, many cadres in the Communist Party did not understand the formulation of "greeting the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and even some senior Party cadres had doubts. ”

In the face of the grim situation and the cruel war environment, Chairman Mao was able to foresee the arrival of a new upsurge of the revolution, which is precisely the astonishing thing about the leader's foresight.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

Ignoring Chairman Mao's wise foresight, Chiang Kai-shek, who was sitting in the presidential palace in Nanjing, mobilized heavy troops to launch a key offensive against northern Shaanxi and the Shandong Liberated Areas, attacking the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, which had only 20,000 People's Liberation Army troops, and attacking the Shandong Liberated Areas with 450,000 troops. Chiang Kai-shek was determined to burn the flames of war to Yan'an and occupy Yan'an at all costs.

The situation in Yan'an is becoming increasingly tense. The Communist Party faces an existential threat.

"Chairman Mao, on the one hand, strives for the possibility of good —defending Yan'an; on the other hand, prepares for the worst possibility—abandons Yan'an." Hu Qiaomu pointed out in his memoirs: "In the past, some people thought that Chairman Mao had to abandon Yan'an from the very beginning in order to lure the enemy deeper, which was inaccurate. In fact, Chairman Mao was anxious to hold Yan'an and crush Chiang Kai-shek's plan to invade Yan'an. ”

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

Because the enemy is too strong. On March 13, Hu Zongnan's first-line troops of 140,000 men attacked Yan'an, while only 5,000 troops were used to defend Yan'an in the border area. In order to preserve his strength, Chairman Mao decided to abandon Yan'an.

When bidding farewell to Yan'an, Chairman Mao, like an old man who had temporarily left the house, said meaningfully to his commanders and fighters guarding him: The enemy is coming, and we are ready to clean his house. Our army's war is not about the gains and losses of one city and one place, but about destroying the enemy's living forces. Where there are people who lose their land, everyone and everyone loses their land; if they lose land, they lose everyone and everyone loses their land. The enemy entered Yan'an with a clenched fist, and when he arrived in Yan'an, he had to stretch out his fingers so that we could cut it off one by one. Tell the comrades that in one year or two years, we will come back, and we will exchange one Yan'an for all of China.

A few words show Chairman Mao's deep understanding of the magical foundation of philosophy and show Chairman Mao's use of the art of war.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

A green horse that was not fierce, a bucket hat that covered the rain and the sun, and Chairman Mao, who withdrew from Yan'an City, led his headquarters to fight on the northern Shaanxi plateau. Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai had only 150 guards, a stretcher and portable radio station and plenty of spare batteries. Zhou Enlai was worried about Chairman Mao's safety, but Chairman Mao said, "This is the best terrain to bury the regular Kuomintang troops." "They walked a long, long way, full of wind and sand, long ravines and sheep gut trails; Hu Zongnan's army was chasing everywhere.

Many times, they passed by the enemy. Danger accompanies them all the time. But Chairman Mao described such treks as "a step away." During the "walk" of one year and five days, Chairman Mao used radio to direct the People's Liberation Army in various battlefields throughout the country, which not only annihilated a large number of living forces of the Kuomintang army, but also made itself develop and grow.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

In the first year of the war, from June 1946 to June 1947, the People's Liberation Army traded 358,000 casualties for a large area of land in the Liberated Areas and won the victory of annihilating 1.12 million Kuomintang troops. The Nationalist army fell from 4.3 million to 3.73 million, while the People's Liberation Army rose from 1.27 million to 1.95 million.

In the second year of the war, the time came for the People's Liberation Army to shift from strategic defense to strategic offensive.

On June 30, 1947, Liu Deng's army of four columns of 120,000 people crossed the Yellow River in a section of more than 300 miles in southwest Lu, took more than 120 wooden boats, and eliminated nine and a half brigades of the Kuomintang army in southwest Lu, opening the great prelude to the strategic offensive of the People's Liberation Army.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

On August 7, Liu Deng's army ended its rest ahead of schedule, jumped out of the heavy encirclement of the Kuomintang army, and rushed south in three ways, crossing the Longhai Road, crossing the Huai River, and successfully completing the task of leaping thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountains, like a sharp knife inserted into the heart of the Kuomintang-ruled area.

Subsequently, Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi led their troops to cross the Yellow River south in late August and advance into western Henan; Chen Yi and Su Yu led the Western Front Corps of the East China Field Army into the southwestern Region of Lu in early September, and then advanced into the Yuwan-Anhui Soviet Border Region. The three-way army, which had turned to the outer front to fight, carried out strategic development in the Central Plains, forming a favorable position in the shape of "pin" and seriously threatening the basic ruling area of the Kuomintang government south of the Yangtze River. What makes people even happier is that the Eastern Front Corps of the East China Field Army, which is fighting on the inner front, launched offensive operations in the Jiaodong area from early September; the Northwest Field Army turned to a counter-offensive from late August; the Jin-Cha-Ji Field Army launched an offensive on the northern section of Pinghan Road in early September; and the Northeast Field Army held an autumn offensive from early September.

The situation on all these battlefields that is favorable to the Platon Army and unfavorable to the Kuomintang has painted a magnificent picture of the general situation in which the People's Liberation Army has turned into an all-out offensive.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

Marshal Liu Bocheng later incisively summed up this situation as the people's liberation army's strategic offensive posture of "three services cooperating and two wings containing." The cooperation of the three armies was that Liu Deng's army broke through the center and went straight to Dabie Mountain, Chen Su's army advanced into Yuwan Su, and Chen Xie's army advanced into western Henan. These three large armies formed a "pin" glyph formation between the Jianghuai River and the Han Dynasty, acting as horns for each other, chasing deer from the Central Plains, and moving to annihilate the enemy. The two wings contained the Northern Shaanxi Liberation Army to attack Yulin and mobilize Hu Zong to the north and south; the Shandong People's Liberation Army to suppress the enemy in Jiaodong and continue to lead the Kuomintang troops attacking Shandong to the seashore.

The offensive of the People's Liberation Army, which has turned into a strategic offensive, is like the thawed ice row on the Yellow River, surging and unstoppable.

The Northeast Field Army successfully ended the winter offensive and reduced the Northeast Kuomintang army to three isolated areas of Jinzhou, Shenyang, and Changchun; the First Corps of North China held the Battle of Jinzhong and annihilated more than 100,000 enemy troops; the Second Corps of North China, in order to pinpoint the enemy on the Beining Road, cooperated with the northeast to attack the Jirecha area and annihilated 24,000 enemy troops; the Western Front Corps of the East China Field Army, with the cooperation of the Central Plains Field Army, held the Battle of Eastern Henan, conquered Kaifeng, and annihilated more than 90,000 people in the Shounian Corps of the enemy area; and the Central Plains Field Army launched the Xiangfan Campaign and annihilated more than 20,000 enemy troops.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

In the second year of the war, from July 1947 to July 1948, the People's Liberation Army recaptured and conquered 164 cities including Shijiazhuang, Xiping, Luoyang, Kaifeng, Weixian, Linfen, Yan'an, Baoji, and Xiangfan, and the total strength increased to 2.8 million, including 1.49 million field troops; the Kuomintang army was annihilated by more than 1.52 million people, and the total strength dropped to 3.65 million, of which the main force of the 1.98 million regular army was divided into five battlefields in the northeast, north China, northwest China, central plains, and east China.

In the third year of the war, the Chinese Communist Party held a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, the "September Conference", in Xibaipo. Chairman Mao pointed out in his report: Our strategic policy is to overthrow the Kuomintang; the strategic task is to advance the army, produce one inch longer, strengthen discipline, transition from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare, build an army of 5 million, annihilate 500 brigades of the enemy's regular army, and completely overthrow the Kuomintang in about five years from the middle of 1946.

The meeting also determined that in the third year, the Plakmen Will still all fight north of the Yangtze River and north and northeast China; that the field armies with relatively good conditions must establish their determination to fight an unprecedented war of annihilation; that is, to pass the hurdle of a truly decisive offensive, that is, to conquer a large city with more than 100,000 enemy garrisons at one time; and to pass the level of a general battle to annihilate the enemy's reinforcement corps of more than 100,000 people.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

On September 16, the Battle of Jinan was launched as scheduled. The East China Field Army conquered Jinan in 9 days with a powerful offensive, completely annihilating more than 100,000 enemy defenders and capturing the commander of the defending army, Wang Yaowu. The victory in the Battle of Jinan not only removed the nails of the Kuomintang army in the hinterland of the Shandong Liberated Area, but also opened the prelude to the strategic decisive battle of the People's Liberation War.

When the East China Field Army liberated Jinan, the Northeast Field Army launched the first of the three major battles that shocked the world, the Liaoshen Campaign.

The Liaoshen Campaign lasted 52 days, with 69,000 casualties and the elimination of more than 472,000 Nationalist troops. Chiang Kai-shek's dream of treating the northeast as the "home of victory" was completely shattered.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

On November 6, just four days after the end of the Liaoshen Campaign, the East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army jointly launched the Huaihai Campaign.

The Battle of Huaihai lasted 66 days, the People's Liberation Army suffered more than 130,000 casualties, and annihilated a Kuomintang army's "Suppression General" forward headquarters, 22 military headquarters, and 55 divisions, a total of 555,000 people. At this point, most of the main forces and elite divisions of the Kuomintang army on the southern front were annihilated, the area north of the Huai River was completely liberated, and most of the area around Huainan was controlled by the People's Liberation Army. The Battle of Huaihai caused Chiang Kai-shek to lose almost all of his elite troops, and Chiang Kai-shek no longer had any strength, and no matter what kind of struggle he made, he could not save the fate of defeat. The Communist Party of China and the Chinese People's Liberation Army under its leadership are full of infinite vitality and vitality.

The balance of war was completely tilted.

Chairman Mao abandoned Yan'an to lure the enemy deeper? Hu Qiaomu: Actually, Chairman Mao very much wanted to hold on to the weight of the Balance of War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the first half of 1946, whether it was "weight" or "quality," due to historical reasons, the Kuomintang side was clearly superior, Chairman Mao proposed to "greet the new upsurge of the Chinese revolution," and many cadres did not understand that third, the People's Liberation Army shifted from strategic defense to strategic offensive, and every bead on the "abacus" of war seemed to be at will at Chairman Mao's disposal

The People's Liberation Army not only surpassed the Kuomintang army in quality, but also had an advantage in quantity.

At this time in China, for the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people, the final victory was about to come, just as Chairman Mao had predicted 20 years ago in the dense forest in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains, this victory was a ship standing on the coast and looking at the sea and the tip of the mast could already be seen, a sunrise that had seen the light shining in the east from the top of the mountain, and a baby that was about to mature in the mother's womb.

Victory is coming, but there are bumps, thorns and risks on the road to victory.

About author:Shi Kui, history teacher at colleges and universities, history researcher. He has been cultivating the history of the Party, the Military and the History of War for a long time. History lovers are welcome to exchange criticisms.

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