In the Jianzhong network, the camp seems to be a very low-level thing, often associated with fighting stupid battles, and the strong men who can break the wrists of the steppe powers are disdainful of doing this kind of thing, this view can not be said to be empty, Zeng Guofan in criticizing his own performance once said that his shortcomings are "hard villages, fighting stupid battles", and in the "Pipe System Chapter", put forward the view that "those who make good use of soldiers have no ditches and have eyes and ears". So is this view correct? Did the Han Dynasty really take this as the core idea of governing the army? Let me start with the historical record and explore this issue.
【Well-prepared ancient Chinese military camps】
The importance of camping
Different from the traditional impression is that most of the time the army is not in a fierce battle, when not encountering the enemy, the things done are basically collecting materials, camping and cooking such boring work, after encountering the enemy, most of the battles are also small-scale, low-intensity outpost battles, then the barracks are not good or not, if the location of the barracks is not well chosen, such as far from the water source or the terrain is too low, it is easy to be attacked and besieged by the enemy; if the protective facilities of the barracks are insufficient, It is difficult to provide sufficient cover for low-intensity engagements, so that the army is prone to chaos and even rout. (1) And the "Pipe" said to rely on the eyes and ears, is very unreliable, not to mention that the deployed scout itself may have omissions, even if his eyes and ears will not leak anything, the transmission of accurate information (such as the size of the enemy, the type of troops, the direction of travel) will consume a lot of time, which is tantamount to delaying the fighter. If you use smoke, fire and other ways to pass, the speed is fast, but the accuracy of the message will be very low, easy to be used by the enemy to cause misjudgment, and the collection of troops itself is also a waste of time, the lack of adequate protection will make it difficult for you to organize effective defenses.
【Fast signal transmission means - wolf smoke】
Li Guangli is a perfect example: in 90 BC, Li Guangli was implicated in the scourge of witchcraft, eager to make a meritorious contribution, leading a large army to attack the Xiongnu, and then forced to retreat due to unstable military morale, and was besieged by the main force led by the Xiongnu Shan Yu on the way. Due to the lack of fortifications and the inefficient operation of the scouts (and possibly even without the scouts), Shan Yu took advantage of the night to dig a trench in front of the Han army camp and attack the Han army from the rear, the Han army failed to organize effective resistance, and fled to the trench dug by the Xiongnu, resulting in a "military chaos" situation. In this battle, we can see two crucial points, the first Li Guangli's lack of fortifications, so when attacked by the enemy's back, there is no way to effectively resist, can only flee; the second reconnaissance is difficult to take into account all the enemy actions (if there is a scout). ②
[The attack of the Xiongnu defeated Li Guangli's army]
More importantly, well-protected camps can give soldiers in dangerous situations a sense of security and morale, and in some emergencies can also serve as a last resort to turn the tide of the war. The Han Empire lacked such examples, but there were many examples in the distant Mediterranean: for example, in the Battle of Magnesia in 190 BC, the Roman legions that were defeated by Seleucid's superior cavalry relied on the camp to complete the reorganization and forced the cavalry pursued by Antiochus III, thus turning a draw into a victory (3); in 15 AD, the Roman legions retreating from the Germanic forest were ambushed and besieged by a large number of Germans, and it was precisely because of the temporary construction of the barrier that the Roman army was saved from collapse and regained confidence. In the end, relying on this temporary camp to win. ④
【Roman legions defending barracks】
Does the Han army despise encampment?
It is precisely because the fortification camp is very important, so the military experts do not all believe the lies of the "Pipe", and when talking about the military camp in the "Liutao Military Strategy", it is said: "When the three armed forces are important, they must not be accustomed to using equipment... When the three armies stopped, there were wu chong, big bridges, and front and back refusals; ... "According to the description in the book, the temporary camp of the marching army needs at least small obstacles such as vehicles, shields, and horses, and shelters to protect the camp, and if a defensive camp is set up, traps and obstacles such as nets, wooden fences, wooden or iron nails should be arranged on the basis of the earthen wall." In practice, the fortification of the camp will increase early with the demand, such as digging trenches outside the camp, setting up complex and winding roads inside the camp, laying traps, and building towers near the barriers. ⑤
[Rejecting horses (left) and Tribulus terrestris (right)]
In reality, there were also many Han generals who recognized this practice, such as Wei Qing, Li Ling (6) and so on who camped in a car in the marching state, while those who built barriers were Yingbu, Zhou Yafu, Cheng Buzhi, Zhao Chongguo, and Gongsun Zhan (7). Of course, there are also those who do not attach so much importance, such as Li Guang and Geng Bing, who do not like to camp and fortify, and march freely and loosely (8). It can be seen from this that although the Han Dynasty did not have a rigid tradition and stipulated that marching troops should fortify camps, and there were indeed some people who did not do so, there were also generals who set up with a cautious attitude and believed that it was very necessary to do so, and it was not uncommon to fight "hard villages and fight stupid battles". Failure to do so is often the case when the generals are not strict in governing the army or lack the corresponding conditions.
exegesis:
(1) Zeng Guofan once said that the reason for his hardened village was: "One camp is fortified to attack and defend, the second is cautious to pull up the camp to prevent the enemy from attacking, the third is to look at the terrain to compete for danger, and the four masters and guests are to control the odds of victory" The first three points are the important reasons for the camping; the "Book of Han, Li Guanglie's Biography" records that Cheng Buzhi said that the reason for his encampment mentioned: "General Li is extremely simple, but the prisoners are forbidden; and his soldiers are also happy and die for it." Although our army is troubled, it will not offend me."
(2) The Book of Han records: "The troops were also drawn to the rapid evil Wuyanran Mountain. Shan Yu knew that the Han army was tired, and he covered the second division with 50,000 horses, killing and injuring many people. In the front of the Han army, several feet deep, it struck sharply from behind, and the army was greatly defeated, and the second division fell. The last sentence is just 25 words, and the amount of information contained is not small.
(3) Appian, History of Rome, vol. 11, verse 36
(4) Tassi Tuo's Chronicles, Vol. 1, chapters 65-68
(5) The "Biography of Gongsun Zhan of the Book of Han" records: "Naisheng repairs the fortifications, and the building looks at dozens of times"; the "Biography of the Book of Han and Zhao Chongguo": "The parts are guaranteed, and the wooden trees are fenced, and the school network is endless" The fence is the ditch. "Hanshu Shufu Biography" "I know the twists and turns of Wubi, please return"
(6) "The Biography of Wei Qing in the Book of Han": "So the Wugang Chariot was made into a camp by itself"; the Biography of Li Ling in the Book of Han: "The army lived between two mountains, and took the big car as the camp"
(7) The "Biography of Hanshu Yingbu" records that he "dug ditches and barriers, and divided the pawns to guard the levy and take advantage of the plugs"; the "Hanshu Zhou Yafu Biography" records that "Yafu is rumored to open the wall" wall is the earthen wall; the "Hanshu Li Guanglie Biography" mentions that Cheng Buzhi: "The department of the song xingwu camp Chen, fighting the diaodou"; the "Hanshu Zhao Chongguo biography": "The line must be prepared for war, and the camp wall must be strengthened"; the "Hanshu Gongsun Zhan biography" records: "Naisheng repairs the camp, the building looks tens, the Linyi River, and the Liaohai Sea" explicitly mentions the camp linhe, the construction of barriers and towers.
(8) "The Biography of Li Guanglie of the Book of Han": "The Guangxing has no part to do chen, it is good for the water and grass to be in the house, everyone is self-reliant, and it is not to fight and defend itself"; "The Biography of Geng Bing" of the Book of Han: "Rest and do not tie the camp"