On June 19, 2022, Gustavo Petro defeated right-wing real estate magnate Rodolfo Hernández in the second round of the presidential election, becoming the first left-wing candidate in Colombia's history to win the presidential election. Petro received 11272740 votes (50.49%), while Hernández received 10551520 (47.26%). Overall turnout was 58 percent, a twenty-five-year high.
After his victory in the second round of the presidential elections, Colombian leftist presidential candidate Gustavo Petro hugged Francia Márquez, vice-presidential candidate of the Historical Pact Alliance.
The victory of Petro and his vice presidential partner, Francia Márquez, the daughter of black miners and activist who fought for the legitimate rights of Colombian miners — builds on the massive urban protests that have rocked Colombia over the past few years. As a result of protests, Colombia's major cities were repeatedly paralyzed in 2018, 2019 and 2021, and all this was caused by millions of "nobodies", mostly from the urban periphery, the least educated young working class with the least public benefits. They showed admirable courage, endurance and discipline in the face of the police to bring "terrible nights" (from the lyrics of Colombia's national anthem) to an end.
Breaking the deeply entrenched and irrational social fabric in Colombia will be a daunting task. However, changes are already happening. Can the structure of Colombia's extractive export economy be changed? Can the extreme concentration of wealth be reversed? Will Petro reform Colombia's U.S.-backed police and military behind it, or will he rely on emerging paramilitary groups operating in much of Colombia? Can he protect citizens' rights to gather, protest, express their opinions and vote without fear of bloody repression? At this stage, we can only partially answer these questions and provide educated guesses about those answers that will be revealed over time.
Oligarchy: Origins and Historical Struggle
Colombia's history is often described as a paradox: on the one hand, its long-term political and economic stability, a "nation-state without a national identity", with regular elections and alternating political parties dedicated to an investment policy; On the other hand, it has been plagued by political violence almost from the beginning. But in fact, there is no obvious contradiction between the two.
As in other Latin Americans, between 1880 and 1930, under the Conservative Party and the so-called independent liberal oligarchy, the popular class was almost completely excluded from political participation due to restrictions on property and education. In the 30s of the 20th century, when the Liberal Party returned to power after 50 years in opposition, it did not elect a popular representative strong enough to challenge the oligarchy of the alliance of gentry landlords and big merchant groups. Instead of resolving the most fundamental partisan conflict between them, the coalition ruling groups of the two parties have formed new factions within the party, causing new disputes.
During the Cold War, Colombia was dependent on the United States and largely maintained an oligarchy. In 1957, the leaders of the two parties shook hands and signed a gentleman's agreement. In the years that followed, the Liberals and Conservatives were able to take turns in power, strictly excluding their left-wing rivals. In the 60s and 70s of the 20th century, the agricultural crisis became increasingly serious, the modernization paradigm of nation-state developmentalism1 tended to collapse, and protesters from below were either suppressed or embarked on the road of armed resistance.
At this stage, the huge US market injected new factors into Colombia, and the already turbulent social situation became more complicated. Building on the existing cannabis export network, the drug economy began to expand dynamically in the late 1970s. The political situation has ushered in a new component. The wealth of the drug lords soon flowed into real estate, livestock, transportation, finance, sports, construction, entertainment, construction, and local politics, putting great pressure on the Liberal Party. Death squads organized by drug lords to counter rivals became the nucleus of far-right paramilitary groups, and they soon became an important part of a new historical bloc in Colombia.
Against this backdrop, Gustavo Petro, born in 1960, entered the political arena. His father was a teacher in the province of Córdoba before studying civil engineering in Bogotá, Colombia. In the early 80s of the 20th century, Petro successfully ran for election and became a councillor in the city of Zipakila; In 1984, he announced in the town square that he had organized activities in the M-19 guerrilla group. In 1985, weeks after the attack on the Palais de Justice, Petro was arrested and sentenced by the Colombian army for possession of weapons and imprisoned for two years. After his release in 1987, social protests rose again. Similar to FARC and ELN, Petro negotiated with the government for citizens' right to vote along with Carlos Pizarro and Antonio Navarro Wolfe, fellow M-19 members. In 1991, Petro was officially elected to the Constituent Assembly. A year later, Pizarro and FARC candidates were assassinated by death squads.
In the 90s of the twentieth century, Colombia became increasingly at odds with the spirit of social democracy enshrined in the new Charter. Under harsh political control and neoliberal economic policies, Colombia has become a living hell with soaring murder rates, rural rebellions, and state repression. Then-President Álvaro Uribe Vélez exacerbated the conflict as never before. The Uribe government accelerated trade and financial liberalization, privatization of the public sector and deregulation of the labour market. U.S. multinationals and investment banks have become the main beneficiaries. When Uribe left office in 2010, the Colombian Gini coefficient reached 0.85. According to legend, he himself was one of the largest landowners in Colombia at the time.
The people's outburst with the popular party
In 2018, although Conservative candidate Dou Kay eventually won the presidential election with 54% of the vote, Petro achieved a historic achievement: he won 8 million votes, or 42% – the approval rating of left-wing presidential candidates has never been higher. To those who closely follow Colombian politics, Duquet's victory is more like the product of power trading and electoral fraud by drug dealers.
In 2019, Alberto Caraschia, Minister of Finance in the Duquet government, proposed a series of neoliberal reforms that had a new impact on Colombian society, with the siphon effect2 being more pronounced. In Caraschia's reform plan, Colombia will lower the minimum wage, introduce hourly contracts, differential wages, and hand over public pension funds to private entities; privatization of state-owned oil companies, broadcasters, electricity companies and enterprises owned by less than half of all countries; Lower taxes on multinational corporations while raising taxes on the middle and working classes. At the end of November 2019, unions and student groups launched a nationwide strike. In fact, this general strike goes far beyond the scope of the student movement. It is estimated that 1.5 million people took to the streets in almost all major and secondary cities in all areas of production swept by strikes.
Students, unions, teachers, peace and environmental movement organizations, feminist groups, truck drivers, indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups, retirees, LGBTI affirmative action organizations, farmers' organizations, middle-class professionals, and some small and medium-sized business owners protest day in and day out against government corruption, police brutality, social inequality, rising electricity bills, massive mining projects, and government killings of activists. The younger generation, which did not experience the repression of the 80s and 90s of the 20th century, performed particularly well. Among them are not only students, but also workers and the unemployed, who live in precarious lives. In the protests that shook the whole brother for weeks, these young people played a leading role.
In 2021, in Bogotá, Colombia, people displayed signs during protests demanding government action to address poverty, police brutality and inequalities in the health and education systems.
However, the parliamentary elections in March 2022 witnessed the changes that have already taken place. Under Petro's leadership, the Historical Pact coalition participated in elections as a New Left coalition of 20 small parties and groups, with a universal suffrage rate of 17%, 20 out of 108 seats in the Senate and 28 out of 166 seats in the Parliament, becoming the largest political bloc. The traditional major Liberals and Conservatives were second and third respectively, with universal suffrage rates of 14 per cent and 12 per cent respectively. Uribe and Ducai's so-called Democratic Centre 3 and Santos' Socialist Workers' Party4 each received only 10% support, roughly on par with the Greens5. For the Democratic Centre Party, it was a heavy blow – from the strongest party in parliament to a small fringe party with 13 seats in the Senate and 16 seats in Parliament.
Unsurprisingly, in the run-up to the presidential election, right-wing politicians shouted elaborate slogans and manipulated online videos and tweets to create a web of disinformation on racism and misogyny. The mainstream media highlighted Petro's radical past. The outgoing Ducé denounced the Historical Pact coalition as a lackey of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. In the end, Petro and Márquez easily won the election in a round held at the end of May with just over 40% of the vote.
Represented by the victory of Petro and Márquez on June 19, 2022, Colombian politics made a historic breakthrough. After two hundred years of ruthless rule by landlords, corporations and warlords, the popular class finally had its own "tribune".
In his victory speech on election night, Petro declared that the government would "develop capitalism." As announced in the election, Petro's plan is not radical, much less subversive. Instead, he promised modest reforms to restore investment capital flows, while breaking the shackles of neoliberalism and confronting the freedoms of racial, gender, and environmental movement groups. For the first time in history, left-wing feminists are playing a role in Congress and other state departments. Is the redistribution of social wealth accompanied by representation? If not, can de-representation redistribution work effectively?
The objectives of the Petro administration are to consolidate the progressive foundations of the 1991 Constitution, reduce social inequality, discreetly redistribute wealth through progressive taxes, guarantee basic civil rights, and promote the political and economic democratization of Colombia. Instead of trying to build 21st-century socialism, as Chávez 6 did, Petro at least envisioned a more regulated capitalist society in his rhetoric. If such a vision sounds utopian, it goes some way to indicative of how politics has changed dramatically in Colombia and indeed in our time.
Recovery and the way home
Economically, the main goal of the Petro government is to break Colombia's dependence on commodity rents, the drug economy and organized crime, although former Finance Minister Ocampo has said Colombia will need them. Investors and Petro's political opponents breathed a sigh of relief for Ocampo's nomination.
Fossil fuels now account for half of Colombia's total legal exports, and Petro wants to phase out related industries, while taking steps to ban hydrocarbon exploration and large-scale open-pit mining thereafter, halt fracking and offshore drilling pilot projects, and use rents from 170 existing contracts to fund other public benefits.
He wants to promote solar, wind, hydro and "green" hydrogen energy, and receive international compensation by preserving coal and oil reserves. However, green rhetoric itself is cheap. Between 1998 and 2012, left-wing governments in Latin America began to speak out about the environment, but soon found themselves inseparable from energy rents and commodity exports. Will Petro also be forced to follow this old path?
Politically, it remains to be seen whether Petro has the will and ability to build a broad left-wing front that includes trade unions, social movement groups, feminist groups, and community organizations and mobilizes voters through their demands.
Will Colombia finally move beyond its exclusive political model and open up with its neighbours to meet the needs of the wider urban and rural social forces? Or will everything in the Petro government become a short-lived experiment in which right-wing military forces will force it to step down and reconfine Colombia back to a closed and solitary path of history? It's too early to say whether a new agenda will emerge in Colombian cities, but it is already a possibility. Perhaps it is now at least conceivable that there is a historic political bloc that can force capital to make concessions, pay taxes in peace, and obey government laws. Reform of the police and armed forces is difficult to achieve, and their recalcitrant resistance may remain a major obstacle. Much depends, however, on the outcome of Foreign Minister Leyva's negotiations with the United States on trade and narcotics.
Colombia's bloody history under the constitutional framework of the Republic is written by a long war and the export of drugs for fuel and capital over the past four decades. Colombia is thus different from Peru, Mexico and other Central American neighbors similar to it. (Mexico's disastrous "Mérida Plan" of 2006-2010 was modeled after the Colombian Plan.) ）
Today, the Petro Government has set the corresponding task of rebuilding the country, in accordance with the social, cultural and environmental rights enshrined in the 1991 Constitution. In this respect, Colombia can even rival Bolivia and Ecuador, which have progressive constitutions. Behind the success of both countries, there were huge social struggles that opened the way for progressive governments to come to power, but at the same time these struggles succeeded in angering the far right.
Petro's proposed "national agreement" could be interpreted as an attempt to prevent such an outcome. The danger is that the Petro government may back down without commitment to peace, social planning and job guarantees.
This time, however, Colombia and its neighbours seem to be united in their support of democracy and popular struggle, and cooperation among States throughout the region will be strengthened. If Colombia were to help revive the new Bolivarian project, no matter how easy it was, Chávez and even Fidel Castro might be laughing at the grave.
At least, something in Latin America has returned to square one.
【Explanation of terms】
- Nation-state developmentalism
Developmentalism argues that the best way for less developed economies to develop is to foster a strong and diversified internal market and impose high tariffs on imports; "Third World" countries can use external resources to achieve and maintain national autonomy under capitalism; Especially in developing countries, sustained economic growth guarantees the leadership of politicians.
2. Siphon effect
The siphon effect in economics refers to economic tornadoes caused by economic activities and has a strong attraction effect on surrounding individuals, collectives or countries.
3. Democratic Centre Party
A right-wing party founded in July 2014, it was the largest party in the Colombian Congress. The leader is former President Álvaro Uribe.
4. Socialist Workers' Party
Left-wing party, section of the International Workingmen's League - Fourth International, the first Trotskyist party in Colombian history. It was established on September 23, 1977, 10 days after the national general strike against the government of Alfonso López Mitchellson.
5. The Greens
Founded in September 2009, it is a center-right political party. Advocating "oxygen for the country's political life", it requires respect for the constitutional system, the pursuit of social justice, respect for life, opposition to violence, the protection of the environment and biodiversity, and the realization of economic, social and environmental sustainable development.
6. Chávez
Venezuelan politician, former 52nd President of Venezuela and founder of the Movement of the Fifth Republic, was elected President in December of the same year. Radical measures for reform were emphasized, advocating the reduction of centralization, decentralization, and constitutional amendments.