In the recent Iranian missile + drone attack on the Israeli mainland, the Israeli army claimed to have achieved a 99% interception success rate.
It should be said that this data is almost certainly "propagated" and deliberately "improved" for the sake of political needs. Because the actual number of missiles launched by Iran is not as large as Israel claims, and only a few dozen missiles have actually hit, while the Israeli side claims to have hit hundreds.
The U.S. side admits that nine missiles were hit at two military bases in southern Israel alone. Even if these 9 confirmed missiles are used as a benchmark, and then extrapolated according to the number of Iranian missiles + drones launched by Israel, it is impossible to obtain a 99% interception rate data.
What's more, the missiles that actually hit Israel were not only aimed at two military bases, but also that Iran did not actually launch as many weapons as the Israeli army claimed.
In particular, it should be emphasized that the real majority of Israel's interception data is not for missiles, but for drones.
The Israeli army claims that with the help of its allies, it has basically eliminated all the drones attacked by Iran outside its borders, and its number has reached 185.
For netizens who don't understand the relevant situation, they may be amazed by the "superb" interception rate of the Israeli army and its allies, but after a little analysis of the inside situation, you will know that the article here is too big.
Because the drone launched by Iran is not a high-cost cutting-edge weapon, but a consumable equipment that can be said to be "inexpensive".
And its model is also very familiar to everyone, that is, the Witness-136 UAV.
Such drones were supplied to Russia by Iran and have been used on a large scale on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield.
In terms of performance alone, this kind of UAV cannot be said to be too high-end, but the key is that it is very effective, its range is large enough, and it can also be equipped with a 50-kilogram warhead, and it is still not small if it hits the target.
What's more, it's a very low cost to make, estimated in the West at $20,000, especially if it's made in large quantities, the actual cost may be less than $20,000.
Because it is inexpensive and does not require too high a technical content, it can be manufactured in large quantities, and after obtaining production lines in Russia, it is also mass-produced and used in wars.
If the quantity is full, it will bring huge air defense pressure from the enemy.
This pressure is not to say that it is technically impossible to intercept the "small motorcycle" (i.e. Witness-136), but in terms of the cost of interception, it is very uneconomical.
If this weapon is left unchecked, then it can hit many types of targets, and the damage caused by the 50-kilogram warhead is not small.
But if you want to manage it, how?
Taking the battlefield in Ukraine as an example, the area is hundreds of thousands of square kilometers, and the air defense equipment is a high-value weapon, and the air defense system to cover the entire territory of Ukraine requires a huge amount of air defense equipment, which NATO cannot meet.
And even if you have equipment, you need ammunition to intercept it.
Ukraine has received a number of advanced air defense weapons through Western aid, which have played a huge role in responding to Russian missile attacks.
However, after a large number of "small motorcycles" are used, they can highly consume the limited anti-aircraft ammunition of the Ukrainian army.
And when a large amount of air defense ammunition is consumed, the Russian army's missiles are attacking, and the "high and low matching" strike system formed by it will achieve quite good strike results under the premise of its own controllable cost.
Then in this round of Iran's strikes on Israel, it is actually a strike system of "small motorcycles" plus missiles.
Because it does not need to inflict an undue blow on Israel to reduce its chances of retaliation, Iran has chosen to launch a Witness-136 drone swarm on its own soil.
Due to the drone's slow flight speed, it takes several hours to reach the target area, effectively telling Israel in advance that Iranian retaliation is coming.
When the drone is about to arrive in the target area, Iran's ballistic missile is being launched after it, which will form a coordinated penetration effect between the drone and the missile.
Among them, drones play the same role as the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield, it is to consume and attract the opponent's air defense resources.
In order to intercept these drones, the air forces of the United States, Britain, France, and Jordan all dispatched fighters to intercept them, and the Israeli Air Force also dispatched a large number of fighters to respond.
Even if we follow the IDF's propaganda data, which claims to have shot down 185 Iranian drones, the value of these drones is only $3.7 million at most.
The operating costs of sending hundreds of fighter planes to the air in response to the above-mentioned multinational air forces, plus the cost of launching expensive air-to-air ammunition to shoot down these drones, are far greater than the meagre $3.7 million.
Even in terms of cost, it is almost disproportionate.
Because Iran can manufacture UAVs of the Witness-136 series in large quantities, its inventory is still quite large, but it is not so easy for the air force of Israel and its allies to replenish the corresponding ammunition.
And Iran is not only cheap drones, its cruise missiles, ballistic missiles are also not expensive, this time also used a lot of old stock bombs, to cover the real penetration of the missiles.
After calculating the cost of Israel's air defense, various experts have estimated that the relatively small estimate is more than $500 million, while the more estimate is more than $1.3 billion, and the cost of Iran's ammunition is less than one-tenth of the cost of Israeli interception.
The question is that at this level of interception, Iranian missiles managed to hit Israeli military bases, which, according to the Chief of the General Staff of the IDF, was "unprecedented".
It is precisely because the so-called 99% interception rate is not so high, that Israel thinks that it has suffered a big loss, so it has recently publicly announced that it will retaliate, and if it really wins, it will obviously not be so angry.
Therefore, the "large quantity and cheap management" of weapons and equipment is also a big advantage. This is especially true in large-scale confrontations.