World Population Situation Report 2024: From the Big Bang to the Big Transition

Highlights:

• 1

  According to the United Nations' World Population Prospects 2022 Medium Scenario projections and Yuwa's population projections, the world's population will peak at 10.3 billion in 2087 and then slowly decline to 10.2 billion in 2100.

• 2

  Urbanization has entered a phase of deceleration, and it is expected that two-thirds of the world's population will be urban by 2050.

• 3

  In 2021, more than 100 countries and regions had a total fertility rate below replacement level, with 42 countries falling into the "low fertility trap", and South Korea having the lowest total fertility rate in the world at 0.88 (down to 0.72 in 2023).

Text: Yuwa population

Guide

People are both consumers and producers, and population is related to the prosperity of the country and the well-being of the people, and together with capital and technology, it determines the potential growth rate of the economy. Demographic factors change slowly for most of the period, but they accelerate during the transition period, and the momentum sinks strongly. The global population is facing great changes unseen in a millennium, the population explosion period is coming to an end, the population has changed from high growth to low growth, and some countries are aging, declining birthrate, and unmarried, and the population cycle is undergoing a major turning point, and the demographic factors are gradually changing from slow variables to fast variables. Population studies are becoming more and more important in the framework of macro analysis.

Key takeaways

Data description: The United Nations has continuously revised population estimates and projections through newly acquired data, and in recent years, the version has gradually lowered the world population projections, but still tends to overestimate the Chinese population, but considering that the population data provided by the United Nations covers many countries, including birth, death, migration and other data, this report mainly uses the United Nations World Population Prospects 2022 data, and China partially uses the data of the Yuwa population Chinese Population Projections Report 2023 Edition. Among them, the total world population forecast data = the United Nations forecast total population - the Chinese part + the Yuwa population forecast data for the Chinese population.

With the process of industrialization and urbanization, the world's population has experienced a low growth stage with a high birth rate and high mortality rate, a high growth stage with a high birth rate and a low mortality rate, and a transition stage from high growth to low growth, which is called the "first demographic transition" in demographics. According to the United Nations World Population Prospects 2022 "Medium Scenario" projections combined with our projections for the Chinese population, the world population will peak at 10.3 billion in 2087 and then slowly decline to 10.2 billion in 2100. In terms of sub-regions, developed countries in Europe and the United States took the lead in entering the "low, low, low" population growth mode, and entered the aging and low fertility stage earlier, while Africa is still in the stage of industrialization, and the population is still increasing rapidly, and the future African population will contribute 90% of the world's population increase, becoming the main growth pole of the world's population.

After World War II, as the "baby boom" subsided, European and American countries took the lead in ushering in the "second demographic transition", which was manifested in the following ways: the marriage rate declined, the divorce rate stabilized, the first marriage time was delayed, the proportion of unmarried cohabitation increased, the proportion of non-marital births increased, and the lifetime unmarried rate was relatively high. The most direct factors for the change of marital behavior are the changes in values and ideologies, including the realization of self-worth, the popularization of the concept of gender equality, and the fact that people pay more attention to individual satisfaction, which has led to an increase in the number of non-traditional families such as non-marital cohabitation and non-marital childbearing. In Sweden and France, unmarried cohabitation has the highest rate of substitution for marriage, with more than 14% of people aged 20 and over.

According to fertility theory, the dominant factor driving fertility decline has shifted from the demand for high mortality to the stage of utilitarian fertility fading and then to the stage of cost constraint. Due to the differences in population policies and social backgrounds of different countries, the fertility rate decline is obviously different, and the fertility transition in Europe and other countries started earlier but took a long time, while the fertility transition in some Asian countries started later, but due to the existence of fertility restriction policies and other reasons, the fertility rate declined rapidly. For example, the proportion of family welfare expenditure in Nordic countries is generally higher than that of other developed countries in southern Europe and Asia, and the fertility rate is also relatively high, with the total fertility rates of Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and East Asia being 1.58, 1.33, and 1.17 respectively in 2021. In contrast, some Asian countries began to learn from Europe and encourage fertility after a long period of population control, but due to the late policy change and insufficient support, the fertility rate did not increase significantly, and the total fertility rates of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore in 2022 were 1.26, 0.78, and 1.05, respectively. In addition, marital culture and religion can also affect fertility. East Asia believes in Confucian culture, and the proportion of non-marital births is low, while developed countries in Europe and the United States advocate more freedom and openness, and the proportion of non-marital births is also higher.

With the intensification of the declining birthrate and aging population and the decrease in the total labor force, the "demographic dividend" is facing the need to transform into a "talent dividend", which is reflected in the improvement of education level and the extension of healthy life expectancy. 1) Economic and social development and the improvement of income level have brought about the improvement of the education level of the population, and the gross enrollment rate of primary schools has changed from a rapid increase, a slow decline to a slow increase, and higher education has achieved a leapfrog development from elite education to the popular stage. 2) In terms of specific countries, the developed countries of the United States and the United Kingdom have the leading level of education, and the proportion of people with primary and junior high school education in China, India and other countries is relatively high, but the proportion of education level in high school and above needs to be improved. 3) The health status of the world population has improved, and the life expectancy of the population has increased. From 1950 to 2021, the world's life expectancy at birth increased from 46.5 years to 71 years, an average annual increase of 0.3 years.

Due to the long-term low fertility rate and labor shortage, immigration has become a way for European and American countries to supplement their labor force, or become the "third demographic transition". More than 60% of international migrants are in Europe and Asia, the United States is the largest country of immigrants, receiving nearly 20% of migrants, and India is the largest country of emigration. For the host countries, the age structure of immigrants is relatively young, which can alleviate the labor shortage, increase talents, and improve the innovation of the country's population, but there is a problem of cultural integration. For the emigrating countries, they can obtain remittances, issue expatriate bonds, and obtain direct investment from the diaspora, but it will lead to the loss of labor.

With the development of the economy, the urbanization within a country is continuously promoted, and the urban population is concentrated in the metropolitan area, providing a steady stream of impetus for regional development. The proportion of the population of the largest cities in the United States, Japan, and South Korea began to decline in the second half of the 19th century, but the population in metropolitan areas continued to concentrate, and the proportion of population in California, Texas, and Florida increased from 18.6% to 29.1% in the United States, and from 23.3% to 29.3% in Tokyo, Japan, from 1970 to 2020.

directory

Data description

1 Aggregate: Shifting from high growth to low growth, or peaking before 2087

2 Age: Aging is accelerating, and 31 countries, including Japan and Italy, have entered the stage of "super aging".

3 Gender: Gender disparities persist, and there is still a long way to go to achieve gender equality in political participation and economic status

4 Marriage: The phenomenon of "late marriage" is prominent, and the number of non-traditional families is increasing

5 Fertility: The declining birthrate is accelerating, with more than 40% of countries having a total fertility rate below replacement level

6. Labor: The level of education has been significantly improved, from the "demographic dividend" to the "talent dividend"

7 Income: There is a high degree of inequality in distribution, with 13% of the population owning more than 80% of the wealth

8 Immigration: More than 6 percent of international immigrants are in Europe and Asia, and the United States is the largest country of arrival

9 Urbanization: Entering a phase of decelerating growth, two-thirds of the world's population is expected to be urban by 2050

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Data Description:

Population projection data is the basic data required for countries and regions in the world to formulate macro-development strategic plans such as population, economic and social development. Whether it is the regulation of population advocated by Plato in the "Ideal Republic", or the debate of "big countries and people" or the "small countries and widows" advocated by Lao Tzu, all countries in the world have never stopped predicting and regulating the population at the strategic level. In recent years, the contradiction between population and resources, the deepening of population aging and other problems have become prominent, and how to make accurate judgments on the future trend of population change is not only the focus of research in the field of demography, but also related to the fundamental plan of future population development strategy and social and economic development of countries around the world. Against this backdrop, a number of international organizations or research institutes have projected the world's population based on different methods, and it is inevitable that there will be fierce debates when projecting fertility and population changes in the coming decades or beyond. Total population projections are inaccurate and require constant revision due to inaccuracies in historical data collection and estimation and limitations in forecasting methods, biases in fertility projections, and cognitive biases in population issues.

The United Nations continues to revise population estimates and projections through new data, and the World Population Prospects (WPP) continue to lower its projections for the total world population, with the latest UN Medium Scenario projecting that the global population will peak at 10.36 billion by the end of the century. The United Nations Population Division has been updating the World Population Prospects 2022 (postponed by one year due to the pandemic) since 1963 and has been updated to World Population Prospects 2022 (which was delayed by one year due to the pandemic) and contains population estimates for 1950-2021 and population projections for 2022-2100 for 234 countries and territories. The 2015, 2017 and 2019 versions of the WPP "Medium Plan" predict that the world's population will be 11.21 billion, 11.18 billion and 10.88 billion respectively in 2100, WPP2022 continue to lower the global population projection, believing that the world population will reach about 10.36 billion by the end of this century.

The United Nations WPP2022 downgraded its forecast for Chinese and still tends to overestimate Chinese. WPP2022 forecast for the Chinese population of the "medium scenario" fertility rate parameters are: 1.18 in 2022, 1.27 in 2030, 1.34 in 2040, 1.39 in 2050, and about 1.48 in 2100. However, according to official data, China's total fertility rate in 2022 is only 1.05, which shows that the United Nations has overestimated the fertility rate of the Chinese population and predicts a slow increase in the future. However, we believe that due to the high cost of childbirth and the low average fertility willingness of Chinese, it may be difficult for the fertility rate to recover in the future if fertility is not vigorously encouraged. The "medium scenario" parameters of the population projection in the "Chinese Population Forecast Report 2023" are: the fertility rate will gradually increase from 2023, rise to 1.1 in 2028, and be fixed at 1.1 from 2028. By comparison, the United Nations overestimates China's total fertility rate by 15%-30%. It should be noted that an overestimation of fertility by 30 per cent means an overestimation of the number of births to the next generation by 30 per cent, an overestimation of the number of births two generations later by 69 per cent, and an overestimation of the number of births three generations from now by more than double.

In terms of data, although the United Nations data has some limitations, it provides historical population estimates and future projections for more than 200 countries or regions, and includes data on births, deaths, migration, etc., which is relatively comprehensive. Therefore, this report mainly uses the data of WPP2022, and the data of the Yuwa ChinesePopulation Forecast Report 2023 Edition is partially used in China. Among them, the total world population forecast data = the United Nations forecast total population - the Chinese part + the Yuwa population forecast data for the Chinese population.

1 Aggregate: Shifting from high growth to low growth, or peaking before 2087

Since the first year of the Common Era, the world's population has experienced a low growth stage with a high birth rate and high death rate, a high growth stage with a high birth rate and low death rate, and a transition stage from high growth to low growth, which is called the "first demographic transition" in demography. According to the latest data from the United Nations, the world's total population reached 8 billion on November 15, 2022.

1) A.D. - 1770: a period of low growth with high birth rate and high mortality rate. The world's population has slowly increased from less than 200 million to 800 million, with an average annual growth rate of less than 1‰, limited by economic and medical conditions, the average life expectancy of human beings is low, but there is a lack of reliable data, according to historians, the average life expectancy of Europeans before 1400 was less than 50 years, and the average life expectancy of Chinese in the Qing Dynasty was only 33 years.

2) 1770-2000: a period of high growth with high birth rate and low mortality rate. From 1770 to 1950, the population increased rapidly from 800 million to 2.5 billion, with an average annual growth rate of 6.4 per thousand, and from 1950 to 2000, the population increased from 2.5 billion to 6.1 billion, with an average annual growth rate of 18 per thousand. From the perspective of mortality rate, economic prosperity and technological progress after the industrial revolution have brought about improvements in living and medical conditions, the mortality rate has been greatly reduced, and life expectancy has been extended, with the crude mortality rate falling from 19.1 per thousand to 8.5 per thousand, the infant mortality rate falling from 14 percent to 4.9 percent, and human life expectancy increasing from 45 years (male) and 48 years (female) in 1950 to 65 years (male) and 69 years (female) in 2000. From 1950 to 2000, the crude birth rate dropped from 36.9 per thousand to 21.0 per thousand, which remained at a relatively high level.

3) Since 2000: the transition from high growth to low growth. From 2000 to 2022, the world's total population increased from 6.1 billion to 8 billion, the average annual growth rate dropped to 12 per thousand, and the crude mortality rate of the population remained at a low level of about 8 per thousand, and with the improvement of economic development and health, the infant mortality rate has dropped to the level of 28 per thousand, but people's willingness to have children has declined, and the crude birth rate of the population has decreased from 21.0 per thousand to 16.8 per thousand. According to the United Nations' World Population Prospects 2022 Medium Scenario projections and Yuwa's population projections, the world's population will peak at 10.3 billion in 2087 and then slowly decline to 10.2 billion in 2100.

In terms of sub-regions, before the 21st century, the world's population was concentrated in Asia and Europe, and then the population center of gravity gradually shifted southward, and it is expected that more than 90% of the world's population increase will be in Africa from 2023 to 2100. From the perspective of population proportion, in 1950, the population of Asia and Europe accounted for 55.4% and 21.7% of the world's population respectively, 8 of the world's top ten most populous countries were in the Eurasian continent, and the population of Africa accounted for only 9%. In 2022, 59.2% of the world's population will be concentrated in Asia, the proportion of Europe's population will drop to 9.4%, Africa's proportion will rise to 17.8%, and the African country Nigeria will become the seventh most populous country, and Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan will all withdraw from the ranks of populous countries. From 1950 to 2021, Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania contributed 21.8%, 61.0%, 3.7%, 9.0%, 4.0%, and 0.6% of the world's population increase, respectively. According to the United Nations World Population Prospects 2022 "Medium Plan" projection and combined with Yuwa's population data, Africa will contribute more than 90% of the world's population increase from 2023 to 2100, becoming the world's main population growth pole.

In terms of specific countries, there are about 42 countries with a decrease in the world's population from 2015 to 2021, of which the 10 countries with the largest average annual decrease are Japan, Venezuela, Ukraine, Italy and other countries. It is mainly divided into three categories, the first is Japan, Ukraine, Italy and other countries, facing the "low birth trap", the average annual natural growth rate is negative, resulting in a decrease in the total population; the second is Venezuela, Lebanon and other countries, due to poverty, war and other countries have a population outflow, the average annual net migration rate is negative; the third is Romania, Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries have a low birth rate and an outflow to Western Europe and North America, and the total population is also showing negative growth. At present, more than 40 countries are facing negative natural population growth, including developed countries such as Japan, Italy, and Germany, among which German immigrants support the total population growth trend, while Japan and Italy have low fertility rates and negative population growth. Japan's fertility rate has been sluggish for a long time, and it is the country with the most serious low birthrate and aging population in the world, and the population problem has risen to the level of "national disaster" and the economy has fallen into a "lost 30 years"; the United States has prospered because of people, and the population has boosted the economic take-off of the United States, and in the 60s of the 20 th century, the United States entered a stage of low natural growth, and immigrants supported the population to maintain stable growth, but as the largest receiving country of immigrants, the racial problem still exists.

For nearly 70 years, China, India and the United States have been the world's top three most populous countries, and according to United Nations estimates, India's population has surpassed China in mid-2023 to become the world's most populous country. In 2022, the Chinese population will be 1.41 billion, accounting for about 30% of Asia and 17.8% of the world. According to the "Medium Plan" of Yuwa's "Chinese Population Forecast Report 2023", the total Chinese population in 2030, 2050 and 2100 will be 1.37 billion, 1.23 billion and 630 million respectively, accounting for 16.2%, 12.8% and 6.1% of the world's population respectively. Under the low scenario, the Chinese population will fall to 480 million by 2100, less than half the population of India.

2 Age: Aging is accelerating, and 31 countries, including Japan and Italy, have entered the stage of "super aging".

The world's population began to age in 2005, and after 2015, the aging process of the world's population accelerated, the "demographic dividend" disappeared, and the growth rate of the proportion of the elderly population increased from less than 0.1 percentage points per year to 0.2 percentage points, and the size of the elderly population aged 65 and above in 2022 has reached 780 million, and it is expected that by the middle of this century, the total number of elderly people will double to 1.6 billion, and the proportion of the elderly population aged 65 and above is expected to reach 25% by the end of this century.

1) From 1950 to 1970, the proportion of children (under 15 years old) increased rapidly, from 34.3% to a peak of 37.5%, of which 68.7% of the new children came from Asia, the proportion of the working-age population (15-64 years old) decreased, from 60.6% to 57.2%, and the proportion of the elderly population (over 65 years old) fluctuated between 5.0% and 5.3%.

2) From 1970 to 2015, the proportion of children decreased to 26.2%, and with the increasing age of the population born from 1950 to 1970, the "demographic dividend" appeared, and the proportion of the working-age population increased to a peak of 65.6%, of which the "demographic dividend" was the most obvious in Asia, and 66.7% of the world's working-age population increased in Asia during this period, while the proportion of the elderly population remained at a low level, slowly rising from 5.3% to 8.2% , with an annual growth rate of less than 0.1 percentage points, the world's population has entered an aging stage.

3) After 2015, the age structure of the world's population has changed dramatically, and the aging population will intensify, and the population structure will change from adolescent to middle-aged and elderly. From 2015 to 2022, the proportion of the elderly population increased from 8.2% to 9.8%, with an annual increase of 0.2 percentage points. According to the United Nations World Population Prospects 2022 "Medium Plan", the world's population will enter the stages of "deep aging" and "super aging" around 2038 and 2066 respectively.

In terms of countries, 31 countries and regions, including Japan and Italy, have entered the stage of super aging, with the elderly population accounting for more than 20%, and 42 countries and regions, including Spain, have entered the stage of deep aging.

In terms of the proportion of the elderly population, in 2022, the proportion of the elderly population in 31 countries and regions such as Japan, Italy, Finland, and Portugal will be higher than 20%, and they will be in the stage of "super aging", of which 70% will be in Europe, and 42 countries and regions such as Spain, Austria, and Belgium will account for between 14% and 20%, and will be in the stage of "deep aging", of which 62% will be in Europe. Japan is the country with the most aging population, with 29.9% of the population elderly.

In terms of the rate of aging, it took Japan 24 years to go from aging to deep aging, Germany 40 years, France 126 years, China only 21 years, Japan took about 13 years, Germany took 36 years, France took 28 years, and China is expected to take about 20 years.

In terms of the dependency ratio of the population, among the countries with an elderly population of more than 20%, the total dependency ratio of all countries is higher than 50%, and the burden of the population is heavier. Of the 42 countries and territories with an elderly population of 14 to 20 per cent, 23 have a total dependency ratio of more than 50 per cent and 19 countries have a total dependency ratio of less than 50 per cent. Among them, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and China have relatively low total dependency ratios of 36.9%, 41.0%, 44.4% and 46.6% respectively.

Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Korea peaked in 1986, 1988, 1991, 1992, 2007, 2009, and 2013, respectively, and China and Brazil peaked in 2010 and 2018 respectively.

According to the population pyramid, we can judge the rationality of the age structure of a country's population, including expansion, stability and decline. Among them, the tower shape of the expansive population pyramid is mountain-shaped, with a sharp top and a wide bottom, and the population of the lower age group accounts for the largest proportion and decreases to the older age group, such as India; the tower shape of the stable population pyramid presents a bell shape, with the same width at the top and bottom, and the proportion of the population of each age group is roughly balanced, such as the United States, France, and Sweden; and the tower shape of the shrinking population pyramid is wide at the top and narrow at the bottom, with a large proportion of the elderly population and a small proportion of the young population, such as Japan. South Korea's population pyramid is shifting to a recessionary type.

3 Gender: Gender disparities persist, and there is still a long way to go to achieve gender equality in political participation and economic status

In recent years, the sex ratio of the world's total population has been stable within a reasonable range, from 1950 to 1963, when the number of men in the world was slightly smaller than that of women, with a sex ratio of 99.3-100.0, and from 1964 to 2011, the sex ratio rose from 100.0 to 101.3 and has remained around 101 since then. From 1950 to 2022, the sex ratio of Asia and Oceania is more than that of women, mainly due to the influence of the concept of male ancestry, children following their father's surname, and "male dominance and female dominance", Oceania has a declining gender ratio, with a sex ratio of 100.6 in 2022, and Africa, Latin America and North America have slightly lower male population than females, with a sex ratio of 99.7 in 2022, 97.0 and 98.1.The male population in Europe is much lower than that of women, and there are more male casualties due to the impact of World War II, and the sex ratio of the European population was lower than 90 in 1950, and it will recover to 93.3 in 2022, and the balance has not yet been restored. In terms of countries, there are 16 countries and regions in the world with a gender ratio of more than 110, including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, of which 6 are in West Asia and 5 are in the Middle East. The 10 countries and regions with the lowest sex ratios include five European regions such as Ukraine and Latvia, three Latin American regions such as Martinique, and two or two Western Asian regions such as Armenia and Georgia.

Due to the relatively high proportion of the population in Asia, the sex ratio at birth in the world is greatly affected by Asia, and the sex ratio at birth increases first and then decreases, showing an inverted "U" shape. From 1950 to 1980, the sex ratio at birth in the world remained around 105, and from 1980 to 2005, the sex ratio at birth increased from 105 to 107, and then gradually decreased to 105.7 in 2022. From 1950 to 1979, the sex ratio at birth remained stable at 106, from 1980 to 2005, from 160 to 109.9, and then gradually decreased to 107 in 2022. In terms of countries, the countries with the highest sex ratio at birth are Liechtenstein, Azerbaijan, China, and Vietnam, all of which are higher than 110, of which Liechtenstein has a total population of only 40,000 and a small sample size There has been a marked improvement in ideology, with a marked decline in the sex ratio at birth; Vietnam is part of the "Han cultural circle" and has a patriarchal mentality.

According to the laws of biology, in the natural reproductive state without intervention, the sex ratio at birth is relatively stable in different periods, regions and countries, and remains between 103-107 because the sex ratio of the birth population reflects the sex ratio of the future population, if the sex ratio of the birth population deviates from this normal range for a long time, it will lead to an imbalance in the population ratio, a mismatch in the marriage and love market, and an aggravation of gender discrimination. According to the World Population Prospects 2022, countries with marriageable men aged 20-40 accounting for more than 70% of the total population in this age group include Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, both Muslim countries in West Asia, where the proportion of marriageable men is relatively high, and gender discrimination is still deeply rooted. In terms of total, the number of men aged 20-40 in China and India is more than 20 million more than that of women, and the number of men aged 20-40 in the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and the United States is more than 1 million more than that of women. In addition, the long-term imbalance in the sex ratio will exacerbate gender discrimination, and problems such as trafficking in women and sex crimes will also appear. If the absolute number of women is insufficient, a large number of marriageable men will be separated from normal marriage and family life, forming a special single social group, which will have an impact on traditional family life, increase the demand for non-marital sex, and the rights and interests of women and girls may be violated.

In addition to the gender gap in the number of people, there is also a gap between women and men in terms of economic, political, and educational attainment. Overall, the global gender gap in education and health is small, with more than 95% of the gap closed, but there is still a long way to go to close the gender gap in political participation and economic status. The World Economic Forum has released the Global Gender Gap Report 2023, which analyzes changes in the gender gap in four areas: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. According to the report, the gender equality indices for economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment are 60.1 per cent, 95.2 per cent, 96 per cent, and 22.1 per cent, respectively, and at the current rate, it will take 169 years, 162 years, and 16 years to close the gender gap in economic participation and opportunity, the gender gap in political empowerment, and the educational attainment gap.

Subregionally, North America has the smallest gender gap, with a European equality index of 76.3 per cent, surpassing North America's 75 per cent, followed by Latin America with a gender equality index of 74.3 per cent, Eurasia and Central Asia at 69 per cent, East Asia and the Pacific at 68.8 per cent, Sub-Saharan Africa at 68.2 per cent, and South Asia at 63.4 per cent, surpassing the Middle East (63.4 per cent) and North Africa (62.6 per cent). At the current rate, it will take about 67 years to close the gender gap in Europe, 95 years in North America and 152 years in the Middle East and North Africa.

4 Marriage: The phenomenon of "late marriage" is prominent, and the number of non-traditional families is increasing

Lesthaeghe (1995) proposed the theory of the "second demographic transition" and divided it into three phases: the first stage (1955-1970): the divorce rate rose, the fertility rate fell, and the contraceptive revolution stopped when the age of marriage fell. Phase II (1970-1985): Premarital cohabitation increased, and non-marital fertility increased. The third stage (after 1985): the divorce rate is stable, the remarriage rate is declining, and the fertility rate is restored to those over 30 years old, which promotes the increase in fertility rate. At present, Europe and the United States and other countries are in the third stage, and the specific performance is as follows:

1) Declining marriage rates. In 1970, the marriage rate in most OECD countries was between 7 and 10 per thousand. By 1995, the marriage rate in OECD countries generally dropped to 5‰-7‰, and then the marriage rate continued to decline, and by 2020, the average marriage rate in OECD countries did not exceed 4‰.

2) The divorce rate is stable. Divorce rates are generally higher in most OECD countries compared to 1970, and Norway's crude divorce rate has doubled during this period. The divorce rate remained stable after 2010. In 2020, the divorce rate in Italy was as low as 1.1 per thousand, and in Switzerland it was as high as 2.5 per thousand.

3) The first marriage is postponed. In the early 90s of the 20th century, the average age of first marriage for women in OECD countries was between 22 and 27 years old, and the average age of first marriage for men was between 24 and 30 years. In 2020, the average age of women in almost all OECD countries was between 27 and 33 years, and that of men was between 29 and 35 years, and the average age of first marriage was 30.7 years for women and 33.1 years for men in OECD countries. The data shows that the average age of first marriage for women in most countries has been delayed by 4-9 years.

4) The proportion of unmarried cohabitation has increased. Unmarried cohabitation is generally an alternative form of marriage in Northern Europe and is less common in Eastern and Central Europe. In OECD countries, on average, about 60% of people over the age of 20 live with a partner, most of whom are married, or have a civil or registered partnership, but also about 10% live as a common-law partner. The rate of cohabitation is high in Sweden at nearly 20 per cent, and in Denmark, Estonia, France, New Zealand and Norway it is around 15 per cent. Cohabitation is rare in Southern and Eastern European countries, particularly in Poland and Greece, where only about 2% of the population aged 20 and over cohabit. In the Nordic countries, cohabitation has become an important form of long-term partnership, resulting in the prevalence of delayed or substituted marriages.

5) The proportion of births out of wedlock has increased. In 1970, less than 10 per cent of children were born out of wedlock in most OECD countries, compared with an average of only 7 per cent in the 28 OECD countries for which data are available. By 1995, the average share of the OECD 28 countries had grown to 24%, and by 2020 to 41.9%. In terms of specific countries, 14 OECD countries, including Chile, Denmark, Estonia and France, have more than 50% of children born out of wedlock, among which Chile (75.1%), Costa Rica (72.5%) and Mexico (70.4%) have a particularly high proportion. In contrast, in Israel, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea, less than 10% of births are out of wedlock.

6) The lifetime unmarried rate is at a high level. Lifelong unmarried refers to a lifetime without marriage, but in reality it is difficult to count, although there are people who experience their first marriage at the age of 50 and later, but the corresponding proportion is small. According to the United Nations' World Marriage Data 2019, we use the single rate of the population aged 45-49 to approximate the lifetime unmarried rate. According to the data, there is a large gap between the unmarried rate of men and women aged 45-49 in Germany, with 25.8% of men and 16.6% of women in 2016, while Sweden has a higher rate of 45-49 years old and 35.9% of men and 29.5% of women in 2016.

The decline in the marriageable age population and the imbalance in the sex ratio will lead to a decline in the marriage rate. On the one hand, the marriageable age population has declined significantly, and the basis for marriage has been weakened; on the other hand, the imbalance in the sex ratio of the marriageable age population will also lead to a mismatch in marriage. According to United Nations data, from 1950 to 2022, the global population of women aged 20-40 increased from 380 million to 1.21 billion, men increased from 380 million to 1.27 billion, and the gap in the number of marriageable men and women increased from -3.58 million to 59.96 million, increasing in absolute terms.

Religious influences, changes in attitudes, cost pressures, policy changes and other factors that affect the change of marital behavior have led to the postponement of marriage and childbearing, and the increase in the number of non-traditional families such as non-marital cohabitation and non-marital childbearing.

1) In the late Roman Empire, the authoritarian Catholic tradition and Muslim invasion contributed to the formation of conservative values. The family is predominantly patrilineal, with an emphasis on family responsibilities and the guilt of sex outside of marriage and non-procreational sex. In Northwest Europe, the influence of the Germanic-Norse tradition led to weak family ties, where the individual took precedence over the family, and the Reformation further cemented this historical pattern. As a result, cohabitation and childbearing out of wedlock are very common in the Nordic countries where religious influence is weak.

2) The change of marital values is mainly reflected in the change from focusing only on form in the past to focusing on quality and happiness, husband and wife belong to an equal relationship, pay more attention to whether the married life and way of getting along are pleasant, marriage is not only a form, but also not only pay attention to longevity and stability, and the phenomenon of "divorce if you don't agree" is more frequent.

3) Excessive pressure and high cost of marriage lead young people to postpone marriage or even avoid marriage. Affected by the pressure of traditional marriage norms, young people will face difficulties such as the choice of marriage partners, the cohabitation of in-laws after marriage, and the pressure of traditional social roles after marriage, and under the marriage and family model of "male dominance and female dominance", men will face the pressure of high housing prices and inability to solve the housing problem, and women will face the pressure of high cost of childcare time, which greatly aggravates the overall marriage cost of the family and exacerbates the phenomenon of late marriage and non-marriage.

4) Different marriage and childbearing policies will also lead to inconsistencies in marriage and childbearing behaviors in different countries. In some Nordic countries, for example, common-law couples are allowed to obtain legal status by registering a "civil union". Regardless of whether they are married or not, there will not be much difference between couples living together in terms of taxes, residence, rights and benefits to have children, etc., and the rate of unmarried cohabitation will be relatively higher.

5 Fertility: The declining birthrate is accelerating, with more than 40% of countries having a total fertility rate below replacement level

Due to the "compensatory fertility" after World War II, the world's total fertility rate rose briefly from the 30s to the 50s of the 20th century, and then entered a 30-year period of rapid decline, and the decline in the world's total fertility rate slowed down after the 21st century, and the changes in fertility rates in various regions were differentiated.

1) From the 30s to the 50s of the 20th century, "post-World War II compensatory births" appeared in most developed regions. The world's total fertility rate has remained at about 5, with the average total fertility rate of most countries in Western Europe and Northern Europe rising above the replacement level to 2.7, the total fertility rate of developed countries in North America and Oceania reaching 3.7, and the fertility level of socialist countries in Eastern Europe also rebounding.

2) From the 60s to the 90s of the 20th century, fertility rates around the world fell sharply, with Europe and North America falling below replacement levels, and other regions still above replacement levels. From the perspective of fertility rate, the total fertility rate in the world has dropped from 5 to 2.7, of which the total fertility rate in Africa has dropped from 6.7 to 5.3, which is still at a high level, Europe and North America have dropped from 2.6, 3.5 to 1.4 and 2.0 respectively, all of which are below the replacement level, and the total fertility rate in Asia, Latin America and Oceania has dropped from 5.7, 5.9 and 4.1 to 2.5, 2.7 and 2.5 respectively, which is still above the replacement level. In terms of changes in fertility rates, the total fertility rate in the world has decreased by nearly 50 percent, of which the total fertility rate in Asia and Latin America has decreased by more than 50 percent, 55.2 percent and 54.4 percent, respectively, the total fertility rate in Europe and North America has decreased by 40 to 50 percent, and the total fertility rate in Africa and Oceania has decreased by less than 40 percent, 21.2 percent and 39.6 percent, respectively.

3) After the 21st century, the decline of the world's total fertility rate has slowed down, and the changes in fertility levels in various regions tend to be differentiated, and Europe is the only region with a positive growth rate of total fertility, with a growth rate of 14.2%. In terms of fertility, the total fertility rate in the world fell from 2.7 to 2.3, of which Latin America fell from 2.6 to 1.9, below replacement level, Africa from 5.3 to 4.3, still above replacement level, Asia from 2.5 to 1.9, North America and Oceania after taking the lead in a slight increase to 1.6 and 2.2 respectively, and Europe from 1.4 to 1.5, but still below replacement level. In terms of changes in fertility rate, the growth rate of total fertility in the world was -9.6%, of which Latin America, Asia, Africa, North America and Oceania changed by -28.6%, -24.3%, -16.8%, -15.6%, -17.6% and -12.2% respectively, and only Europe had a positive growth rate of 4.6%.

In 2021, more than 100 countries and regions had a total fertility rate below replacement level, of which 42 countries fell into the "low fertility trap", and South Korea had the lowest total fertility rate in the world, at 0.88 (down to 0.72 in 2023). In 2021, 31 countries had a total fertility rate higher than 4, most of which came from Africa, and 121 countries and regions had a total fertility rate below replacement level, accounting for 52%, of which 42 countries, including South Korea, Singapore, and China, have entered the "low fertility trap" with a total fertility rate of less than 1.5.

The rate of fertility decline varies significantly between different countries, with developed countries such as Europe starting earlier but taking a longer period of time, while some Asian countries started later but experienced a faster decline due to the introduction of fertility restriction policies. Among them, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea all began to implement fertility policies aimed at controlling population growth after World War II, and promoted family planning by publicizing the benefits of families with few children and subsidizing birth control families, so as to accelerate the decline in fertility rates, and the total fertility rate of South Korea and Singapore dropped from 5 to below 2.1 in 19 and 12 years respectively, which is significantly faster than that of European countries.

According to the fertility theory, with the economic and social development, the decline of fertility rate is an inevitable trend, and the fertility rate can be divided into four stages: 1) the high mortality driven stage, where people need to use high fertility to counter high mortality rate, and the total fertility rate is mostly above 6; 2) the mortality decline driven stage, people realize that low fertility can also ensure maximum returns, and the total fertility rate drops from more than 6 to about 3; 3) the utilitarian fertility fading stage, where people's fertility behavior is closer to emotional needs, and they pay attention to the improvement of the quality of children, and the total fertility rate is roughly reduced from 3 to about 2; 4) the cost-constrained low fertility stage, the total fertility rate drops to the replacement level below 2.1, below the level of intended fertility. According to United Nations data, even in people with very low fertility rates, women want to have two children on average, and the current low fertility rate is changing from being driven by mortality to utilitarian fertility fading and cost constraints, and the weakening of the fertility base (late marriage, non-marriage, late childbearing, etc.), and the rising opportunity and direct costs of childbirth are the main reasons affecting the fertility level.

From the perspective of fertility cost, on the one hand, childbirth hinders women's human capital accumulation and career development, resulting in an increase in fertility opportunity cost. From 1970 to 2022, the proportion of female students enrolled in colleges and universities increased from 8.2% to 44.8%, technological progress liberated manual labor, and more women could participate in the labor market, but gender inequality would affect fertility intentions. OECD data shows that in 2021, the median income of full-time male employees in OECD countries was 12% higher than that of women, of which the gender income gap of full-time employees in South Korea, a country with a very low fertility rate, was as high as 31.1%, and in Japan it was 22.1%, while the gender income gap of full-time employees in Denmark and Sweden, where the fertility rate rebounded to 1.8, was only 5.0% and 7.4%. OECD country data show that the smaller the difference between men and women's labour force participation rates, the higher the total fertility rate. On the other hand, the high cost of childcare inhibits fertility behavior. According to the "China Fertility Cost Report 2022" released by Yuwa Population, if calculated as a multiple of the cost of raising a child to just 18 years old relative to the country's per capita GDP, Australia is 2.08 times, France is 2.24 times, Sweden is 2.91 times, Germany is 3.64 times, the United States is 4.11 times, Japan is 4.26 times, China is 6.9 times, and South Korea is 7.79, which is the highest.

In addition, marital culture and religion can also affect fertility. East Asia believes in Confucian culture and has a low proportion of non-marital births, while developed countries in Europe and the United States advocate freedom and openness and have a high proportion of non-marital births. From a cultural point of view, after World War II, developed countries in Europe and the United States advocated more free choice on the issue of marriage and childbearing, and "non-marital birth" was more accepted in the European and American cultural circles. East Asian countries have long been influenced by Confucian culture, and the concept of marriage is traditional, and non-marital births are often forbidden or even spurned, and the acceptance is low. According to OECD data, in 2020, the United States and France accounted for 40.5% and 49% of births out of wedlock, respectively. This compares to less than 5% in Japan and South Korea. In terms of religion, the fertility rate of Islamic countries is higher than that of non-Islamic countries, with the average fertility rate of Islamic countries being about 3.4 in 2021 and about 1.3 in non-Islamic countries. Islamic countries have a relatively low level of economic development, low levels of female education and labor force participation. According to the World Bank, fertility rates are negatively correlated with GDP per capita, with the Tropic of Cancer in Islamic countries being higher than in East Asian countries.

For example, the proportion of household welfare expenditure in Nordic countries is generally higher than that in southern Europe and other developed countries in Asia, and the fertility rate is also relatively high, with the combined fertility rates of 1.58, 1.33, and 1.17 in 2021 in northern Europe, southern Europe, and East Asia, respectively. Family policy originated in Europe, initially to support families in difficulty in the process of industrialization and modernization, and later became an important part of the policy to encourage childbearing. In terms of specific countries, countries such as France and Sweden have a high proportion of household welfare spending and maintain high fertility rates, while countries such as Germany and Switzerland have begun to learn from the welfare policies of "Nordic" countries in recent years and successfully overcome the "low fertility trap". In addition, due to the high cost of time and energy to care for children, which is also reflected in the difficulty of children entering nurseries, kindergartens, and schools, OECD countries help working women return to work as much as possible after childbirth by providing inclusive childcare centers, reducing the time cost of caring for children, and in 2020, the nursery rate of most OECD countries aged 0-2 is between 10% and 60%, with an average of 36.0%, and the higher the nursery rate, the higher the fertility level.

In contrast, after a long period of population control, Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have also begun to learn from European family policies, encouraging fertility by reducing the burden of family childbearing and parenting, and promoting gender employment equality. In 2022, the total fertility rates of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore were 1.26, 0.78, and 1.05, respectively. The main reasons are: 1) There is inertia in the concept of population, which is difficult to adjust quickly. 2) The timing of policy adjustment is too late, and the best opportunity is missed. South Korea did not begin to change its population policy until the fertility rate was 1.6 and did not encourage fertility until around 1.1, while Japan did not start to encourage fertility until the fertility rate was 1.5. France began encouraging fertility as early as 1939, when the fertility rate had not yet fallen below replacement level. 3) Fertility support policies are still insufficient. From 2001 to 2019, Japan's household welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 0.99% to 1.95%, South Korea's from 0.23% to 1.56%, France's 3.44%, Sweden's 3.42%, and the OECD's average 2.29% in 2019. 4) Traditional family values are deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, women's professional independence is difficult to guarantee, and the gender wage gap is large. According to OECD data, the wage gap between men and women in South Korea and Japan in 2021 was 31.1% and 22.1%, respectively, and the OECD average was 12%. While these countries have had little effect after introducing policies to encourage fertility, without them, fertility rates are likely to decline even faster. Establishing and improving the policy system of childbirth support and promoting the construction of a childbirth-friendly society can not only boost the willingness of families to have children, but also create a healthy family social environment and improve the happiness of residents.

6. Labor: The level of education has been significantly improved, from the "demographic dividend" to the "talent dividend"

Due to the slowdown in the growth rate of the working-age population and the decline in the labor force participation rate, the growth rate of the global labor force has slowed significantly, from 1991 to 2019, the year-on-year growth rate of the labor force number fell from 1.8% to about 1.2%, and the average growth rate in the three years from 2020 to 2022 is about 0.7%. On the one hand, the growth rate of the working-age population has slowed down significantly since 1982, with the working-age population increasing from 2.73 billion to 5.16 billion from 1982 to 2022, with a year-on-year growth rate of 2.4% falling from 2.4% to 0.6%, and on the other hand, the labor force participation rate has been declining due to factors such as the retirement wave, the epidemic and the economic downturn, and the overall global labor force participation rate has dropped from 71.6% to 66.4% from 1990 to 2022. With the decrease in the total working population and the overall decline in the labor force participation rate, the year-on-year growth rate of the working-age population at this stage showed a downward trend, and the year-on-year growth rate of the labor force decreased from 1.8% to 1.2% from 1991 to 2019. From 2020 to 2022, affected by factors such as the global epidemic and the economic downturn, some working-age people withdrew or temporarily withdrew from the labor market, and the average annual growth rate of the total labor force population remained balanced or decreased slightly.

Subregionally, the global labor force participation rate over 15 years of age increased slightly from 60.6% to 60.9% between 1990 and 2022 in high-income economies by raising the statutory retirement age and increasing incentives for older workers to remain in employment. During the same period, due to factors such as a declining birthrate and aging population, adverse selection brought about by the improvement of social welfare, the labor force participation rate in middle- and low-income economies declined, from 65.7% and 69.4% to 59% and 66.9% respectively.

Labor force is the foundation of economic development, and international experience shows that the growth rate of working-age population is positively correlated with GDP growth to a certain extent. The relationship between population and economy is complex, and the level of economic development is not absolutely determined by the size and structure of the population, but the population, especially the labor force, is the most basic and important factor in the development of any economy. According to the World Bank's 182 economies for which data are available, the average growth rate of the working-age population aged 15-64 in the past ten years is positively correlated with the average growth rate of GDP in the past ten years.

The economic growth rate of countries such as Japan and South Korea is positively correlated with the growth rate of the working-age population in the same period. With the peak of the working population, the disappearance of the demographic dividend, and the economy falling into the "lost 30 years", South Korea's economic trend and the growth rate of the working population are basically the same. According to the data, the average growth rate of Japan's working-age population remained at a high level of 1.6% from 1961 to 1975, and the average real GDP growth rate also remained at a high level of 7.7%, while the average growth rate of the working-age population maintained a low growth rate of 0.9% from 1976 to 1988, and the real GDP growth rate also fell to 4.4%, and the growth rate of the working-age population from 1989 to 2022 turned from positive to negative and continued to grow negatively, and the real GDP growth rate changed from 5.4% to zero growth. In 1992, the proportion of Japan's working-age population peaked at 69.8% and then declined, which, together with the bursting of the bubble in the early 1990s, the failure of policy responses, the turbulence of the international environment, and the lag in industrial restructuring, plunged the Japanese economy into a "lost 30 years".

Due to the intensification of the declining birthrate and aging population and the decrease in the total labor force, the "demographic dividend" is facing the demand of exchanging quality for quantity, and it has changed to a "talent dividend", which is reflected in the improvement of education level and the extension of healthy life expectancy.

1) Economic and social development and the improvement of income level have brought about the improvement of the education level of the population, and the gross enrollment rate of primary schools has changed from a rapid increase, a slow decline to a slow increase, and higher education has achieved a leapfrog development from elite education to the popular stage. From the perspective of primary education, the overall primary school gross enrolment ratio (GER) of the world population increased from 89% to 102% between 1997 and 2020 (note: the gross enrolment ratio exceeds 100% due to the inclusion of students who start earlier or later). From the perspective of higher education, from 1973 to 2022, the higher education enrollment rate of the world population increased from 10.3% to 41.8%, and higher education has achieved a leap from elite education to mass education. Internationally, the enrollment rate of higher education is usually used to indicate the development process of higher education, and it is generally believed that when the gross enrollment rate of higher education is less than 15%, it belongs to the elite education stage, 15%-50% is the stage of popularization of higher education, and more than 50% is the stage of popularization of higher education.

2) In terms of specific countries, the United States and the United Kingdom have the leading level of education, and China, India and other countries have a relatively high proportion of people with primary and junior high school education, but the proportion of people with high school education and above needs to be improved. From 1990 to 2020, the average number of years of education for the population aged 25 and above in the United States increased from 13.0 years to 13.7 years, the United Kingdom from 7.9 years to 13.4 years, France from 7.6 years to 11.6 years (2019), Japan from 11.6 years to 12.8 years (2017), and China from 4.8 years to 8.1 years. From the perspective of the distribution of education in the working population, according to OECD data, in 2022, the proportion of people aged 25-64 with junior high school education and below in the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, and India will be 8%, 16%, 17%, 19%, 63%, and 78%, respectively, and the proportion of higher education will be 50%, 33%, 42%, 51%, 19%, and 13%, respectively.

3) The health status of the world population has improved, and the life expectancy of the population has increased. According to the World Population Prospects 2022, life expectancy at birth increased from 46.5 years to 71 years from 1950 to 2021, an average annual increase of 0.3 years. Subregionally, life expectancy at birth increased from 61.5 to 80.3 years in high-income countries, from 43.5 to 70.1 years in middle-income countries, and from 31.6 to 62.5 years in low-income countries. By country, life expectancy at birth in China increased from 43.7 years to 78.2 years, an average annual increase of 0.5 years.

The priority development of education and human resources is the driving force for a country's sustained economic prosperity, and it is necessary to popularize higher education and improve the quality of talents. 1) The United States was the first to popularize primary and secondary compulsory education, and it was also the first country to promote the popularization of higher education, after World War II, by subsidizing veterans to receive higher education, expanding the scope of funding, and constantly expanding the coverage of higher education; since the 80s of the 20th century, the United States has gradually shifted its focus to improving the quality of education, through several amendments to the Higher Education Act, the establishment of a teacher training quality reporting system, and put forward higher practical requirements; 2) South Korea has implemented the strategy of rejuvenating the country through science and education in the stage of industrial transformation. Attaching importance to talent training, increasing investment in education, and completing industrial transformation, it has also realized the transformation of demographic dividend into talent dividend. Since 1990, South Korea's public spending on education has increased year by year, and the growth rate of higher education enrollment has increased, which has reserved a large amount of human capital for South Korea's economic transformation. 3) Japan has passed three education reforms to help release talent dividends. In 1960, the Japan Economic Council issued the "Long-term Outlook for the Japanese Economy", which clearly expressed the call for creating an educational dividend during the first demographic dividend boom. In the 70s, Japan began to implement the second education reform, introducing high school quasi-compulsory education and correspondence education. Since then, in order to meet the needs of the people for education and economic development, Japan has continued to expand the scale of higher education, and the number of universities and students has increased dramatically, gradually realizing the popularization of higher education. Through the enactment of the "Lifelong Learning Promotion Law", the strategy of "building a country through science and technology" has been established, and the third education reform has been implemented to continuously improve and strengthen the cultivation of talents and improve the quality of talents. According to the United Nations, in 2020, the Human Capital Index (HCI) of the United States, South Korea, and Japan was 0.7, 0.8, and 0.8, respectively.

7 Income: There is a high degree of inequality in distribution, with 13% of the population owning more than 80% of the wealth

Global inequality in income and wealth distribution has generally gone through a process of intensification, improvement, and re-intensification, and the large-scale monetary easing after the epidemic in 2020 has exacerbated regional inequality in global wealth distribution, making the rich richer and the poor poorer, and wealth inequality has improved in 2022.

From the perspective of income distribution, according to the World Wealth and Income Database (WID), the concentration of income distribution in most of the world's economies peaked before World War II and gradually weakened after that, but since the 1980s, the income distribution within each economy has not improved, but has deteriorated again, and the rate of improvement is faster than before. From 1982 to 2000, the income share of the top 1% of the world's income group increased from 16.9% to 20.8%, and the income gap continued to widen, and the income gap remained at the level of about 19% after 2000, and the income inequality was relatively high.

In terms of total wealth, global wealth declined for the first time since 2008, largely due to the appreciation of the US dollar against many other currencies. In current nominal dollar terms, net private wealth fell 24% year-over-year in 2022, and adult wealth fell 3.6% year-over-year. However, if total wealth increased by 3.4% year-on-year at the 2021 exchange rate, the decline in global wealth was largely due to the appreciation of the dollar.

From the perspective of wealth distribution, the wealth gap will narrow in 2022, and the proportion of wealth of the world's top 1% of the ultra-rich class will drop to 44.5%. According to Credit Suisse's Global Wealth Report 2023, there were 59.4 million millionaires (in US dollars) in 2022, 3.5 million fewer than the same period last year. However, the overall wealth gap remains wide, with 13.1% of the world's adult population owning 85.2% of wealth in 2022.

From a regional perspective, the total social wealth of Latin America, Africa, and India increased by 18.6%, 4.6%, and 1.5% respectively in 2022, while the total social wealth of North America, Europe, the Asia-Pacific region (excluding China), and China decreased by 4.5%, 3.4%, 2.6%, and 1.7%, respectively.

In terms of international comparison, China's income gap is at the middle to high level in the world, and the wealth gap is at the middle to low level in the world. From the perspective of various countries, the income and wealth Gini coefficients of Japan and Italy have remained at a low level, and the income and wealth gap has been maintained at a low level through effective distribution and redistribution policies; the income Gini coefficient of the United States is not high, but the wealth Gini coefficient is high, and the environment of continuous quantitative easing has pushed up the value of financial assets, which has widened the gap between the rich and the poor; India and other developing countries have fallen into the income distribution trap and the income and wealth Gini coefficients are both high; and China's income and wealth Gini coefficients are currently in a reasonable range, and the imbalance is controllable, but it still needs to be improved。

The over-issuance of money, the decline in the share of labor income, and the income distribution system and mechanism are the main causes of the gap between the rich and the poor.

First, the over-issuance of money will lead to the redistribution of wealth, which will easily exacerbate the gap between the rich and the poor, and the inflow of over-issued money into the market will cause inflation and the rise of broad asset prices. On the one hand, inflation will squeeze residents' real income, and on the other hand, the inflow of funds into the capital market will give rise to asset bubbles, and people with a high proportion of real estate and financial assets in the asset allocation structure will increase their wealth rapidly, and the gap between the rich and the poor will widen. According to BIS data, from 1970Q1 to Q1 2022, the average annual growth rate of local currency housing prices and the growth rate of local currency nominal GDP in 23 economies were 6.3% and 7.2% respectively, excluding Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, and Hong Kong, China, with a correlation coefficient of 0.87. From 2009.01 to 2023.12, the Nasdaq and S&P 500 indices both rose more than 3 times, while the SSE 100, SSE 50 and CSI 300 rose 4.7 times, 3.8 times and 2.4 times respectively.

Second, technological progress will increase the marginal productivity of capital (capital-biased), which will increase the share of capital income and decrease the share of labor income, thereby widening the income gap between labor owners and capital owners, and thus increasing the gap between rich and poor.

Third, the choice of efficiency and fairness at different stages of development affects the income distribution gap. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, China's income distribution system has changed from egalitarianism to distribution according to work and then to multi-factor distribution; the way of thinking has changed from attaching importance to average, to giving priority to efficiency and taking into account fairness, to taking into account efficiency and fairness; and the gap between the rich and the poor has gradually changed from being at a low level to continuously widening and then to easing.

Fourth, the income distribution mechanism affects income inequality. The income distribution system is divided into primary distribution, redistribution and tertiary distribution. The U.S. is mainly redistributive through taxes and social security, and the income tax system increases its marginal tax rate as the income level increases, and at the same time, it is funded by the federal or state government to help low-income people in the form of cash subsidies, food stamps, etc., and encourages individual donations through tax deductions. Japan promotes equality through primary distribution, including by maintaining high prices for agricultural products, introducing preferential financial policies for small businesses, and carrying out public works in remote areas.

8 Immigration: More than 6 percent of international immigrants are in Europe and Asia, and the United States is the largest country of arrival

In recent years, the stock of international migrants has gradually increased, and the proportion of migrants in the stock of migrants has increased from 2.3% to 3.6% from 1970 to 2020, of which more than 60% of the world's migrants are in Europe and Asia, and the proportion of Asian migrants has gradually increased in the past 20 years, while the proportion of European migrants has decreased.

From the perspective of total migration, the global migration stock increased from 800 million to 280 million from 1970 to 2020, accounting for 2.3% to 3.6%, on the one hand, thanks to the facilitation of transportation facilities and the development of transportation vehicles, and on the other hand, due to the era of peace and economic globalization, cross-border investment and production brought about work migration. From the perspective of the structure of the migration stock, the proportion of immigrants aged 20-64 who are of working age increased from 69% to 73.2% from 1990 to 2020, and has remained above 70% during this period. Due to the impact of turmoil and conflict and the impact of the pandemic, refugees accounted for 12% of international migrants in 2020, the highest in nearly 20 years.

From the perspective of migration distribution, in 2020, Europe, Asia, North America, Latin America and Oceania accounted for 30.9%, 30.5%, 20.9%, 9%, 5.3% and 3.3% of the migration stock in Europe, Asia, and Asia, respectively, more than 60% of the world's migration stock is in Europe and Asia, from 2000 to 2020, the proportion of Asian migration stock is rising, while Europe and North America are gradually declining, Europe and North America implement stricter immigration policies, and the economic growth of Asian countries improves the "cost performance" of immigrants.

In terms of the proportion of migrants in the total population, Oceania and North America are the major continents of immigration, with the proportion of migrants in the total population of each region in 2020 being 22% and 15.9%, respectively.

As of 2020, about 64% of migrants live in high-income areas, more than 50 million migrants live in the United States, accounting for about one-fifth of the world's total migrants, and more than 17 million migrants emigrate from India, making India the largest emigrant.

In terms of immigration and emigration countries, the largest immigration country is the United States, with 50.633 million international migrants living in the United States as of 2020, accounting for 19% of the total, followed by Germany and Saudi Arabia with 15.762 million and 13.455 million respectively, and India is the largest source of international migrants, with 17.87 million emigrants from India as of 2020. This is followed by Mexico, Russia and China, with 11.186 million, 10.757 million and 10.461 million respectively, with the largest migration routes tending to be from developing countries to more developed economies.

From the perspective of net migration in the past five years, the top five net immigrants from 2015 to 2020 were the United States, Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Canada, with net migrations of 477.4, 271.9, 142, 1.303, and 1.21 million, respectively, and the top five net outflows were Venezuela, India, Syria, Bangladesh, and China, with net outflows of 326.6, 266.3, 213.7, 1.848, and 1.742 million respectively.

For the host countries, the age structure of immigrants is relatively young, which can alleviate the labor shortage, increase talents, and improve the innovation of the country's population, but there is a problem of cultural integration. Taking the United States as an example, racial contradictions in the United States originated from the black slave trade in the 15th century, although the Civil War achieved the emancipation of blacks, but failed to fundamentally solve the social status of blacks, and the United States successively appeared in the Los Angeles riots, the "Black Lives Matter" movement and other anti-racial discrimination movements. Although the United States has received more immigrants from Asia, Central and South America, and Africa in recent years, ethnic minorities are still in a disadvantaged position in terms of political status, education, and employment.

At the same time, immigrants increase the fiscal expenditure of high-welfare countries and squeeze out the employment opportunities of local citizens, which will cause an "anti-immigrant movement" among local people. Taking Europe as an example, since 2015, the situation in the Middle East and North Africa has been turbulent, with a large number of refugees pouring into Europe, and the ensuing frequent security incidents and terrorist attacks have affected social stability and disrupted economic order. Native Europeans believe that immigrants have a low economic contribution and damage to economic development, but they receive government financial subsidies and the interests of local people are harmed, which leads to anti-immigrant sentiment and anti-immigration movements.

In the case of emigrants, they have access to remittances, the issuance of expatriate bonds, and direct investment from expatriates. According to the World Bank, foreign exchange remittance inflows to low- and middle-income countries grew strongly, significantly larger than foreign direct investment, which was about three times larger than foreign direct investment in 2022. However, the emigration of the population will cause the loss of labor force in the migrant country, which will affect the local economic development.

9 Urbanization: Entering a phase of decelerating growth, two-thirds of the world's population is expected to be urban by 2050

The world's urbanization process is roughly divided into three stages, before 1950, the world's rural population accounted for more than 2/3, in 2007 the world's urbanization rate reached 50%, the urban population began to exceed the rural, the current world population urbanization process is in a deceleration stage, in 2020 the world's urbanization rate is about 56.2%.

1) Before 1950, more than two-thirds of the world's population lived in rural areas. In the sixties of the eighteenth century, the industrial revolution began in the United Kingdom, and gradually spread to Germany, the United States, France and other countries, driving the development of world urbanization, by 1950, the world urbanization rate reached 30%, and the urbanization rates of developed countries such as Britain, Germany, the United States, and France were 79%, 67.9%, 64.2%, and 55.2% respectively, basically realizing urbanization, while the urbanization rate of developing countries such as China and India was less than 20%;

2) From 1950 to 2007, the world's urbanization was in an accelerated development stage, the world's urban population grew rapidly, from 750 million to 3.36 billion people, with an average annual growth rate of 2.7%, the urbanization rate increased from 30% to 50%, and the proportion of the world's urban population exceeded that of rural areas.

3) According to the United Nations World Urbanization Outlook 2018, the urban population will increase from 3.36 billion to 6.68 billion from 2007 to 2050, with an average annual growth rate of 1.5%, and about two-thirds of the world's people will live in cities by 2050.

In terms of sub-regions, North America and Latin America have entered the late stage of urbanization, while Asia and Africa have a urbanization level lower than the global level of 56.2%, and will become the main force of urbanization in the next 30 years, which is expected to provide 87.7% of the new urban population. In 2020, North America and Latin America had a high degree of urbanization, with urbanization rates of 82.6% and 81.2%, respectively, entering the late stage of urbanization, while Europe and Oceania had 74.9% and 68.2% urbanization rates, respectively, and Asia and Africa had 51.1% and 43.5% urbanization rates, respectively, and were still in the stage of rapid urbanization development, with an urbanization degree lower than the global level of 56.2%. In terms of countries, the urbanization rate in Japan has exceeded 90% in 2020, and the United Kingdom, the United States, South Korea and other countries have also exceeded 80%, entering the late stage of urbanization, while India's urbanization rate is only 34%.

From 1950 to 2020, the proportion of the world's urban population of more than 10 million increased from 3% to 13%, and in 2020, the urban population of Germany and the United Kingdom was mainly concentrated in small cities below 300,000, and the urban population of Japan was mainly concentrated in megacities of more than 10 million.

In terms of the number of cities, there were only two cities in the world with a population of more than 10 million in 1950, Tokyo in Japan and New York in the United States, 10 in 1990, and 29 cities with more than 10 million in 2020.

From 1950 to 2020, the proportion of the world's population with more than 10 million people increased from 3% to 13%, and the proportion of urban population with less than 300,000 decreased from 60% to 41%.

From the perspective of specific countries, the urban population of Germany and the United Kingdom is mainly concentrated in small cities, with the population of cities below 300,000 accounting for 73% and 54% respectively, and there are no cities with more than 10 million. The gap between the infrastructure, job opportunities, and social security conditions in large, medium, and small cities in Germany is relatively small, and urbanization is characterized by "decentralization"; Japan's urban population is mainly concentrated in megacities, with 49% of the urban population above 10 million, while only 20% of the urban population is less than 300,000.

From 1960 to 2020, the proportion of the world's population living in the largest cities decreased slightly from 17.6% to 16.1%.

Overall, the proportion of the population of the largest cities in the United States, Japan, and South Korea began to decline in the second half of the 19th century, but the population in the metropolitan area continued to concentrate, and the proportion of the population in Florida, Texas, California, and Texas increased from 18.6% to 29.1% from 1970 to 2020, and the proportion of the population in the Tokyo area increased from 23.3% to 29.3%.