China shares borders with 14 land neighbors with a total length of more than 22,000 kilometers, including a border with Mongolia of about 4,710 kilometers, a border with Russia of about 4,300 kilometers, and a border with Kazakhstan of more than 1,700 kilometers. All have been demarcated. Among the few remaining unfinished borders is such a country, which was once a vassal state of the mainland, but has not established diplomatic relations with the mainland, and the border demarcation negotiations between the two sides have been seriously interfered with by the third country, India, which is Bhutan. So what are the disputes over the demarcation of the border between China and Burkina Faso? What geopolitical considerations are hidden behind India's frequent interference?
What disputed territories exist between China and Bhutan?
Bhutan, full name Kingdom of Bhutan, is located on the southern slope of the eastern part of the Himalayas, bordering China to the east, north and west, and India to the south, with a land area of about 38,000 square kilometers. According to historical dispute data, there are seven areas that were once undisputed, namely the Yadong section of the China-Africa border, the Ninglu District of Duina Township of Yadong County, the Kuragang Rifeng area north of the Himalayas, the Baiyu area in the southern part of Loza County, the Minjiuma area of Lakang Town in Loza County, the Mera Pass area and the Merasadin area in Jiba Township, southwest of Cuona City.
Bhutan is located on the southern slopes of the eastern Himalayas, a well-established mountain country.
The reason why it is said here is that these seven disputed areas are the product of different historical stages, which can be divided into three categories: one is that it has clearly belonged to China, but there are still international criminals in Bhutan, such as the Kuragon Rifeng area (1290 square kilometers), Ninh Land (60 square kilometers) and the Myla Pass area (150 square kilometers) north of the Himalayas. Located on the Chinese side of the watershed of the Himalayas, Bhutan abandoned its claim due to its history of Tibetan temple jurisdiction.
The Kuragon Rifeng area north of the Himalayas is the largest area that has clearly belonged to China, also located on the Chinese side north of the Himalayas, the watershed characteristics are obvious, the reason why Bhutan is marked, it is said to be because it is located in the cold mountains, inaccessible, in the early years without the assistance of satellite maps, coupled with the absence of field surveys, was included in Bhutan, now Bhutan has changed its ownership, but there are still foreign media, websites have other intentions to mark the wrong. At present, our side has built a road to the west of Kulagang Rifeng, and built a new village of Gongzhangpu Village, Sexiang Township, Luozha County, guarding three mountain passes leading to the outside world on the east side of Kufeng.
Kuragon Ri Peak is completely in China, not the highest peak in Bhutan as rumored on the Internet, Zhongbujie Peak is the Ganga Bensun Peak at an altitude of 7570 meters, here is corrected.
As for the other Mera Pass area, the reason is roughly the same as the Kuragon Ri area, which is still not marked by field surveys. Due to the obvious geographical watershed characteristics of the local Himalayas, the map of Bhutan has been modified to clearly belong to the Chinese side. At present, the mainland has built a patrol road from the border defense link of Jiba Township to the Myla Pass, and there is a natural village near it.
The second category belongs to the current hotspots of contention, namely the Yadong section of the China-Africa border (592 square kilometers), the Baiyu area in southern Loza County (580 square kilometers) and the Mingyuma area in Lakang town (55 square kilometers). At present, the Mingyuma area of Lakang town is under the actual control of our side, and in recent years it has not only upgraded the road and opened the Baila Mountain tunnel, but also established the village of Mingyuma to the border. Therefore, in this case, Bhutan has partially modified the map boundary, but foreign websites or media still draw the border to the northern boundary of the Minkyuma area.
At present, the joint survey team of China and Burundi has surveyed the scope of the dispute between the two sides, that is, the Baiyu area stretches from the Russian-Eastern Bridge in the east, to the Tsogala and Daxi Ridge in the west, and to the Tashi Lang Brown in the south, totaling 580 square kilometers. At present, the area is divided into the border by Bhutan, and the Bhutanese painting method is followed internationally, but in fact, after more than 20 years of anti-encroachment pull, our side has actually controlled most of the area.
In 2016, the villages of Jelob and Demaron were built one after another, and the construction of Raj Highway, Jerobu-Votang Highway (to Basang Nong Votang), Xincangpu Highway, Jignong Highway, and Jinan Highway (to Lalong Lakang) was in full swing. At present, only Bhutanese outposts, temples and settlements remain south of Sedwo, which is a cross-patrol area with blurred borders, which means that more than 60% is under our actual control.
Finally, there is the disputed area in the Yadong section of the China-Africa border, which has changed from 659 square kilometers before the founding of the People's Republic of China, but later changed with the expansion of actual control. This is the front line of the Yadonggou Corridor out of Siliguri, and it is the most strategic location among the seven disputed areas in China. This disputed area has experienced the experience of losing soil in the late Qing Dynasty, recovering Yadong after the founding of the People's Republic of China, and gradually controlling the disputed area.
The disputed area of the Yadong section of the China-Africa border covers the Kivu, the middle and upper Chamapu, the upper and middle reaches of Langmapu, the Chartang River, the Luling River and the Lujungqu River Basin and the Lower Doklam area. There are differences in the way the area is divided, but the geographical scope covered is similar. At present, the areas of Kivu, the middle and lower reaches of Langmap, Chamapu and Upper Doklam have been controlled, and as for the upper reaches of Langmapu and Chartang, Bhutan has patrol troops; In addition, there are Bhutanese herders grazing in the Lulin area, and only the village of Pangda below Mount Dangbi shows signs of our activity.
The third category belongs to disputed areas that have not been raised before and have been revisited in recent years. It is represented by Merasadin (3,540 square kilometers), the largest of the seven disputed areas in China, currently controlled by Bhutan. Originally the area was a British Indian colony and Bhutan gave it to Bhutan when the border was drawn in 1936, because part of the area originally belonged to southern Tibet, which we raised objections in 1959, but after a brief counterattack against India in 1962, the troops advanced to the southern tip of southern Tibet, but did not enter the area.
Previously, the China-Africa border negotiations only targeted parts of the western and central sectors, and China did not make territorial claims to the area during the negotiations, but only described the area as a disputed area in some relevant documents. Until 2020, China opposed Bhutan's demand for funding for the Sakton Wildlife Sanctuary, arguing that "while the territory of the region has not yet demarcated the border, the central-eastern and western parts of the border are disputed". The proposal here may be more due to the fact that the border between southern Tibet and Bhutan on the mainland is not formally demarcated, so it is likely that the site will be raised in future Sino-Bhutan border negotiations.
The historical attribution of Merasadine is mainly complicated by the geographical scope, first of all, Merasadin village and Sardin village and their pastures belong to the upper reaches of the Manas River Valley, east of Tahigang Dzong, originally under the jurisdiction of My Tawang Monastery, and the other Bharnadi River and Chamo River Basin, which belong to the jurisdiction of My Tarong Dzong. The British colonists plotted the "McMahon Line" in southern Tibet to transfer Mera and Satin to Bhutan, and the rest to southern Tibet, and then in 1949, India did not sign a treaty, and privately assigned to Bhutan the mountainous area of the Barinadi River Valley, which originally belonged to the Da Long Sect in southern Tibet, so that the outline of today's Merasadin was obtained.
Therefore, these seven disputed areas, from our point of view, are mainly disputes over the Yadong section of the China-Africa border, the Baiyu area and the Merasadin area, with a total of 4,712 square kilometers, and our actual control is only about 34%; However, according to Bhutan's view, the dispute is only 764 square kilometers in parts of Yadong and Baiyu, and our actual control is about 77%. In the Yadong section and the Baiyu area where the two sides overlap, our actual control is more than 40% and 60% respectively.
Although on paper, our actual control does not have an absolute advantage, considering that the Lulin area of Merasadine and Yadong is an area that we have not reached, and most of these areas are inaccessible forest reserves, they are relatively weaker than our actual control area in terms of strategic value. However, for the upper reaches of Langmapur and the Chartang River Basin in the Yadong section of Bhutan's actual control, there is still value for our side, of course, winning all of them is definitely the optimal solution, but for the present, it is not realistic.
Why has India repeatedly interfered in the negotiations on the demarcation of the China-no border?
China and Bhutan are both sovereign and independent states, and Bhutan has long been a vassal state of China in history, so it has never formally demarcated the border by treaty or agreement, but there is still a traditional customary line between the two countries. Since the 80s of last century, the border issue has been resolved through negotiation and consultation, and so far 24 rounds of border talks have been held, and a broad consensus has been reached, but due to repeated obstruction by India, the border between the two sides has not been formally demarcated.
In fact, the Sino-Cuban border issue is a matter for China and Africa, and has nothing to do with India. As a third party, India has no right to intervene in and obstruct the process of border negotiations between China and Brazil, let alone claim territory for Bhutan, but in actual negotiations, India frequently interferes in the negotiation process of Bhutan, and even when each negotiation is about to achieve a breakthrough, it will induce pressure on Bhutan through various coercion and benefits, resulting in the demarcation negotiations going to waste.
For example, before the 25th round of border talks between China and Bhutan, it was revealed that China wanted to exchange part of the northern territory for Bhutan for Doklam, so immediately there was a three-day visit to Bhutan by the Indian foreign secretary, and the Doklam issue was one of the core of the trip, and then provided 851 million rupees to Bhutan in aid. Later, when the Prime Minister of Bhutan said that Bhutan and China did not have a "major border issue" and could be delimited in the next "one or two rounds of meetings", it triggered heated public opinion in India, and then the King of Bhutan hurriedly paid a three-day visit to India and agreed to "expand the framework of India-Africa partnership".
First of all, India insists that Bhutan is its "protectorate" and does not want Bhutan to reach a border agreement with China, because once China does not smoothly demarcate the border, it will inevitably be the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Bhutan and normalization of relations. Then Bhutan has changed from being dependent on India in the fields of diplomacy and economy to having more choices, resulting in Bhutan being out of India's control.
Moreover, Bhutan's geographical location, facing the fragile throat of India and its six northeastern states - the Siliguri corridor, once Bhutan mutinied, the southern Tibet region occupied by India, and even Manipur, Nagaland, and Assam who were deeply influenced by Tibetan culture may also defect, after all, these areas have a wide variety of ethnic groups, mixed religious beliefs, and the main ethnic group is the yellow race, the race, appearance and the main ethnic group of India are very different, and there has always been an independent tendency. Since the time of British India, there have been dozens of rebels, large and small....
It is precisely these geopolitical factors that make India feel pins and needles in the face of negotiations on the demarcation of the border between China and non-China. In 2017, under the pretext of maintaining Bhutan's territory, it even invaded the Lower Doklam area and interfered with our normal infrastructure activities, which is the "June 18 China-India Doklam Confrontation Incident". It did impede progress in the boundary talks, so much so that when negotiations were reopened, it stressed that Doklam needed the three parties to be ready to negotiate and to bring India, which had nothing to do with the disputed territory, into the case, which we could not have agreed to. It is conceivable that there will be a long way to go before China does not demarcate.
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Note: This article is the 14th chapter of the "Undetermined Borders" series, just a family statement, welcome to correct and forward. In addition, the picture part in the article is quoted from Weibo 1002, if there is a copyright private connection, please delete.