The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War is also known as the Second Indo-Pakistani War. This is an important event in the history of the international Cold War, the result of the India-Pakistan War, which made the US South Asia strategy finally a total failure.
Whether it is the past India-Pakistani war, or the India-Pakistani conflict in recent years, no matter what the cause, the final flashpoint is only one, that is, the "Kashmir" issue, the origin of the "Kashmir" issue, due to the limited space, I will not talk about it here today. Interested partners can go to check Baidu.
Speaking of the Second India-Pakistan War, the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 cannot be bypassed. Everyone knows that the United States has been leading a group of little brothers to surround China, all kinds of demons, all kinds of means, soft and hard, and those who want to have a face without a face, as long as they think it is useful, they will make it out without scruples. It's buzzing around you like flies, making people want to pull out their intestines and strangle them to death.
In fact, this was the usual method used by the United States during the Cold War in the last century. Its means and ends are even more blatant and undisguised. At that time, Pakistan was still an ally of the United States, so it also "shouldered" this task. At that time, India was the main initiator of the Non-Aligned Movement and pursued an independent foreign policy. This also makes the US "containment" policy unable to be fully implemented, for this reason, the United States has spared no effort to win India over, but with little effect.
The Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 overwhelmed the United States. India, whose nose and face were swollen by China's rubbing on the ground, expressed its disapproval with its usual "confidence in fans". As a result, the two countries hit it off, and the United States began to vigorously support India politically, militarily, and economically, hoping to win India over and contain China. As a result, U.S.-India relations began to develop rapidly from the Kennedy era.
After taking over as president, Johnson tried to make India and Pakistan "loyal Cold War partners" in South Asia by providing military and economic assistance to India and Pakistan. In this way, it will form a complete containment posture against China and the Soviet Union.
Sadly. Dreams are full, reality is bone. The military and economic assistance of the United States not only failed to achieve its strategic intentions, but became the driving force of the 1965 India-Pakistan War, and with the outbreak of the Second India-Pakistani War, it also completely shattered the illusions of the United States, and in the end, the Johnson administration of the United States did not prevent India from further strengthening its relations with the Soviet Union, nor prevented Pakistan from further developing relations with China. His influence and strategic intentions in South Asia have also been completely frustrated.
India dramatically increased its military spending after the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, accounting for 2.1 per cent of total national production from 1961 to 1962, 3 per cent from 1962 to 1963 and 4.5 per cent from 1964 to 1965. With U.S. military assistance to India, India's military strength increased dramatically, and by 1965, the Indian army had increased from 500,000 to 825,000, including 9 mountain divisions and 45 combat squadrons in the Air Force.
Pakistan has a clear understanding of India's military development and its potential impact on the Kashmir issue. Marshal Asgar Khan, then chief of staff of the Pakistan Air Force, said that under the guise of preparing to deal with China, India has successfully received a large amount of military assistance from the United States, is building a huge army, they have almost doubled the air force, strengthened the naval force, further increased the production capacity of aircraft and tanks ... Pakistan faces a very dangerous situation. "If we do not face this situation bravely and prepare it immediately, then when its armed forces are fully increased, the time will come for India to achieve its political goals without waging war."
Since Pakistan's national interests are seriously threatened, this has become a crucial factor in promoting Pakistan's decision to develop friendly relations with China. Against this backdrop, calls for a reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy have begun to emerge within Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is a representative of Pakistan's foreign policy, and after becoming foreign minister in January 1963, he more actively advocated the development of friendly relations with China, claiming that friendship with China is a fundamental principle of Pakistan's foreign policy.
The pakistani leader at the time, Ayyub Khan, also began to consider re-evaluating and recognizing the role of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Treaty Organization for Pakistan. He said in early 1963 that Pakistan would withdraw from these treaties if it found that they were not only useless, but on the contrary harmful to national interests.
In this regard, the United States has deceived Pakistan and told Pakistan with a bitter face: "The best way to safeguard Pakistan's interests is to do everything in its power to strengthen ties with the free world, not to weaken them."
Although Pakistan has repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with the United States' assistance to India, and has repeatedly stated that economic and military assistance to India will be used by India for Pakistan. But these concerns, the Americans are saying are not worth a damn.
Bundy, then Special Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs, said the U.S. was fully aware of Pakistan's dissatisfaction with India's policy, but Pakistan must realize that "we are determined to help India because of the global anti-communist strategy." The United States decided to "establish a new relationship with India in order to develop its industrial and military potential against the Chinese Communists." Despite Pakistan's objections, the United States continues to provide military assistance to India, with the aim of not only making India a "shield with sufficient military defense capabilities", but also "building a vibrant society that can fully withstand Chinese infiltration.""
That is to say, in the eyes of the Americans at that time, India's importance has surpassed Pakistan, and as for the paper contract of allies and no allies, it has long been stepped on by the United States. In the face of interests, where are the allies!
But in order to appease Pakistan to encircle China, the United States decided to provide Pakistan with two squadrons of F-104 supersonic fighters in fiscal year 1965, but this set the premise that the "political climate" must be "satisfactory" at that time. The so-called "political climate" of the United States must be "satisfactory", that is, Pakistan must be obedient, neither too close to China, and at the same time shut up the relationship between the United States and India. As for the Kashmir issue, which Pakistan is most concerned about, the United States believes that this is a kind of robbery by Pakistan taking advantage of the weak timing of India's defeat by China to force India to surrender on its knees.
At the end of May 1964, Indian Defense Minister Chavan visited the United States, and the United States agreed to provide $50 million in military assistance to India in fiscal year 1965. On June 6, the United States officially announced its military assistance program to India.
Ayyub Khan was extremely angry with the U.S. decision, who openly accused the U.S. of abandoning friends without hesitation, "opportunism, and no moral standards." Huge anti-American rallies have been held across Pakistan.
In a July 1 letter to Johnson, Ayyub Khan wrote: "U.S. military aid to India undermined Pakistan's interests, led to an arms race between India and Pakistan, increased their economic burden, and opened a convenient passage for communism to expand into the South Asian subcontinent."
Ayyub Khan even claimed that Pakistan would be forced to reconsider its obligations as an ally. However, Johnson ignored the Palestinian complaints, insisting that military assistance to India could contain the communist threat to the South Asian subcontinent, which was in the interest of both India and Pakistan. He warned Pakistan that if Pakistan were to reconsider its relations with the United States, the United States would have no choice but to reassess its relations with the Palestinian side.
In March 1965, Ayyub Khan visited China. The United States was furious about this, and the United States said internally, "We should punish Ayyub Khan." Johnson's letter to Ayyub Khan was full of threats, "Your visit to China at this time will lead to public concern about the differences between Pakistan and the United States on the treatment of Communist China, so it will seriously affect the economic and defense assistance of the United States to Pakistan, which is not conducive to the "common interests" of the United States and Pakistan." Johnson said in the letter that he had decided to postpone Ayyub Khan's visit to the United States.
The United States sees Pakistan pursuing an increasingly independent foreign policy and developing close relations with communist China, Indonesia, and the Third World in order to seek their support for Pakistan's demands on Kashmir. This approach to Kashmir is wrong, it is Pakistan taking advantage of India's political instability, and at the same time, Pakistan's policy of putting too much pressure on India is increasing tensions in South Asia, which will make it more difficult to resolve the problem.
Pakistan believes that India has no intention of peacefully resolving the Kashmir issue, and that U.S. military assistance to India is the reason for India's increasingly hardened stance, and that because India relies on U.S. aid, the United States can exert critical pressure, but has not taken any action. Not only does the United States see no connection between military aid and India's actions in Kashmir, but it also accuses Pakistan of being too sentimental about U.S. military aid to India. At the same time, the United States has always confidently believed that the assistance given by the United States to Pakistan is an important means of influencing Pakistan's policy, because pakistan will not receive so much aid from China or the Soviet Union.
Under the mentality of solipsism in the United States, Pakistan is a wronged little brother in front of the United States, whether it is national interests or so-called alliances, it is not worth anything in the eyes of the big brother of the United States. The subsequent outbreak of war also confirmed Pakistan's initial fears.
Although after the war began, the United States exhausted all means, exerted all kinds of pressure, mobilized all kinds of resources, and even used Britain, the Commonwealth, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, etc., this wishful thinking, always put the interests of the United States first, mediation is doomed to failure.
In January 1966, finally under the mediation of the Soviet government, India and Pakistan signed the Tashkent Declaration, and India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw to the area where they were located before August 5, 1965. The Second Indo-Pakistani War came to an end.
After the 1965 war, the United States still hoped to use its assistance to India to force India to ease relations with Pakistan and maintain the influence of the United States in South Asia. The United States stressed that although India is more important than Pakistan, the United States will not consider resuming aid until there is a reasonable development in the situation in South Asia; The settlement of the India-Pakistan issue can only rely on political compromise and coordination of the positions of the two sides.
The United States delayed military aid to India to this end and took advantage of India's food shortages and famines from 1965 to 1966 to force the Indian government to focus its economic development on agriculture. Regarding U.S. policy, Indian officials have publicly stated that India is prepared without aid and does not succumb to pressure; Even without U.S. wheat, India would not trade in Kashmir.
During the same period, the Indian government not only constantly criticized U.S. policy on the Vietnamese issue, but also increased its cooperation with the Soviet Union in the political, economic, and military fields. By the early 1970s, India was able to produce 2/3 of the required weapons and equipment domestically. More importantly, in 1971, India concluded a 20-year Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, which was a military alliance, and the United States almost completely lost its influence over India.
After the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, the United States decided to take a "hardline" line against Pakistan because Pakistan's "political performance" could not allow the United States to provide it with comprehensive development assistance. Pakistan must recognize that any pro-China move will cause serious political trouble for US-Pakistan relations. In response to the "hard-line" policies of the United States, Pakistan vigorously developed relations with the Soviet Union and China after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War in order to obtain various kinds of assistance, especially military assistance.
The Soviet Union also signed an agreement in June 1968 to increase military assistance to Pakistan, and from 1967 onwards, the Soviet Union began to supply Pakistan with military trucks, jeeps and transport helicopters. Pakistan's termination of U.S. facilities using Peshawar in early 1968 marked "the disappearance of the only remnants of a special relationship that once existed between the United States and Pakistan."
The 1965 India-Pakistan War was not only the result of the contradictions and conflicts between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, but more importantly, it was also a direct result of the changes in major power relations in South Asia after the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962. U.S. policy toward the South Asian subcontinent fully serves the U.S. global containment strategy and the policy objectives of containing China in Asia.
Since the United States takes containing and preventing China's influence as the core of its South Asian regional policy, the "domino theory" as the basis for its support and assistance to India, and military and economic assistance as the main means to achieve its South Asia policy objectives, there is an irreconcilable contradiction between the US policy of aiding India against China and developing an alliance with Pakistan at the same time.
Before the 1965 India-Pakistan War, the United States decided to pursue a policy that was more in line with the "real strategic interests" of the United States in South Asia, and thus judged that Pakistan's development of relations with China seriously threatened the security interests of the United States in South Asia. The non-involvement of the United States in the war and the pressure to force India and Pakistan to accept a ceasefire by stopping aid, while largely punishing Pakistan, have actually lost the channels to exert influence on India and Pakistan.
This characteristic was made even more evident by the Soviet Union's vigorous assistance to India and the development of relations with Pakistan after the 1965 India-Pakistan War, as well as Pakistan's development and close relations with the Soviet Union and other countries, and the influence of the United States in South Asia rapidly declined.