
✪ Liu Zhaolong | Changhua Normal University, Taiwan
Recently, the leader of the DPP authorities selectively "forgot" the key event of the founding of the Republic of China in the "Double Tenth Speech", the Xinhai Revolution and the main founder, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, deliberately replaced the expression "Republic of China" with "Taiwan of the Republic of China." When referring to the two sides of the strait, he referred to the mainland as "China" throughout the whole process, constantly strengthening the meaning of "Taiwan independence," which aroused great concern from all walks of life. What is worth asking is, what kind of mentality does the Taiwan people have in looking at history and imagining cross-strait relations?
As a professor at Changhua Normal University in Taiwan, Mr. Liu Zhaolong deeply analyzed the political mentality and historical concepts of Taiwanese people today. He pointed out that when many Taiwanese people look back on modern history, they often do not have the same resonance and pain as mainlanders, and they seem to have selective amnesia when dealing with history —abandoning what he wants to forget, remembering what he wants to remember, and also choosing the history he wants to interpret. And this broken memory stems from the "passer-by mentality" of Taiwanese people formed over the centuries - so many people in history have come, anyway, they have to leave in the end, who has done what in the past or at this moment, is it so important? This is why, apart from the reunification and independence factions, the view of the majority of the Taiwan people is to "look at the situation while walking" and "maintain the status quo." The existence of this "pass-by mentality" means that they can even give up the cultural foundation of the same language and the same species as the mainland, and this is also a reason for the difficulty of cross-strait dialogue and communication.
This article was originally published in the magazine "Culture Horizon" and represents only the views of the author. The perspective of the witnesses and the reflective awareness of the problem presented in the article provide a reference for us to understand the mentality of Taiwanese society. It is hereby compiled and distributed for the reader's consideration.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="12" > Taiwanese passer-by mentality and selective forgetfulness</h1>
A friend on the mainland once asked me a very interesting question: "Do you Taiwanese hate Li Hongzhang?" The question was simple and profound, and when I took the same question to the class and asked my students, I was greeted with a laughing response: "Haha! Who cares about Li Hongzhang? This question not only fully reflects the differences in the fundamental thinking of the two sides of the strait, but also highlights the reality that "you did not understand me, and I did not understand you."
Li Hongzhang is synonymous with China's painful history in modern times, many humiliating treaties were signed by his hand, and modern Chinese intellectuals are often helpless and distressed when they talk about Li Hongzhang. While asking me this question, my friends on the mainland may be expecting me to have the same resonance and pain as him, but I let him down. I replied to him: "You should first ask me whether the Taiwanese hate the Japanese, and if the Taiwanese do not hate the Japanese, your problem does not exist at all." "In fact, Taiwanese don't hate the Japanese, so this problem doesn't exist."
▍ Passer-by mentality and selective forgetting
From the perspective of Taiwanese people, Chinese mainland is really a very heavy land, from the Forbidden City to the Yuanmingyuan, from Beijing to Dunhuang, as long as there are monuments, it will remind all the humiliations that Chinese nearly a hundred years of history, so the monuments are often also "patriotic education bases", reminding tourists who originally tried to relax at any time "don't forget the humiliation of the past, remember patriotism." On the other hand, in Taiwan, no place will hang a "patriotic education base" sign to remind you, and the explanatory plaque of the monument only tells you the history of the place in the past, that is, "who has been here", reminding people that everyone was a passer-by - the Dutch have come, Zheng Chenggong has come, the Qing Dynasty has come, the Japanese have come... Finally? Everyone is gone. In the same way, you and I who are standing here will have to leave sooner or later. Since everyone is a passer-by, why should we resent each other?
The differences in cross-strait historical experience and geographical environment have created two different modes of thinking, and the differences between these two kinds of thinking have also caused invisible obstacles to cross-strait exchanges today. Chinese mainland's long history is both assets and liabilities, which brings more psychological pressure to Chinese "can't be a loser", so mainlanders are always pursuing strength and reminding themselves that they must "stand up". Both the Olympics and the World Expo are designed to prove that today's Chinese stand up, believing that as long as there is such a world-class event in the future, it will continue to be used to prove the same proposition. This mentality is both arrogant and inferior, so when mainlanders interact with people, part of it is based on self-righteous and generous style, and the other part is based on inferiority, and the two are skillfully integrated into the personality of mainlanders, outsiders do not understand the inside story, and if they are not careful, they will step on the red line.
In the process of pursuing strength, in addition to strengthening their own confidence through the continuous pursuit of external affirmation, mainlanders also confirm their own identity construction through continuous search for roots. In the process of self-identity construction, emotional conflicts will occur when there is a conflict with outsiders on symbolic things. For example, in recent years, the verbal and physical attacks of mainland netizens on neighboring South Korea and Japan are representative of such problems. In Taiwan, everyone is a passer-by mentality, it looks like they are ready to leave, so the question of history is also so-so - anyway, they may have to leave at any time, who has done what in the past or at this moment, is it so important? Therefore, the taiwanese people say that the good point is that they are "very tolerant of history", but in fact, they are "love how to explain it". Except for politicians, probably no one will delve into the past of history, and even politicians are selectively in-depth. Therefore, when talking about history with Taiwanese people, everyone seems to have selective amnesia, and everyone abandons what he wants to forget, remembers what he wants to remember, and also chooses the history he wants to interpret.
Few Taiwanese can fully tell the bits and pieces of this land, and everyone's memory is fragmented: veterans from other provinces remember the goodness of the mainland's hometown, and the elderly taiwanese in this province remember the night and order in the era of Japanese occupation, and the two sides have no intersection at all. The exploitation and killing of Taiwan by the Japanese during the colonial rule period almost do not exist in the memory of the old people of Taiwan, so not many people remember the anti-Japanese heroes Jian Dashi and Lin Shaomao, and even the "Wushe Incident" that caused international shocks gradually disappeared in the impression of Taiwanese people. Similarly, for Chiang Kai-shek's corruption during his reign over the mainland and the greed of the Kong-Song family, the provincial veterans also selectively forgot, not only forgetting how they were forced to pull on warships as soldiers, but also regarded Chiang Kai-shek as a "great leader" or "savior of the nation" after coming to Taiwan, and believed that Chiang Kai-shek was the only one who could bring them back to their hometown, which was simply a collective "Stockholm syndrome."
For a passer-by, the past is not important, the present is not important, and where to go in the future is the most important. However, this kind of passing mentality, after more people, quantitative changes will also produce qualitative changes. The retreat to Taiwan in 1949 is a magical history, and all the passers-by crowded on this small island have produced a new culture, which is very different from the five thousand years before 1949 in China.
This kind of historical and cultural rupture based on passer-by mentality is actually not uncommon in Taiwan. For example, when the world is warmly celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Taiwan is all cold, as if the war in World War II has never affected Taiwan, and everyone seems to have forgotten the tragic bombing of Taiwan by the US military at the end of World War II, and the heavy casualties caused. For example, in September 2009, Ms. Wang Yuling, the widow of Zhang Lingfu, a Kuomintang general killed in the Battle of Meng Lianggu, came to Taiwan to apply for the re-issuance of the medals that Zhang Lingfu had received during his lifetime, including the army's highest honor, the Order of the Blue Sky and White Sun. Obviously, who Zhang Lingfu is has been forgotten by most Taiwanese, and only when you go to the Martyrs' Shrine will you find out that Zhang Lingfu is actually the number one person! In the Chinese mainland, thanks to the TV series and middle school history textbooks, Zhang Lingfu's image, although not necessarily positive, is still vividly imprinted in the minds of the people of Chinese mainland. Therefore, the differences in cross-strait interpretation of history are very interesting; although they have passed through the same process, they may not have the same viewpoint, and the inconsistent historical facts have chosen to forget or express their own positions. Much like the current cross-strait relations.
As a result, the people on both sides of the strait who share the same language and the same kind have begun to have differences in their interpretations of historical affairs. For example, mainlanders and Japanese people have a grudge against each other, and Taiwanese who have experienced the "imperial nationalization" movement can not only accept the Japanese and Japanese culture, but even have a sense of admiration, so that some cultural components have penetrated into the genes, completely changing the cultural identity of Taiwanese. So how can a Taiwanese whose Japanese culture has infiltrated its genes hate the Japanese? If these Taiwanese people don't hate the Japanese anymore, how can they hate Li Hongzhang? As for the shame brought about by the "Maguan Treaty", it has been completely swept away from the memory of the Taiwanese people, like a person with amnesia. In the eyes of many Taiwanese, the Japanese seem to be close relatives, with a sense of cultural familiarity and intimacy, while the mainland on the other side, which has been separated for 50 years, is like a stranger. Therefore, when Lee Teng-hui said that he was Japanese before the age of 20, he inevitably aroused indignation on the other side of the strait: "How can there be Chinese willing to think of themselves as Japanese?" But in Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui's view is the common sentiment of a considerable number of Taiwanese of the older generation who have undergone Japanese colonial rule. Since they were all educated to be Japanese before the age of 20, the mainland on the other side of the strait has always emphasized "the same language and the same species" and "blood is thicker than water," or has spared no effort to emphasize that there are so many common points between the two sides of the strait, which has become an inexplicable and wonderful thing for these elderly People of Taiwanese nationality.
▍What is the "essence of Chinese culture"?
Mainland friends often say that the essence of Chinese culture is in Taiwan, or that this is the basis or consensus of cross-strait exchanges. Taiwan's culture and memory were reorganized after 1949, and the elements of the reorganization were not only the 2 million soldiers and civilians who came to Taiwan in 1949, but also the 6 million Taiwanese who originally lived in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule. If we use a mathematical problem, even if these 2 million people represent the "essence of Chinese culture", what is the proportion of memories of Taiwanese who have been colonized by Japan for 50 years?
Such a combination, after 60 years of deliberately introducing The recombination and connotation of American culture, the culture and memory it has formed are naturally very different from the so-called "essence of Chinese culture." In addition to these elements, in recent years, many Taiwanese have married mainland and Southeast Asian spouses (the total number has exceeded 300,000), which naturally adds some new elements to Taiwan's cultural composition. These new elements will change their composition proportions with the change of time, so that the culture and cognition formed will naturally have more differences with the cognition of traditional Chinese culture, and will also make mainlanders on the other side feel more strange.
In fact, what exactly is "Chinese culture" or "the essence of Chinese culture"? I'm afraid even the Taiwanese themselves can't say it clearly. From the specific national treasures of the Palace Museum, to the Mid-Autumn Festival, the Dragon Boat Festival and the Spring Festival, to some religious figures such as the "Heart Six Lun" advocated by Master Sheng yan, some people think that it is. But whether this is the "essence of Chinese culture" or not, in fact, it is difficult to say. For example, the British Museum also has many Chinese national treasures, can it be said that the United Kingdom also has the "essence of Chinese culture"? Countries around China such as Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan also celebrate the Lunar New Year, and it is difficult to say that these countries also have the essence of Chinese culture. We can only say that in the process of Taiwan's cultural construction, Chinese culture is a very important element, but not the only element. As for its proportions, frankly no one can say for sure.
If we give an example, if we want to find something to represent Taiwanese culture, the most representative one is probably "Sichuan-style beef noodles". In the early years, Taiwanese people worked in many farms and did not eat beef, and naturally there was no beef noodles. Under the influence of the US military stationed in Taiwan, Taiwanese began to eat beef. Some soldiers from other provinces were afraid that American steak was difficult to eat, so the military gang began to develop a Chinese braised pork method for beef, and the next Chinese noodle became the Yangchun version of beef noodles; or sold beef to butchers, and the offal was left to cook into a pot, and then became beef offal; and the Sichuan military relatives in Okayama, Kaohsiung, imitated pixian watercress sauce to make Okayama spicy watercress sauce, which became an indispensable flavor of Sichuan-style beef noodles. A small bowl of beef noodles, including the painstaking efforts and creativity of the US military, veterans from other provinces, sichuan military dependents and others. Everyone is a passer-by, and the individual factors of these passers-by are integrated into a new culture. This new culture has traditional old elements, as well as several new elements derived from old traditions. Can we still say that these new cultures are the "essence of traditional Chinese culture"?
▍Construct multiple positions of identity
As for the construction of Taiwan's own self-identity, in the case of multicultural recombination, it has become a difficult "multiple choice problem" in the eyes of mainlanders. In addition to the two monopoly options, more options are "looking while walking" and "maintaining the status quo" at both ends of the snake and mouse. In other words, everyone doesn't say broken, look at it later. In this pursuit of self-identity construction, Taiwan is also constantly looking for various elements to serve as symbols of self-identity that are different from Chinese mainland. For example, traditional characters, Mazu circumambulation, Guan Gong beliefs, Zhuyin symbols, Taiwanese, or Mandarin that is different from the Beijing dialect ... Some elements even if they are similar to those on the other side, Taiwanese people do not mind, even if Mazu believers organize groups to go to the Meizhou Ancestral Temple in Fujian every year to incense, but the vast majority of Taiwanese still think that this is a unique belief and custom of Taiwanese. Therefore, in the process of constructing self-identity, Taiwanese people have a huge force of compromise and tolerance, even if some of the elements are the same as those on the other side, they will not blush and argue that this is an element that is "exclusive to him". From a certain point of view, Taiwanese do not care about sharing this element or trait with the mainland, because in the case of a passerby, there is no element that is "exclusive to him". That being the case, while choosing, it is natural to accept that this option will be abandoned one day in the future. From this point of view, the so-called "common element" that mainlanders and Taiwanese do not argue about, when mainlanders are the cultural basis of the same language and the same species, from the perspective of Taiwanese, this is only a temporary choice at this stage, and does not necessarily represent an eternal choice. Therefore, while mainlanders think that they can engage in dialogue with Taiwanese on this basis, they do not know that Taiwanese are ready to abandon this foundation at any time.
Of course, this kind of pluralism and tolerance, in addition to the contingency of historical shaping, also has a lot to do with the implementation of Taiwan's later democratic politics. Obviously, in the process of cultural shaping on both sides of the strait, political factors have always been a very important change. The closer the evaluation of people to the present history, the more deeply they are influenced by politics. The problem was also serious in Taiwan, but after the lifting of martial law and democratization in 1987, the problem gradually eased and has almost ceased to exist. Due to the continuous excavation of folk historical materials (such as the publication of the diaries of Chiang Kai-shek and Song Ziwen in the United States), and the publication of various memoirs of small people who were not originally known (such as Chiang Kai-shek's bodyguard Weng Yuan and others), the information may not be all credible, but it does enrich the interpretation of historical figures and historical events. Many people who used to live above the temple, or major historical events, have been pulled to the perspective of fairness and common people to re-examine the evaluation, although the angle of evaluation is different, but the multiple angles make this person come alive, so that he begins to look like a person, not like a god.
In addition to the re-examination and evaluation of major figures or major historical events, the choice of positions on current events is even more dizzying. This also makes it even more difficult for mainlanders on the other side to understand the positions and choices of the Taiwanese people. A simple and well-intentioned move, such as "one country, two systems" and ECFA, can also spark a heated debate within Taiwan, which is difficult for mainlanders on the other side to understand. From the mainland's point of view, why has so much goodwill been released and is willing to make so many concessions or concessions, but the Taiwanese people are still picking and choosing, how discouraged is this. Mainlanders will never be able to understand why, while trying to get closer to Taiwan, some Taiwanese are trying to push mainlanders farther away. This difficulty in understanding each other's inner world is actually the biggest obstacle to cross-strait communication now. Because the two sides are always talking to each other on different channels, thinking that they are using words that the other understands, and expounding views that they cannot understand each other.
Every time they visit the mainland, friends on the mainland often use "brother" to describe cross-strait relations. I also often jokingly say that if you think that the two sides of the strait will move toward reunification in the future, then how can the two sides of the strait be brotherly relations? Because the traditional Chinese brotherhood is that after the death of the parents, the family property is divided and scattered, which in turn argues for independence. I further said that if the premise of the future development between the two sides of the strait is reunification, it should be more like a cousin who wants to marry his cousin and live together forever. Since this is the case, it means that in addition to having common blood and relationships, there are more different elements and differences (such as different surnames and different original families). How to smooth out these different differences, understand the subtle and unknown changes in the heart of the Taiwanese cousin, and let the Taiwanese girl willingly marry is the mentality that the mainland cousin should have.
This article was originally published in the magazine "Culture Vertical and Horizontal", originally titled "Taiwanese Passerby Mentality and Selective Forgetting", the space limit, the content has been abridged, please refer to the original issue for comments. Welcome to share personally, please contact this public account for media reprints.