The time of existence of the China Air Task Force
From 4 July 1942 to 1 March 1943
2. The strength of the air contingent in the Chinese theater
Strength: 23rd Fighter Group (74th, 75th, 76th Squadron), of which 1/3 of the fighter pilots are pilots of the U.S. Volunteer Air Force of the Chinese Air Force.
The 308th Bomber Group (Squadrons 373, 374, 375, 425) consisted mainly of B-24 heavy bombers.
III. The establishment of the aviation contingent in China
1. Sino-US negotiations
At the end of December 1941, the U.S. government approved the incorporation of volunteers into the U.S. military, and in January 1942, the two sides discussed seven conditions for the volunteers to be incorporated into the U.S. military, including the chain of command and Chennault's official powers after he returned to active service.
Between March 29 and April 1, Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, Mrs. Chiang, Stilwell, and Clayton Bissell (then Stilwell's Air Force Staff Officer, later Commander of the 10th Air Force, becoming Chennault's superior) and Chennault met in Chongqing to finalize the reorganization. Stilwell promised to send a complete fighter group (the 23rd Brigade) to China as a condition for withdrawing from the volunteer team and hoping that the volunteer team would handle the withdrawal on April 30. However, Chennault believed that it was too late to complete the preparations, and the planes and personnel of the 23rd Brigade could not complete the preparations before the end of April, so he asked for the transfer on July 16; Bissell advocated July 1, and finally adopted the compromise proposed by Mrs. Jiang: July 4 was the date of reorganization.
On 9 April 1942, Chennault was promoted from the rank of captain when he was discharged to colonel, and on 18 April, he was promoted to brigadier general. On the 23rd, the US military issued a statement officially accepting the volunteer team, which praised the merits of the volunteer team and explained that the 23rd fighter group would be sent to China to take over the volunteer team's mission. The U.S. military had hoped that all members of the volunteer team would remain in China after the merger, wear the uniform of the 23rd Brigade, and continue to serve with their excellent combat skills and actual combat experience, but the results were unexpected. After the investigation results, only 5 pilots and 22 ground crew members among the volunteers were willing to add the upcoming US Army Air Contingent in China. There are three reasons for this:
(1) The volunteer team fought in a harsh environment, lived for a long time in the case of excessive fatigue, insufficient supply of disease, and birth and death, hoping to get some opportunities for respite and recuperation, so most of them were eager to get a vacation before the annexation, but they did not get the permission of the US military, so they were demoralized and unwilling to continue fighting.
(2) Although the living environment of the volunteer team is poor, the biggest advantage is that it is relatively free and does not have to be subject to the strict discipline restrictions of the standard army, which may be the reason why many volunteers are willing to fight in China, but when the reorganization committee member Bissell asked the volunteer team to stay, most of the answers received were no. The main reason was the reluctance to accept Bissell's leadership.
(3) Most of the volunteers preferred to transfer to China Airlines or Hindustan Aircraft Company to seek higher-paying jobs, while others were originally members of the Navy or Marine Corps, and were willing to return to their original units after that, rather than adding contingent services.
2. Comparison of the status of air contingents in China and air contingents in India
On July 4, 1942, the volunteer team became a historical term, and the China Air Task Force, which replaced the volunteer team, was officially established on that date. Stilwell was originally promised to form an air contingent in China with a fighter group (including four squadrons) and 100 aircraft as a condition for disbanding the volunteer team. But in fact, at the beginning of the establishment of the task force, according to Chennault, the second combat brigade, which constituted the main force of the task force, only 12 pilots and 20 ground crew members came to China, and the aircraft and some equipment were used to receive the original materials of the volunteer team. From the point of view, the personnel and aircraft of the contingent were completed one after another.
Because the volunteers were left too few, the 23rd Fighter Group, the 16th Fighter Squadron and the 11th Medium Bomber Squadron had to be allocated from the Tenth Air Force to form an aviation task force in China.
In October, under the 10th Air Force, an additional lndia air task force was formed. The Indian Air Contingent has four squadrons of heavy bombers, three squadrons of medium bombers, plus two squadrons of fighters, while the Air Contingent in China has only four squadrons of fighters and one squadron of medium bombers.
The difference in strength between the two contingents is very large, and the bombers are offensive aircraft, the fighters are defensive aircraft, and the Chinese contingent has only one medium-sized bomber squadron. Therefore, the air contingent in India occupies a favorable position over the air contingent in China in terms of establishment, staffing, and service support, which also proves that the support of the United States for the Chinese theater at that time was given secondary consideration.
3. Mission and logistical support of the air contingent in China
The main tasks of the air contingent in China are threefold:
First: Protect the eastern and southern routes of Hump Airlift, including the Kunming area of the airlift line terminal.
Second: attack and sabotage of Japanese aircraft and coastal Japanese ships operating in China.
Third: Support China's ground forces
The logistical support of the air contingent in China is either locally sourced in China or directly supplied by China. For example, mechanics, in addition to British and American personnel, have non-military Chinese; the construction and maintenance of airfields is independently borne by China; the ground guards of airports are served by Chinese army units; the meals of contingents continue to be supplied by the field service corps; and medical hygiene is supported by missionaries near the station. In addition, aircraft maintenance of level IV or above must be sent to the repair base of The Tenth Air Force of India; aircraft equipment, spare parts, ammunition, gasoline and certain daily necessities must still rely on the support of the United States.
After Burma fell to the Japanese army, the Burma Road was blocked, and supplies to China since then have relied mainly on air routes through Hump (the peaks of the Himalayas in the Sino-Burmese-Indian Theater). The original plan was to expand Air China's DC-3 fleet to 20 or 25 aircraft to serve as the main airlift between Kolkata and Chongqing.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Air Force is planning to open a line of communication from Sadiya, located at the eastern end of the Brahmaputra river in assam province, a railway terminal about 200 miles from mykiltyina upstream of the Irrawaddy River via the rugged mountains of northern Myanmar. After arriving in Myitkyina, load the cargo onto a barge and travel 100 miles down the water from the upper Irrawaddy River to Bha mo, and then switch to trucks in Ba mo and reach Kunming and Chongqing via the Myanmar Highway.
dc--3
On 15 June 31, 75 Douglas aircraft, namely C-47 and C-53, arrived in Kolkata for air transport between China and Burma. At the same time, the construction of an ideal hard-faced airport in Myitkyina is also being stepped up, hoping to use 72 twin-engine transport aircraft to transport 7,500 tons of supplies per month to its destination.
c--47
In fact, when the air contingent stationed in China was established, it was at the beginning of the hump route, the replenishment operation was not on the track, and the route was very long, and it had to surpass the hump peak of the towering clouds, and it was hit by storms and snow, so the transportation volume was limited after all, and the materials imported every month were very small, so the supply obtained by the contingent in the early days was very scarce.
c--53
Stilwell and Bissel originally agreed to supply the Chinese contingent with 1,986 tons of supplies per month, but between July 1942 and January 1943, only 300 tons per month were shipped, 400 tons were obtained in February 1943, and increased to 615 tons in March. The task force's offensive in the summer of 1942 relied mainly on China's self-payment for the purchase of preserved war materiel after the start of the War of Resistance, and by around February 1943, the task force had been unable to carry out its mission for more than a month because it had run out of fuel. Another example is that when the contingent was established, the equipment of the 23rd Brigade was transported to China, but arrived in China as late as the autumn of 1943; at this time, the contingent had withdrawn and was reorganized into the 14th Air Force.
4. The achievements of the air contingent stationed in China
Although the air contingent in China was formed in battle, encountered many difficulties in supply, and was deliberately suppressed by Stilwell, often supported in hardship, it later became the backbone of the US Air Force in China, and was a world-famous fighter team, always maintaining a record of five to one victory. In addition to serving as air defense and maintaining hump air transport safety in various localities as agreed upon, the contingent also continuously attacked the bombing and strafing enemy air bases and communication routes in Burma-Vietnam, western Yunnan, and the coastal areas of Guangdong, and assisted in attacking the Kailuan Coal Mine in Hebei Province.