Since February 2024, the official social media platform of the Afghan Special Police Force Command has continuously posted dozens of photos of its SWAT team members conducting winter training. In addition to the photos, there are also many promotional videos. This social media account was created in early 2022.
The General Command of the Special Police Unit is a subsidiary of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. On September 8, 2021, the Ministry of Interior of the Interim Taliban Government of Afghanistan opened its office, marking the Taliban's formal takeover of Afghanistan's internal security affairs.
According to the image released on the official social platform of the Afghan Special Police Unit General Command (GCPSU), the Afghan special police unit is conducting winter training. (GCPSU official social platform/photo)
NATO has provided training
According to the division of departments published on the official website of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, there are 12 departments, including the public security police, the anti-narcotics police, the special forces police, and the health service police, and the special police force ranks third, which shows the importance of its status. In the division of powers published on the website of the Ministry of the Interior, the First Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directly manages the General Command of the Special Police Forces.
The "General Command of the Special Police Forces of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" is abbreviated as GCPSU in English. This is the same department and abbreviation as the previously collapsed "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Police", and it can be seen from the organizational structure that the new Afghan government has not made changes and has directly copied it, but it should have made some adjustments to the internal personnel organization.
During the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, GCPSU was a subordinate department of the Ministry of the Interior, which was mainly responsible for the work of police special forces. State-level special police units directly under the Ministry of the Interior, such as Crisis Response Team 222 (CRU-222), Commando Team 333 (CF-333), formerly known as the Afghan Special Narcotics Unit and Afghan Territorial Force 444 (ATF-444). Others, more units, are special forces units (PRUs) at the provincial level.
In addition, the training and operations of GCPSU, advised by special operations personnel from the Joint Task Force for Special Operations in Afghanistan and the NATO Special Operations Forces Command in Afghanistan (NSOCC-A).
Its Special Police Training Center (SPTC) is located in Logar province, and the completion of its courses is a prerequisite for serving in the GCPSU National Mission Unit. The SPTC is staffed by experienced officers from the provincial special forces and is responsible for selecting candidates from the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF).
Becoming a SWAT officer is a long road. The training lasts almost a full year and is divided into four phases: the first phase is 16 weeks of basic skills training; The second phase lasts for 8 weeks and is called the National Special Police Unit Member Course; The third phase lasted 24 weeks and strengthened training on urban combat, medical skills, helicopter attacks, explosive breakthroughs, and arrest techniques. The final stage is a focused and cohesive unit training cycle.
During the training, SWAT trainees will learn a variety of specialized skills: Afghan law related to the use of arrest warrants; police skills, such as body searches, use of force; As well as proficiency in weapons in combination with laser sighting and night vision devices. Cadets can then take specialized courses such as sniper training, advanced medical training, or explosive ordnance disposal. The ultimate goal is to become a super-capable SWAT team member who can handle high-risk combat missions.
Under-equipped
During the period when the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was in power, the situation of counter-terrorism and crime was severe, and many terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State were active in Afghanistan. In addition, the task of countering narcotics and eliminating narcotics in Afghanistan is also very arduous. The U.S. and NATO coalition forces, as well as the Afghan National Army, have been carrying out sustained attacks against the Taliban and terrorist groups, but with little success.
In 2005, there was a series of attacks in Kabul, Afghanistan. At that time, there were no special forces under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They sent ordinary police, members of the Afghan National Security Service and the army to fight the terrorists, causing a large number of civilian casualties. That's when they decided to create a Crisis Response Unit (CRU).
In 2006, then-National Security Adviser Hanif Atmar, during his tenure as Minister of the Interior, established a special police unit, Crisis Response Team 222 (CRU-222), whose main task was to provide a national-level tactical response to terrorist incidents such as hostage incidents and high-profile attacks, as well as high-risk arrest operations for criminals, terrorists and insurgent suspects in the Greater Kabul area. The nationwide maneuver is also supported by the Department of Defense's Afghanistan Special Mission Wing (SMW).
CRU-222 has always had NATO Special Operations Advisers to provide training, advice, and assistance to the unit. Initially instructors were served by the British Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), and later assisted by the US Army Rangers and Norwegian commandos. For example, in October 2017, the New York Police Department sent special police units and CRU-222 to conduct joint training to share experience in counter-terrorism tactics.
Initially, CRU-222 had 100 members, and by 2018, it had expanded to approximately 7,000 members. In the beginning, the CRU-222 faced serious under-armament, armed with Hungarian and Bulgarian-made AK rifles, Russian-made PKM machine guns, and Iranian-made RPGs. After active work at the US Embassy, the CRU-222 began to be reloaded with American-made M4 carbines. However, in terms of special warfare equipment, there is still a huge gap. In their day-to-day operations, CRU-222 SWAT team members tape flashlights around the barrel of their guns, and they also like to spray green camouflage patterns on the body of the gun.
Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Razib Mubariz, who served as the commander of the CRU-222, said in an interview with the media that the unit is generally divided into three groups when performing its tasks: an assault squadron, a surveillance squadron and a support squadron. A typical 60-person operation is deployed. They work 15 days and rest 15 days and are able to respond quickly to crises. The goal is to be dispatched within five minutes of receiving the order.
Mubariz was proud of his subordinates for being able to "assess the situation, develop a plan, and kill all the terrorists in a matter of minutes." "Now we can be ready in three minutes, whereas it used to take three hours." When suicide bombers attempt to take hostages on a large scale, CRU-222 is tasked with a quick sortie and kill terrorists without restrictions. According to their brutal experience, the faster they kill terrorists, the lower the casualties among civilians and themselves.
On March 7, 2017, the terrorist group ISIS-K attacked the Wazir Akbar Khan Hospital in Kabul. In this attack, the terrorists used improvised explosive devices and light weapons. CRU-222 reacted immediately, flanking the ground floor and roof of the building, and cleared all floors of the main hospital building, rescuing patients and doctors trapped inside the building. During the fighting, one SWAT officer was killed and three others were injured; All terrorists were eliminated. Unfortunately, 38 civilians were killed.
Trainees can take specialized courses such as sniper training, advanced medical training, or explosive ordnance disposal. Pictured is a former Afghan SWAT. Author/Courtesy photo
Since May 2015, GCPSU has conducted 1,591 operations, of which only 148 have required NATO assistance or served as advisers. Many missions were successful and managed to attract media attention.
As a result of the progress, former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani ordered the command to double its strength by 2020. This is a difficult task, and the Ministry of the Interior also plans to achieve broad cooperation among the various units through the formation of new units such as the national CRU-555, 888 and 999, while strengthening the training and equipment of the existing three units.
Of course, the expansion will not solve the internal problems faced by GCPSU. Logistics have been hampering the functioning of the Afghan special police unit. They also compete with other Afghan special operations forces for support capabilities. Elite units also complain that they are being misused and assigned to perform tasks beyond their capabilities. Finally, NATO advisers in the Special Operations Advisory Group had to emphasize the need for tactical patience to create conditions conducive to the success of the mission; Despite the unfavourable conditions, Afghan fighters were too impatient in carrying out their tasks.
The success of the GCPSU in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is due in large part to NATO advisers, who have helped the troops train to international standards and provided them with the appropriate cutting-edge technology, equipment and weapons.
Building an "Elite"
After the collapse of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in mid-2021, the GCPSU went through a relatively chaotic phase during the initial period of the Taliban rule. Because for a long time, GCPSU fought against the Taliban forces, and in the process of fighting between the two sides, they also formed a lot of bonds. After the Taliban took control of the situation, many of the middle and high-level commanders of the GCPSU either fled or disappeared, and many were captured by Taliban forces and sentenced to death.
Soon, however, the Taliban administration realized that they were in a new political position and had many problems to face, especially in the face of more extreme terrorist groups, and urgently needed the assistance of members of the former government armed and police forces with stronger counter-terrorism experience, especially the members of the special police units under the GCPSU, who had undergone rigorous training, had extensive experience in counter-terrorism operations, and had skills in professional fields.
The Taliban interim government soon issued an order to actively accept the return of personnel from former special operations and special police units, while ensuring that the sequence of combat units as a whole is as close as possible to the institutional mechanisms of the former government.
The well-laid out images show the ability of GCPSU to fight terrorism and vicious crime, and they are still being trained and equipped with Western ideas. (GCPSU official social platform/photo)
The Taliban are very focused on propaganda. They know how to create an atmosphere where the outside world can perceive that GCPSU is still an elite force on the front lines of counter-terrorism. Judging by the images and videos displayed on various social media, the GCPSU now looks like a special forces anywhere in the world.
If it weren't for the Taliban's "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" flag, people might think that the photo is of a U.S. special forces undergoing winter training. The well-laid out images show the ability of GCPSU to fight terrorism and vicious crime, and they are still being trained and equipped with Western ideas. The Taliban want to flex their muscles and earn the respect of the outside world. The message is that they have the responsibility to fight back against all the "terrorists" in the country. The aim is to show the outside world that they are still capable of ensuring the level of law enforcement and keeping up with the West.
Through a series of training photos and videos posted on GCPSU's social media, we may be able to analyze some of the details that appeared in the unit.
The special operators in the photo are armed with a number of Russian or American-made small arms, including DPMS "Black Panther" LRT-SASS sniper rifles, M4A1 carbines and AK-47 automatic rifles.
In terms of the types of small arms, it can be seen that the M4 carbine is the main rifle and the AK-47 is the auxiliary model. This is similar to the equipment model of the former government SWAT.
As a relatively high-level special police unit of the former government, GCPSU has certain advantages in the priority supply of equipment. Good equipment will definitely be available first, and at the same time, considering that they often cooperate with the US military or NATO units, they will also try to get closer to the US military in the selection of weapons to obtain convenience in terms of supply.
The choice of the American side in equipping GCPSU is also interesting. For example, the aforementioned "Panther" LRT-SASS sniper rifle. This is a product of the American small arms manufacturer DPMS. In 2008, it participated in the selection of the U.S. Army sniper rifle, but later lost to the Knight Arms Company (KAC) SR-25, and DPMS switched to bringing it to the civilian market.
The "Black Panther" LRT-SASS caught up with the fashionable wave of 0.308-inch caliber ammunition, but the price was lower than that of other brands of sniper rifles of the same caliber, which also attracted a lot of attention for a while. It's a pity that because of the worse trigger force control problem, it returned to "calm". It is estimated that the price is moderate, the caliber can meet the tactical needs and the support of the US military's ammunition of the same caliber, the United States and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior chose the "Black Panther" sniper rifle to equip the GCPSU.
The same example includes the choice of pistol. The Glock 17, the M92F Beretta and the Smith & Wesson SW9VE pistol can be seen in the photo. The M92F "Beretta" is supposed to come from the U.S. military's aid, which is the same as the active model when the U.S. military invaded Afghanistan at that time.
However, the choice of Glock 17 and Smith Weisson SW9VE pistols was a bit more careful. The Smith & Wesson SW9VE pistol was disputed with Glock over the technical patents, and Glock later sued Smith & Wesson in court for infringement. Smith & Wesson had to revise the base design of the SW9 and paid Glock a significant royalty. This episode has kept the Smith & Wesson SW9 priced at 40% lower than Glock.
Cheap, close to Glock, and shy-cash-strapped users who want good gear will have a hard time saying no to the Smith & Wesson SW9. Therefore, it is quite appropriate to see both pistols in the equipment sequence of the former GCPSU at the same time, and the cheap SW9VE as a supplement to Glock.
However, it can also be seen in the picture that whether it is the M4 carbine, or the sniper rifle, or the M92F, there is relatively serious wear. The anodizing treatment and polymer coating of the firearm at the time of leaving the factory are more seriously worn, revealing the original metal color of the firearm. On the one hand, this reflects the high mission intensity of the GCPSU and the frequent use of equipment, and on the other hand, it also reflects the Taliban's hidden concerns in terms of logistics and supply.
Logistical supply concerns
After the withdrawal of US troops, although the Taliban received a large amount of military supplies from US troops and the former Afghan government, according to statistics, there were more than 310,000 rifles alone. However, in the context of the subsequent supply cut off and the absence of a strong small arms industry of its own, the captured equipment will one day be depleted. At that time, the problem encountered by these handsome SWAT officers in the photos now is not whether they can take good photos, but whether they can effectively face the deadly terrorists when they carry out their missions.
On August 31, 2021 local time, after the US military withdrew from Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, Taliban special forces arrived at Hamid Karzai International Airport and obtained a large number of weapons and equipment. (Visual China/Photo)
At the same time, other problems can be observed in the photos. These SWAT officers are neatly draped, with night vision goggles, tactical vests, bulletproof helmets, logistics backpacks, noise-canceling headphones, radios, etc., and snipers are also dressed in professional gilly suits. However, the ancillary equipment of these specialties also has the aforementioned shortage of equipment, and will also need to be replaced with the extension of the service life. For example, night vision goggles have a strict service life, beyond which night observation will fail. Some of the new SWAT cadets were shown in videos taken at graduation ceremonies with a carrying rack with a tactical terminal on their chest, but the inside was empty, and several thousand dollars worth of tactical terminals were not allocated.
The lack of these ancillary equipment will also cause serious support problems for the active Afghan SWAT team members when performing their missions. In the dark night environment, night vision goggles cannot see clearly; When calling for support, the radio fails; In the rain of bullets, bulletproof helmets and body armor are too long, and the bulletproof performance decreases; When you need to figure out your location on the battlefield, the tactical terminal doesn't know what to do, or the civilian GPS fails.
The problem of the above-mentioned small equipment is easy to solve, and the international market or other large production capacity countries can provide a variety of model choices and purchases. The real problem is that without the air support of the former government army, the delivery distance of the GCPSU's elite SWAT force has been drastically reduced, and it can only rely on vehicle operations, from the long-range mobile force of the previous government to the mobile guard force of a strategic location.
Finally, the operational capability of this elite SWAT unit in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan needs to be carefully observed. Some information can be obtained from the photos and videos, but the only photos and videos cannot make an effective evaluation of its actual combat capability.
• (The author is the deputy editor-in-chief of Weapons magazine)
Xiao Ning, a special researcher at the Southern Defense Think Tank
Editor-in-charge: Yao Yijiang