Russia has set six red lines for negotiations, how many are Ukraine likely to accept?
The fourth round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine has been launched, and the fighting between the two sides on the battlefield is still going on. Can this round of negotiations really bring peace to Russia and Ukraine? In fact, this point mainly depends on whether the conditions between the two sides can be negotiated.
Since the fighting is currently taking place in Ukraine, the ability to cease fire depends mainly on the conditions proposed by the attacking side, that is, Russia. After holding talks with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in Antalya, Turkey, On the 10th, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kureba is said to have brought back a list requested by Russia to Ukraine, and the Russian side said that as long as and only if these conditions are met, a ceasefire can be achieved.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kureba.
The list has not yet been officially published, but both the Russian Free Media Network and Ukraine's Weekly Mirror, citing "reliable diplomatic sources," published a "six-point condition":
First, Ukraine has renounced its accession to NATO and maintained its neutrality, and Russia is willing to be the guarantor of Ukraine's security;
Second, to give Russian the status of the second official language of Ukraine, to remove all restrictions on the Russian language;
Third, the recognition of Russia's sovereignty over Crimea;
Fourth, the recognition of the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk;
Fifth, the de-Nazification of Ukraine and the prohibition of the activities of ultra-nationalist, Nazi and neo-Nazi parties and social organizations, and the repeal of existing laws glorifying Nazis and neo-Nazis;
Sixth, ukraine is demilitarized and completely abandons offensive weapons.
Although there is no final confirmation, these "six red lines" are fully in line with putin's goals when he launched a "special military operation against Ukraine" and has strong credibility. At first glance, these conditions have hardly been modified or conceded from the beginning, so harsh that Ukraine is almost "subjugated". It should be said that if Russia takes Kiev or subverts its current regime, it is logical for Ukraine to accept such conditions. But now that it is clear that it has not been played, there are still many cards in the Ukrainian side, and it seems unlikely that it will bow its head.
However, before the fourth round of negotiations, the Representative of the Ukrainian side said that the two sides had made positive progress and that it was possible to achieve results in the future. On the 14th local time, Alestovich, an adviser to the Office of the President of Ukraine, said that Ukraine and Russia are expected to sign a peace agreement within one to two weeks at the earliest, and a peace agreement at the latest in May. At the level of diplomatic language, this means that the six red lines drawn by Russia can be negotiated, and the Ukrainian side also said that it is impossible to fully accept the Russian conditions, which means "surrender".
Judging by the tenacity of Ukraine's current combat, this statement is somewhat strange. However, on closer inspection, politics is nothing more than the art of compromise and logic, and as long as the two sides really want to talk, even if they talk according to russia's six conditions, it is normal to be able to negotiate results. After all, it's not uncommon for both sides to declare themselves a big win after a negotiation, as long as they can give enough to the parties when a compromise is reached.
So let's see how likely Ukraine will accept these six red lines of the Russian side, and perhaps from this we can see the direction of compromise and the possible art of negotiation.
The first red line is nato, and Ukraine's acceptance can reach 90%-100%.
This point has long been made clear to Ukraine, and it can agree not to join NATO, which is an important fulcrum at which the two sides can negotiate results. However, the two sides fought so fiercely that the Ukrainians' trust in Russia is difficult to guarantee, and they may choose to join the European Union and the Visegrad group instead, rather than relying entirely on Russian security guarantees. The difference between 90 and 100 per cent of this point lies in whether there are conditions that define the conditions under which Ukraine will not be allowed to join any political group.
The second red line is to grant Russian the status of the second official language of Ukraine and to remove all restrictions on the Russian language. Ukraine has a high probability of acceptance at 100%
To do so would demonstrate Ukraine's sincerity in the pursuit of national reconciliation. Before the war, Ukraine was very wary of the general distrust of the Russian-speaking area, but the places such as Kharkiv, which was the most fiercely fought in this war, were the Russian-speaking areas, and whether or not to speak Russian and whether to recognize Ukraine does not seem to be equal. Therefore, it does not seem that the Concessions of the Ukrainian side here are a big problem, but whether Kiev will restrict the Russian language in other ways after the war (for example, from a folk and cultural point of view) is another matter.
The above two points seem to be not very problematic, if the positions of both sides are so close, then the matter will be easy to solve, but the third and fourth articles are difficult to compromise.
The third red line is the recognition of the independence of the two republics of Donbass, and the acceptance of Ukraine is 0%
This is hardly negotiable. First, almost no government will now accept concessions to change the borders; second, there is no international basis for the independence of these two "republics", and no country other than Russia has recognized their independence; and finally their self-drawn borders are far larger than the pre-war control zones, and many places are still under Ukrainian control, even if the Russian-backed Yanukovych comes to power, because his hometown is in Donbass, and it is unlikely that he will support the separation from Ukraine here.
The Russian side will most likely use it as a bargaining chip, and may end up with a high degree of autonomy as the bottom line.
The fourth red line is crimea's independence, with a 45 percent chance that Ukraine will accept it.
Although the Russian side has occupied the area for nearly a decade, it is difficult to make concessions in terms of both demographic composition and military interests. However, changing the boundaries of the land by giving up land is a "suicide" act, so Ukraine will most likely not recognize Crimea as belonging to Russia. Based on reality, Ukraine may accept to say its own thing, just to save face, so that Russia can also retain its existing achievements; however, Russia may not accept it, and will not accept it unless it is confirmed by the cession of territory. This is probably the most critical point of conflict in this negotiation.
The fifth red line is de-Nazismization and de-Russianization, which is accepted by Ukraine at 60%
This is a very flexible red line, Ukraine is unlikely to recognize itself as a Nazi, and the so-called anti-Russianization issue can also be continuously resisted by the people rather than the official. Therefore, in the joint condemnation of the Nazis and the withdrawal of ukrainian officials from expressing their anti-Russian positions, the two sides may find common ground. This is also the lowest point of this red line, which is acceptable to the Ukrainian side.
It is just that russia's subtext is to ask the Zelensky government to step down, which is probably the highest point of this red line, and if there is no huge change on the battlefield, the Ukrainian side will most likely not accept it.
The sixth red line is the de-arming of Ukraine, which is about 50% accepted.
The key is to look at the meaning of "de-armed", Ukraine can accept a continuous state of non-nuclear, non-chemical and biological weapons, refuse foreign armaments and establish bases (including Russia), but after this war, restrictions on its conventional weapons are unlikely to be accepted, Russia may reach an agreement on the bottom line of "offensive weapons that have destroyed Ukraine", and may also require restrictions on the production and import of weapons from Ukraine. When it comes to which part of all this, it is estimated that it also depends on who is more favorable to the battlefield situation.
With the arrival of the spring snow season, Russia's offensive will face greater difficulties, Ukraine's losses are also very large, and NATO's refusal to set up a no-fly zone has deeply dissatisfied Zelenskiy.
Both sides have the desire to solve the problem, so that we have expectations that the two countries can negotiate a result, but these six red lines are only the demands of the Russian side, and the Russian side demands the withdrawal of Russian troops and war reparations, and the Russian side is not expected to give a positive response soon. Even if negotiations may lead to a ceasefire, it will be difficult to accomplish the purpose of a package to resolve or even freeze the Russian-Ukrainian issue.
Peace and compromise are promising, but the sincerity of the parties will probably be fully demonstrated when it is realized that substantial progress on the battlefield cannot be made.
【End】
Welcome to the public number [Sasu] (sasutime)