Stills from the Soviet-Polish War
01
In the 1920 Soviet-Polish War, the Polish army defeated 800,000 Soviet troops, blocking the pace of Soviet Russia's expansion to the West and the export of revolution.
The road to the west was impassable, and the Soviets set their sights on the east.
With the resumption of Sino-Russian communications in 1920, the Soviet government and the Comintern successively sent representatives to China to investigate China's military and political situation and look for supporters and potential collaborators.
Left: Coat of arms of the Comintern; right: Lenin
These deputies focused on inspecting Wu Peifu, Zhang Zuolin, Sun Yat-sen, Chen Jiongming, Feng Yuxiang, and others; after a period of contacts, Zhang Zuolin, Wu Peifu, and Chen Jiongming were successively passed away.
Zhang Zuolin is pro-Japanese and hostile to Soviet Russia, and the two sides have always been inseparable from talking about the Middle East railway and the Outer Mongolia issue, and the Middle East railway and the Outer Mongolia issue are the core interests of Soviet Russia, and unless there is war, it will never give up, which means that There is no possibility of cooperation between Soviet Russia and Zhang Zuolin.
Zhang Zuolin
Powerful and clean-ended, Wu Peifu was once very enlightened and progressive, and the Soviets at first spoke highly of him, believing him to be a progressive warlord and praising him for "combining the thoughtfulness of a philosopher with the wisdom of a sophisticated and courageous politician and a genius military strategist." However, Wu Peifu also refused to give in on the middle east railway and outer Mongolia issues, and he was very dismissive of the Soviet Russia set. The talks between the two sides collapsed.
Chen Jiongming was a well-known powerful faction, and at first his position in the eyes of Soviet Russia surpassed that of Sun Yat-sen, and he was the highest priority of the Soviet Union. However, as he broke up with Sun Yat-sen, the value of his investment shrank significantly, coupled with his reservations about the attitude towards Soviet Russia, which was eventually abandoned by Soviet Russia.
In the end, Feng Yuxiang, an alternative who had split off from the Beiyang warlords, and Sun Yat-sen, who had repeatedly lost battles on the road of revolution, became the targets of the Soviet Union's alliance.
Left: Yue Fei; Right: Newspaper report on "Sun Wen Yue Fei Declaration"
In January 1923, the publication of the Joint Declaration of Sun Wen and Yue Fei marked the establishment of a practical alliance between the Soviet Union and Sun Yat-sen. After that, money, weapons, and advisers from the Soviet Union arrived in Guangzhou.
There is a question: Why did Sun Yat-sen, a supporter of American-style democracy, and the original form of government of the Republic of China, which was designed by reference to and modeled on the separation of powers of the United States, suddenly turn to embrace the totalitarian state of Soviet Russia?
Sun Yat-sen himself explained it this way:
"The Republic of China is like my child, he is now in danger of drowning. I'm going to try to keep him from sinking, and we're being swept away by the rapids in the river. I asked The British and the United States for help, and they stood on the bank of the river laughing at me, and then came the straw of Soviet Russia, because I was going to drown, and I had to grab it, and the British and the United States shouted at me on the shore, don't grab the straw, but they don't help me. They laughed and told me not to grasp the straw of Soviet Russia, which I knew was better than nothing. ”
Sun Yat-sen entertained Soviet advisers at a banquet at Shaoguan
When a Reporter from the New York Times asked whether Soviet Russia was democratic, Sun Yat-sen replied: As long as they are willing to help me overthrow the Beiyang government, I don't care whether they are democratic or not.
Sun Yat-sen engaged in decades of revolution, defeated and defeated, looking for Foreign Aid from Europe and the United States, and reaping only sneers, at this time, Soviet Russia was willing to teach him the secrets of revolution by hand, and was willing to help him with real money and silver. Sun Yat-sen broke through the defenses, and only then did he decide to unite with Russia and take Russia as his division.
02
After clarifying the alliance between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang, let's look at the Northern Expedition and Soviet aid.
Many people believe that the Northern Expeditionary Army relied on the money and weapons aided by the Soviet Union to crush the Beiyang warlords with the momentum of destruction and decay.
This view is not correct.
The Soviet Union's assistance to the Guangdong Nationalist Government can be roughly divided into three aspects: one is model transplantation, the other is technical guidance and support, and the third is money, weapons and material assistance.
Obviously, the first two are to teach people to fish, which is equivalent to helping the Kuomintang to enhance their internal strength and teach superb moves, and the last one is to teach people to fish, similar to sending a weapon to take advantage of.
The role of weapons only accelerates the process of unifying the rivers and lakes, and internal skills and moves are the core of dominating martial arts.
Borodin (center) in China
Let's start with pattern porting.
Revolutions have failed repeatedly, and Sun Yat-sen has reflected on the reasons, arguing that the Kuomintang lacks a clear revolutionary program, is weak and scattered, many party members are either corrupt and degenerate, or demoralized, and the party organizations are almost paralyzed.
One example illustrates this phenomenon vividly: when Borodin asked Sun Yat-sen how many members of the Kuomintang there were, Sun Yat-sen could not answer.
In the eyes of the Soviet representatives, the Kuomintang was not a modern political party, but more like a gang organization—a loose organization, a vague political program, and a complex internal faction, all supported by the prestige of Sun Yat-sen. Such a party is not a matter of combat effectiveness.
The Kuomintang was sick, the Soviet Union had medicine.
The set of secrets that the Soviet Union had explored and developed, tested by brutal war, proved to be very useful.
Its highly centralized decision-making and mobilization system can mobilize resources from all aspects to the greatest extent possible to serve politics and war, and can achieve uniformity, order prohibition, upload and issue, such as arm and finger, and rapidly enhance the combat effectiveness of the army in a short period of time.
In view of this, Sun Yat-sen was determined to reorganize the Kuomintang in a drastic way, and the method of reorganization was to learn from Soviet Russia, ask Borodin, the general adviser of Soviet Russia in Guangzhou, to be the kuomintang's organizational coach, to train the Kuomintang in Russian methods, to turn the Kuomintang into an organized, disciplined, and powerful party, and to rely on this party to build and govern the country.
Borodin's Letter of Appointment issued by Sun Yat-sen
He understood that the revolution could not rely solely on force, so it was necessary to build a revolutionary army, so that Party members should fight in coordination with the army, rely on the power of doctrine, propagate doctrine to the masses, transform the people's psychology, impress the people, and so on.
In November 1923, the Declaration on the Reorganization of the Kuomintang of China, the Draft Program of the Kuomintang of China, and the Draft Constitution of the Kuomintang of China were simultaneously published, in which the Kuomintang established the principle of democratic centralism, emphasized the relationship between the upper and lower levels and strict organization and strict discipline, and required the formation of a party group (similar to the Party Committee) in the various organizations active of the Kuomintang, so that the Party's principles and policies could be effectively implemented.
In July 1925, the National Government was established, establishing the background of "party rule" - the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the Political Committee held the highest power, and the National Government was guided and supervised by the Chinese Kuomintang and was in charge of national affairs, which also meant that the Chinese Kuomintang monopolized national power and ruled the country with the party.
Obviously, this is also learned from the Soviet Union - its originality and ingenuity.
At the inauguration of the National Government, the far rightmost man crossed his leg was Borodin
03
Before the reorganization, the Kuomintang was in a state of decline, and the armies under its command were also in disarray, including the Dian Army, the Gui Army, the Xiang Army, the Guangdong Army, the Yu Army, the Gan Army, the Shanshan Army, and so on.
In essence, these armies are no different from the Beiyang army, the generals support themselves, the ranks are scattered, the system is disordered, the combat strength is worrying, and many people do not really listen to Sun Yat-sen's command.
Relying on such a force to deal with the Beiyang warlords is tantamount to a fool's dream.
Therefore, it has become a top priority to transform these miscellaneous armies into a genuine revolutionary army.
Under the guidance and assistance of The Military General Adviser Gallen, in July 1925, the Nationalist government established the Military Commission, which defined the subordination between the Party and the army from the top level of design, as well as a high degree of centralization and unification of military leadership.
After the establishment of the Central Military Commission, through a series of personnel adjustments and system design, the various armies under the jurisdiction of the National Government in Guangzhou were unified and reorganized into the National Revolutionary Army, and military power was grasped.
gallon
Gallen also transplanted the "three-three system" organization system of the Soviet Red Army into the National Revolutionary Army, with each division having 3 regiments, 9 battalions, and a total of 27 infantry companies, abolishing the brigade-level establishment, setting up guard battalions, artillery battalions, supplementary battalions, communications companies, engineer companies, and other small detachments at the division level, and assigning machine gun companies, reconnaissance companies, technical companies, health companies, logistics companies, and supplementary companies at the division level.
Compared with the beiyang army's organizational system, the "three-three system" is more capable and flexible, which is convenient for giving play to the combat effectiveness of the army.
Compared with the Beiyang army, the biggest feature of the National Revolutionary Army is the introduction of the party-army system, that is, the army political work system.
The Kuomintang believes that the Russian-style military political work system can not only monitor the political loyalty of officers and soldiers, but also unite the centripetal force of the troops, boost morale, and even shoulder the tasks of propaganda and mobilization of the masses, which can be called the strongest buff auxiliary skills on the battlefield.
When Chiang Kai-shek led a delegation to the Soviet Union to investigate, he also appreciated this system, and after his return, he presided over the work of the Whampoa Military Academy, immediately began to experiment with the organization of the party-oriented army, and began to set up party representatives in the new army.
The political work system was not consistent among the various armies, and the First Army (Commander Chiang Kai-shek), composed of Whampoa Military Academy students as the backbone, implemented it best, and the other armies followed suit the First Army, but they were almost meaningless.
Borodin
However, it is better to have than nothing, even if it is not thoroughly implemented, it is stronger than the Beiyang Army.
It is worth mentioning that the Kuomintang took Russia as a teacher, not a complete transplantation of the Soviet system, it has some reservations, the guiding ideology and political system is still its own, this is the bottom line, what it learned from the Soviet Union is a more practical organizational system, revolutionary methods, revolutionary experience, and so on. This is why the Soviet Union failed to assimilate him.
04
Then there's the technical guidance and support.
Before and during the Northern Expedition, the Soviet Union sent a large number of political, military, and financial advisers and technicians to the Nationalist Government and the Northern Expeditionary Army, who were distributed in various important organs, various armies, and services, and many even participated in front-line battles.
Among them, the most famous are Borodin, the general political adviser of the Kuomintang and the National Government, and Gallon, the general adviser of the Military Of the National Government.
As Borodin said earlier, he was the organizational coach of the Kuomintang, one of the two chief architects of the Kuomintang reorganization (the other was Sun), and the weight was self-evident.
Soviet adviser on the way to the Crusade
Gallen was the Military General Adviser, directing and assisting the National Government in reorganizing the National Revolutionary Army, which was only part of his work.
Prior to this, he advised the Guangzhou government (the predecessor of the Nationalist government), drew up a battle plan, defeated Chen Jiongming, and pacified the combined forces of Liu Zhenhuan and Yang Ximin. After this, he participated in the preparation and command of the Northern Expedition.
The Northern Expedition was an unprecedented revolution, and the preparations were complicated, such as military expenditure and sources, army expansion plans, military and political cadre training, war strategy and tactics, and so on, which required careful calculation and rigorous sand table deduction.
Much of this work was done by Gallen and the advisory board he led.
For example, we know that the first step in the Northern Expedition was to conquer the Two Lakes and then fight Jiangxi.
This strategy was not like this at first, Chiang Kai-shek tended to divide the troops and march to Hunan and Jiangxi at the same time, but Gallen opposed it, believing that the Northern Expeditionary Army had limited strength, advocating concentrating forces and concentrating on surprise attacks, first attacking the next province, and then fighting another province, to avoid making enemies in many places, specifically, to fight Wu Peifu first and guard against Sun Chuanfang.
Finally, the High Command adopted Gallon's suggestion. In hindsight, Gallon's opinion was correct.
Under the gallon, there were other Soviet military advisers who played an important role in the army, such as Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief Military Adviser Bragodatov, Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Operations Sneev, Minister of Reconnaissance Strumbis, Leader of the Combat Training Service and Organization Branch Tesrenko, Chief Adviser of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army, Chief Adviser of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army, Chief Adviser of the General Staff Yefremov, Chief Adviser of the Artillery Borogin, Chief Adviser of the Air Force and Head of the Flight Team Sergeyev, Reg of the Navy, Quartermaster Adviser Rogov, Orlov, the military medical adviser, the cavalry adviser Zyuk, the ironclad consultant Bakol, and so on.
In addition, the first eight armies of the Northern Expeditionary Army were also equipped with Soviet advisers.
Most of these military advisers who have come to China are long-tested and experienced Commanders and Fighters of the Red Army; they have received further study in military academies, their military and political qualities are first-class, they do not shy away from hardships and dangers, they dare to go to the front, they are particularly able to endure hardships, and they are particularly capable of fighting.
c Chiang Kai-shek, borodin on the right
In terms of finance, the Soviet Union sent a group of financial advisers headed by the famous financial expert Stein to serve as advisers to the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of the National Government to help the National Government unify its currency, stabilize finance and economics, and assist the Northern Expeditionary Army in solving the problem of military expenditure.
In the eyes of the Soviet advisers who had experienced great winds and waves, compared with the terrible War I and the brutal Soviet-Russian civil war, the Northern Expedition launched by the Nationalist government was a bit pediatric - their enemy, the Beiyang Army, was inferior to the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War.
Soviet advisers helped the Kuomintang cultivate a large number of military and political talents, the most typical of which was the Whampoa Military Academy. Soviet advisers not only determined the setting of courses, the formulation of management systems, the selection of teaching materials, and the employment of instructors, but also dominated military exercises, weapons operations, and tactical teaching.
The Whampoa Military Academy taught the latest and most advanced military skills at that time, many training subjects were carried out in full accordance with the Soviet code, and its essence came from the practice of the First World War.
By June 1926, on the eve of the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek announced that the Whampoa Military Academy had trained a total of 6,400 cadets, and these young and energetic fresh blood joined the National Revolutionary Army as middle- and lower-ranking officers, playing an exemplary and backbone role, and greatly enhancing the combat effectiveness of the army.
Sun Yat-sen (front left), Soviet adviser Gorov (front right) and President Chiang Kai-shek (back middle) at the opening ceremony of the First Phase of Whampoa
05
Finally, I would like to say the monetary and weapons assistance that is of greatest interest to all.
Due to differences in statistics and methods, the amount of money and weapons used by the Soviet Union to aid the Nationalist government was never conclusive, but certainly not as many as "hundreds of thousands of rifles".
Say a set of data for your reference.
From 1924 to 1926, the Soviet Union, in the form of bookkeeping, assisted the Nationalist government in four batches of weapons: the first batch, 4,000 Japanese rifles, 4 million rounds of ammunition, 1,000 large knives, and 500 spears; the second batch, 9,000 Russian rifles, 3 million rounds of ammunition; the third batch, 40 Makqin machine guns, 12 guns (with the latest sights and ammunition boxes), 1,000 rounds of shells; the fourth batch, 5,000 Russian rifles, 5 million bullets, and 50 machine guns. 12 guns.
Information also shows that the Soviet Union provided 3 tanks and 12 aircraft.
Teachers and students of Whampoa rejoiced with soviet sailors who delivered supplies
As far as weapons are concerned, the amount of Soviet aid to the Nationalist government is not as much as that of Feng Yuxiang.
According to the IOUs left by Feng Yuxiang in Moscow, during the same period, the Soviet Union aided Feng Yuxiang with 31,500 rifles, 51 million rounds of ammunition, 227 machine guns, 60 artillery pieces, 58,000 shells, 5,000 sabers, 10 aircraft, 8 ironclad locomotives, 3,750 ptes of gasoline, and 750 putts of aviation fuel.
In terms of money. According to incomplete statistics, before the Northern Expedition, the Soviet Union assisted the Nationalist government with more than 5.3 million rubles, in the early stage of the Northern Expedition, it provided another 3.6 million rubles, and after April 12, the Soviet Union provided more than 7.5 million rubles to the Wuhan Nationalist Government in Wang Jingwei, for a total of more than 16.4 million rubles.
Of course, this assistance is not free of charge and will need to be repaid in the future. It was just that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei successively turned against the Soviet Union, and this account became a dead account.
Quantitatively, the money and weapons aided by the Soviet Union were not enough to change the balance of strength between the Kuomintang and the Beiyang warlords, and these money and weapons could be regarded as initial start-up funds, and most of the military expenditure and weapons in the war were still solved by the Kuomintang itself.
Still
06
Back to the original question: Could the Northern Expedition have been successful without Soviet assistance?
My opinion is that in normal historical circumstances, no.
Many people do not know that in fact, before Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition, Sun Yat-sen had carried out the Northern Expedition 3 times.
As a result, Yuan Jia caocao, sealed the wolf Juxu, won the canghuang Beigu.
The first was the War of Defending France, where Sun Yat-sen relied on the Dian army and the Gui army to fight, and was defeated because Lu Rongting and Tang Jiyao did not cooperate; the second time was in 1922, when the Northern Expedition army achieved good results in Jiangxi, but Chen Jiongming was in the rear, and the Northern Expedition ended hastily; the third was in 1924, when Sun Yat-sen unified 40,000 miscellaneous troops under his command into the founding army, and attacked Cao Kun and Wu Peifu, and as a result, the army could not open the situation in Jiangxi and was forced to withdraw.
Obviously, according to Sun Yat-sen's previous method of doing things -- find some rabble-rousers, give them a name, and let them work with the Beiyang Army, the Northern Expedition will not succeed in a hundred years.
If Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang alone were to explore the revolutionary road on their own, they would not know what year and month they would have to wait.
The key to the rapid victory of the Northern Expedition was the rebirth of the Kuomintang and the establishment of the National Revolutionary Army.
Both of these points are inseparable from the help of the Soviet Union.
【References】
The Special History of the Republic of China Volume V: The National Revolution and the Northern Expedition
History of the Republic of China, vols. 4 and 5
The Soviet Union, the Comintern and the Northern Expedition (1926-1927)
A Study on the Assistance of the Comintern to the Chinese Revolution during the Great Revolution
The Aid of the Comintern and the Soviet Union to the Northern Expedition