The Paper's reporter Yu Xiaoxuan
Hanoi in April 1975 and Kabul in August 2021 both symbolize everything a great power should avoid: fear, chaos, and pathetic futility. As a superpower, the United States has the support of almost the world's most powerful think tank, but why has it repeatedly encountered such tragedies?
For the war in Afghanistan that ends in 2021, American journalist Craig Whitlock said that in the three consecutive U.S. administrations since George W. Bush, realistic assessments of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan have been suppressed. In fact, in contrast to the apparent apparent superiority of absolute power, the U.S. government is lying to the public and lacks the "courage to admit that the United States is slowly losing the war."
Whitlock worked for The Washington Post, covering the Pentagon and U.S. national security. He has long been concerned about the U.S. war on terror and the U.S. military strategy in the Middle East after 9/11, and has traveled to Afghanistan and its surrounding areas with senior U.S. military officers on several occasions. In the summer of 2016, Whitlock heard that an "unknown federal agency," the Office of special inspectors of Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), was working on an interview program called "Lessons Learned" to examine U.S. failed policies in Afghanistan so that future mistakes would not be repeated. Whitlock applied to SIGAR for manuscripts, notes and recordings of the "Lessons Learned" interview program.
"I think the public has a right to know the criticism of the war within the government — it's an indelible truth." Whitlock wrote. After several twists and turns, he obtained more than 10,000 pages of "snowflakes" documents from former U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, who fought the war in Afghanistan. Based on these documents, Whitlock wrote the Afghanistan Document, which exposes how the United States fell into a aimless war and how it whitewashed the truth about failure to the public.
"Afghan Documents", by Craig Whitlock, translated by Chen Xiaoqian and Zhang Wendou, CITIC Publishing House, March 2022 The pictures in this article are all courtesy of CITIC Press
The title of "Afghanistan Documents" echoes the "Pentagon Papers" that leak the internal story of the Vietnam War, exposing many mistakes made by the United States in the War in Afghanistan. The materials obtained by Whitlock cover core areas of the United States' entire process of conflict and governance in Afghanistan over the past 20 years. Starting with the basic proposition of how U.S. intervention shifted from military involvement to rebuilding Afghanistan into a "modern state," Whitlock noted that U.S. failures included widespread corruption in Afghanistan, the massive opium trade, and a failure to build viable security institutions.
The Whitlock book highlights America's biggest problem in Afghanistan: it has never figured out who the bad guys are. "The United States does not know what it has done in Afghanistan, lacks a practical war strategy, and does not understand the culture and society of Afghanistan." Whitlock argues that successive U.S. administrations have set vague and inconsistent goals for the war in Afghanistan, which has also confused and frustrated generals and soldiers fighting on the front lines.
Whitlock also uses a great deal of ink to describe how america's huge fiscal spending has fueled corruption in Afghanistan. "In the 20 years that the United States has provided funding, the 'ill-fated' campaign to transform Afghanistan into a modern nation has gone from one extreme to the other in terms of funding." At first, Mr. Whitlock noted, the Bush administration was stingy when Afghans needed help the most, but later, the Obama administration "overpayed" by providing excess aid to Afghanistan, creating a new set of problems that could not be solved. "Throughout, reconstruction efforts have been hampered by arrogance, incompetence, bureaucratic infighting, and chaotic planning."
Beginning in 2006, the Taliban began to make a comeback in Afghanistan, and there was a great deal of reassessment of the situation and policy adjustments in the United States. But these back-to-the-ear voices — and much of the details in the Afghanistan Papers — were ignored by policymakers, "and the whole process was like a train crashing in slow motion."
The book ends in April 2021 when U.S. President Joe Biden announced his withdrawal from Afghanistan in September. "When is the right time to leave?" Another year, two years, or ten years? What are the conditions to leave? Biden said at the White House, "I haven't heard any good answers to these questions." If you can't answer, I see, we're not going to stay here. ”
It's been a full year since Biden announced the decision. The Taliban have been in power in Afghanistan for more than half a year. While no country has so far publicly recognized the legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban government, last month the United Nations adopted a resolution establishing formal ties with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
The history of Afghanistan is destined to be written by the Afghan people, and Whitlock believes so. But he hopes to use the book Afghanistan Papers to "get a shot" of U.S. policymakers. "The collusive silence of military and political leaders has allowed them to avoid being held accountable, while also avoiding reassessments that could have changed outcomes or shortened the period of conflict." This is where the "justice" that the book shows in the face of lies lies lies.
Recently, the Chinese edition of the book "Afghan Documents" was published by CITIC Publishing House. The author, Whitlock, was interviewed in writing by the www.thepaper.cn. Some of the interview transcripts are summarized below for the benefit of readers.
Winning is already a huge political pressure
The Paper: For years, the United States has assured officials and politicians that things are moving forward and that the war will be won, you wrote in the book. But at the same time, U.S. officials, diplomats and development workers, including the secretary of defense, have pessimistically admitted in their internal documents that things are not proceeding as they should. What causes this huge contrast? What lessons should we learn from America's 20 years of experience in Afghanistan?
Craig Whitlock: Government officials always make positive changes or whitewash the facts in their wartime public statements. But what is unusual and striking about the "Afghanistan Papers" is that U.S. officials are outspoken and daring to criticize in private. Some senior generals and diplomats admit that the United States does not know what it has done in Afghanistan, lacks a practical war strategy, and does not understand The culture and society of Afghanistan. U.S. military officials, including former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, have admitted that they "don't know who the bad guys are." In other words, it takes a lot of effort for them to identify who the enemy is. The candor of incompetence and failure by these leaders of U.S. policy in Afghanistan is very different from what the American public has seen for decades.
One reason for the discrepancy between public and private assessments is that the ability to win in Afghanistan has become a formidable political pressure. Unlike the U.S. wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the vast majority of the American public agreed with President Bush's decision to go to war in Afghanistan in 2001. At first, the American public thought U.S. military action in Afghanistan was necessary and legitimate. It was a war of self-defense against 9/11, and the Americans wanted to ensure that al-Qaida could not launch similar attacks from its headquarters in Afghanistan in the future. Moreover, most Americans believe that by the time the Taliban stepped down in late 2001, the United States had already won victory in Afghanistan. But as a result, it has become increasingly difficult for American political and military leaders to publicly admit that they are gradually losing a war that the American people think they have won.
Moreover, U.S. military commanders fear that if they openly discuss setbacks and defeats in the war in public, they could lose their official positions. In the book, I describe the encounters of U.S. Army Gen. David McKirnan, who served as the supreme commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2009. After McKirnan made a series of pessimistic statements about the progress of the war, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates relieved McKiernan of command. It is rare for American admirals to lose their jobs in wartime. Before McKirnan, the last U.S. military supreme commander to be fired during the conflict was Army General MacArthur, who was removed from office by President Truman during the Korean War in 1951.
"We are the rich people"
The Paper: Your book also reveals a very important point that U.S. financial aid fuels corruption in Afghanistan. In fact, some international institutions, such as the World Bank, assess the situation in recipient countries when providing loans or assistance, often on the premise of good governance and avoidance of corruption. But why is the United States pouring so much money into Afghanistan without any curb to corruption?
CRAIG WHITLOCK: As part of a new strategy to strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan government and Afghan security forces, the United States invested the most in development projects in Afghanistan during the Obama administration. In December 2009, Obama announced the dispatch of 100,000 U.S. troop reinforcements to Afghanistan and billions of dollars more to development project spending. But Obama is anxious to see results, and he wants to begin withdrawing these reinforcements within 18 months, so the Obama administration also knows that the time window to turn the tide of the war is short. As a result, the U.S. government invested money in development without really assessing whether these projects were worth pushing.
The "Afghanistan Papers" criticize this approach by people like U.S. Army Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, who oversaw Afghan war policy during the Bush and Obama administrations. "Occasionally, okay, we can overspend." "We are a rich country that can put money into a bottomless pit and the banks will not go bankrupt," Lute said. But should we? Can't we be more rational about this? ”
As you pointed out, a lot of U.S. financial aid will only exacerbate corruption in Afghanistan. "The basic assumption is that corruption is a problem in Afghanistan and we are the solution." Barnett Rubin, an expert on Afghanistan and a senior adviser to the State Department during the Obama administration, said, "But corruption has an indispensable ingredient — money — and we are the rich." ”
The Paper: Last year, Fu Limin, a former senior US diplomat, said in an interview with The Paper, "Terrorism is a tool of war, not something that can be opposed." It is not an ideology, it is not a country. It is a means, a means of violence. You really can't effectively oppose a means. "What do you think of what he said? If you go back in time to 2001, what do you think is the better option for the United States?
Craig Whitlock: As the Afghanistan Document makes clear, the United States has struggled to clearly define its goals in Afghanistan and who the enemy is. At first, in 2001, it became clear who the enemy was: al-Qaida. Bin Laden's al-Qaida officially declared war on the United States in 1996, attacking the U.S. Embassy in East Africa in 1998, the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, and the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001.
The United States initially succeeded in conducting military operations against al-Qaida's headquarters in Afghanistan. By April 2002, most al-Qaida leaders and combatants in Afghanistan had been killed, captured, or fled. Since then, however, the United States has lost its goal in Afghanistan. It slowly became embroiled in a war where the enemy was no longer primarily al-Qaida, but the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Over the next two decades, the United States fought a war with the Taliban in Afghanistan — even though the Taliban were not directly involved in the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attack.
Responsible Editor: Zhang Wuwei Photo Editor: Le Yufeng
Proofreader: Liu Wei