The 18th Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is a contingent with a long revolutionary history, the predecessor of this contingent was the 7th Column of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu Military Region, the first commander was Yang Yong, and then in December 1946, the special service battalion of the column went south to Yudong under the leadership of Deputy Political Commissar Zhang Guohua, and formed the Yuwan Soviet Military Region with the Shuidong Army Subdistrict and the Central China 8th Army Subdistrict, with Zhang Guohua as the commander.
Subsequently, the troops of the Yuwan Soviet Military Region participated in the Yudong Campaign, the Zhengzhou Campaign, and the Huaihai Campaign, and in early 1949, in accordance with the order of the Central Military Commission on unifying the entire army, it was officially reorganized into the 18th Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, with Zhang Guohua as the commander and subordinate to the 5th Corps of the Second Field Army.
After the establishment of the army, the 18th Army successively participated in many important battles such as the Battle of Crossing the River and the Battle of Hengbao, and soon after the founding of New China, the 18th Army was originally going to garrison the relatively wealthy southern Sichuan, but in January 1950, the superiors handed over a more important task to the 18th Army.
This mission was to ask the 18th Army to advance into Tibet, where the plateau lacked oxygen and the environment was harsh.
After the order was issued to the 18th Army, a fear of difficulties quickly spread among the army, after all, everyone knew that it was too hard to go to Tibet, and many people were ready to go to southern Sichuan.
Under these circumstances, many people in the army were extremely emotional, and some even wrote a letter to Zhang Guohua, saying that "they do not want to enter Tibet because of their poor health."
What's more, he is preparing to be a deserter.
Faced with this situation, Zhang Guohua, who has always been mild-tempered, trembled all over, and he slapped the table at the mobilization meeting and angrily reprimanded:
"All deserters are not allowed to go to Tibet, and they are to be transferred to other places on the spot."
As soon as this order was issued, the troops' fear of difficulties was immediately stopped, and at the meeting held not long after the oath meeting to enter Tibet, Zhang Guohua's deafening speech made the officers and men who had previously had the idea of becoming deserters all bow their heads in shame.
"You regard Tibet as a barren land, but the imperialists have never disliked it as desolate, and for so many years they have been desperately drilling into Tibet as long as they seize the opportunity, and now several countries are attacking the idea of Tibet.
These words made the people present wake up and immediately feel ashamed of their previous thoughts of fear and evasion, and after thinking about it, everyone said that they would resolutely enter Tibet to defend the safety of the border.
At this point, all the officers and men of the 18th Army were fully mentally prepared to enter Tibet, and although they knew that they would face extremely difficult and difficult conditions, they naturally had no complaints when they thought that the army commanders had taken the lead.
After the ideological work was completed, Zhang Guohua set up a research group on various policies in Tibet to conduct a thorough investigation of the political, economic, and cultural aspects of the Tibetan people, as well as the military situation in Tibet at that time.
And just when Zhang Guohua was nervously busy, an unexpected news came that Zhang Guohua's three-year-old daughter died of illness.
"Difficult and difficult" is Zhang Guohua's first child, and the departure of his beloved daughter made Zhang Guohua extremely sad, and he didn't even have time to see his beloved daughter for the last time.
On March 18, 1950, the advance unit of the 18th Army set off from Leshan, and before leaving, Zhang Guohua told the troops to respect the customs and habits of the local people, and the advance team also strictly followed the requirements, truly achieved no crime in the autumn, and won the unanimous support of the local people.
As ordinary people in Tibet, they naturally welcomed the arrival of the PLA, but as the elite class in Tibet at that time, they did not think so at all, and these people were thinking about how to use force to resist the arrival of the PLA.
To be sure, the army in the hands of the Tibetan elite at that time did not have the strength to compete with the PLA, after all, the PLA had just defeated the 8 million troops of the Kuomintang, and the entire population of Tibet at that time was only 1 million.
Moreover, compared with the People's Liberation Army at that time, the generation gap between the Tibetan army and the People's Liberation Army was quite large, and it is no exaggeration to say that the Tibetan army at that time was almost the same as the army of the Middle Ages.
For example, the most typical point is that there is a huge class gap between the officers and soldiers of the Tibetan army, in the eyes of the officers, the soldiers are equivalent to tool people, and if they make a slight mistake, then the officers have the right to inflict capital punishment on the soldiers.
More importantly, due to its remote location, the Tibetan army has not fought a decent battle for many years, and this is completely different from the people's army that has just experienced the liberation war.
However, it is not entirely correct to say that the Tibetan army is useless, at least in terms of the strategic situation at that time, the Tibetan army still has a certain chance of winning against the PLA.
Some people will say that this medieval team has a chance to win in the hands of the People's Liberation Army, this is not a joke, in fact, there really is, and there is more than one.
First of all, the equipment was not too bad, the equipment of the Tibetan army at that time was mainly British, and there were a small number of earthen cannons, in addition to rifles and light machine guns, which was not much worse than the People's Liberation Army that had just completed the Liberation War at that time.
At that time, the Tibetan army used "daiben" as its combat unit, and one "daiben" had about 1,000 people, while the Tibetan army had a total of 10 "daiben," which is more than 10,000 people, and how many troops did the 18 th Army have? According to military history, the 18 th Army's contingent entering Tibet at that time was 30,000 people.
With 30,000 to more than 10,000, it seems that the 18th Army has the advantage, but don't forget that the Tibetan army is fighting in a familiar environment, so as long as the use of troops is reasonable, combined with the favorable terrain, it can resolve the disparity in strength.
And the most critical issue is the logistics.
The 18th Army entered Tibet, the biggest problem is the supply of the troops, military history records, when the troops just arrived in Ganzi, there was a "food shortage" situation, some companies even dig wild vegetables, catch gophers, catch sparrows.
It can be seen that logistics supply was a shortcoming at that time, and although many methods were used, the problem still existed.
And this, if the Tibetan army uses it well, it also has a chance to win, after all, the Tibetan army can achieve local supply, but the PLA needs to pay a great price to maintain the supply line.
This is the reason why it is said that the Tibetan army at that time had a chance to win, and once the Tibetan army can fully use these advantages in place, adopt the strategy of "exchanging space for time", do not go head-to-head with the PLA, and use the terrain and supplies as much as possible to consume the PLA, and at the same time delay the war time to the maximum, then the longer the time, the more beneficial it will be.
But the problem is that the top brass of the Tibetan army at that time, through a series of "mysterious operations," were stunned to completely destroy these advantages.
The first "mysterious operation" that the Tibetan military top brass did at that time was to send someone to assassinate an important person.
Speaking of Geda Living Buddha, in fact, he is also an old friend of our army, when the Red Army's Long March passed through Ganzi in 1938, he had contact with Mr. Zhu, Liu Shuai and others, and under the inspiration of our party's policy of resisting Japan and saving the country, he mobilized the Tibetan masses to support the Red Army.
Not only that, after the Red Army marched north, Geda Living Buddha fought wits and courage with the Kuomintang reactionaries, during which he also successfully covered hundreds of wounded Red Army soldiers, and in the face of the Kuomintang's coercion and temptation, he firmly refused to serve as a "representative of the National Congress", and when he learned the news of the founding of New China, he immediately sent a representative to Beijing to pay tribute to Chairman Mao and President Zhu.
More importantly, the Living Buddha Geda has established extremely high prestige in Tibet for many years, and he also fully supports the peaceful liberation of Tibet; when the advance troops of the 18th Army arrived in Ganzi, he proposed to our party that in order to reduce the resistance of the People's Liberation Army to Tibet, he was willing to use his personal connections to rush to Lhasa to publicize the policies of our party and our army to the Tibetan high-level at that time.
Upon learning of this news, Mr. Zhu was very moved, and personally called back to the Living Buddha of Geda, telling him not to take risks, but the Living Buddha of Geda still insisted on making a contribution, and in this way, he embarked on the road to Lhasa with Mr. Zhu's concern.
Strictly speaking, it would be beneficial for anyone to have such an important figure as the Living Buddha of Geda, who had both local prestige and support for our party's policies, to be in the middle, and the vast majority of the local upper-class people and masses in Tibet at that time also expressed great support for the preaching of the Living Buddha Geda.
However, a small number of reactionaries deliberately obstructed the journey of the Living Buddha of Geda, and when he first arrived in Qamdo, he was controlled by these reactionary elements, and, in order to prevent future troubles, the reactionaries frantically extended their black hands to the Living Buddha of Geda.
On August 22, 1950, the Living Buddha of Geda died at the age of 48 after being poisoned by British spy Ford in Changdu.
The killing of the Living Buddha of Geda can be regarded as dispelling the idea of our army not using military means as much as possible to a certain extent, and also strengthened the Central Military Commission's determination to launch the Qamdo Campaign.
Originally, all this could have been avoided, so this was the first stupid thing that the Tibetan high-level did at that time, and the second stupid thing they did was to change the commander on the spot.
Before the Battle of Qamdo, the governor of Qamdo, which was the main transportation route, was an old Tibetan nobleman named Lalu, and this person strongly advocated armed resistance, and even promised to fight no matter what.
It can be seen from his words that this person is an out-and-out main battle faction, and if such a person sits in Qamdo, he will naturally cause some trouble to our army.
But just as the Battle of Qamdo began, the Tibetan elite at the time replaced Lalu and was replaced by Ngapoi, who was inclined to negotiate.
After Ngapoi took office, he was inclined to compromise and saw no need to provoke the PLA, so he immediately issued a series of directives, including stopping the recruitment of more Kham militia and dismantling the fortifications that Lalu had built on the top of the hill.
In this way, Ngapoi invisibly created a lot of advantages for our army, and he made a mistake in judgment, believing that it was already September and the weather was beginning to turn cold, so our army might not launch an attack in this season, so he relaxed his vigilance, which gave our army a strategic advantage.
In accordance with the Central Military Commission's call for "a complete military and political victory in the campaign" and "making the first contribution to the Tibetan people," the 18 th Army, under the leadership of Zhang Guohua, carried forward the spirit of enduring great hardships and hard work, strictly abided by policies and disciplines, paid attention to uniting the masses in Tibetan areas, and did sufficient preliminary work for the upcoming campaign.
In the end, the Battle of Qamdo officially started on October 6 of that year, a total of 18 days before and after, to the end of October 24 of that year, our army achieved the final victory like a bamboo, all of the five generations of the Tibetan army, most of the three generations were annihilated, and another generation of the uprising, and the British spy Ford and others hidden in the Tibetan army were also captured by our army.
After the liberation of Qamdo, the dawn of Tibet's liberation appeared, and in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, the 18th Army quickly marched into Lhasa, and finally in October 1951, completed all the military deployments after entering Tibet, and successfully planted the five-star red flag on the roof of the world, thus the entire territory of Tibet was declared liberated.
With the liberation of Tibet, the 18th Army also ushered in a change in role, in February 1952, the Central Military Commission based on the 18th Army, the establishment of the Tibet Military Region, Zhang Guohua as the commander, so far, the 18th Army number was revoked.
Although the number of the 18th Army was revoked, the spirit of the 18th Army remained, and in the following years, the officers and men of the 18th Army devoted themselves to the work of building Tibet, and under the leadership of Zhang Guohua, the Tibetan military and civilians realized the opening of the Kang-Tibet and Qinghai-Tibet highways to traffic in only two years, creating a miracle in the history of the world's highways.
More importantly, the accompaniment of several years has also enabled the masses in Tibetan areas to have a better understanding of the essence of our party and our army in serving the people wholeheartedly, so that they can truly unite firmly under the banner of our party and jointly contribute to the realization of border stability and the construction of a prosperous Tibet.
In 1963, he led his troops to participate in the border self-defense counterattack operation, and once again achieved brilliant results to ensure the stability of the border.
On February 20, 1972, due to long-term overwork, General Zhang Guohua, who was presiding over the meeting, had a heart attack, although emergency treatment was subsequent, but unfortunately, General Zhang Guohua did not wake up and died on the 21st of that month at the age of 58.
The central leadership greatly regretted the sudden death of General Zhang Guohua, and Chairman Mao sighed, "I will never see Zhang Guohua again."
Among the generals and commanders of our army, there are many people with excellent military talents, but at the same time, there are not many people who have excellent military qualities and are flexible in handling national issues and are not principled, and General Zhang Guohua is one of them outstanding, especially his unswerving implementation of the instructions of the party Central Committee is even more valuable, and such General Zhang Guohua can be called the backbone of the republic.