There have been 7 deputy commanders before and after the Volunteer Army, namely Deng Hua, Han Xianchu, Hong Xuezhi, Chen Geng, Song Shilun, Yang Dezhi, and Yang Yong.
Which deputy commander performed the most eye-catching? In the author's opinion, it is Deng Hua, the first deputy commander.
Admiral Deng Hua has made a lot of contributions to the Korean battlefield, and this article mainly talks about a major event that everyone rarely notices, which starts with four bottles of Moutai.
1. The clouds that shrouded Mr. Peng for three years
On December 15, 1952, Deng Hua returned to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army in Hicangli from China. It snowed heavily that night and a cold snap fell. The leaders of the Volunteer Army gathered in the war room for a meeting, and Deng Hua took out four bottles of Moutai from his satchel, saying that it was a New Year's gift from Premier Zhou to the leaders of the Zhi Division.
Yang Dezhi, deputy commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, said: "Keep this wine and drink it when we win a big battle." ”
Deng Hua said that wine is not the key, and he brought Chairman Mao's important instructions on the current grim situation: to prevent the US army from carrying out an amphibious landing on the rear of our army.
This suddenly made the air heavier.
Since the Chinese People's Volunteers entered the DPRK in October 1950, the fear of preventing the U.S. military from repeating the Inchon landing has not been dispelled.
On October 8, 1950, when the Volunteers were preparing to enter North Korea, when President Peng was in Shenyang for talks with North Korean Minister of Internal Affairs Park Il-woo, he received a reminder from Kim Il Sung, asking the Volunteers to first send three divisions to Wonsan and Hamhung on the east coast of North Korea, and Anju at the mouth of the Cheongchon River on the west coast, in case the US troops landed again.
The tragedy of the collapse of the Korean People's Army made Mr. Peng pay special attention to it, and also made Mr. Peng's string collapse particularly tight, and this sentiment then affected the top level of the Zhi Division, and in the following three years, not only Mr. Peng has been shrouded in this dark cloud, but the intelligence department of the Volunteer Army has also made five false alarms and miscalculations about the US military to launch a landing.
The first false alarm occurred on October 21, 1950, that is, the third day of our army's entry into Korea, Deng Hua led the leaders of the 13th Corps of the Volunteer Army to send a telegram to General Peng and Chairman Mao, saying that the US army had landed in Xin'an Prefecture on October 20, 1950, and learned that there was still an attempt to land at Tieshan.
If you look at the picture, these two places are on the west coast of North Korea, in the rear of our army. Deng Hua suggested that the Military Commission should quickly transfer an army to the Andong area just in case. It was later confirmed that this was a false report by the intelligence services. However, in order to ensure the safety of the rear road of the Volunteers, the Central Military Commission still urgently transferred the 66th Army to the front line of Sinuiju.
The second false positive occurred a week later. Mr. Peng heard from a US radio broadcast that 50,000 U.S. troops were going to land at Wonsan on the east coast, but he later found out that it was a miscalculation. However, Chairman Mao once again agreed to the request of the Volunteers to transport the Ninth Corps to the mouth of the Meihe River in Jilin.
The third miscalculation occurred in April 1951 in the Fifth Campaign. At that time, Mr. Peng mistakenly believed some intelligence, believing that the US troops had been repeatedly attacked, and attempted to make a large-scale landing behind us, thus reversing the passivity in one fell swoop. In order to seize the opportunity, General Peng launched the fifth campaign ahead of schedule, regardless of the fact that our army had not yet completed the campaign preparations. Zeng Siyu, commander of the 64th Army, recalled that before the troops had entered the attack position and the artillery had not yet reached the position, the 19th Corps ordered an attack. The direct reason is the fear of landing in the rear of the US army.
The direct cause of this false report was that Li Qiwei deliberately let off steam, saying that he would transfer US troops stationed in Japan to the DPRK and let the navy sail out of the port of Pusan to operate in the waters off Incheon. That is, the US military engaged in strategic deception.
The effect was somewhat somewhat, the Volunteer Army's offensive was launched in a hurry, and the Ninth Corps of the Eastern Front still left an army to defend Yuanshan.
The fourth miscalculation occurred shortly after. As soon as the Fifth Campaign ended, the General Staff received a report from the front that it had discovered US military activities in the waters off Wonsan. Although Nie Rongzhen judged that it was unlikely to be a landing, the Military Commission still decided to move Yang Chengwu's 20th Corps forward to increase troops for the front line.
The fifth miscalculation came from the Soviet side. In early September 1951, the Soviet Union reported that in retaliation for the Fifth Campaign of the Volunteer Army, the US military decided to simultaneously commit five divisions of troops from the east and west coasts of Korea to carry out amphibious landings. This time it is also obvious that the US military is also a strategic deception.
Second, the landing of US troops is real or false
As everyone knows, until the Korean armistice, the US military did not carry out amphibious landing operations, so why did our side have miscalculated five times in a row?
Is it the ability of our army's intelligence departments or the mentality of the top brass of the volunteers? The author believes that it is the latter.
Mr. Peng once said: "I have fought all my life and have never been afraid, but when the volunteers crossed the 38th parallel and fought all the way to the 37th parallel, I looked around and was really scared." At that time, I was not thinking about my personal safety, but I was really scared to see the hundreds of thousands of Chinese and North Korean troops under the enemy's offensive. I couldn't sleep well for a few days and nights, and I was always thinking about how to get out of this situation. ”
The further south the volunteers went, the greater Mr. Peng's worries.
It is difficult to say whether or not it was overreacting? It is difficult to say, because the US military has indeed prepared sufficient naval and air forces, and if the US military is willing, it may launch a second Incheon-style landing operation at any time to cut off the rear of our army.
What power do they have?
Mainly the Seventh Fleet of the US Navy, but also some naval ships of miscellaneous client states. It is divided into three parts:
The first part is the 77 task force, which is not listed one by one. The core weapons platform is 3 aircraft carriers, USS Princeton, USS Charlie the Good Man, USS Boxer, as well as 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, and 18 destroyers. It is mainly active on the east coast of North Korea.
This task force was close to the border between North Korea and the Soviet Union, and in addition to threatening the Sino-North Korean coalition forces, it was also tasked with monitoring the movements of the Soviet navy.
The second part is the 95 task force, 2 aircraft carriers, Sicily, Glorious. The former is American, and the latter is that of the United Kingdom, the number one ally of the United States. There are 83 other ships, mainly boats of dog-legged countries. This part of the force is mainly on the west coast of North Korea, and most of the time it is active in the Yellow Sea, and its intentions are self-evident.
The third part is the 90 amphibious landing force of the US army. Different from the above two parts of the force, this unit mainly sent troops ashore. I won't go into details. The Inchon landing was carried out by this unit, and they sent 69,450 US troops and more than 7,000 vehicles and equipment ashore.
In the second battle, under the hammer of the Ninth Corps of Song Shilun, it was also this unit that transported the defeated American troops from Xingnan Port, and the American troops transported away more than 200,000 combat troops and non-military personnel, 17,500 vehicles and equipment, and 350,000 tons of goods in just a few days, which made the volunteers sigh with admiration.
After the fifth battle, the U.S. army could not break through the defense line of the Volunteers anyway, even if it defeated the 180th Division, but was beaten head-on by the Volunteers in the subsequent Cheorwon Blockade and was a little confused.
Those who watched the excitement felt that the volunteers finally withdrew from Cheorwon and the US troops occupied the place, but those who know know that the volunteers took the initiative to withdraw with a favorable defensive posture. The U.S. military paid heavy casualties to occupy the empty city.
So Van Vliet and Ridgway wanted to mess up the Volunteer Army through the rear landing plan. The U.S. 8th Army had drawn up two landing plans, but Ridgway did not agree to any of them.
The reason is very realistic, Li Qiwei is an objective and calm person, never despises the enemy, he believes that even if he successfully lands, he will fall into the encirclement and counteroffensive of the powerful forces of the volunteers, and their combat effectiveness is not comparable to that of the Korean People's Army in those years.
The top level of the US military has always regarded the dropping of atomic bombs and the landing in the rear as the biggest cards in their hands, and they have not dared to play them for a long time.
3. The disappeared Deng Hua and the 120,000 army
In the winter of 1952, the US military reconnaissance and intelligence department suddenly discovered a startling fact, whether it was from the intercepted radio signals of the Volunteer Army or the information learned by the front-line reconnaissance personnel, Deng Hua, the deputy commander with the highest appearance rate of the Volunteer Army in the past, had disappeared for a long time.
What worries the US military even more is that the numbers of four corps of the main force of the Volunteer Army, which often appeared in the past, have disappeared......
The U.S. military has a characteristic of fighting wars, that it is not afraid of the number of volunteers on the opposite side, but it is afraid of a sudden decrease in numbers. This group of troops, who are good at camouflage and good at night movement, will create terrible consequences once they drive to a place that the US military does not know.
Where did Deng Hua go? Which four armies disappeared?
Deng Hua's previous appearance rate was indeed high, and he participated in the command of the first five battles, and the US army had long known the prestige of this deputy commander through the mouth of the prisoner. After the armistice negotiations began, Deng Hua repeatedly went to Kaesong to fight with the Americans.
Deng Hua's characteristics are very different from that of President Peng; he is not only able to command operations and has the fierceness of a soldier; he can also maintain a cautious and meticulous style of work; especially when negotiating with the Americans, he is not intimidated by the scoundrels and arrogance of the US side, second, he is not confused by their language tricks, and third, he can accurately grasp the bottom line and key points of the Americans, react very quickly, and think very quickly, and he is a very difficult negotiating opponent, which makes the Americans quite a headache.
This point was admired even by Li Kenong (then vice minister of foreign affairs and director of intelligence of the Central Military Commission), who participated in the negotiations at the time.
At the beginning of December 1952, Deng Hua returned to Beijing to report on his work and wrote a report on the current situation to Chairman Mao, analyzing the trend of North Korea. Either stop fighting there, or continue fighting. There are also two ways to play, one is to fight a little bit and play non-stop according to the current defensive situation. The other is that the Americans will tear their faces and continue to fight vigorously and carry out landing operations in the rear of our troops.
Regarding the landing operation, Deng Hua also analyzed two situations, the first is Xiaodeng, which is tactical, as an auxiliary to the frontal front, and has little significance. The second is Daeden, like the landing at Incheon, to cut off our rear with a large force.
After Chairman Mao saw it, he immediately aroused a high degree of vigilance.
Deng Hua's analysis reached an unprecedented height, and before that, Mr. Peng was busy with military affairs and did not conduct a detailed analysis of the anti-landing operation.
The War Department of the Central Military Commission had also made a prediction on the US military landing, and Zhang Zhen, then chief of operations, was also known for being strict and meticulous, and the forecast report written by Zhang Zhen held that the US troops might have seven landing sites in our rear, but the Sino-DPRK coalition forces in most areas were strictly guarded, and there was no big problem.
Deng Hua's analysis basically overturned Zhang Zhen's view, saying that we should not be too optimistic, and we should not do the method of elimination of the direction and possibility of the enemy's landing, but should do the method of enumeration. Who can say for sure whether or not to climb and how to get on the ground, and the initiative lies with the enemy? Only by enumerating the possible situations at each landing site can we take precautions in advance.
The masters in the world are unattainable in the eyes of ordinary people, but there is also a difference between masters and masters, in the deepest realm, there may be only a trace of difference, and it is this slight gap that determines the rank of the master.
Chairman Mao admired Deng Hua's rigor beyond ordinary people.
On December 7, 1951, Chairman Mao summoned Deng Hua and not only agreed with Deng Hua's judgment, but also added weight. This is the famous "three certainties":
It is certain that the enemy will land, definitely from the west coast, definitely between the mouth of the Cheongchon River and Hancheon.
On the day of the meeting, Deng Hua was greatly shocked ideologically.
Chairman Mao's judgment was not only much higher than the judgment of the War Department, but also higher than Deng Hua's judgment.
Whether it is the report written by Zhang Zhen or Deng Hua's report, it is predicted that the landing site of the US troops is relatively southern, and the area between the Qingchuan River Estuary and Hanchuan is far west and north, and it is a place where the Chinese and North Korean allied forces are extremely well defended, and Han Xianchu has been operating there for a year and has a certain foundation for coastal defense.
Is that Chairman Mao's judgment wrong?
I don't know if it's wrong, Deng Hua took the four bottles of Moutai wine given to him by Premier Zhou on the spot, returned to the Korean front line in the starry night, and after discussing with Mr. Peng and others, just like the situation detected by the US army, he quietly withdrew from the defense line with several troops and came to the west coast.
What for?
Concrete fortifications were built, artillery was deployed, minefields were set up along the coast, and anti-landing and anti-landing combat training was conducted......
It is all tribulated, cumbersome, and without any outstanding highlights, so we will not go into details.
Yang Di recalled that as soon as Deng Hua arrived at the West Coast command post to replace Han Xianchu, he immediately raised the coastal defense work by a higher level; first, his rank was different, and the first deputy commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers was slightly higher than Han Xianchu, who was in charge of operational command; and second, he came with Chairman Mao's order, and everything must meet the first-rate standard, and there must be no mistakes.
Deng Hua led the staff officers to investigate, investigate, and understand the military area by army, urging them to push the troops in place and carry out the project within a month or two.
In fact, Deng Hua took away not only four armies, but also the 16th Army and the 54th Army that had just come up from China, but these two armies had little contact with the US military, unlike the 120,000 armies of the 38th, 39th, 40th and 50th armies, which beat the US army out of muscle memory, and the US military paid more attention to them.
Judging from various sources, Chairman Mao's prediction may indeed not have much basis for the enemy's situation, but we say that the deployment of the great man is not only not wrong, but also a strategic measure with a considerable strategic height and killing two birds with one stone.
How?
First, although it is unlikely that a major war will really break out on the west coast, this is the only lifeline for our army; if the US military really invests heavy troops in the land, sea, and air force at all costs, and can fight to the death here, our army's defense against the landing will be insufficient, and it is very likely that the US military will break into the rear of our army, and not only will the city of Pyongyang fall, but the hundreds of thousands of troops on top of our 38th parallel will advance and retreat.
This move, like dropping an atomic bomb, is a strategic move that you dare not use in normal times, but once you use it, it will have a miraculous effect.
Therefore, it is better to be prepared than to be attacked. The means of guaranteeing the bottom must be there!
In 1953, the reason why the war situation became more and more stable and less and less able to set off big waves was due to the homework done by the West Coast.
Second, the defense of landfall on the west coast not only effectively shields the threat from the sea, but also provides an irreplaceable guarantee for the hinterland of the DPRK. There are a large number of antiaircraft artillery units in coastal defense projects on the east and west sides, especially on the west coast.
The continuous antiaircraft artillery groups in the north and south have made it difficult for US planes to enter North Korea to bomb and bomb, and our army's logistical lines of communication have been able to ensure security, which has played a greater role than the MiG corridor. Three lines of communication have been built from the Yalu River to the front line of the 38th parallel, and the cars of our army's logistics units dare to move forward on a large scale in broad daylight. By the time the counterattack war south of Jincheng began, the materials accumulated on the front line of our army were enough for the front-line troops to eat for several months, and a large number of Soviet-made weapons were continuously transported to the front, and the previous "seven-day offensive" had long since ceased to exist, and the "lack of food disease" and "lack of artillery disease" had been cured, and the so-called "magnetic tactics" that Li Qiwei had pondered out had no tricks.
Before the armistice, our volunteers had gradually regained the confidence and technical confidence to annihilate a large number of enemies.
Nothing in the world is isolated, and this is especially true in war.
Large-scale fortifications were gradually built on the west coast, and the US military soon reconnoitred the real situation, and learned that Deng Hua had quietly done such a big thing, and the US military also gave up the idea of the second Inchon landing with interest, and unwillingly withdrew the five sea monsters that were surrounding the open sea and ready to come to the peninsula at any time to the naval base.