The Middle East commented that | the President of Israel or visit Turkey, but the road to reconciliation between the two countries is difficult to be optimistic

The Paper's special contributor Liu Zhongmin

Recently, there have been positive signs of relaxation in Turkey's relations with Israel. According to Israel's Jerusalem Post, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavushoglu called Israeli Foreign Minister Il Rapid on Jan. 20, the first call between senior diplomats of the two countries in 13 years. On February 3, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Israeli President Herzog would visit Turkey in mid-March, but the Israeli president's office has yet to respond. Erdogan also said at a Jan. 18 news conference that Turkey was willing to cooperate with Israel in building a gas pipeline to Europe via Turkey after the United States said it did not support the plan of Greece, Israel and Cyprus to jointly build an eastern Mediterranean pipeline. It is also reported that Erdogan and Herzog have spoken by phone three times since the formation of the new Israeli government, and the two sides are currently negotiating Herzog's visit to Turkey.

In 2021, complex internal and external factors have led to the intensification of the strategic dilemma of major powers in the Middle East, and many contradictions erupted in the "Arab Spring" have been relatively eased, which in turn has led to a positive relaxation of regional major country relations. There have been positive interactions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries, Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries, relations within the Gulf Cooperation Council, and relations between Arab countries and Syria. According to reports, Iran and Saudi Arabia are actively preparing for the resumption of diplomatic relations. While continuing to confront and clash with Iran and the Palestinian Hamas, Israel has also broken through from the periphery, continuously improved its relations with Arab countries, and normalized relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco in 2020-2021.

At a time when the wind of détente between major powers in the Middle East is blowing, Turkey and Israel, as two important regional powers, have not been implemented at the operational level despite the goodwill of the leaders of the two sides in 2021 to improve relations. During the Cold War, Turkey was the first Islamic country to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic relations with it; with the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the relationship between Turkey and Israel was frictional over the Palestinian issue, but there was no serious conflict between the two sides. The two sides also established a close strategic alliance in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. With the obstruction of the Middle East peace process after 2000 and the outbreak of conflicts between Palestine and Israel on many occasions, especially the return of Turkey's diplomacy to the Middle East after the Justice development Party came to power in 2002, the relations between Turkey and Israel have taken a sharp turn for the worse, the two sides have attacked each other on the Palestinian-Israeli issue and the Kurdish issue, two core issues of mutual concern, and friction and conflict have continued on almost all hot issues in the Middle East. In 2010 and 2018, the two countries recalled the ambassadors of each other's countries twice.

Despite recent signs of détente in Turkish-Israeli relations, turkey's foreign ministry continues to blame Israel's Palestinian policies, while Turkey's ministry of worship organized a "seminar aimed at raising awareness of the conflict in Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque."

Considering that Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and other countries have improved since 2021, it seems reasonable for Turkey to improve relations with Israel. However, as far as Turkey's relations with Israel in the past 20 years are concerned, the interests and entanglements of interests between the two sides are far more complicated than Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and other countries. The serious differences between the two countries on the core issues of Palestine and Kurdism determine that the prospects for easing their relations are still difficult to be optimistic.

Erdogan demonstrated the territorial changes between Palestine and Israel at a meeting. Al Jazeera picture

I. Cooperation and Contradictions between Turkey and Israel in the 20th Century (1949-2000)

Turkey recognized the state of Israel in 1949, not only as one of the first to recognize it, but also as the first of the Muslim-majority countries to recognize Israel. However, fearful of Arab opposition, it has adopted a more cautious approach to maintaining contact with Israel.

In 1958, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Mendez met in secret, and the two sides reached a "peripheral pact" to strengthen cooperation between the two sides in intelligence and military. The agreement was a practice of the strategic thinking of Israel's "peripheral alliance", which was proposed by Baruch Uziel, an Israeli parliamentarian, in 1948. He believed that arab States posed the greatest threat to Israel, and that Israel must develop alliances with non-Arab nations and countries to build a stronger alliance than the Arabs. Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion embraced and developed this idea, arguing that Israel should strengthen its relations with Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia and other countries beyond its rival Arab neighbors. (See Zhang Bo, A Review of Turkey-Israel Relations in the Cold War, in West Asia and Africa, No. 8, 2010, p. 46.) Although the Turkish-Israeli "peripheral alliance" was established, because Turkey did not want to offend Arab countries, Turkish-Israeli cooperation was still relatively low-key or even secretive.

After entering the 1960s, Turkey's alliance with the United States was severely frustrated, especially the United States was pressured by the Soviet Union to agree to withdraw missiles deployed in Turkey, and warned Turkey not to send troops to Cyprus on the Cyprus issue (see Liu Zhongmin: "Allies on Different Paths": "U.S.-Turkey Relations Between Enemies and Friends, Enemies and Friends", https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_15328754). Turkey had to turn to Arab countries and even the Soviet Union for diplomatic support, and Israel's constant attacks and occupation of Jerusalem in the Arab-Israeli war also put Turkey as an Islamic country under great moral pressure on its relations with Israel.

Against this background, Turkey stopped the Turkish-Israeli secret agreement signed in 1958 in 1966. In the Third Middle East War in 1967, Turkey did not allow the United States to support Israel through Turkish military bases, opposed Israel's forcible occupation of Arab territory by force, and actively provided humanitarian assistance to Arab countries. During the Fourth Middle East War in 1973, Turkey still refused U.S. aid to Israel through Turkish military bases. Islamist parties that emerged in the 1970s, such as the National Order Party and the National Salvation Party, strongly condemned Israel and Zionism, and in November 1975, the Turkish government supported the United Nations resolution on the classification of Zionism as racist. (See The Pre-Wave, pp. 47-48.) ）

Since then, Turkey has established contacts with fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Organization, making the palestinian issue a sensitive issue in Turkish-Israeli relations. In 1974, Turkey recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians; in 1979, PLO leader Yasser Arafat traveled to Turkey to open an office of the PLO in Ankara, leading to a serious decline in Turkish relations with Israel; in July 1980, the Knesset passed the Jerusalem Act declaring Jerusalem to be Israel's inalienable capital. Turkey condemned Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and closed its consulate in Jerusalem while downgrading diplomatic relations between the two countries to the rank of second secretary. Turkey thus won the support of Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia's economic assistance.

However, Turkey has not interrupted diplomatic relations with Israel, especially the cooperation between the two countries in the security and military fields is still going on in secret. Secret exchanges between the two countries' intelligence agencies have also been ongoing, and Turkey has still agreed to the passage of Israeli Air Force aircraft through its airspace.

In the 1980s, the U.S. push for peace in the Middle East and the détente of U.S.-Turkey relations after Ozal became Prime Minister of Turkey created the conditions for détente between Turkey and Israel. Egypt's signing of a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 greatly reduced pressure from Arab countries in Turkey-Israel relations. In 1982, Turkey abstained in voting on a United Nations resolution condemning Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights; in 1983, when Edzal became Prime Minister of Turkey, he advocated strengthening Turkey's strategic relationship with the United States and emphasized the need to secure U.S. assistance to Turkey through the development of relations with Israel. Against this backdrop, the pace of improving relations between Turkey and Israel has accelerated. In September 1986, Turkey sent diplomats at the ambassadorial level to Tel Aviv as chargé d'affaires, and in the mid-1980s, Turkey's economic and trade cooperation with Israel and military and security cooperation continued to strengthen. The resurgence of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 1987 and the outbreak of the first great Palestinian intifada led to a surge of anti-Israel calls in Turkish society, but this did not affect the further development of official relations between Turkey and Israel.

The establishment of US hegemony in the Middle East after the 1991 Gulf War, the intensification of the division of the Arab world, and the significant progress made in the Middle East peace process have all created conditions for Turkey to improve relations with Israel. In this context, Turkey has resumed its contacts at the ambassadorial level with Israel, but has also taken care to maintain a balance in its relations with Israel and Palestine. On 19 December 1991, Turkey announced that it would simultaneously upgrade its diplomatic relations with Both Palestine and Israel to the ambassadorial level.

In the 1990s, Turkey and Israel took advantage of the post-Cold War changes in the international and regional environment – the Madrid Peace Conference, the Gulf War and the Oslo Accords – to transform their relationship from an economic one to a strong security partnership. The 1990s Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance was based on "a combination of expedient measures on both sides, in part because both sides saw Syria as a security threat." ”

The strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel is mainly reflected in the Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation Agreement signed by the two countries in 1996. The agreement stipulates that Turkey will allow Israeli aircraft to enter its airspace, allow Israel to use its airports for emergency landings, and that naval vessels of the two countries can enter each other's ports and hold military exercises; Israel will help modernize the Turkish Air Force and improve the combat capabilities of Turkey's existing American fighter jets. In practice, after the signing of the cooperation agreement, the Israel Defense Forces helped the Turkish forces to update their equipment, the Israeli Air Force entered Turkey for training, the two countries decided to jointly produce air-to-surface missiles, and held joint naval and air military exercises in the Mediterranean.

In addition, the economic and social exchanges between the two countries are also deepening, and tourism and trade are growing. After the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, Israel quickly provided official and private assistance, gaining Turkey's favor. In 2000, Israel and Turkey signed an agreement allowing Israel to purchase water resources from Turkey and signed the first memorandum of understanding to promote scientific cooperation. A U.S. study commented that during the Cold War, "the relationship between Israel and Turkey was more of a marriage of convenience, and from 1992 to 2000, the relationship entered a honeymoon period."

II. The Long-Term Crisis and Reconciliation Dilemmas in Turkish-Israeli Relations since the 21st Century (2000-2016)

The second Palestinian intifada erupted in late 2000 and the 2002 electoral victory of turkey's Justice and Development Party (JEP) all shook the alliance between Turkey and Israel as Erdogan became prime minister against Israel's growing ideology and politicization in Turkey. For example, in 2004, after Israel assassinated Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin, Erdogan denounced it as a "terror act" and condemned Israel's "state terrorism" practices in Gaza. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations and civilian and military cooperation between the two sides were maintained.

Israel's withdrawal from Gaza led to a brief improvement in Israeli-Turkish relations. In May 2005, Erdogan visited Israel — his first and only visit to date — and he invited Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to visit Ankara. In September 2005, Turkey facilitated the first public official talks between Israel and the Palestinians, which were seen as an important outcome of Turkey's quest to advance its good offices diplomacy in the region.

But Hamas's victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, followed by meetings between Hamas leaders and Turkish government officials at AKP headquarters, upset the balance between Israel and Turkey. The escalation of violence in Gaza and israel's war with Lebanon's Allah Party in 2006 led to a surge of public condemnation and popular protests against Israel in Turkey. Nevertheless, relations between Israel and Turkey have been maintained. In 2007-2008, Turkey even brokered secret negotiations between Israel and Syria.

2008 was a watershed year in Turkey's relations with Israel. Three days after Israeli Prime Minister Olmert visited Turkey and discussed Israeli-Syrian relations with Erdogan, Israel launched operation Cast Lead against Gaza, which not only ended the Israeli-Syrian peace process, but also changed Israel-Turkey relations. Erdogan sees Israel's actions as an insult to him personally and a fatal blow to bilateral relations. It was for this particular reason that at the subsequent World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009, Erdogan openly clashed with Israeli President Shimon Peres.

Since then, diplomatic clashes between the two sides have intensified, with the Turkish side calling Israel's actions in Gaza a "genocide" and Israel saying it would recognize Turkey's actions against armenians during World War I as "genocide." At that time, turkey's diplomatic disputes with Israel had affected military cooperation between the two sides. For example, Turkey blocked Israel from participating in the Anatolian Eagle military exercise, and the United States and Italy withdrew from the exercise in protest, leading to the cancellation of the exercise.

The May 2010 Incident of the Mavi Marmara, the first conflict in the history of bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel, led to the withdrawal of ambassadors from each other's countries, bringing diplomatic relations to a standstill for six years. The Blue Marmara was purchased by the Turkish Islamic NGO, the Insani Yardım Vakfım [IHH], to participate in the Gaza rescue fleet and seek to break Israel's blockade of Gaza at sea. Because the ship did not heed the Warning of the Israeli Navy, IDF commandos attacked it, resulting in the deaths of 10 Turkish activists, one of whom was a dual citizen of the United States and Turkey. After the incident, the good offices of the United States were also fruitless, the relations between Turkey and Israel were downgraded to the chargé d'affaires level, and the relations between the two countries entered a long period of turmoil and estrangement.

Since 2015, changes in the situation in the Middle East have contributed to reconciliation in Israeli-Turkish relations.

First, the two countries' common interests in Syria have increased, and both governments have shifted from seeking regime change in Syria to placing more emphasis on their own interests. Turkey's top priority is to prevent the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish autonomous region or independent state in Syria, while Israel has strenuously avoided Iran and Lebanon's Allah party from establishing bases against Israel on its northern border.

Second, Turkey and Israel have a common interest in containing and guarding against Iran. The two countries have long worried about Iran, with the 2015 U.S. nuclear deal with Iran and Iran's rising influence in Syria and Iraq, fueling Israeli and Turkish concerns about Iranian expansion.

Finally, following the discovery of the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas fields, the development and pipeline construction have brought Turkey and Israel to share economic and political interests. Turkey's shooting down of Russian bombers in November 2015 prompted Turkey to recognize the importance of getting rid of its energy dependence on Russia and the need to seek other energy partners in the region, and the discovery of the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas fields provided an opportunity for Turkish-Israeli cooperation.

As a result of these factors, representatives of Turkey and Israel signed a preliminary agreement on normalization of relations in December 2015, which included a $20 million compensation fund for victims of the Blue Marmara incident and Israel's extradition of a senior Hamas leader from Turkey. At the end of June 2016, the two sides signed a settlement agreement. The main elements of the agreement reportedly include: in addition to compensation, Israel will allow Turkey to carry out infrastructure construction in Gaza (such as hospitals, power plants and desalination facilities); in order to maintain long-term alliances, Turkey is committed to passing a bill and no longer claim compensation to the Israel Defense Forces; Turkey has promised not to allow Hamas to carry out any terrorist or military activities against Israel from Turkish territory.

Of course, the core obstacles to Turkey's relations with Israel have not been resolved, and both sides have adopted pragmatic tactics. Turkey has abandoned its demand that Israel lift the blockade of the Gaza Strip, and Israel has accepted the continued presence of Hamas in Turkey.

Iii. Convergence of Interests and Conflicts of Interest in Current Relations between Turkey and Israel (since 2016)

The normalization of relations between Israel and Turkey at the end of 2016 was an important milestone. However, the contradictions in the relations between the two countries have not been completely resolved, and the relationship between the two sides has both the convergence of interests and the conflict of interests, and it is extremely complicated. In the field of convergence of interests, the two governments have cooperated in the economic, energy and security fields, but the relationship between the two sides still faces multiple obstacles, and the distrust between the political leaders and the public of the two countries, especially the two sides on the Palestinian issue, the Kurdish issue, and the serious differences between Turkey and Israel, Cyprus and Greece on the energy issue, are structural contradictions in the relationship between the two sides.

1. Economic interests are the greatest convergence of interests of both sides

From 2010 to 2016, the Turkish-Israeli diplomatic crisis caused a certain impact on bilateral economic cooperation. After the Blue Marmara incident, the number of Israeli companies operating in Turkey decreased, with 33% of Israeli companies stopping operations in Turkey. However, Israel and Turkey are largely able to distinguish between economic and strategic relations. Despite the freeze on diplomatic relations between the two countries, bilateral trade has increased. Bilateral trade has been on the rise as relations between the two countries have eased. By 2017, Israel was one of Turkey's top ten export markets, and Turkey was Israel's fifth-largest trading partner, after the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Netherlands.

Another economic interest of Israel is turkey's reopening of the aviation market to EL AL. The resumption of EL AL flights to Turkey has brought substantial economic benefits to Israel. In addition, Israel and Turkey share great interests in the field of tourism. The "Blue Marmara" incident and the Turkish terrorist attack have affected tourism on both sides, resulting in a serious decline in tourists, and only after 2016 has it recovered significantly.

2. There are still huge uncertainties in the field of energy cooperation where interests intersect and divergence coexist

Turkey's oil and gas cooperation with Israel around the Eastern Mediterranean is constrained by complex political, security, economic and technical factors involving several other countries that may be involved in the development of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In 2010, the Leviathan gas field was discovered off the coast of Israel, estimated to hold between 470 billion and 620 billion cubic meters of natural gas. The development of the gas field could cost about $4 billion. Israel has two sides of the argument for energy development and pipeline construction cooperation with Turkey: proponents argue that the Turkish market is technically viable and economically profitable, and that there is a need to diversify gas supply in Turkey; skeptics stress that the construction of an undersea pipeline from the Leviathan gas field to Turkey would cost an estimated $2 billion to $4 billion, with potential political conflicts posing serious challenges to protecting the pipeline. Another major factor in the construction of the Israeli-Turkish pipeline is the role of Cyprus. Cypriot officials have made it clear that they will not allow the pipeline to pass through their exclusive economic zone unless the conflict with Turkey is resolved and Israel supports Cyprus' position. In July 2017, peace talks between Turkey and Cyprus broke down, further exacerbating political obstacles to the Israeli-Turkish pipeline.

The bigger problem behind the development of oil and gas in the Eastern Mediterranean is the political game of all parties. After the Blue Marmara incident, Israel's relations with Cyprus and Greece have been strengthening. In December 2017, Israel signed an agreement with Cyprus, Greece and Italy to explore the construction of the 1,200-mile EastMed pipeline. Israel has also been exploring cooperation with Jordan and Egypt. As a result, Turkey's relations with Israel are constrained by the complex relations of Turkey, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, And Egypt, as well as the influence of great powers such as the United States and Russia.

3. The question of Palestine and the Kurdish issue are the core differences in the political relationship between the two sides

Since the AKP came to power, the conflict between Turkey and Israel over the Palestinian issue has escalated, and factional competition between Fatah and Hamas within Palestine has complicated the triangular relationship between Turkey, Israel and Palestine. The differences between Turkey and Israel on the question of Palestine focus on two main areas — Gaza and East Jerusalem. The opening of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem in May 2018 and the outbreak of two Gaza conflicts in 2018 and 2021 have strained relations between Turkey and Israel.

One of Turkey's demands on Israel is the lifting of the blockade of Gaza, which demands that Turkey stop sheltering Hamas leaders on its territory. Some American scholars believe that because the Justice and Development Party supports the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the parent organization of Hamas, the Relationship between Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey is not based on common interests, but on a common ideology. Some Israeli officials believe that members of Hamas's military wing are still operating in Turkey and receive financial support from the Justice and Development Party. Thus, the differences between Turkey and Israel over Hamas are a deep conflict involving the ideology of the Justice and Development Party, while Israel links Turkey's support for Hamas with support for Islamic radicalism and influence on the Palestinian political process, thus deepening the hostility between the two sides. For example, diplomatic retaliation and verbal scathing attacks between Erdogan and then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after the may 2018 conflict in Gaza were a concentrated manifestation of this contradiction, and the two sides even recalled their ambassadors to each other's countries.

The east Jerusalem issue is another focal point of tension between Turkey and Israel. Turkey has repeatedly accused Israel of trying to change the status quo in Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, while Israel has denounced Turkey's political support for Islamist groups in East Jerusalem. In December 2017, Erdogan opposed U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, more strongly than any other Muslim leader. Netanyahu, on the other hand, condemned Erdogan and Turkey's policies toward the Kurds, internal dissidents and the extremist group Islamic State.

The REPORT of the RAND Corporation of the United States believes that the medium- and long-term relationship between Turkey and Israel will be mainly affected by the Palestinian-Israeli issue, the tension between the two countries in the political and security fields will be difficult to change, and the frequency of tension and relaxation will also be synchronized with the periodic outbreak and relaxation of the Palestinian issue. Since Israeli-Palestinian relations are unlikely to improve in the short term, it is unlikely that there will be major changes in Turkey-Israel relations in the short term. Although both countries have threatened to sever relations and expel ambassadors from each other, relations between the two sides will not completely break down.

The Kurdish issue is another important influencing factor in Turkish-Israeli relations. Since the 1960s, Israel has maintained cautious military, intelligence, and commercial ties with Iraqi Kurds, in part to create a buffer zone against Iraq's Saddam Regime and Iran. In June 2014, Netanyahu became the first national leader to express support for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; on September 25, 2017, before the Iraqi Kurds held an independence referendum, Netanyahu strongly supported the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) to hold an independence referendum, which caused strong dissatisfaction from the Turkish government, especially Erdogan.

In short, the convergence of interests and conflicts of interest between Turkey and Israel are intertwined and complex, involving issues such as each other's core interests and domestic politics, as well as regional affairs and a complex game of a series of state and non-state actors inside and outside the region. The two sides will maintain some cooperation in the economic, energy and security fields, but strategic differences on a range of political and security issues, as well as the deep distrust accumulated in the past two decades, make it difficult to be optimistic about the complete reconciliation between the two sides.

"Middle East Review" is a column by Professor Liu Zhongmin of the Institute of Middle East Studies of Shanghai University of foreign Chinese, which adheres to the combination of reality, theory and foundation, and responds to practical problems with historical and theoretical depth.

Responsible editor: Zhu Zhengyong Photo editor: Zhang Tongze

Proofreader: Yan Zhang