Author: Liddell Hart
Translation: Little Xiaoice
During the four-year war, the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet encountered only one – the hide-and-seek Battle of Jutland. On the afternoon of May 31, 1916, a fleet built to fight for sea supremacy inadvertently encountered another fleet that had controlled sea supremacy for hundreds of years. Around evening, the two most powerful fleets in the world, fumbling toward each other, made contact, disengaged, contacted again, disengaged again. Then night fell between them. At dawn on the "glorious first of June," a bewildered British Grand Fleet cruised alone on the empty sea.
From the day the war broke out, the British Navy adopted the right strategy, recognizing the fact that maintaining sea supremacy was more important than defeating the German fleet. Britain quickly gained maritime supremacy, and the Entente's entire war effort was based on this, as Britain's survival depended on it. Churchill summed up the problem in one vivid sentence: "Of the two belligerents, the only person who could lose the war in one afternoon was Jellicoe (Admiral, Commander of the British Grand Fleet). "Thus, the goal and desire to defeat the German fleet has always been on the back burner. Defeating the German High Seas Fleet could hasten the Allies' victory and even make them invincible. The collapse of Russia, and the rampant german submarines, almost drove Britain to the brink of starvation, and could be blamed entirely on the inability of the British fleet to crush it. But if the British navy paid a heavy price for defeating the German fleet and then lost its strategic advantage, Britain would inevitably be defeated.
From August 1914 onwards, the strategic goal of the German Navy had been to avoid the risk of a decisive battle until the British fleet was severely weakened and the prospects for victory for the German Navy shifted from bleak to equal. Therefore, to achieve the goal of weakening the British Navy, the Germans mainly used mines and torpedoes as a means of warfare. The British fear of underwater weapons, and the possibility that they would pose traps or create opportunities, dramatically changed the balance of power and made British prevention strategies more cautious. In a prescient letter of 14 October 1914, Jellico reminded the Admiralty that if there was an opportunity for engagement, he would see the German battleship's avoidance as a signal of an attempt to lure him into a trap in which the Germans must have laid mines and submarines; he would not fall into the trap, but on the contrary, he would quickly make a detour. In other words, he intends to move sideways so as not to be caught off guard by the enemy, which not only makes the opponent's most potential weapon useless, but also may cause the opponent to lose its balance. To some extent, this calculation shows that Jellicoe's consideration of the theory of war is extremely thorough.
The strategic tone of Germany and Britain is fully in line with the realities they face, and the question is whether they can show greater motivation and more shrewdness in the implementation of such strategies. After nearly two years of war, the situation in May 1916 was that the British fleet was still waiting for a favorable opportunity to engage, and the German fleet was still far from achieving its initial goal of weakening the British Navy. Although mines and torpedoes caused some damage to the Royal Navy, the British fleet had a greater advantage than it had at the outbreak of war. In the coming engagement, the Royal Navy mobilized 37 dreadnought capital ships (battleships and battlecruisers) against 23 German warships. The gap between the two sides in terms of artillery was even greater, with the Royal Navy having 168 13.5 to 15-inch guns, plus 104 12-inch guns, while the German Navy had only 176 12-inch guns. Admittedly, the German fleet still had 6 ex-dreadnought battleships, but in a fleet showdown, these older battleships were not much stronger than live targets under the heavy guns of the British fleet. In addition, the presence of these older battleships seriously slowed down the already slower speed of the German fleet. The Royal Navy also had a great advantage in terms of cruisers and destroyers, with 8 armored cruisers and 26 light cruisers against 11 German cruisers and 80 destroyers against 63 German destroyers.
After the outbreak of war, the British gained another advantage in the field of intelligence, not only through occasional contact to get a clearer understanding of the german weapons performance, but also to crack each other's communication codes. In August 1914, the German light cruiser Magdeburg sank in the Baltic Sea, and the Russians discovered the German Navy's code and communication manual, as well as their map of the North Sea grid, in the arms of a drowned junior officer. The Russians sent this information to London, and after that, British intelligence agencies continued to intercept each other's encrypted radio communications, thus obtaining a lot of information about the enemy's movements in advance. Although the Germans were also suspicious and changed their codes and maps, efforts to close intelligence gaps were offset by the development of the British radio direction finding technology, which the Royal Navy used to determine the location of enemy ships. This was the origin of the Battle of Jutland.
In January 1916, the German High Seas Fleet welcomed a new commander. The commander of the fleet nominated by Admiral von Tirpitz was Vice Admiral Scheer, who actively advocated a more aggressive war strategy. The pressure of the British blockade and the pressure exerted by President Wilson forced German submarines to relax the blockade prompted the German Navy to rush into action. Rumors also circulated that the British fleet had sent forces to cover their own coasts from invasion, which encouraged the Germans to resolve to act. In mid-May, Scheer finalized his battle plan. He planned to send a cruiser to carry out a surprise attack in Jutland, luring the British fleet to meet it with some force, the German submarines ambushed the other side to fall into the trap, and the German high seas fleet behind it was ready to strike. The submarines were dispatched in time, but the bad weather made it impossible for the German side to send airships for reconnaissance. Without this safeguard, Scheer would not have acted, and as a result, the submarines had exhausted their endurance at sea. On 30 May, Scheer decided to abandon the original plan and replace it with another plan. The new plan was conceived as a reconnaissance force of battleships and light cruisers, led by Vice Admiral Hipper, to the Norwegian coast to demonstrate force, with Scheer leading the main force of the fleet to follow the rear beyond sight. Scheer judged that the German Navy's move posed a threat to the patrol and transport missions of the British cruisers, and might attract some of the strength of the British fleet, which would give him the opportunity to annihilate the other side. In the early morning of May 31, hipper's fleet anchored north, with the Schell fleet trailing 50 miles behind.
In fact, the British Admiralty had learned last night that the German fleet was about to set sail, and although the purpose of the other side was not clear, it still ordered the Grand Fleet to go to sea. At 22:30 that night, Jellico led the main force of the fleet east to a rendezvous point about 50 miles off the Norwegian coast, on the way to meet Jerram's squadron from Invergordon. Betty's squadron of battlecruisers, reinforced by four state-of-the-art Queen Elizabeth-class battleships, while setting sail from Port Roses near Edinburgh, must, on Jellico's orders, reach 69 miles south-east of the main rendezvous point by 14:00 p.m. on May 31. If no enemy ships were found there, Jericho turned and headed south towards The Gulf of Helgoland, while Betty's fleet was ordered to remain in his field of vision.
Betty arrived at the rendezvous point at the allotted time, and had just turned north toward the Jellico fleet when the light cruiser Galatia, which was acting as cover, spotted a lone merchant ship. So it did not turn with the other warships, but continued to sail to the southeast, south-east, ready to inspect the merchant ship. This is the first of many yin and yang errors. Because at the same time, a German light cruiser covering Hipper's west wing also spotted the merchant ship and decided to go over and check it out. Soon, the two unsuspecting opponents spotted each other and immediately alerted their respective superiors. In this way, this strange merchant ship not only triggered the Battle of Jutland, but probably also led to the decisive victory of the British Navy. This was because, in the absence of this encounter, the two forces might meet further north, when the German fleet would be farther away from the shelter and closer to Jellicoe's iron tongs.
This article is excerpted from the "Two World War History Set (World War I History + World War II History)"
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