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preface
Mandela, de Klerk and Butelezzi are three historical figures who played pivotal roles in South African society in the first half of the 90s. They reflect both the will of the race, class or group they represent, as well as the will of their individuals, which have played a significant role in a certain historical period.
The outstanding role of Mandela in the early 90s
Mandela's personal thoughts, will, style and qualities played a hugely positive role in the extraordinary period in South Africa from 1990 to 1994. The long period of struggle since 1944, especially 28 years behind bars in a white prison and special struggles, honed him into a politically mature black leader.
In his long struggles, including in the face of extreme adversity, he adhered to three unshakable principles: the right to political equality in South Africa, one person, one vote; Mobilizing the masses widely; Persist in armed struggle until apartheid is abolished.
However, he is also a pragmatic politician who faces reality squarely, is familiar with the combination of principle and flexibility, has a calm understanding of the situation in South Africa, and thinks rationally.
He was well aware that the disparity in economic, political, military and cultural power between black and white South Africans caused by history was far from the point where blacks could "force land" whites.
Based on this grim and realistic estimate, Mandela pondered two questions while he was still behind bars:
First, how to correctly deal with the problem of majority rule in a unified country;
Second, how to properly deal with white demands: There needs to be a political structural guarantee, and not letting the majority rule means that blacks rule whites.
After the "legalization" of the ANC in February 1990, Mandela focused on several major matters, all of which were accurate and steady:
First, for the ANC itself, which has regained a foothold in South Africa, he has focused on grassroots construction and implemented the "M-Plan" that he has dreamed of for decades.
The plan called for the establishment of tight groups from the grassroots level, gradually forming regional and town leadership bodies, subordinate to the Central Executive Committee. During the ANC's ban, the plan was undermined in some areas.
Mandela demanded that the branch be re-established in most of South Africa, and membership quickly increased to 1 million to 1.7 million. Mandela's personal demeanor played a very good role in strengthening the unity within the ANC.
His prestige has grown since his release from prison, with 80 percent of blacks supporting him, but he respects Tambo, the frail and sick party chairman who has fought abroad for many years, as if he were a brother, and he only wanted to be vice chairman until the death of the overworked Tambo.
He worked aggressively against the radical-minded factional bloc within the ANC to make it clear that the "one-person-one-vote system" should not and could not mean immediate black majority rule in the current balance of power.
The radical Pan-African National Congress, which split from the ANC in 1959, worked on many fronts, exchanging views, coordinating positions and securing its participation in political negotiations.
As for the "Azaniya People's Organization", he also did a good job of unity, set up a joint committee between the two sides to discuss the work of promoting unity, and patiently negotiated the reference to "nationalization" in the Economic Program.
Mandela tried to persuade some ANC leaders to agree to his meeting with Boutlezi, which some leaders strongly opposed because they believed that such a meeting would enhance Boutlezi's status, which was desired by Boutlezi, who was bent on becoming a "black leader".
Some members of the ANC's leadership did not do enough to unite their biggest opponents among blacks, and their tactics were inadequate, and the serious consequences of which soon became apparent.
In June 1990, he further tested "majority rule" and introduced the concept of "multi-ethnic rule", which he believed "exists to be a joint rule between the ANC and some members of the Kuomintang and other party organizations".
Later, Mandela made it clear that even if the ANC had a majority in future elections, the first non-racial government would be composed of political parties.
At the same time, Mandela will need to test how much support his proposals will gain in his own allies. Against the white ruler, President de Calec, Mandela took a beating and pulling approach.
All of this work by Mandela was to strengthen solidarity among blacks and remove obstacles to political negotiations with white governments in order to gain the initiative in negotiations.
De Klerk's two-sided strategy
De Klerk was good at observing the situation, and the major measures he took decisively were based on careful observation and reflection on the situation. First, he believes that the situation in South Africa has developed to an extremely serious point:
Black consciousness and resistance have reached a level that no bloody repression can suppress, and the pressure on the white government is becoming increasingly unbearable.
Five consecutive years of national emergencies have done little. The only option for the white government was to sit down and negotiate with the ANC, or else it would be "swept away by the tide of change of direction".
Second, if South Africa does not fundamentally change its policy, the international community's sanctions against South Africa in all aspects, especially economic sanctions, will only become more severe.
Since 1985, South Africa's capital outflow has reached at least $11 billion, and foreign exchange reserves have plummeted, leaving only $1.9 billion, and 550 foreign companies have moved out of South Africa.
The economic situation is extremely serious, which puts great pressure on the operation of the government and has a great impact on the white capital group. A growing number of whites in politics and business not only recognized that apartheid had to be changed, but also took action to explore viable ways for blacks and whites to reconcile and coexist.
Based on a growing awareness of the situation, once de Klerk officially became president, he dared to let go and do what former President Botha hesitated for many years and did not dare to do.
Thinking he had laid a foundation, he turned his focus to the struggle for "power distribution." He first raised the banner of opposing the "one-person-one-vote system," threatening that the introduction of one-person-one-vote elections would inevitably lead to the rule of the black majority, and was therefore "completely unacceptable."
In fact, he opposed the so-called "winner takes everything" black cabinet system, and demanded a distribution of power that was beneficial to whites under the one-person-one-vote system, and the proportion of blacks in the distribution of power was reduced as much as possible.
Therefore, he soon proposed the implementation of four or five political programs, including a bicameral system that "accommodates the interests of different groups." These include the need to provide minority parties with certain representation in the Government, decentralization and the strengthening of local government powers. The aim was actually to maintain more white privilege.
To this end, de Klerk "took a two-pronged approach": on the one hand, he firmly grasped the current regime, kept the political and economic power in his own hands, opposed the establishment of a transitional government, delayed political negotiations as much as possible, and tried his best to protect the interests and privileges of whites to "comfort" and divide the white right-wing forces, and win more white people's personal support for him.
On the one hand, it tried to divide the black camp, supported Butelezi's "Incata", expanded the contradictions between black organizations, encouraged and exploited violent conflicts in black areas, and reaped profits in order to contain and weaken the ANC.
In August 1900, de Klerk allowed members of Incata to march and assemble armed with "traditional weapons" – spears, knives, and axes. This further intensified the conflict between the ANC and "Inkata", leading to the escalation of violent conflicts.
The total number of violent clashes in the months of 1990 exceeded the previous three years combined. There is evidence that some violent clashes between black organizations were instigated by de Klerk for political reasons.
What's more, de Klerk's cabinet and Minister of Law and Order Vlock used secret political appropriations and other means to get the security police system to secretly fund "Incata" $100,000, and the South African Army helped "Inkata" to conduct military training.
But on the other hand, de Klerk also knew that the real leader of the black man was Mandela, not Boutlezi, so the underlying desire that de Klerk had to do so was to make Mandela a negotiable object without being too strong an opponent.
Butelezi plays a supporting role as a tribal remnant Butelezi increasingly felt his diminished status in the black camp and the role of "Incata" after the legalization of the ANC and Mandela's release.
On 14 July 1990 , the Funkata Freedom Party was founded and began to recruit members outside the province of Natal to confront the ANC. These initiatives led to the rapid spread of black bloodshed to the black neighbourhoods around Johannesburg.
Since mid-August, violent clashes have intensified in black neighbourhoods. Large-scale violence between Incata supporters and ANC supporters is on the rise, with 800 deaths in black-populated areas such as Soweto alone in early September.
Fighting resumed in early December, with 200 dead people in a week. In 1990, 3,500 people died as a result of conflict, more than in five years combined.
At the beginning of the new year in 1991, black neighborhoods were once again engulfed in violent clashes. In this way, "Incata", led by Butelezi, played an inglorious role in the struggle for the distribution of power in the early 90s of the 20th century. De Klerk needed a tool to make snipe mussels for a while.
British journalists have repeatedly reported that the extreme rightists within the white South African regime have repeatedly stirred up nationalist sentiment among the Zulus by transporting weapons, training the military backbone of the "Inkata" and sowing discord, and trying to create discord between the "Inkata" and the ANC.
epilogue
South Africa's "third force", the white South African intelligence and police departments, directly intervened in the violent conflict in black towns, exacerbating the vicious development of the situation.
Mandela Document,A.N.C,1990.1.in Riley,E.，op.cit.，p.214.
Time magazine, 7 May 1990, p. 23.
John Genbao, Africa Insider, vol. II, World Knowledge Press, 1957, pp. 550-552.