The second phase of the 1953 summer holiday counterattack in the Korean War affected the expectations and dilemmas of the Chinese and North Korean coalition forces. At this critical juncture, General Yang Yong's decision became the center of attention, and he decided to keep Zheng Weishan as commander of the campaign, rather than enjoying the victory alone. This move stems from the depth of strategic thinking, which is related to the topography of the central mountains of Korea, the deployment of firepower, and the tension between the enemy and our armies. This article will elaborate on the specific process of this phase of the campaign, reveal the ingenuity behind it, and recreate the fierce battle scene of that time.
Terrain & DeploymentThe mountainous terrain of central Korea has caused serious disruption to military activities. The belligerents are arranged here in a compact and careful manner. General Yang Yong did not seek a quick victory, but adopted prudent tactics and cautiously dealt with the war situation. Knowing that his military was limited and he could not risk throwing all his troops into battle, he devised a plan for a grouped attack. Although we have a strong army in Korea, past failures have taught us that there are huge losses to be taken from acting hastily.
In order to ensure the success of the war, the army carefully arranged the battle sequence, which included the 60th, 67th, and 68th armies of the 20th Army Corps, as well as units from the 24th and 54th armies. These battle sequences play a key role in the second phase of tactical operations, each responsible for controlling specific objectives, ready to go, and demonstrating strong strategic execution. However, how to cooperate within such a sequence became a new issue, especially for the 24th and 54th armies, which were not part of the original legions, so special attention was needed in command and coordination.
The second phase of the war was more tactical, focusing on striking at specific enemy positions. This advanced demand has put the military's strategic thinking and execution capability to a severe test, and it requires the ability to quickly and effectively implement tactical arrangements and precise means of strike. Coordination and cooperation among the forces will play a key role in this process. In the face of the enemy's defensive line, our army must demonstrate excellent tactical techniques to reduce the threat of the enemy's defensive line as much as possible.
Assault in depth and operational resultsAfter the end of the first phase of the battle, our army quickly adjusted its strategy, launched a deep surprise attack, and launched a fierce attack on the enemy forces on the southern front. This move demonstrates the precision of our army's strategic layout and its heroic and fearless spirit. However, an in-depth evaluation and summary of the results of the battle is also indispensable. Some military experts have pointed out that if we can mobilize troops in advance and implement a more in-depth strategy of advancing southward, we are expected to reap more fruitful results. This viewpoint has triggered in-depth thinking and discussion on military policymaking.
During the battle, our army tried to implement multiple rounds of tactical interspersed to interfere with the enemy's defense system, but due to the constraints of the terrain and the enemy's rapid response, the results were not satisfactory. In this regard, the military command department is deeply summing up lessons and drawing on scientific policy decisions. Some people pointed out that the reckless advance may lead to unnecessary casualties, and it is recommended to adopt a prudent strategy and implement refined small-scale tactics.
Defensive preparation and outcome evaluationDespite the military deployments, the rapid retreat of the South Korean army still raises military concerns. In wartime, troops are under great challenges and pressures, and their responses must be swift and accurate. General Yang Yong laid out the defense tightly, but the assessment of the battle situation still needs to be pondered. Although our army has won a certain degree of victory, whether it can effectively annihilate the enemy and consolidate the results of the battle remains to be thoroughly explored and analyzed.
In the second phase of the counterattack in the summer of 1953, although there were some successes, many problems and challenges were revealed in the course of the actual operation. After the war, the army conducted an in-depth analysis of these lessons and lessons, hoping to provide important references for future battles. This action left a deep mark on history and became one of the key chapters of the Korean War.