A prominent feature of China's 100-year modern history is the situation of warlords fighting each other. Whether it was the late Qing government, or the Beiyang government and the Nanjing Nationalist government in the Republic of China, the central court's control over the whole country was very limited, and all the large and small warlords were entrenched in one side and divided and ruled.
You must know that although Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing Nationalist Government formally unified China in 1927, the military and political officials of each province were local divisions, ruling one side and disobeying the central government. Chiang Kai-shek was also troubled by this, and also launched the Central Plains War and the Chiang-Gui War, and finally reluctantly integrated the whole country's forces in the center by encircling and suppressing the Red Army.
However, during the War of Liberation, the local forces of the Kuomintang were still divided into one side, and they harbored evil intentions and intrigues, which became one of the important reasons for the destruction of Chiang Kai-shek's military power.
However, since the birth of the Communist Party of China, there has never been a situation of warlord secession. Even during the War of Liberation, there were no warlords among the dozens or even millions of generals and commanders of our party. For example, when New China was founded in October 1940, the number of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was as high as 5 million, and almost all of them were elite soldiers in a hundred battles, but these 5 million troops were highly concentrated in the hands of the Party Central Committee. Although the war between the southwest and Taiwan was still unsettled at that time, the military power in various places was in the hands of the Party Central Committee.
Now, let's look at why our party does not have a situation of warlord scuffle.
1. In the early days of the party's founding, the principle of the party commanding the gun was established
Unlike the warlord forces of the feudal society and the Republic of China, our party has possessed a very strong advanced nature, a very high level of consciousness, and a very organizational nature since its founding. Therefore, under the leadership of Chairman Mao, from the early days of its founding, our party has made clear the principle of "the party commanding the gun", and no matter how powerful the commanders at the front line are, they will ultimately follow the instructions of the central authorities to make decisions.
In this regard, Chairman Mao first played an exemplary role. After the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927, Chairman Mao was thinking about how to maintain the party's absolute leadership over the revolutionary army. On the march, Chairman Mao investigated and studied all the way, and found that companies with a large number of party members fought more heroically and had high morale, and they would play the vanguard and exemplary role of party members, and basically did not desert.
As a result, Chairman Mao decided to rebuild an army that was different from the old forces. To put it simply, it is necessary to set up party organizations in the armed forces, and use the party to command the guns, so as to maintain the advanced nature and organizational nature of the armed forces. As a result, he began to set up branches in the company, set up groups in the platoon, and established an organizational system for party members in the squad.
By setting up party organizations at all levels in the troops, we can ensure that the troops carry out their work under the guidance of party representatives. The party representatives of the party organizations in the armed forces are responsible for the leadership and political work of the armed forces and ensure the consistency of the line, principles, and policies of the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.
After the reorganization of Sanwan, Chairman Mao established the party's leadership over the grassroots level of the army, as well as the party's control over the army. At the same time, Chairman Mao creatively came up with the principle of "building a branch on a company" and using the party's organization and beliefs to control the operation of the army. The army is loyal to the party, not to the individual.
Chairman Mao also played an exemplary and leading role in the party's command of the army. An oolong letter in Gutian revoked Chairman Mao's post as secretary of the former party committee in the Red Army, and Chairman Mao immediately expressed his obedience to the orders of the party organization. You must know that the Red Army entrenched in the Jinggangshan base area was personally pulled up by Chairman Mao and Zhu De, and almost all the grassroots soldiers and commanders and fighters were single-handedly drawn by Chairman Mao.
Although Chairman Mao was angry, he still obeyed the leadership of the "Soviet Union" faction in the party as soon as possible. Even after the failure of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression, the leaders of the Soviet faction of the Party Central Committee lost all the base areas, and Chairman Mao never thought of using methods other than the rules to solve the problem.
Chairman Mao's recapture of the command of the army from Bogu and other leaders of the "Lingering Soviet faction" at the Zunyi Conference also followed the internal party procedures. It can be seen that since Chairman Mao and Zhu De founded the Red Army in the Jinggangshan base area, they have washed away the temperament of the old warlords, and the political work cadres have been enriched into the company, ensuring the centralization and unification of military power. Our Party's army is not an individual allegiance, but a collective allegiance to the Party Central Committee.
2. Chairman Mao's wise leadership
During the War of Liberation, although the generals had hundreds of thousands or even millions of troops, they actually obeyed the leadership of the Party Central Committee and carried out the orders of the Central Military Commission, which also attributed to the wisdom of the supreme leader, Chairman Mao.
Many facts have proved that Chairman Mao, as the supreme leader, can guide our party's revolutionary activities to develop in the right direction, and without Chairman Mao, it would be difficult for our party's revolution to operate correctly.
For example, after the defeat of the Great Revolution, the three major uprisings, only the Autumn Harvest Uprising retained the revolutionary fire in Jinggangshan. During the leadership of Chairman Mao in the Central Soviet Region of Jiangxi, the construction of the base areas was thriving, and the leadership of the "leftists" such as Li De and Bogu led to the fifth defeat of our party's revolution and the collapse of the Central Soviet Region.
The Zunyi Conference established the leadership position of Chairman Mao, Chairman Mao knew the success of the Red Army's Long March, and Zhang Guotao led the Red Army south to Chengdu and finally suffered a great defeat.
The victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression proved the success of Chairman Mao's theory of protracted warfare and the defeat of Wang Ming's Liusu faction. Jiangbei succeeded because Chen Yi and Su Yu obeyed Chairman Mao's instructions, and Jiangnan International failed to send Xiang Ying.
In the War of Liberation, Lin Biao obeyed the command of Chairman Mao, took the lead in seizing the Northeast in the Liaoshen Campaign, and strictly ordered the capture of Jinzhou to close the door and beat the dogs, and the People's Liberation Army occupied the Northeast and laid the foundation for the liberation of New China.
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It can be said that because of Chairman Mao's erudition and wise decision-making, he gave the correct solution, so that the generals of our party are also willing to obey Chairman Mao's command, rally closely around Chairman Mao, and are unwilling to go their own way.
Of course, the Central Military Commission is not a hall of words, and it also follows the principle of "generals are outside, and some do not obey others." There are also generals who have different opinions on the orders of the Central Military Commission, such as Su Yu, the god of war of our party, who once "disobeyed orders three times."
Su Yu's first disobedience was in the early days of the War of Liberation, when in the face of the situation of the national army's large-scale attack on the liberated areas, the Central Military Commission formulated the strategic policy of our army to attack from the outside and fight in the south, with the aim of annihilating the enemy's forces and developing the liberated areas. However, Su Yu believed that it would be more advantageous for our army to fight in the Soviet-central region, because the national army was weak in the Soviet-central region and Huainan was strong, and it could also get the support of the Nanjing base camp.
The Central Military Commission seriously discussed Su Yu's views and revised the operational policy. In this way, Su Yu relied on his own decision-making and achieved a situation in which the Soviet Union and China won seven battles and seven victories.
Su Yu's second disobedience was when the situation in Central China underwent a major change, and the Kuomintang reorganized the 74th Division to attack the Lianghuai region. At that time, the Central Military Commission believed that our army did not have the strength to annihilate the 74th Division, the ace unit of the Kuomintang, and decided to abandon the two Huai and look for another fighter.
However, Su Yu believed that it was the beginning of a large-scale war of annihilation of our army, so he suggested to the Central Military Commission that the war of annihilation be concentrated in central China and that the two field armies should be used to concentrate their forces on the war of annihilation. After discussion, the Central Military Commission agreed to Su Yu's decision, which enabled Su Yu to lead our army to victory in the Battle of Subei.
Su Yu's third disobedience was in early 1948. At that time, the Central Military Commission organized the Southeast Field Army according to the war situation, trying to lead the war to the area south of the Yangtze River. According to the strategic intention of the Central Military Commission, Su Yu believed that the troops would not be able to reach the Yangtze River for the time being, so as to attract the main forces of the Central Plains and East China Field Army, and that a large-scale war of annihilation should be fought in the Central Plains and the Huanghuai area.
After listening to Su Yu's opinions, the Central Military Commission also changed its original plan, and only then did the Huaihai Campaign take place.
It can be seen that the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao correctly led the battle of our party's army, but the CMC was also able to conscientiously absorb the opinions of the front-line generals, and this was also one of the important reasons why the generals obeyed the command of the central authorities and were unwilling to resist them in separate chambers.
3. The revolutionary environment also led to the elimination of betrayed generals
The new democratic revolution led by our party to the Chinese people was a painstaking revolution and also eliminated some generals who might betray the revolution.
For example, Zhang Guotao of the Red Fourth Front Army once wanted to support 100,000 troops, set up another central committee, and betrayed the party organization. However, when he led the Red Fourth Army south to attack Sichuan, he was bombarded by the Sichuan warlords, and suffered more than half of the casualties, so he had to turn around and go north to the west, and almost all the troops were wiped out.
It can be seen that the arduous environment of the Chinese revolution is like a big wave sweeping sand, and the rest are the generals of our party who are loyal to the revolution and the leadership.
Fourth, the system guarantees the unity of the country
In 1950, at the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic of China, there were six major military regions on the mainland: northeastern, northern, eastern, central-southern, northwestern, and southwestern. These six military regions were compatible with the six central armies and large administrative regions established at that time. Due to the needs of the unequal war situation in the southwest, it is inevitable that local generals will lead the party, government, and military leaders.
For this reason, the leaders of the CPC Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao were also vigilant, and in order to ensure the unity of the country in terms of system, they began to carefully adjust the deployment of the armed forces to avoid all possible situations. For example, in 1952, Chairman Mao began to transfer the secretaries of the five major military regions to Beijing, so that these figures with super real power in the local areas could work in the central departments, so as to avoid becoming "local snakes" and ensure that power was returned to the central government.
For example, when the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea broke out, Peng Dehua, the number one leader in the northwest, led the main force of the four fields into Korea to fight. As a result, he left the northwest, and after leading our army to victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea on the Korean battlefield, he left the northwest and served as the defense minister of the central government, no longer directly commanding the army and coordinating the management of the country.
Liu Bocheng of the Southwest Military Region participated in the preparatory work for the establishment of the Army University and was out of touch with the army. Nie Rongzhen of the North China Military Region entered the General Staff Headquarters and was responsible for assisting the Central Military Commission. In this way, there are only a few people left in the six military regions, and in the localities, except for Deng Xiaoping, all other identities are political commissars, and they are no longer the real commanders of the army.
At the same time, Chairman Mao arranged for military and political dignitaries to enter Beijing in 1952, such as Deng Xiaoping, who served as the Government Council and Vice Premier after he was stationed in the Central Committee, and then the leaders of the Northeast Bureau, East China Bureau, Central South Bureau, and Northwest Bureau also entered Beijing to take up important posts. In this way, the dignitaries of the local military districts left the localities and separated from the army. In 1954, the central government abolished the five administrative regions, and the matching system of the six military regions became history.
After the demise of the six military regions, the system of the twelve military regions followed, so that the army was not so highly concentrated. The commanders and political commissars of the major military regions are no longer the old marshals and generals of the past, and the representatives of the young Zhuang faction who are promoted to the age of 40 to 50 lack battlefield experience and are out of touch with the army, and naturally do not grasp the actual military power. In this way, the military power of the various military regions is naturally highly unified in the center.
5. Mao Zedong Thought guarantees reunification
Chairman Mao paid attention to the party's ideological and political construction, and established the leading position of Mao Zedong Thought in the army in the Yan'an revolutionary base area. In this way, the army, from the generals to the ordinary soldiers, understand that the army belongs to the state and the people, and that the army serves the people, not for a certain person, thus ensuring the unity of military power.
Epilogue:
Since our party is a political party established to pursue revolutionary ideals and realize the highest ideals of mankind, the army naturally also serves the country and the people, and naturally can create miracles, avoid the armed division of the warlords in the feudal era, and ensure the ideological, pure, and political nature of the army.