The real inside story about how the 6th battle was fought and why it was not fought
On June 10, 1951, after the end of the 5th Campaign, as far as I know, the Maine government at that time had requested the mainland to negotiate an armistice in Korea through neutrality and the soviet union at the time. In a telegram to Chairman Mao Zedong on July l, General Manager Peng said: "It is absolutely necessary to fully prepare for protracted combat and to win peace talks to achieve the policy of ending the war. I can grasp the banner of peace, which is beneficial to both the Korean people and the Chinese people. Insisting on not taking the eighth line as the boundary, both sides can get by, such as the United States and leap insisting on the occupied area now, I am ready to counterattack in August. General Peng also envisioned that if the enemy was in a hurry to attack the north, the 3rd and 19th Corps would not be ready, that is, the troops on either line of defense in the U would be added. The echelon of 4 armies "fought a moderate campaign" in mid-August.
Based on his above-mentioned idea, Mr. Peng instructed the Zhisi Operations Division to draw up a battle plan for the 6th campaign, and it was planned to launch a campaign counterattack with 10 armies in the first echelon, concentrating forces to annihilate the US 3rd Division and the Turkish Brigade. The second step was to annihilate the US 25th Division (two regiments) and the 2nd Division of the South Korean Army. In addition, 5 divisions were used as the second echelon of the campaign, and the results of the battle continued to be developed as appropriate.
Following Peng's intentions and instructions, the Shiji Operations Division drew up a plan for the 6th campaign, which was to be implemented in mid-August after the rainy season in Korea.
In 1959, when Peng Zong was unfairly criticized, he also involved the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. Some people say that the plan for the 6th campaign was formulated by Peng Dehuai without authorization, which violated Chairman Mao's policy of fighting a small war of annihilation, deviated from the reality of our army at that time, and "engaged in left-leaning military adventures," and defined this as one of the crimes of General Peng's "opposition to the central authorities." To this day, Peng Zong's unjust case has been rehabilitated, but the plan for the 6th campaign is still negated.
I have repeatedly recalled the situation at that time on this issue, and I remember very clearly that General Peng instructed our Zhisi Operations Department to formulate a plan for the 6th campaign, which was formulated on the basis of Chairman Mao Zedong's instructions. In order to write this situation clearly and accurately, I had a telephone conversation with Comrade Meng Zhaohui, then chief of the operations section of the Zhi division operations department at the Academy of Military Sciences. The two of us had several longer conversations on the phone until the conversation was clear.
Comrade Meng Zhaohui said: Most of the statements on the plan for the 6th campaign are related to the fight against small annihilation battles. Therefore, it is necessary to first talk about Chairman Mao's instructions on fighting a small war of annihilation and General Manager Peng's attitude towards this instruction. Chairman Mao summed up the experience of the volunteer army in the previous battles after it entered the Korean War, and at the end of the 5th campaign on May 26, 1951, he instructed: "Successive battles have proved that it is difficult for our army to carry out a strategic or campaignary great relocation, and it is difficult to achieve the task of annihilation by encircling several divisions of the US army, or an entire division, or even a whole regiment at a time. ... ... For several months, the British army only practiced a tactical small encirclement, that is, each army carefully selected only one battalion or slightly more of the enemy army at a time and completely surrounded and annihilated it. In this way, if two or four more battles are fought, their morale must be reduced, and their confidence must be shaken, and then they can make a plan to annihilate one whole division or two or three divisions at a time, and it was through this process of small annihilation to great annihilation that we used to fight Chiang Kai-shek's New First Army, New Sixth Army, Fifth Army, Eighteenth Army, and Gui's Seventh Army. Since our army entered the DPRK, it has completed a certain distance of this small annihilation war in five campaigns, but it is not enough, and it will take several battles to complete the stage of the small annihilation war and enter the stage of the great annihilation war. As for the location of the attack, as long as the enemy is willing to advance, the more in the northern area, the better, as long as it does not exceed Pyongyang and Wonsan. In terms of the method and scale of fighting a small annihilation war, Mao Zedong pointed out at the table: "Three or four armies (which can also be a little more) are used at a time, and other units are on standby and fight when they have the opportunity." Such a rotation of combat will weaken the enemy in the summer, autumn and winter, and a large-scale offensive can be carried out in the next spring (note: 1952). ”
Meng Zhaohui said: On May 27, General Manager Peng sent a telegram to Chairman Mao and said very clearly: "The military policy instructions are completely correct and should be implemented in accordance with them." Immediately after that, general manager Peng drafted a letter according to Chairman Mao's instructions, submitted it to Chairman Mao for approval, and forwarded the letter to the volunteer armies on June 2. This shows that Peng always fully supported and carried out Chairman Mao's instructions to fight a small war of annihilation, and did not "oppose the central authorities" with Chairman Mao at all.
I said, "Old Meng, after listening to what you said, I think that someone is trying to confuse Chairman Mao's small annihilation war in the campaign with the 'zero knock kraft candy' in battle that Chairman Mao later instructed during the defensive operation of the position, and deliberately confuse it and frame General Peng, right?"
Old Meng said: What you said is completely right, that's what it is. Chairman Mao Zedong's policy of a small war of annihilation is to continue to weaken the enemy and make the transition to a war of annihilation. It is different from the small and piecemeal annihilation war carried out by our army after the implementation of position defense operations, with the enemy's company platoon units as the target of annihilation, so it is not possible for the latter to measure the operational training at that time.
Meng Zhaohui said: "After five consecutive battles in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, both sides have become equal opponents and are seeking new strategies. On May 16, 1951, the U.S. National Security Council decided to negotiate an armistice with China and North Korea in pursuit of a so-called 'glorious truce'. On June 4, Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung held talks in Beijing on the issue of operational policy and the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, and consulted Stalin. That is to say, at this time, the enemy and us are preparing for armistice negotiations, and the plan for the 6th campaign is drawn up against the background of this situation. Commenting on the 6th Campaign Plan cannot be separated from this foundation.
On June 11, 1951, Chairman Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Mr. Peng to inform him of the outcome of his talks with Prime Minister Kim Il Sung on the issue of operations. Mao Zedong said: "It has been agreed with Kim Il Sung that at present there will be no major counter-offensive campaign for two months, and preparations will be made for a sure counter-offensive in August. "I think that this idea was clearly put forward in the context of the two sides brewing up armistice negotiations, so it is undeniable that the prison elements of possible negotiations have been taken into account, and it is beyond the original idea of a small war of annihilation. On July 1, China and North Korea issued a statement agreeing to hold armistice talks. On July 2, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung and proposed that our army should "do our utmost to raise its vigilance." ... ... In the event of a large-scale attack by the enemy, our army must hold a large-scale counter-offensive and defeat it. "Chairman Mao Zedong has made it very clear that he will do. Qian Ri's focus was on cooperating with the armistice negotiations. This is the internal context in which the 6th Campaign was formulated.
What's the inside story of the postponement of Campaign 6? Meng Zhaohui said: There are materials to confirm . On July 24, 1951, Mr. Peng reported to Chairman Mao his views on the armistice negotiations and the combat readiness of our army. Mr. Peng said: "US imperialism is in a state of contradiction, and I have won several more battles,........... Persistence in reason and moderation, after complex struggles, the possibility of peace still exists. "And then Peng. The general pointed out: "We (the army) strive to complete the preparations for the counterattack of the campaign in mid-August. If the enemy does not attack, it will be held until September. On July 26, Chairman Mao sent a telegram agreeing with General Peng's opinion, and Chairman Mao Zedong said: "Before the armistice agreement is signed and the war has not really stopped, it is absolutely necessary for our army to actively prepare for the September offensive." "The armistice negotiations entered the discussions on the establishment of a demilitarized zone by determining the military demarcation line. The US side opposes the use of the '38th Line' as a boundary, and under the pretext of relying on its naval and air superiority, it attempts to seize 12,000 square kilometers of land from our side without a fight, and threatens to attack militarily. In order to combat the enemy's madness, on August 8, General Peng reported the deployment of the battle counterattack to Chairman Mao. General Manager Peng said in the report: "Preparing for a fierce battle for twenty days to a month, the fatigue casualties of the nine armies of my first echelon can no longer be fought, and the second echelon ... A total of nine armies were put into battle at the right time, and the offensive lasted for another month. ... ... Break the previous six or seven days of short-term attacks. Consuming about 40,000 enemies every month, it seems that the US imperialists may succumb to peace. ”
I said to Meng Zhaohui: "Right, right, I remember, on August 17, 1951, General Peng instructed the Zhisi Operations Department to issue an operational pre-order to the troops in the name of the Joint Division, that is, the "Sixth Campaign Predetermined Plan." It is scheduled to start the campaign with the first echelon of l0 armies. First, it concentrated its forces to annihilate the US 3rd Division and the Turkish Brigade. The second step was to annihilate the US 25th Division (two regiments) and the 2nd Division of the South Korean Army. It is also planned that 5 armies will form the first echelons of the campaign and continue to develop the results of the battle as appropriate. ”
I added: "Deputy Commander Deng Hua was in Kaesong to participate in the armistice negotiations, and after he received the Telegram of the Joint Division on August 17, he sent a telegram to General Peng on August 18. I remember that Deputy Commander Deng Hua's telegram to The gist of General Peng's suggestion was: If we do not immediately carry out a campaign counterattack at present, we should also make a tactical counterattack as much as possible, recover some places, and push forward the line of contact between us and the enemy, so that I can better understand the situation of the enemy's position and its solidity. In replying to Deng Hua's telegram, Mr. Peng expressed his agreement with Deng Hua's opinion. He also specifically explained to Deng Hua that the preparatory order of August 17 was to mobilize the whole army and actively prepare for combat, rather than specific deployment. ”
Meng Zhaohui said: The situation you just said is basically consistent with the original material. On August 19, 1951, Premier Zhou Enlai and Acting Commander Nie Rongzhen, in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, studied the advance order of August 17 in the name of General Peng in the name of the Joint Division, and issued instructions in the name of the Central Military Commission to determine the September campaign plan, "instead of stepping up preparations and not launching." The Central Military Commission analyzed the situation of the negotiations at that time and the situation between the enemy and us, and pointed out: "In terms of combat, we have also been able to cooperate with and adapt to the requirements of the negotiations. Now that we have heavy troops in our hands and the air force and artillery are gradually strengthening, the enemy cannot but have concerns about this in the course of negotiations, and now we can grasp the initiative by not launching a campaign. ”
On August 21 and 22, General Peng called the Central Military Commission twice and agreed with the Central Military Commission's analysis of the situation and the guidelines put forward. Decision: "The September campaign was changed to active preparation for war, to prevent the enemy from attacking, and to prepare for an appropriate counterattack." If the enemy does not attack for the time being, it will be decided in October. ”
On August 21, Chairman Mao sent a telegram to General Manager Peng asking him to seriously consider Deng Hua's august 18 proposal. Chairman Mao also proposed to General Manager Peng: "In September, We will be able to counterattack with such a war wood." On August 23, General Manager Peng sent a telegram agreeing to Chairman Mao's instructions. General Manager Peng said: "When there is no major campaign offensive in September, you can choose to hold a local offensive at the salient of the puppet army. ”
At that time, we only knew how General Peng instructed the Operations Department to formulate the plan for the 6th campaign, and how we were going to revise the plan later, but we did not know these internal situations at the top. The 6th campaign was not carried out because the enemy, in order to cooperate with its negotiations at Panmunjom, had already begun to exert military pressure on us, that is, in the section "Smashing the Enemy's Local Offensive in the Summer and Autumn of 1951", written in the "History of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea by the Chinese Volunteer Army", our army smashed the enemy's local offensive in summer and autumn after 5 months of counterattack operations, annihilating more than 160,000 enemy troops. The enemy admitted that the failure of the offensive was "more than worth the loss" and was forced to reach a military demarcation line agreement with us on November 27. Since then, the focus of the war has shifted to positional defense operations. The situation changed, and the 6th campaign plan naturally stopped mentioning it.
According to these internal situations mentioned by Comrade Meng Zhaohui, I have the following two understandings: The formulation and suspension of the implementation of the first and sixth campaign plans. It was entirely in accordance with the instructions of Chairman Mao and the Central Military Commission, and by no means was General Peng's unauthorized act of 'opposing the central authorities': The second and sixth campaign plans were very imposing, but the goal of annihilating the enemy was not large. This shows that when drawing up the campaign plan, we have learned from the experience of the past when we opened our mouths too much and it was not easy to completely annihilate the enemy, rather than trying to fight a war of annihilation. Some people say that Peng Zong still wants to fight a big battle in order to avenge the losses he suffered during the transfer of the 5th campaign, and this understanding is not only unfounded, but also very wrong."
Comrade Meng Zhaohui completely agreed with my view and clearly pointed out that it was absolutely necessary and a requirement of the situation to draw up a plan for the 6th campaign at that time, and that after the plan formulated by the Operations Department was in line with the intentions of General Peng and the Central Military Commission, it was very correct for the Central Military Commission to determine the plan but not to issue it to ensure the initiative.
Explore the 6th Campaign Plan. Not only to restore history as it was. And also to learn from it. A comprehensive and correct understanding of the before, after, and a series of command and practice activities before and after the formulation of the 6th Campaign Plan is of great significance for us to study and study chairman Mao, the Central Military Commission, and General Peng's art of controlling the war and the art of commanding the battlefield, and we have received many profound lessons from it. For example, first, the principle of subordinating military struggle to political struggle is concretely applied to how it should be embodied in the question of operations. Specifically, how the purpose and timing of operations should be coordinated with and adapted to the needs of political (negotiation) struggles; second, how war instructors and battlefield commanders should strive for and maintain their own initiative, how to embody the operational enthusiasm of mobilizing commanders and fighters of the whole army in operational arrangements, and so on; when peng considered operational arrangements, he regarded mobilizing the operational enthusiasm of the commanders and fighters of the whole army as an important factor, which is very enlightening; third, the Central Military Commission finally determined the principle of having heavy troops in hand and not preparing for them, so as to ensure the initiative. It is a profound innovation in the art of war and has achieved practical results.
From the internal situation of the enemy at that time, it also fully proved that the strategic and campaign decisions of the Central Military Commission, Chairman Mao Zedong, and Commander Peng Dehuai were not only completely consistent, but also very wise and correct.
According to the "Operational Report of the United Nations Army" and foreign reports sent to the Security Council by The United Nations commander-in-chief Of the "United Nations Army" released by the United States after the war, li qiwei, insulted the security council for half a month, and revealed that the enemy was quite uneasy internally after learning of our military warfare activities. In his report, Ridgway repeatedly reminded the Security Council that the Chinese and DPRK armies were going to launch an offensive. He said: "A large number of Chinese reinforcements have arrived in South Korea, and a strong artillery reserve has been sent to the front line and is preparing to launch a new offensive." "A soldier replenishment is underway. We have vigorously strengthened combat preparation activities such as military stations and bases, and have made great progress. "The enemy's manpower, equipment, supplies are enough to attempt a major offensive." "The enemy will soon launch the 6th offensive." Wait a minute. An "insider report" written by American columnist Allen said that Richmond had submitted to the US policymaking authorities the "darkest report" since the armistice negotiations began. Ridgway 's greatest concern is the unsatisfactory development of the enemy's troops (referring to the rear of our army) and the clear indication that the Communist Party is ready to turn around when the day comes, that is, to launch an all-out war. ... ... The Communists took advantage of the silence of the battle to not just build up their ground forces. It also greatly expanded the strength of its air force. Now from the lowest estimate, the Communists may send six hundred jet fighters at a time ... The situation on the ground is equally depressing. The most recent estimate is that the strength of the communist army exceeds nine} - ten thousand people. It is said that Ridgway's report has caused strong shock in the US decision-making authorities. Some people have been "eager to advocate an armistice in Korea" and urged the Us "Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the overall strategy of the Korean War." ”
The above facts fully show that the preparation for the 6th campaign put a lot of pressure on the enemy, and it bound the hands and feet of the enemy. At that time, the enemy did everything in his power to obstruct and delay the armistice negotiations, but he did not dare to break the negotiations; if he wanted to exert military pressure on me and force us to submit, he could only carry out a partial offensive and did not dare to carry out an all-out offensive. The enemy's decision-making has always been in contradiction. The formation of this situation of the enemy is directly related to the policy of holding heavy troops in the hands of our Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, and preparing for but not issuing them, at least as one of its important factors. The ancients said that soldiers have "soldiers who surrender without fighting" and said, I think that the preparations for the 6th battle should be well deserved.
This is the real situation of Peng Zong's preparation for the 6th campaign plan.