The investigation team of the State Council answered reporters' questions on the investigation of the "7.20" exceptionally heavy rainstorm disaster in Zhengzhou

Beijing, 21 Jan (Xinhua) -- A few days ago, an executive meeting of the State Council deliberated and adopted an investigation report on the "7.20" exceptionally heavy rainstorm disaster in Zhengzhou, Henan Province. On the hot issues of social concern in this disaster investigation, the reporter interviewed the relevant responsible person of the investigation team of the State Council.

I. Reporter: Why did you set up an investigation team of the State Council to investigate this exceptionally heavy rainstorm disaster in Zhengzhou, Henan Province?

A: Let's first review the situation of this exceptionally heavy rainstorm. From July 17 to 23, 2021, Henan Province suffered a rare heavy rainstorm in history, and the rainfall process occurred mainly in northern Henan (Jiaozuo, Xinxiang, Hebi, Anyang) from 17 to 18 days; From the 19th to the 20th, the center of the rainstorm moved south to Zhengzhou, and a long-lasting exceptionally heavy rainstorm occurred; From the 21st to the 22nd, the center of the rainstorm moved north again, and gradually weakened on the 23rd. This exceptionally heavy rainstorm process, from the cumulative surface rainfall, Hebi is the largest, 589 mm; Zhengzhou was second, at 534 mm; Xinxiang was the third, at 512 mm. From the perspective of the rainfall at the process point, it is also the largest in Hebi, which is 1122.6 mm. The maximum daily rainfall occurred in Zhengzhou on July 20, at 624.1 mm, close to the average annual rainfall of Zhengzhou (640.8 mm).

The exceptionally heavy rainstorm caused a total of 14.786 million people in 150 counties (cities, districts) in 16 cities in Henan Province to be affected, and the direct economic loss was 120.06 billion yuan, of which Zhengzhou was 40.9 billion yuan, accounting for 34.1% of the province; There were 398 deaths and disappearances in the province due to the disaster, including 380 in Zhengzhou, 10 in Xinxiang, 2 in Pingdingshan, Zhumadian and Luoyang, 1 each in Hebi and Luohe, and 95.5% of the deaths and disappearances in Zhengzhou due to the disaster.

In this exceptionally heavy rainstorm disaster, although there are many disaster areas in Henan Province, the scope is large, and the disaster situation is serious, but the major casualties are mainly concentrated in Zhengzhou, and the incidents and disaster response problems that arouse widespread concern in society are also mainly concentrated in Zhengzhou.

In order to find out the problems, sum up experience, and learn lessons, with the approval of the Party Central Committee, the State Council set up an investigation team to investigate the "7.20" extraordinarily heavy rainstorm disaster in Zhengzhou, Henan Province. This is mainly based on two considerations: on the one hand, the major casualties and property losses caused by this disaster are rare in recent years, and all sectors of society and the broad masses of the people are highly concerned, although it is caused by extreme weather, but it has exposed many problems and deficiencies, and it is necessary to investigate the process and causes clearly, and give a responsible account to the party and the people, society and history; On the other hand, in the context of global climate change, the risk of natural disasters on the mainland has further intensified, extreme weather has become stronger and heavier, and extreme heavy rainfall such as Zhengzhou, Henan Province, may increase in the future, and it is necessary to sum up experience and learn lessons through disaster investigations, find out the shortcomings and weak links in the prevention and control of natural disasters, learn from each other, and guide the whole country to improve them in a targeted manner, better cope with the major disaster risk challenges that may be faced, and effectively protect the safety of people's lives and property. Carrying out this investigation fully reflects that the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core adheres to the people-centered development thinking and the concept of "people first, life first", is highly responsible for the safety of people's lives and property, and reflects the great importance attached to preventing and resolving major risks, promoting the modernization of the national governance system and governance capabilities, and improving disaster prevention and response capabilities.

Reporter: What is the process of this disaster investigation? How to ensure the scientific objectivity and accuracy of the investigation work?

A: This is the first time that such a global natural disaster survey has been organized at the national level, and there is no precedent to follow, and it involves a wide range of areas, many key events, strong professionalism, and the workload and difficulty are very large.

Under the strong leadership of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, the investigation work was led by the Ministry of Emergency Management, and the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Public Security, the Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Health Commission, the China Meteorological Administration, the National Energy Administration, and the Henan Provincial Government participated, and six special working groups were set up, including comprehensive coordination, monitoring and forecasting, emergency disposal, transportation, urban waterlogging, and flash flood geological disasters, which were led by relevant ministries and commissions. At the same time, an expert group is set up, composed of academicians and authoritative experts in the fields of meteorology, water conservancy, municipal administration, transportation, geology, emergency response, and law, to carry out disaster assessment and provide professional support for the investigation. The relevant departments of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the State Supervision Commission shall guide the relevant work.

The investigation team conscientiously studied and implemented the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important instructions, adhered to the attitude of being responsible to the party and the people, society and history, adhered to the principles of following laws and regulations, seeking truth from facts, scientific rigor, and comprehensive objectivity, and in accordance with laws and regulations such as the Emergency Response Law, the Flood Prevention Law, the Safety Production Law, and the Flood Prevention Regulations, fully considered the characteristics of natural disasters, and sought truth from facts to grasp the "three distinctions", that is, to distinguish between objective force majeure and subjective inaction. Distinguish between insufficient ability and quality from irresponsibility, distinguish between the lack of laws and regulations and standards and the lack of implementation of safety provisions on duties and tasks, and through on-site investigation, access to materials, visits and discussions, acceptance of letters and visits, inquiry talks, investigation and evidence collection, analysis and calculation, expert demonstration, etc., comprehensively investigate the disaster process and key events, conduct in-depth demonstrations of key issues and qualitative issues, and fully listen to expert opinions. During the investigation, the investigation team consulted more than 90,000 pieces of data, conducted more than 100 field surveys in key areas, conducted nearly 200 discussions and investigations, and inquired and talked more than 450 times.

After a comprehensive and in-depth investigation, the performance of duties and existing problems of the party committees, governments, and departments and units of Zhengzhou City and relevant districts and counties (cities) was ascertained, the key events of widespread concern to society and the problem of late reporting and concealment of the number of deaths and disappearances due to disasters were identified, the main lessons and suggestions for improvement were studied and put forward, and an investigation report was formed, which was deliberated by the plenary meeting of the investigation team and evaluated and passed by the expert group.

3. Reporter: In this exceptionally heavy rainstorm disaster, what are the specific characteristics of the rain and flood situation in Zhengzhou City?

A: The investigation team organized meteorological and hydrological experts to conduct a comprehensive review and analysis of the occurrence and development process of disasters. Specifically, the rain and flood situation in Zhengzhou City mainly has the following four characteristics:

First, the rainstorm process is long, wide-ranging, and the rainfall is extremely strong in the short duration. This round of rainfall is equivalent to nearly 4 billion cubic meters of water, which is the most extensive and intense heavy rainstorm process in Zhengzhou since meteorological observation records have been recorded. On July 20, the zhengzhou national meteorological station had a maximum daily rainfall of 624.1 mm, close to the average annual rainfall of Zhengzhou. In particular, from 16:00 to 17:00 on the 20th, the strongest rainfall in Zhengzhou was 201.9 mm, breaking through the historical extremes of the continental meteorological observation record. Second, the floods of major rivers have greatly exceeded history, and the dangerous situations of embankment reservoirs have recurred frequently. Three major rivers, including the Jialu River in Zhengzhou City, have experienced large floods that exceed the guaranteed water level, and the process flood volume has exceeded the maximum value measured in history. A total of 418 large and small rivers in the city have occurred in 418 dangerous situations, and 84 of the 143 reservoirs have different degrees of danger, threatening the safety of major infrastructure in Zhengzhou city and the Beijing-Guangzhou Railway Trunk Line and the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. Third, the rainfall in urban areas far exceeds the drainage capacity, and the public facilities in residential areas are seriously flooded. On the 20th, the average rainfall of the 24-hour surface in Zhengzhou's urban area was 1.6 times to 2.5 times that of the planning and fortification standard of the drainage zoning, and there were many overflows in 10 inland rivers, and the main urban area was generally seriously flooded, resulting in the flooding of more than half of the underground space and important public facilities in the city's residential areas. 129 people were missing due to disaster deaths in the main urban area, with drowning being the main cause. Fourth, the peak of the flood in the hilly area rose rapidly and rapidly, causing a large number of casualties. In the western mountainous areas of Gongyi, Xingyang, Xinmi and Dengfeng, the 4 cities of mountain floods and small and medium-sized rivers have a huge flood, due to the silting and shrinking of river ditches, many houses, bridges and roads and other river-side ditch construction, resulting in water barriers to aggravate the water level, road and bridge water blocking collapse flood peak superimposed destructive force is extremely large. 251 people died and disappeared due to disasters in the four cities of Shanqiu District, of which 156 people died and disappeared directly due to flash floods and flooding of small and medium-sized rivers.

On the whole, the intensity and scope of the "7.20" exceptionally heavy rainstorm in Zhengzhou exceeded the historical record, far exceeding the flood prevention and drainage capacity of urban and rural areas, flooding a large area of urban and rural areas in the city, serious flooding of urban streets, surging floods of river reservoirs for a short time, and a large number of water in streams and ditches in hilly areas, forming a particularly major natural disaster.

4. Reporter: What are the outstanding problems in Zhengzhou City in this disaster response and disposal?

A: Judging from the investigation, although the Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government have done a lot of work after this exceptionally heavy rainstorm, the disaster still caused major casualties and property losses. This is due to the difficulty of defending against extreme rainstorms, the reasons for the rapid development of the city, and the reasons for the large number of historical debts, and also the concentrated exposure of the leading cadres of the Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government, relevant districts, counties (cities), and departmental units, such as insufficient understanding and preparation, ineffective prevention and organization, and improper emergency handling. Mainly focused on the following six aspects:

First, the response to deployment is not tight and unrealistic. Under the circumstance that the leading comrades of the State Council and the Henan Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government have put forward clear requirements, the main responsible persons of the Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government still subjectively believe that the rain in the north will not be too large, the risks are mainly in the Yellow River and reservoirs, the vigilance is not high, the sense of responsibility is not strong, the prevention and deployment are not resolute and in place, and the lack of pertinence, especially on the 17th and 18th, there was no timely and decisive action, and the "critical period" of flood prevention preparations became a "blank period." Second, the emergency response is seriously lagging behind. Changzhuang reservoir occurred a major dangerous situation, Zhengzhou city did not start the level I emergency response in a timely manner in accordance with the regulations, at the same time, the flood prevention emergency response mechanism led by meteorological disaster forecast information has not been effectively established, emergency action and forecast information release is obviously disconnected, until 16:01 the meteorological department issued the 5th red warning on the 20th, only at 16:30 to start the level I emergency response, but it was too late, the disaster has occurred, 90% of the time of death and disappearance of 4 cities in Hill District The above is concentrated from 13:00 to 15:00 on the same day before the start of the level I emergency response in Zhengzhou. Third, the response measures are not precise and ineffective. Responding to major rain and flood conditions with normalized measures, and failing to resolutely take measures to stop gatherings, suspend classes, and suspend businesses in accordance with the red warning, missing the opportunity to effectively avoid a large number of casualties. Fourth, unified command is lacking at critical moments. The main responsible persons of the municipal party committee and the municipal government and other municipal leaders are mostly running at the point, some colliding together, some trapped on the road, and at the critical moment, no municipal leaders sit in the command center to command, do not understand the overall disaster situation in the city, do not grasp the major danger situation in time, and lose the initiative of the leadership to deal with this global disaster. Fifth, there is a lack of effective organization and mobilization. On the day of the 20th, many people still traveled normally, government agencies, enterprises and institutions operated normally, and crowded places, urban tunnels, subways, urban underground spaces, and hillside villages in hilly areas did not take effective risk avoidance precautions in advance. Most of the people who died and disappeared due to the disaster in the city were scattered, and most of them were in a normal state of activity when they were killed. Sixth, the number of people who died and disappeared due to the disaster was reported late. There are problems of failure to report casualties according to the daily statistics in accordance with the regulations, and deliberate obstruction, concealment and non-reporting. At different stages, 139 people were concealed, including 75 at the same level in Zhengzhou City, 49 at the county level, and 15 in townships (streets).

V. Reporter: In this disaster, the dead events such as Zhengzhou Metro Line 5 and the Beijing-Guangzhou Expressway North Tunnel have aroused great concern and doubts in the society.

A: The investigation team conducted an in-depth investigation of several incidents that caused major casualties and social concern, reviewed the occurrence process, identified the main causes and problems, and determined the nature of the incident.

Regarding the death incident of Zhengzhou Metro Line 5 (14 deaths), the investigation determined that this was a serious urban waterlogging caused by extreme rainstorms, the waterlogging washed away the water retaining wall of the Wulongkou parking lot, poured into the subway tunnel, the Zhengzhou Metro Group Co., Ltd. and relevant parties responded to the poor handling, the traffic command and dispatch error, the illegal change of the Wulongkou parking lot design, the lack of strict control over the quality of the construction of the water retaining wall, resulting in major casualties.

Regarding the fatal incident of the North Tunnel of the Beijing-Guangzhou Expressway (6 deaths and 247 vehicles were flooded), the investigation determined that this was a liability incident caused by extreme rainstorms, and the Tunnel Management Unit of Zhengzhou City and relevant departments closed the tunnel and diverted traffic in a timely manner, causing larger deaths and major property losses.

Regarding the flood dam incident of the Guojiazui Reservoir (98,000 people were transferred), the investigation determined that this was an illegal incident caused by the encroachment of road construction and construction units to destroy water projects, the poor supervision of relevant departments led to the blockage of spillways, and extreme rainstorms caused major dangers in the reservoir flood dam.

Regarding the flash flood disaster in Wangzongdian Village, Cuimiao Town, Xingyang City (23 people were killed and missing), the investigation determined that extreme rains caused flash floods and landslides, cross-ditch roadbed water routs, improper emergency plan measures, and untimely evacuation and transfer were the main reasons for the deaths and disappearances of major personnel.

Regarding the explosion accident of Dengfeng Power Plant Group Aluminum Alloy Co., Ltd. (5 deaths), the investigation determined that this was a secondary accident in which a flood of rivers flooded into the electrolyzer of the company's workshop and reacted with high-temperature molten aluminum molten aluminum to cause an explosion. The party committee and government of the town where they were located did not truthfully report the true cause of the death of the person, and illegally used the post-disaster reconstruction subsidy funds for the compensation of the families of the deceased.

Reporter: What deep-seated problems and lessons have been exposed in the disaster response and handling?

A: Indeed, in the process of responding to and dealing with this disaster, many shortcomings in the local emergency management system such as disaster prevention, mitigation and relief have been exposed, and the lessons are very profound. These problems and shortcomings also exist to varying degrees in many parts of the country, and they need to be paid great attention to and effectively improved.

First, some leading cadres, especially the main responsible persons, lack risk awareness and bottom-line thinking. Before the disaster, the responsible person of the Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee and The Municipal Government, especially the main responsible person, subjectively believed that the rain in the north would not be too large, and it was "unexpected" that Zhengzhou would suffer from exceptionally heavy rains and cause serious waterlogging and flash floods. This kind of paralyzing thinking and empiricism also exists in many leading cadres in northern cities, and some leading cadres have insufficient understanding of extreme meteorological disasters, seriously lack risk awareness and bottom-line thinking, and seriously lack emergency preparedness. These problems, in the final analysis, are still the study and implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important exposition on risk prevention and challenges, and the lack of reverence for people's lives and political responsibilities. This is a profound lesson that leading cadres at all levels in all localities must first draw.

Second, the municipal party committee and municipal government and the relevant district and county (city) party committees and governments have failed to effectively play a unified leadership role. In the process of responding to this disaster, the unified leadership and command of the Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government were not effective, the responsibility was not really shouldered, there was no overall arrangement for the command headquarters to sit in command and command the forces on the spot, some leading cadres lacked leadership ability, the overall awareness was not strong, and they did not know what their responsibilities were at the critical moment, where their posts were, and how to play a leading role, resulting in a loss of face. Taking this disaster as a warning, we must focus on solving the problem that some leading cadres will not act in the face of disasters and do not act well, and truly integrate the party's centralized and unified leadership throughout the entire process of disaster prevention and response, so as to make the party's leadership stronger and more powerful.

Third, the implementation of the central government's deployment of the reform of the emergency management system is not resolute and not in place. Zhengzhou City has set up four command organs, including the Flood Prevention and Drought Control Command, the Urban Flood Prevention Command, the Meteorological Disaster Defense Command, and the Emergency Command for Sudden Geological Disasters; under the Flood Prevention and Drought Control Headquarters, there have been four offices, including the Flood Prevention and Drought Control Headquarters, the River and Lake Water Conservancy Prevention Office, the Urban Defense Office, and the Yellow River Prevention Office. All localities should profoundly draw lessons from this, resolutely implement the central authorities' decision-making and deployment of deepening the reform of the emergency management system, and accelerate the formation of a work pattern of "all kinds of disasters and major emergencies" that combines overall planning and coordination and integration of unified and decentralized.

Fourth, there is a deviation in the concept of development, and urban construction is "heavy face and light". As an emerging megacity, Zhengzhou has developed rapidly in recent years, but the implementation of urban planning and construction requirements for disaster prevention and mitigation is not in place, and the construction of urban drainage infrastructure seriously lags behind urban development. Storm sewers differ by more than half compared to cities with built-up areas of comparable size; Only 32% of the funds for the sponge city construction projects that have been invested are actually related, and nearly 56% are used for landscape and greening; During the "13th Five-Year Plan" period, the transformation rate of drainage and other facilities was only 20%. This is also a common problem that has existed for a long time in many places, reflecting that some leading cadres have deviations in their views on political performance, and there is a big gap in the complete, accurate, and comprehensive implementation of the new development concept, overall development, and security.

Fifth, the emergency management system and capacity are weak, and the early warning and response linkage mechanism is not perfect. This rainstorm disaster has exposed many shortcomings such as Zhengzhou's early warning and issuance capabilities, emergency command capabilities, emergency rescue capabilities, social mobilization capabilities, and insufficient scientific and technological support capabilities. In particular, catastrophic weather forecasting is confused with disaster early warning, early warning issuing departments are divided, disaster prevention and avoidance measures are targeted, effective and mandatory, and lack a unified, authoritative and efficient early warning and release mechanism; The linkage mechanism between early warning and response is not perfect, and the practicality of the emergency plan is not strong. To a certain extent, these problems reflect that the mainland's emergency management system is not strong in governance, and a set of systematic systems and capacity systems have not yet been established, and the grass-roots foundation is particularly weak.

Sixth, the cadres and masses' emergency response capabilities and knowledge of disaster prevention and risk avoidance and self-help are seriously insufficient. This disaster also reflects that some newly appointed cadres are not familiar with disaster prevention, mitigation, relief, and emergency management, have not experienced the test of major disasters such as floods and earthquakes, and have seriously lacked practical experience. In addition, in the process of responding to this disaster, the media's publicity and warning role has not been played in place, the dissemination of disaster early warning information is not timely and insufficient, and the public's awareness of safety and the ability to prevent and avoid disasters are not strong. It is very necessary and urgent to strengthen the training of leading cadres at all levels in disaster prevention, mitigation and relief, emergency management capabilities, and popular science education for the masses.

VII. Reporter: In view of the lessons learned from these problems, what suggestions do you have for further strengthening and improving flood prevention and relief work and enhancing the ability to prevent and control natural disasters?

Answer: The problems and shortcomings exposed in the response and handling of the "7.20" exceptionally heavy rainstorm disaster in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, are not only a profound lesson, but also a valuable asset for all localities and departments to learn from each other, self-vigilance and self-examination, pay close attention to making up for shortcomings, strengths and weaknesses, and effectively improve the ability to prevent and control natural disasters. Based on this, the investigation team proposed six improvement measures:

First, we must vigorously enhance the risk awareness of leading cadres and their ability to deal with emergencies. The "Excerpts of Xi Jinping's Discourse on Preventing Risks and Challenges and Responding to Emergencies" is listed as the study topic of the theoretical learning center group of party committees (party groups) at all levels, included in the compulsory courses of party school training at all levels, promote leading cadres at all levels to firmly establish the concept of "people first, life first", coordinate the two major issues of development and security, enhance risk awareness and bottom-line thinking, improve the ability and level of disaster prevention, mitigation and relief, and prevent and resolve risks and challenges, and effectively put ensuring the safety of people's lives in the first place. Leading cadres at all levels who have been newly readjusted and taken up their posts should promptly organize special training before and after taking up their posts, understand their own responsibilities and requirements for responding to various types of disasters, and have the basic capabilities of disaster prevention, mitigation, relief, and emergency response.

Second, it is necessary to establish and improve a responsibility system for local flood prevention work with the same responsibility as the party and the government. Implement the main responsibility of local party committees and governments for flood prevention and disaster relief, implement the same responsibility of the party and government for flood prevention and disaster relief, and the double responsibility of one post, and tighten the responsibility for daily prevention and leadership of the whole process before, during, and after the event. To improve the response plan and operation system of the flood prevention and drought control headquarters, we must adhere to the unified leadership and command of the command center at critical moments, and clarify the specific posts and specific responsibilities during the critical period of flood prevention. The principal responsible persons of the local party and government must first command from the front of the command headquarters, sit in command, and control the overall situation; When going to the scene of the disaster, it is necessary to make it clear that other responsible persons are in command, and maintain smooth access with the command headquarters, so as to always understand the overall situation and make correct decisions.

Third, it is necessary to carry out in-depth reform of the emergency management system and assessment of the operation. In view of the uneven progress in the reform of the emergency management system between regions and between the upper and lower levels, all localities have comprehensively organized assessments, and unified the assessment work with the deepening of reform, systematically find out the gaps between the establishment of command organs, the definition of departmental responsibilities, the support of professionals and institutions, and the operation mechanism, and the optimization and coordination of institutional functions, and take upholding and strengthening the party's overall leadership as the command, establish and improve a unified, authoritative, and efficient emergency command structure, give full play to the comprehensive advantages of emergency departments and the professional advantages of relevant departments, and build a strong command team , improve the system and mechanism, strengthen the support of professional institutions.

Fourth, we must comprehensively carry out the assessment and revision of emergency response plans, and strengthen the integrated management of early warning and response. The assessment and revision of the plan should be combined with a sound system, the specific responsibilities, response mechanisms, and action measures of the commander and all relevant departments and relevant units should be realized and refined, the drill run-in and daily inspection should be strengthened, and the response and implementation measures should be initiated according to the plan and system after the early warning information is released, so as to ensure that it works at critical moments. Establish and complete mechanisms for the study and judgment of extreme weather and major risks, quantify the standards for initiating early warning and emergency response, standardize the release of forecast and early warning information, establish and improve the linkage mechanism between early warning and emergency response, and promptly adopt compulsory measures of "three stops" (suspension of assemblies, suspensions of classes, and closures of businesses) in accordance with regulations.

Fifth, we must improve the overall level of urban disaster prevention and reduction. Carry out in-depth comprehensive risk surveys of natural disasters, integrate extreme weather response and prevention and control of natural disasters into major plans, major projects, and major strategies related to urban development, make up for the arrears of flood prevention and drainage facilities, improve flood prevention and drainage standards and disaster-resistant fortification standards for public service facilities such as hospitals and subways, strengthen the safety guarantee of major lifeline projects, strengthen the safety protection of key facilities such as standby power supply and drainage pump stations, equip key areas with special emergency equipment, and improve emergency support capabilities in extreme situations such as circuit breaks, power outages, and network cuts. The ability to achieve urban disaster prevention, mitigation and relief is compatible with urban development.

Sixth, we must extensively enhance the risk awareness and self-help and mutual rescue ability of the whole society. We should extensively carry out publicity and education on disaster prevention, mitigation and relief in the whole society, give full play to the role of various types of media, and earnestly enhance the vigilance of the masses in preventing risks. Start with basic education in disaster prevention and safety, highlight relevant content in the national education system, and promote the knowledge of disaster prevention, mitigation and relief into teaching materials, schools, communities, and vocational training. Expand a variety of practical exercises, build disaster prevention, mitigation and relief education and training bases at all levels, and science popularization experience venues, stimulate public interest, and enhance the training effect.

Edited by Chen Yuanyuan