Source: "Lookout Think Tank" WeChat public account
Author: Su Weimin
The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea is a war that we did not want to fight but could not but could not fight. The survival of North Korea is closely related to China's security, and if it dies, it will be cold, and if it is broken, it will be in danger. China's support for North Korea is not only a moral responsibility, but also a concern for its own safety, and it must not compete directly with the world's most powerful United States.
Through this contest, the myth of the invincibility of the United States was broken, the fighting spirit of the Chinese people was greatly encouraged, and the "Americanophobia" of a considerable number of people at that time was cured. The whole world is impressed by China, and China's international prestige has increased unprecedentedly, winning a relatively stable and peaceful environment for economic construction and social reform.
Military demarcation line and nearby buildings in north Korea's Panmunjom common security zone on March 5, 2019. Photo| Xinhua News Agency
Today, Uncle Ku shared Yang Shangkun's memories of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea on May 3, 1997, recalled by Yang Shangkun to several veteran comrades of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the Central Military Commission, as recorded by Su Weimin, who was the secretary of the office of Yang Shangkun, former deputy secretary general of the CPC Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee.
On August 15, 1948, the United States supported the Syngman Rhee Group to establish the Republic of Korea south of the 38th parallel. Subsequently, on September 9, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, led by Kim Il Sung, established the state north of the 38th parallel. Since then, the Korean Peninsula has been divided. The "38th Line" changed from a descended dividing line to a military dividing line.
According to the U.S.-Soviet agreement, all Soviet troops withdrew from Korea at the end of 1948; half a year later, although U.S. troops also withdrew from South Korea, they left a large military advisory group and continued to arm the Syngman Rhee clique.
With the support of the United States, Syngman Rhee has constantly provoked military friction near the "38th Line" and threatened to reunify the Korean Peninsula by force. In January 1950, the Syngman Rhee Group signed the "U.S.-Korea Joint Defense Mutual Assistance Agreement" with the United States, and the war was on the verge of breaking out. On the Korean side, Kim Il-sung also twice demanded the conclusion of a "DPRK-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship" with the Soviet Union in 1948 and 1949, but Stalin did not agree to it for fear of provoking the United States.
In April 1949, North Korea learned that U.S. troops were about to withdraw from South Korea, and Syngman Rhee's clique would launch an offensive against Korea after the withdrawal of American troops. To this end, Kim Il Sung asked the Soviet Union to quickly support weapons and equipment, and on the other hand, he sent people to Beijing to ask me to help me in the soldiers.
Mao Zedong said that if the Syngman Rhee clique dared to provoke a war, we would give assistance to Korea and promised to integrate the Korean Division of our People's Liberation Army in the northeast into the Korean People's Army. After the end of the Third Civil Revolutionary War and the completion of the great cause of national reunification, the Korean officers and men in the Chinese army can consider the issue of being integrated into the Korean People's Army according to their own wishes.
Mao Zedong also clearly pointed out that it is necessary to strive for the reunification of all Korea, but judging from the current international situation, there is no need to take action in the near future.
In June 1949, syngman Rhee's clique publicly shouted that it was preparing to deal a devastating blow to North Korea. At the same time, Dulles also traveled to the Korean Peninsula, secretly inspected the "38th Line", and declared that the United States would give moral and material support to the Syngman Rhee clique's anti-communism actions.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula was suddenly tense.
In early 1950, Truman issued a statement that South Korea and Taiwan were not in the U.S. defense circles, which made Stalin dispel his concerns, begin to consider a fundamental solution to the Korean problem, and speed up the pace of arming the People's Army. In March, Kim Il Sung paid a secret visit to the Soviet Union to say that the Korean People's Army had sufficient strength to unify the Korean Peninsula, and Stalin expressed optimism and affirmation.
On May 13, Kim Il Sung came to China to inform the CPC Central Committee that he had secretly visited the Soviet Union and that Stalin had agreed to his plan to reunify the Korean Peninsula. Mao Zedong immediately said that this is a major problem and we must verify it with the Soviet side. He then made an urgent appointment with the Soviet ambassador to China, Roshen, and asked him to report to Stalin confirming Kim Il-sung's claims. The next day, Roshen took Stalin's call back to Mao Zedong and confirmed the matter.
Mao Zedong told Kim Il Sung that we are not the enemy's chief of staff and should think more about what might happen. In order to prepare for the emergency, the Chinese People's Liberation Army is ready to deploy the strength of three armies on our side of the Yalu River, and if the United States sends troops, as long as they do not cross the "38th Line", we will not be able to cross the Yalu River; if the United States crosses the "38th Line", we can consider sending troops to participate in the war in the name of volunteers. Kim Il Sung politely declined, confidently saying: There is no need for China to send troops.
The day after the war broke out, Truman announced that the U.S. Far East Air Force and Navy would enter the war in support of Syngman Rhee. On the 27th, Truman issued a statement declaring that he had sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent China from liberating Taiwan. On 7 July, the United States also manipulated the UN Security Council to pass a resolution authorizing the US invading forces to gather the armies of 16 countries to form a "United Nations Army" and enter the Korean Peninsula to support the Syngman Rhee clique in expanding its war of aggression.
At the beginning of the war, the Korean People's Army was unstoppable, the operation was smooth, and soon crossed the "38th Line." Kim Il Sung issued a broadcast order demanding that the KPA drive all U.S. troops out of southern Korea by the end of August and fulfill its sacred mission of unifying Korea. However, while the KPA marched straight in and hailed victory, its weaknesses were also exposed.
The main forces of the KPA were concentrated on the first line, and the rear was empty; the front line was too long, and it was very difficult to supply. On September 15, the U.S. army landed at Inchon; on the 25th, Seoul was captured, and the KPA troops were cut off, and the situation on the battlefield was sharply reversed.
On October 1, MacArthur ordered the United Nations Forces to cross the 38th Parallel and advance north. On the same day, Stalin called and suggested that we send at least five or six divisions to quickly advance near the "38th Line" to cover the rear of the Korean People's Army in organizing a reserve force. At the same time, Kim Il Sung also sent special envoy Park Hyun Yong to Beijing to request military support.
In the early morning of the 2nd, Mao Zedong immediately came to Beijing for a meeting to discuss the situation in North Korea. On the afternoon of the same day, Mao Zedong presided over a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and pointed out in a clear-cut manner that this matter must be managed, otherwise the Americans would be overwhelmed and even more rampant.
Sending troops to Korea means that China and the United States exchange fire, which may lead the United States to formally declare war on china and direct the flames of war to our country. In this way, not only will it disrupt the country's economic recovery and construction plans, but the United States is the hegemon of the Western world and the number one military power, with a well-equipped army and nuclear weapons.
But Mao weighed the pros and cons and thought it was better to send troops than not to send troops. The involvement of the United States in the Korean civil war was expected. After the outbreak of the war, on July 2, Premier Zhou met with the Soviet ambassador to China, Luo Shen, expressing concern about whether the Korean People's Army could thwart the intervention of the US army, and for precautions, I was ready to gather 9 divisions of troops on the Border between China and the DPRK. On the 7th and 10th, Premier Zhou held two military meetings, at which the meeting made the "Decision on Defending the Northeast Border Defense" and immediately dispatched troops to form the Northeast Border Defense Army. Subsequently, the strength of the border guards soon reached 260,000 people.
Now, if you want to send troops into the DPRK, who will be in charge? Mao Zedong belonged to Lin Biao. Lin Biao, on the pretext of being ill, vigorously pushed back.
On October 4, Mao Zedong presided over an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, and at the beginning of the meeting, Mao Zedong announced that he would meet all day today to discuss the issue of sending troops to Korea. In the morning, we will talk about the reasons why we should send troops, and in the afternoon, we will talk about the reasons why we should not send troops.
According to the situation discussed at the meeting at that time, we basically tended not to send troops, on the grounds that we had just finished fighting, the wounds of the war had not yet been healed, the economy had not yet recovered, and it was not good for me to enter the war in the DPRK. In the afternoon, Peng Dehuai rushed from Xi'an to Beijing and attended the meeting advocating not sending troops. At the end of the meeting, Mao Zedong said: You are not advocating sending troops, and you are all right, but others are at the critical juncture of life and death, and we stand by and watch, no matter what, our hearts are always not a taste.
Peng Dehuai did not take a stand at the meeting because he did not understand the situation, but as soon as the meeting was adjourned, he ran to me and asked me for a detailed explanation of the situation of the morning meeting.
On the morning of the 5th, Mao Zedong took Peng Dehuai to talk alone. Peng Dehuai said that I thought about it for one night and felt that I should send troops. He expressed his willingness to take command of the Crusade. In the afternoon, the enlarged meeting of the Politburo continued, and Peng Dehuai vigorously advocated sending troops to resist the United States and aid Korea. He said that some people are worried that fighting a war will affect construction, but this is nothing, and if it is broken, it will be built later, which is equivalent to postponing the victory of the War of Liberation for several years. If the United States annexes the whole of Korea, it can always find an excuse to provoke us and launch a war of aggression, so it is better to fight late than early, otherwise it will leave endless troubles.
Mao Zedong then compared the three countries of China, the Soviet Union, and the DPRK to a troika, saying that this car was three horses, and the two horses insisted on running forward. As he was speaking, Shi Zhe led Kovalev to come, and Mao Zedong left the venue to meet the Soviet guests in Fortress Garden. After a while, about twenty minutes, Mao Zedong returned to the meeting hall and said, "Look, sure enough, those two horses must be pulled. The meeting immediately made a decision that Peng Dehuai would take command and lead the Chinese People's Volunteer Army into the DPRK.
Peng Dehuai, commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army (first from left), presided over a combat meeting on the Korean front and deployed the battle plan. Photo| Xinhua News Agency
On October 8, Mao Zedong signed the Order on the Formation of the Chinese Volunteer Army. On the same day, Mao Zedong telegraphed Kim Il-sung to form a volunteer army with Peng Dehuai as commander and political commissar, and asked him to "immediately send Comrade Park Yiyu to Shenyang to discuss various issues related to the entry of the Chinese Volunteer Army into Korea to fight in Korea."
On the same day, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao went to the Soviet Union to meet with Stalin and discuss the issue of Soviet military assistance and air cover for our volunteers. On the one hand, Stalin expressed his willingness to provide 16 volunteer air regiments for air cover for my volunteers, and on the other hand, he stressed that it was difficult to immediately dispatch air cover, and it would take at least two or three months to prepare. Because the Soviets could not send the air force to give me air cover for the volunteers, Zhou Enlai had to call Mao Zedong to make a decision.
Because of this twist and turn, on October 12, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang: The various units of the volunteer army are still training in situ, do not move, and invite them to come to Beijing for a talk.
After Peng and Gao arrived in Beijing, on the 13th, Mao Zedong again convened an emergency meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee to reconsider the issue of sending troops or not sending troops. At the meeting, Mao Zedong stressed that China and the DPRK are dependent on each other, and it may not be advantageous for the US military to enter the Yalu River to confront us. After repeated discussions, the meeting finally made the final decision to send troops. A telegram was immediately sent to Zhou Enlai: After consulting with Comrade Gao Gang, Comrade Peng Dehuai, and other comrades of the Politburo, it was unanimously agreed that it would be advantageous for our army to go to Korea.
In the first period, we can concentrate on fighting the puppet army, our army is sure to deal with the puppet army, and we can open up the base area of korea in the mountainous areas north of the Wonsan and Pyongyang lines, and we can inspire the Korean people to reorganize the people's army. Two months later, the Soviet Volunteer Air Force was able to arrive. After six months, we can receive artillery and tank equipment from the Soviet Union, and after training, we can attack the American army. In the first period, as long as we can annihilate a few puppet army divisions, the situation in Korea can change in our favor.
The above-mentioned active policy is extremely beneficial to China, korea, the East, and the world; if we do not send troops, let the enemy press down to the Yalu River, and increase the domestic and international reactionary arrogance, it will be detrimental to all sides, first of all, it will be even more unfavorable to the northeast, the entire northeast border defense army will be sucked up, and the power of south Manchuria will be controlled. In short, we believe that we should go to war, we must go to war. The benefits of participating in the war are extremely great, and the damage of not participating in the war is extremely great.
On October 19, three corps and three artillery divisions of the Chinese Volunteer Army crossed the Yalu River in three routes. For cover, the troops moved at dusk and stopped at dawn. On the 21st, the "United Nations Army" captured Pyongyang, and MacArthur believed that the possibility of Chinese troops was extremely unlikely, and called for the occupation of all of Korea before Thanksgiving Day on November 23. He had no idea that the Chinese Volunteer Army had crossed the Yalu River a few days earlier and was waiting for him in the pockets of the predetermined area. On the 25th, the vanguard units of the 1st division and the 6th division of Li Puppet Army, which were advancing northward, were ambushed by our volunteer army and annihilated by more than a thousand people, opening the curtain of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
From October 25 to November 5, the first campaign of the 10-day War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea annihilated more than 15,000 "United Nations troops," breaking the myth of the invincibility of the US military and stabilizing the war situation on the Korean Peninsula.
The arrogant MacArthur suffered defeat and still subjectively believed that China had only sent a small number of troops into North Korea to defend its border defenses, so he regrouped his forces and accelerated his northward advance with the support of the navy and air force.
On November 24, MacArthur announced to the world that the United Nations Army had begun a general offensive to end the Korean War by Christmas. Subsequently, he asked his troops to quickly reach the Yalu River and go home for Christmas. From November 7 to December 24, the second campaign of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, which lasted more than 40 days, annihilated more than 36,000 enemy troops and recovered Pyongyang and a vast area north of the "38th Line."
The tomb of the martyr Mao Anying in the Martyrs' Cemetery of the Korean Hinokura Chinese People's Volunteer Army. Photo| Xinhua News Agency
In the second battle, on November 25, the headquarters of our volunteer army was bombed by American aircraft, and Mao Zedong's son Mao Anying and another comrade named Gao Ruixin were unfortunately killed. More than a month later, on January 2, 1951, Zhou Enlai wrote a telegram from Peng Dehuai about the matter to Mao Zedong.
Zhou Enlai's letter and Peng Dehuai's telegram were not long, but Mao Zedong read it for a long time. After a long sigh, he said that the thousands of sacrifices could not be taken care of alone. It is over, needless to say. Mao Zedong's spirit is great, but the actual blow is not small! There was no way to do it, and Mao Zedong once had the intention of going to the countryside to rest.
After the second battle, Peng Dehuai suggested that our volunteer army take a break for a while. On December 27, in a telegram to Mao Zedong, he said: "After the victory of the First and Second Battles, the situation in Korea has changed, and I have changed from defense to attack. Although the enemy's morale is low, the equipment is still superior; although our morale is strong, our weapons and equipment are too poor, and transportation is seriously difficult, and it will take three to six months to gradually achieve these conditions at the earliest. As the campaign continued southward, the enemy's lines were shortened and concentrated, and our supply lines were extended, and new difficulties increased. ”
But at the time, the United States was toying with a ceasefire and then a negotiated plot to buy time for another war. On December 14, the United Nations adopted a ceasefire proposal by 13 countries, including India, in an attempt to obstruct our army from breaking through the "38th Line" under the guise of a ceasefire. Mao Zedong believed that the United States and Britain were demanding that our army stop north of the "38th Line" in order to facilitate the reorganization of its army to fight again. Therefore, our army must cross the "38th Line." If it stops north of the "38th Line," it will be very disadvantageous to politics. Therefore, he did not agree with Peng Dehuai's proposal.
On the night of December 31, our volunteer army launched the third campaign of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, which ended on January 8, 1951, lasted 8 days, advanced 80-110 kilometers, liberated Seoul, and annihilated more than 19,000 enemy troops.
Peng Dehuai believed that in the third campaign, the US troops retreated without a fight, and their main forces did not suffer much losses, obviously to lure us south, causing the supply line to be lengthened and the flanks to be exposed, so that they could use their naval and air superiority to repeat the old trick of the Inchon landing.
At this time, the weaknesses of our army were gradually exposed, with poor equipment, no air cover, weak logistical support capabilities, and soldiers carrying only enough food and ammunition to last 5-7 days. The U.S. military taunted me that I could only launch the "Weekly Offensive."
Sure enough, on January 25, the US military gathered more than 200,000 troops to launch an attack on us, which was the fourth campaign of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, which lasted 87 days and ended on April 27. Although the enemy reoccupied Seoul and restored the front to the "38th Line", our army killed and wounded a large number of the enemy, annihilating more than 78,000 enemy personnel.
In the fourth campaign, Peng Dehuai was anxious about the difficulties faced by our volunteer army. On February 21, he returned to Beijing to report to Mao Zedong on the situation in Korea. After his special plane landed at the western suburbs airport, he immediately drove to Zhongnanhai. Unfortunately, Mao Zedong was in the western suburb of Yuquan Mountain, so he turned back to the western suburbs. At this time, Mao Zedong had already taken a nap, and despite the persuasion of the guards, he broke into the room, woke up Mao Zedong who was sleeping, and reported to him the situation of the enemy and us on the Korean front and the many difficulties faced by our volunteer army.
After listening to Peng Dehuai's statement, Mao Zedong put forward after careful consideration: If the Korean War can be won quickly, it will be won quickly, and if it cannot be won quickly, it will be won slowly, and we should not rush to achieve success. This gave Peng Dehuai a chance to dispose of the camera.
On February 25, Zhou Enlai presided over an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission to discuss the issue of units of major military regions taking turns to fight in Korea and how to ensure the supply of materials for the volunteer army. Peng Dehuai did not think enough about the great difficulties facing the country at that time, and one-sidedly emphasized that the rear was ineffective in supporting the Korean front, and even stood up excitedly and patted the table, shouting loudly: "You go to the front line to see what the volunteers eat, what they wear, and for whom they sacrificed?" Can't the country overcome a little difficulty? ”
The meeting made many important decisions on strengthening the front-line troops and logistical supply of the volunteer army, such as the various units of the People's Liberation Army taking turns to participate in the war on the Korean front, so that they can not only replace the front-line troops for rest, but also temper the troops and enhance the modern combat capability of the whole army; send anti-aircraft artillery units into the DPRK to cover the rear lines of communication of the volunteer army; and call on all walks of life to increase production and economize, and donate aircraft.
On March 24, MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the United Nations Army, issued an unauthorized statement that he would extend the war into China, and Washuman removed from his post, and Ridgway took over as commander-in-chief of the United Nations Army. Ridgway's wishful thinking was to repeat the old trick of the Inchon landing, landing on the waist of the bee on the Korean Peninsula and behind our volunteer army, so that our army would be attacked on the stomach and back.
In order to smash this conspiracy of the enemy, Peng Dehuai launched the Fifth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea in advance.
The original plan was to drive the enemy back to the vicinity of the 37th parallel, but due to insufficient preparations, the intended purpose was not achieved. The campaign began on April 22 and ended on June 10, lasted 50 days, crushed the enemy's attempt to advance the front to the 39th parallel of Pyongyang and Wonsan, annihilated more than 82,000 enemy troops, and our volunteer army also paid a great price.
After the fifth battle, the two sides of the war were glued near the "38th Line".
In May 1951, the U.S. National Security Council recommended to Truman that a negotiated settlement of the Korean issue be pursued. On May 31, U.S. State Department adviser and former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Kennan met with Soviet Representative to the United Nations Malik and expressed that the U.S. government was ready to discuss ending the Korean War with China and was willing to restore the pre-war situation. Subsequently, US Secretary of State Acheson and UN Secretary-General Rye expressed this intention of the US Government successively.
Mao Zedong immediately seized this opportunity and on June 3 held talks with Kim Il Sung, who had made a special trip to Beijing; on the 10th, he sent Gao Gang to Moscow to consult with Stalin; and then sent Li Kenong to leave Beijing to preside over armistice negotiations.
Inside the korean war armistice negotiation venue at Panmunjom on March 5, 2019. Photo| Xinhua News Agency
Negotiations began on 10 July 1951 and were not signed by the two sides until 27 July 1953, when the armistice agreement was signed, which lasted more than two years.
At the negotiating table is the second battlefield. During this period, the Korean battlefield was in a situation of talking about fighting and fighting, and the two battlefields were equally complex and intense.
Lee Kenong wrote to me from Kaesong on July 12, 1952, describing the working and living conditions of the negotiating delegation at that time.
The letter said: "The total number of people departing from Beijing on July 3, 1951, including armed guards, was less than 60, and after a year of fighting, it has now expanded to 640 people." Under the direct leadership of Chairman Mao and the Premier, this unit can withstand battle, and at the same time, after a year's test, most comrades have also made progress and changed their appearance, especially for those comrades who have obtained bachelor's degrees and doctorates in the United States, and the practical educational significance is even greater. ”
The letter also said: "The enemy's espionage activities in the neutral area and the venue area are more active than before, and the day before yesterday we set up an ambush in the venue area to capture a special enemy, and attached two photos of the enemy using children to do secret service activities in the venue area, so that you can understand the complicated situation of the struggle against the secret agents here." ”
At the time of the armistice on the Korean battlefield, the equipment of our volunteer army had been greatly improved and its strength had been greatly enhanced. In this regard, Peng Dehuai once said with regret that at that time, our battlefield organization had just been ready, and it was a pity that it did not make full use of it to give the enemy a major blow before declaring a truce. He also envisioned that it would be better to hand over the areas I had withdrawn as buffer zones to neutral state oversight.
On the enemy side, Clark, then commander-in-chief of the "United Nations Army," lamented after signing that he was the first commander in U.S. history to sign an armistice without victory.
Column Editor-in-Chief: Gu Wanquan Text Editor: Yang Rong Caption Source: Xinhua News Agency Infographic Photo Editor: Zhu Xuan
Source: Author: Lookout Think Tank